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The core teachings and practices of Buddhism are systematically directed toward
developing keen and caring insight into the relational or interdependent nature of
all things. This book applies Buddhist thought to reflect on the challenges to
public good created by emerging social, economic, and political realities
associated with increasingly complex global interdependence. In eight chapters,
key arenas for public policy are addressed: the environment, health, media, trade
and development, the interplay of politics and religion, international relations,
terror and security, and education. Each chapter explains how a specific issue area
has come to be shaped by complex interdependence and offers specific insights
into directing the dynamic of this interdependence toward greater equity,
sustainability, and freedom. Thereby, a sustained meditation on the meaning and
means of realizing public good is put forward, emphasizing the critical role of a
Buddhist conception of diversity that is relevant across the full spectrum of policy
domains and that becomes increasingly forceful as concerns shift from the local
to the global.
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Books have histories. But like the histories of all things—at least from a Buddhist
perspective—there is no question of telling the whole story of a book or tracing
it back to an ultimate point of origin. Acknowledgments can never be anything
but partial.
Here I want to make special mention of four people who have contributed to
the writing of this book. First and foremost is my Buddhist teacher, Ji Kwang Dae
Poep Sa Nim. I have been fortunate enough to witness Dae Poep Sa Nim’s peerless
demonstration of the meaning of compassion and wisdom for nearly twenty years.
This book could not have been conceived, much less written, in the absence of
this opportunity.
If it is true that books are completed only as they are read, three friends and
colleagues must be thanked for their contributions to completing this book:
Russell Alfonso, Sonja Amadae, and Graham Parkes. Their critically appreciative
engagement with various chapter drafts over the past years has been crucial in
bringing the writing of this book to a fruitful close.
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INTRODUCTION
The public sphere can no longer be understood or responded to skillfully as a
domain in which essentially independent actors engage one another in pursuit of
their individual and common interests. Neither can the public sphere be under-
stood as a uniform or neutral space of engagement from which we can effectively
retreat as needed or desired. If such a public sphere ever actually existed, global
historical processes have dissolved its boundaries and, it would seem, irreversibly
altered its complexion.
The public sphere is now a realm of complexly dynamic interdependence. It is
an uneven space—a space curved in ways that at once shape and are shaped by
global currents of every imaginable type of material good, service, information,
and knowledge, but also increasingly powerful flows of attention and markedly
differing senses of “the good.” In ways celebrated by some and lamented by
others, it is a space from which we cannot truly retreat and in which we are made
aware that, beyond a certain threshold, our interdependence is also interpenetration.
The dynamics of the public sphere have come to compel realizing that relationships
are more basic than things related and that, at bottom, we are what we mean for
one another.
This book emerged out of twin concerns. The first is that globally deepening
interdependence has been meaning greater inequity and manifestly less-sustainable
practices across a wide range of sectors—from the social and economic to the
political and cultural—both within and among societies. The second is that our
predominant means for critically engaging global interdependence seem not to be
up to the task, and are actually at considerable odds with the emerging twenty-first
century realities of truly complex relationality and accelerating change. In spite
of many manifestly good intentions, our global interdependence has, for a great
many people, been going ever more troublingly awry.
In addressing these concerns, my approach has been to clarify the values,
intentions, and practices animating prevailing ways of thinking about and
responding to these emergent realities, and to reflect on what it would mean to
engender a value coordinating redirection of the interdependencies constitutive of
both the public sphere and of our lived experiences within it. Two convictions
underlie this approach. The first is that complex global interdependence is
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radically pluralizing the public sphere, dramatically amplifying the importance of
difference, especially differences of position or perspective. The second is that,
correlated with this accentuation of difference, an epochal shift is taking place
from an era in which troubling situational dynamics could, for strategic purposes,
be adequately framed in terms of problem–solution to one in which they must be
interpreted and responded to in terms of predicament–resolution. We are entering
an era in which diversity assumes critical centrality and in which generating new
means or “best practices” for arriving at abiding ends is giving way to open-ended
improvisations of shared meaning and resolutely coordinative values and practices.
In approaching the public sphere with these concerns and convictions, I have
drawn heavily on Buddhist conceptual resources. Buddhism is perhaps unique
among world philosophical and religious traditions in having been devoted for
more than 2,500 years to investigating the dynamics of interdependence and how
systematically and sustainably to orient those dynamics toward the resolution of
trouble or suffering. It is also distinctive in having developed and refined con-
ceptual constellations that anticipate—and, I would argue, are capable of system-
atically coordinating—much of what now characterizes cutting edge discourses in
the natural and human sciences, especially their emphases on indeterminacy, the
ontological primacy of relationships, and the inexpungable co-implication of
facts and values. As such, Buddhism can be seen as a tradition of considerable—
perhaps even increasing—contemporary relevance. That, certainly, is my own
view, the merits of which I hope will become evident over the course of the
chapters that follow.
But at the same time, it must be admitted that traditional Buddhist teachings do
not engage precisely the kinds of issues and global dynamics that dominate con-
temporary discussions of the public sphere and threaten public good. There are,
for example, no traditional Buddhist discourses on environmental protection,
institutionalized health care, technological change, media ethics, global econom-
ics, human rights, or the privatization and commodification of education. It is not
just that there are no traditional Buddhist equivalents for these terms. The scales
and patterns of interdependence which now play out in and through the public
sphere did not exist during 99% of Buddhist history, and are only now being
critically regarded by Buddhists in both Asia and the West.
This is necessarily, then, a book of improvisations, in a Buddhist key, on issues
of immediate and substantial significance. It is a sustained effort to think through
a wide range of Buddhist concepts, teachings, and practices with the intent of
enhancing clarity-about and commitment-to orienting our deepening interde-
pendence more equitably and sustainably. While an accurate portrayal of the
present complexion of various domains of the public sphere is necessary to ground
this analytic effort, by no means is there any attempt herein to exhaustively
document their dynamics. Neither is there any attempt to document the historical
place of Buddhism in those domains as a religious or cultural tradition. Specialist
studies of these sorts are widely available, and are important. This, however, is
a work of interpretation and advocacy—one that is more intent on opening
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opportunities for better appreciating (both valuing and adding value to) our
shared situation, than it is on achieving any sort of critical closure.
Engaging Buddhism as countering modernity 
and its discontents
For the purpose of more positively characterizing the work to be undertaken over
the succeeding eight chapters and the kind of openings or opportunities that they
aim at improvising, I would like to spend a few moments considering at a quite
general level the nature of Buddhist practice and relating it to what I have claimed
is the increasing contemporary relevance of Buddhism. More so than a detailed
preview of each of the individual chapters that follow, I think this will afford a
synoptic view of the (perhaps oddly punctuated and recursive) course we will be
taking and why it will not culminate in the delivery of any sort of overarching
Buddhist narrative or “master plan” for reconfiguring contemporary public life.
It is a common view that Buddhist practice consists of retreating from the
world and our customary experiences of it as dual functions of persistently errant
thoughts, speech, and actions; cultivating non-attachment; and achieving inner
peace and serenity. There is much in the history and current practice of
Buddhism, especially in the Theravada traditions, which confirms this view and
which accords well with widespread suppositions about the solitariness of spiri-
tual endeavor and the transcendent nature of its rewards. But Buddhist practice,
especially within the Mahayana and Vajrayana traditions, with equivalent histori-
cal and current precedent can also be seen as endeavoring to opportunely engage
our present situation, as it has come to be, relating with wisdom and compassion;
skillfully bringing about liberation from the trouble and suffering for all sentient
beings; and realizing, eventually, horizonless and exquisitely beautiful buddha-
realms in which all things do the work of enlightenment. According to such a view,
liberation need not imply a transcendence of the world, but rather an immanent
transformation of it.1
These two versions of Buddhist practice can be maintained as distinct for
heuristic purposes, as a way of bringing into focus different currents within the
history of Buddhism as a whole. But like in-breath and out-breath, they ultimately
must be seen as resting upon, beginning, and completing one another. Playing
with the metaphor, too much emphasis on one and too little on the other is liable
to bring on spiritual equivalents of either hyperventilation or hyposthenia—either
peculiarly inflated states of consciousness and experience or a draining away of
interactive strength and resolve. Buddhist practice is, as a whole, critical of
dichotomizing the “inner” and the “outer,” the “private” and the “public,” and,
indeed, the “spiritual” and the “mundane.” It is an explicitly transformative
endeavor that is, at the same time, resolutely non-dualist.
I have found it useful to understand Buddhism’s description of itself as a “middle
way” to signify movement “perpendicular” to any spectrum of dichotomous
views.2 That is, taking up the Middle Way is not a matter of adopting a place
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midway along the spectrum of positions that can be interpolated between any pair
of dichotomous concepts, including those just mentioned and others like “being”
and “non-being,” “reason” and “emotion,” and the “sacred” and the “secular.” The
Buddhist Middle Way is not undertaken by identifying (and then identifying with)
a purportedly compromising or reconciliatory perspective within a given spec-
trum of views, but rather by seeing the adoption of a position anywhere along the
entire spectrum as conducive to continued (and likely intensifying) trouble and
suffering. Buddhist practice can, in this sense, be seen as a systematic challenge
to our prevailing paradigms for organizing and ordering our world and our
experiences of it.
Importantly, however, Buddhist practice also does not proceed by invoking or
valorizing particular positions transcendent to our world as presently organized
and ordered—identifying, in essence, a goal or ideal toward which we are to
work. Instead, Buddhist practice proceeds resolutely from the midst of our situa-
tion, precisely as it has come to be. It is not a process of working toward a given
(effectively, predetermined) destination, but rather working out in a distinctively
different direction. Buddhist practice—in any of its versions—begins in the
immediate here and now and works at qualitatively transforming and reorienting
the change dynamics and relational patterns playing out therein.3
Turning to Buddhism for critical resources and for insights into how best to
reorient the dynamics of the public sphere does not entail turning to Buddhist
practice as such. But because the concepts to which we will be appealing emerged
out of Buddhist practice and came to serve as key supports for it, a similar pat-
tern of engagement will become apparent, especially over the course of the book
as a whole. For example, no particular vision of the good or any particular set of
corrective societal structures and institutions will be forwarded. Considerable
attention will be given to discerning and appraising contemporary patterns of
change and global interdependence, and to clarifying what would be involved in
transforming what they mean, but not to promoting any specific replacements for
them. Engaging Buddhism will involve facing the limits of our dominant para-
digms for understanding the means and meaning of change, deepening awareness
that these paradigms consolidated historically in a space of opportunity that has
since been rendered virtually inaccessible and almost entirely forgotten—a space
in which distinctively different kinds of change and movement are possible, and
in which what we presently think of as intractable is not.
To suggest a musical analogy: the purpose or function of engaging Buddhism
in reflecting on the dynamics of the public sphere is not to propose an alternative
repertoire, but to intimate new means and meanings of virtuosity. Our effort is not
to bring about some specific turn of event(s), but rather to qualify the process of
eventuation itself, changing the very way things are changing. Part of Buddhism’s
present potential for enriching our evaluative engagement with the public sphere
lies how late-twentieth and early-twenty-first century global realities have been
destabilizing our dominant approaches to organizing, ordering, and responding to
change. Like a generation of leaders gone well beyond their prime and out of step
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with the world around them, the modern values and institutions that substantially
determined the topography and large-scale dynamics of the public sphere over
the past 500 years have become a source of liabilities and in apparent need of
retirement. Particularly over the past 40 years, deep skepticism has emerged in a
wide range of fields and from a wide array of perspectives about the foundational
project of modernity and its core values of universalism, certainty, autonomy, and
control, and its claims of global validity for such central and explicitly hierarchic
oppositions as (for instance) the universal and the particular; the exception-less
and the exceptional; the timeless and the timely; logic and rhetoric; literacy
and orality; reason and emotion; mind and body; and the determinate and the
indeterminate.4 Mention might be made, for example, of relativistic and quan-
tum physics, general systems theory, ecology, and complexity theory as anti-
foundationalist challenges to modernity in the natural sciences; in the human
sciences, similar mention might be made of hermeneutics, deconstructionism,
feminist theory, and care ethics.
These often sharp contestations of modern values and institutions collectively
have come to be regarded as expressing “postmodernism” sensibilities, but the
implied singularity of perspective is misleading. There has yet to emerge any
globally affirmed common interests, shared methods of inquiry, or a consensually
constructed ethical framework that could positively relate these paradigm-
challenging perspectives. “Postmodernity” does not refer to a singular phenomenon,
but to a pastiche of otherwise disparate phenomena linked by being forms of
discontentment with the modern, loosely affiliating elements of the pre-history
and excluded margins of modern sensibilities to mount a critique in which those
sensibilities remain central. In a sense, the modern and the postmodern constitute
a single family tree. Or to refer back to an earlier metaphor, they constitute a
polarizing spectrum of contesting values, practices, and perspectives.
Buddhism cannot be fitted neatly onto that spectrum. Its strengths as a source
of concepts suited to reorienting our global interdependence, as presently config-
ured, derive precisely from Buddhism never having shared the terms of engage-
ment that obtain along its length and ultimately define or constrain the meaning
of criticism. Buddhism is neither a Western nor a modern tradition. Neither did it
develop as a response to the West or the modern. This remains true even though
both popular and scholarly interests in Buddhism have accelerated quite phe-
nomenally over the past 50 years, and both Asian and Western convert Buddhists
have actively sought to develop a teaching vernacular adapted to the complexion
of the contemporary world.
Buddhism has, of course, been known in the West over virtually its entire
history. One of the earliest (first century CE) traditions of sculpturally depicting
the Buddha, for example, clearly incorporate classical Greek and Roman stone-
working techniques and aesthetics. And, since the sixteenth century dawning of
the modern era, when Asia and its traditions began figuring centrally in the colo-
nial and imperial imaginations of Europe, Buddhism has been known as one of
the major “world religions.” But at no point was Buddhism ever wedded to the
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West, tied intimately to its fortunes. Neither was Buddhism ever wedded to the
emergence of modernity as a global phenomenon, even in those parts of Asia
where Buddhist teachings had long been considered part of “native” tradition.
There, with very few exceptions Buddhism did not partner significantly with
modernization. Indeed, it largely came to be seen, if not as an impediment to
modernization, then as practically irrelevant. Where Buddhism remained crucial
for national identity, it did so as a heritage that needed to be conserved—a
heritage perceived as at risk.
None of this is to suggest that Buddhism remained essentially unchanged over
the last half millennium. On the contrary, Buddhist traditions changed, in some
ways quite remarkably and with considerable responsive acuity, over this period
in both Asia and in the course of its more recent transmissions into the West. But
in very important ways, the genealogies of Buddhism and those of the modern,
especially Western, world remained unalloyed. In my own view, this was both
natural and fortunate.
Among the most apparent changes within Buddhism, especially over the past
half century, have been a concerted challenging of gender biases and stereotypes;
experimentation with different models of authority and lineage transmission; the
adaptation and editing of ritual dimensions of practice; and a tendency toward
more porous boundaries between the monastic and lay communities, with the lat-
ter often undertaking meditative discipline in a degree and with a depth of com-
mitment that is in many ways remarkable. But no single change has been as
obvious and avidly documented as the increasing stress on Buddhism’s potential
for articulating and critically cultivating public good.
As with the other changes just mentioned and the many more that might be
added to this short list, the impetus toward an understanding of Buddhism as
infused with both resources and imperatives for socially engaged practice is not
entirely new. They have not represented radical breaks with Buddhist tradition,
but rather the incidence of various degrees of “sympathetic resonance” between
Buddhism and its global historical context—changes that have not been from
A to B, but from A to A. In the imaginaries of both early Buddhism and the
Mahayana, for instance, there are clear associations of progress on the path of
Buddhist practice with manifest public good. Early Buddhist texts are lush with
references to past “wheel-turning monarchies”—aesthetically rich and harmo-
niously flourishing polities free from all conflict and poverty—while texts
associated with the later Mahayana Buddhist traditions give cosmic scope to
the relational qualities associated with exemplary public good, describing
“Buddha-realms” in which all things do the great work of enlightenment. Most
powerfully perhaps, the Buddha is said to have described those faring well on the
Middle Way as actively suffusing their entire environment with compassion,
loving-kindness, equanimity, and joy in the good fortune of others—relational
headings that, as in the Asokan empire in third century BCE India or in seventh to




In sum, Buddhism has throughout its history been “socially engaged” and
intimately attuned to what we now refer to as issues of public good. Yet, its mode
of engagement and its senses of the public and of the good differ quite markedly
from those characterizing modernity and its discontents. For our present purposes,
this distinctive difference can be illustrated best by considering the meaning of
interdependence itself.
Interdependence, karma, and inducing 
the unprecedented
Of the key concepts informing Buddhist practice, interdependent origination
(Pali: paticca-samuppada) has perhaps fared most favorably in being “translated”
into Western (and now increasingly global) contexts. It is a concept that has sig-
nificant parallels with descriptions of ecological processes that over the past
50 years have come to enjoy considerable scientific authority. As extended espe-
cially through systems and complexity theory, these ecological insights regarding
interdependence have come to inform a growing array of contemporary perspec-
tives on issues ranging from the dynamics of political and economic globalization
to the means and meaning of psychotherapy. Today, the concept of interdependence
informs the work of virtually all knowledge communities—from the sciences to
the humanities—and has become a key feature of the global critical commons.
Traditionally, however, Buddhist teachings regarding interdependence have
never been presented independently, but only as one—admittedly pivotal—
element within an extended constellation of teachings and concepts. For some of
these concepts and teachings, there are no close Western analogues. The classic
constellation would include: the absence of fixed and essential identities (the
teaching that all things are to be seen as having no-self); the dynamic or chang-
ing nature of all things (the teaching that all things are to be seen as imperma-
nent); the troubled nature of all relational patterns (the teaching that all things are
to be seen as characterized by dukkha or trouble or suffering); the ontological
ambiguity and mutual relevance of all things (the teaching of emptiness); and
karma. In Buddhist contexts, it is understood that all things should be seen as aris-
ing interdependently, but also without any fixed nature, in an ongoing fashion,
with troubling liabilities in any particular situation, and in consonance with
always revisable patterns among the intentions and values of all beings arising
therein. Indeed, this understanding could be seen as an operational definition of
the root meaning of wisdom (prajña) as one of the three interlocking dimensions
of Buddhist practice along with attentive virtuosity (samadhi) and moral clarity
(fila).
Within this constellation of core concepts and teachings that inform Buddhist
practice, perhaps none has proved as difficult to transmit effectively into Western
cultural contexts as that of karma. Yet, in terms of specifically Buddhist critical
resources for framing and evaluating socially engaged strategies for responding
to trouble or suffering in an increasingly complex (and not merely complicated)
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world, karma is clearly paramount. At a minimum, Buddhist teachings on karma
compel seeing interdependence as irreducibly meaningful. A karmic cosmos is
one in which values are finally more basic than facts, and in which reality always
implies responsibility. It is thus telling that although all Buddhist teachers and
practically all Buddhist texts (ancient or contemporary) make some mention of
karma, it has remained in relatively low (if not lowly) profile in Western settings.
This can be attributed in large part to the dynamics of accommodation between
Buddhism and contemporary Western societies. There are apparent and signifi-
cant conflicts between the concept of karma and certain concept constellations
and values broadly characteristic of Western societies. For present purposes, the
most important of these conflicts can be seen as centering on the concept of
autonomous selfhood; a linear understanding of causation; and such values as
objectivity, universality, predictability, precision, and control that inform the prac-
tice of science and that are more generally and popularly embodied in technolog-
ical activity and in the modern critical canons by means of which strategies and
actions are evaluated.
It is part of a karmic understanding of things that any intentionally undertaken
activity will lead to experienced consequences, at some point, at some time. From
the perspective of a scientifically realist understanding of the world, however, one
can plausibly avoid experienced consequences for intentional actions—for exam-
ple, the commission of a theft—by simply putting enough objective distance
between the time and place of those actions and one’s present location. Whereas
all events occurring in a karmically configured life are in some degree meaning-
ful, and distance signifies an alteration of relational quality, the life of a funda-
mentally autonomous individual will necessarily include chance occurrences,
accidents, and the like because such individuals are connected to their circum-
stances through ostensibly only external relations and because distance signifies
for them a quantitative measure of separation. In sharp contrast with Buddhist
teachings on karma, for those who are committed to the ontological priority of
individual existents over relationships among them, reality does not (indeed,
cannot) imply responsibility. Hence the sobering claim made in 1928 by US
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and echoed continuously to the present
day, that the most basic, comprehensive and valued human right is the right to
leave and be left alone.5
Karmically attuned Buddhists (particularly those in Asia) speak constantly and
comfortably about merit-making and about the meaningful or non-random nature
of all events. They assume that our life stories are significantly related and that,
seen clearly, our present encounters with one another yield evidence of intersect-
ing genealogies of values and intentions that are uniquely and importantly our
own. Indeed, it is accepted that there is no full understanding of our relationships
and ourselves, either as we have come to be or as we are at present becoming,
without appeal to karma.
Most Western Buddhists and those others most strongly influenced by modern
sensibilities are, by and large, much less comfortable with this.6 They might
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accept the rhetorical or moral force of the teaching of karma and its associated
narratives about different birth realms and life-to-life continuities, but they
typically cannot see or feel the connection between offering flowers during a new
or full moon ceremony and receiving a promotion at work. While they may be
fascinated by coincidences and the felt significance of apparently chance encoun-
ters, they shy away from accepting that their present life circumstances are
meticulously consonant with previously generated and maintained patterns
among their own values and intentions, and that reshaping those circumstances is
most surely and sustainably undertaken by revising those patterns rather than
trying directly to effect factual change. As a result, most Western or modernized
Buddhists have tended to give karma a wide berth. For many, the concept of
karma has traction (if at all) only as a kind of explanatory “black box” out of which
generically valid responses might be drawn for otherwise unanswerable and
utterly specific questions about why things happen as they do.
While this characterization may verge on caricature, I believe that it remains
the case that most Western Buddhists (and many contemporary Buddhists outside
the West) do not take karma with the seriousness it deserves. This book is an
attempt, among other things, to remedy this situation by insisting that we live in a
karmic world in which our interdependence is irreducibly meaningful and in
which responding effectively to experienced troubles or difficulties—whether
in realm of the private or the public—ultimately entails recognizing their roots in
competing or conflicting values, intentions and practices. Succinctly stated:
seeing our world as karmic is seeing that all experienced eventualities arise as
outcomes/opportunities that are meticulously consonant with patterns of our own
values–intentions–actions. There can be no successful and sustained transfor-
mation in how we relate socially, economically, politically or culturally without
a critically informed change in the order and complexion of our personal and
communal values–intentions–actions. Moreover, in contrast with the world of
objective, scientifically verifiable facts and events, wherein it might be intelligibly
claimed that certain situations cannot be changed, in a karmically ordered world
importantly and fundamentally shaped by values and intentions, no situation—
regardless of appearances to the contrary—is finally intractable. A world and a
life shaped by karma are continuously open to meaningful revision. Indeed, in
such a world, it is the differences in our karma that enable us each to make a
difference.
It is an important part of Buddhist teachings on karma that we cannot fully
determine the outcomes of our actions or of successfully induced patterns of
change. The meaningful interdependence and interpenetration obtaining among
all things itself insures that total control cannot be guaranteed. The outcomes and
opportunities arising in our situation are, in some degree, always co-created in
ways that are themselves irreducibly open to negotiation. A karmic world is (in
Buddhist terms) a world saturated with values and intentions that is always a
work-in-progress and playing out “live”—a world in which contribution and the
unprecedented are always possible.
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The essays that follow are offered in the hope of making an unprecedented
difference: a revision of the patterns of outcomes and opportunities that presently
characterize our global interdependence. They will not offer the Buddhist answer
to how we should approach reorienting our interdependence—a Buddhist blue-
print for better conserving and equitably enhancing public good. At best, they
afford a sense of one Buddhist’s responses to thinking through a representative
range of issues bearing on the work involved in making such a difference. These
responses are necessarily limited. But since it is these limitations that define pre-
cisely how I am different, they are also and inevitably part of the very conditions
that make it possible for me to contribute anything at all.
The ninth century Chan Buddhist master, Linji described this difference-enabled
contributory effort as the work of “true persons of no fixed position” who are
capable of “facing the world and going crosswise.” I find this image arresting and
useful. The work of those who would engage a troubling situation with the intent
of inducing changes that will sustainably dissolve the conditions of trouble or suf-
fering cannot be undertaken on the basis of any prescriptions or set perspectives.
To invoke another musical analogy, those who would undertake this work must be
like master improvising musicians who manage to play just those counter-
rhythms and counter-melodies needed to bring about a total harmonic shift
among all the musicians involved in a given session. Such virtuosos do not
impose a new structure on the situation, directly determining the course of the
music, effectively prescribing what others can or cannot do. Rather, they elicit
new ways of hearing what is already being played, thus opening previously
unsuspected opportunities for novel and yet resolutely shared contributions by all.
In the words of Mazu—one of the most revered and celebrated of Linji’s prede-
cessors in the Chan lineage—by conducting oneself in this way, is it possible to
“benefit what cannot be benefited and do what cannot be done.”
This, it seems to me, is precisely the task of socially engaged Buddhists or
anyone similarly intent upon revising how we relate—with one another and with
our circumstances more broadly—in order to meaningfully alleviate and eventually
eliminate trouble and suffering. Addressing contemporary issues by “facing the
world” means fully appreciating the present situation, as it has come to be—a
unique complex of outcomes and opportunities occasioned by sustained patterns of
values–intentions–actions. It means keen attunement to the dramatic forces shaping
both present and historical situational dynamics. “Going crosswise” means break-
ing sufficiently with the patterns of value–intention–action that have occasioned
present realities to improvise relational changes that will resolve the suffering and
trouble entailed by these realities. It is going skillfully and deeply enough against
the dramatic grain of troubled and troubling situations to effectively consolidate
shared commitments for actively revising what they will come to mean.
Fully appreciating our situation entails understanding it sympathetically, as a
whole, and yet with a high degree of resolution or detail. At the same time, appre-
ciation is a process of adding value—a process of enrichment by means of which
we find ourselves more and more valuably situated. Appreciation, in both its
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senses, is indispensable if we are to contribute sustainably to our situation in
ways that truly make a difference. Truly “facing the world” implies full awareness
of the currents of meaning that inform our present situation. From a Buddhist
perspective, this can only be accomplished through the expression of com-
passion. Skillfully “going crosswise” requires the evaluative resources and creative
capacity for expressing an effective counterpoint to such currents of meaning,
contributing to their fruitful redirection. This, finally, requires considerable
wisdom. “Facing the world, going crosswise” means demonstrating appreciative
and contributory virtuosity in the opening of new and ever more liberating paths
of shared meaning-making.
Mazu’s claim that our work is ultimately that of benefiting those who cannot be
benefited and doing what cannot be done, calls attention to a crucial realization:
the work before us cannot effectively be understood or undertaken as an objective
solution to an equally objective problem. Accomplishing the “impossible” is only
possible if we realize that we are implicated in what we hope to change and our
relationships: we are what we mean for one another. The work before us is one of
participating in the consolidation of profound resolution with respect to a shared
predicament, where resolution implies both clarity and commitment. As such, it
does not perform the “altruistic” function of helping others, but the more
sustainable function of allowing all of us to help each other by revising our
personal and communal karma. Just as the best hedge against poverty is insuring
that everyone has something valuable to contribute to the lives of others, benefiting
those who cannot be benefited is only possible if those who cannot be benefited
are inspired and empowered to benefit others by attentively and compassionately
facing the world and going resolutely crosswise.
An apologetic coda
It is one of the realities of the present infancy of Buddhist advocacy in the West
that there has yet to develop generally agreeable vocabulary for carrying out the
work of a consistently framed and critical Buddhist counterculture. Over the past
decades, some consensus has been formed with respect to translating such key
teaching terms as funyata and paticca-samuppada, respectively, as emptiness and
interdependence. But these terms are themselves empty in essence. They are
glossed differently and generate contrasting (and not invariably complementary)
constellations of meaning depending on who appeals to them, in what context,
and why. Moreover, there is no tight and necessary relationship between such
terms and the concepts occasioned by them in the course of sustained teaching
and practice. Like all other things, concepts arise relationally. They are embedded,
without remainder, in histories that are both personally and culturally specific.
Far from being ultimate and abiding mental or cognitive entities, concepts consist
of focused distillations of sustained patterns of relationship.
When these patterns are just developing—as is presently the case where the
practices distinctively associated with Buddhism in the West (and eventually,
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perhaps, with fully Western Buddhisms) are only just taking coherent and
sustainable shape—unavoidable variations arise in both vocabulary and rhetorical
usage. For this reason, it is seemingly safest to simply transliterate relevant
Buddhist terms rather than attempting their translation into English or other
Western languages and conceptual complexes.7
In addition, however, it is a signal task of the initial phases of Buddhist
advocacy to develop conceptual bridges between Buddhist source cultures and
prevailing indigenous traditions. This process requires sensitively going beyond
simple transliteration to find ways of undertaking Buddhist critical reflection in
new discourse settings. In the essays compiled here, I work with a vocabulary that
resonates with my own practice tradition and that stretches English in ways that
hopefully occasion useful insight. In some cases, this involves reading English
words like diversity in specific and restricted ways that draws out their resonance
with Buddhist concepts and practices. In other cases, it involves rehabilitating
no longer current meanings for common terms, drawing on their conceptual
genealogies in ways that are, admittedly, idiosyncratic. I apologize in advance for
any difficulties that these uncommon usages of English cause the reader.
In offering a coordinative approach to evaluating the current dynamics of the
public sphere and suggesting opportunities for reorienting global interdepen-
dence, I have drawn on a wide (and perhaps eclectic) array of Buddhist teachings.
This reflects my own sense of their internal relatedness and of how best to engage
contemporary realities. By no means should the Buddhist approach offered here
to critically engaging contemporary realities be understood as authoritative in any
traditional sense. They are offered simply by one of limited wisdom striving
vigilantly, with all possible attentive mastery and moral clarity, to speak not just





The environment is the most encompassing of the domains associated with public
good, as well as the domain in which critical engagement with processes of
interdependence has most explicitly been worked into the making of public
policy. Perhaps more importantly, it is also the domain in which the broader
public first became aware of the complex interrelatedness characterizing the pub-
lic sphere as a whole and of how even relatively localized patters of ill-directed
or qualitatively degrading interdependence can have globally adverse effects.
Although awareness of the profound affect of environmental conditions and
change on quality of life is as old as human history, a major turning point
occurred with the publication in 1962 of Rachel Carson’s, Silent Spring.1 Carson
brought forcefully to light the linkages between human industrial and economic
activity, environmental change, human health and security, and the politics of
development, revealing the environment as a public good at risk and in rapidly
compounding need of protection. In the half century since her landmark book,
environmental concerns—especially the dire prospects of global climate change
and instability—have become central to the making of global public policy and
have become among the most important and enduring drivers for social activism.
From very early in the environmental movement, activists and theorists have
noted apparent resonances between concepts crucial to Buddhist practice and
ecological appeals to whole systems and complex webs of interrelationship.
Some have more broadly looked into Buddhist metaphysics and ethics for useful
and historically deep resources for undertaking environmental advocacy.
Likewise, many contemporary Buddhists—particularly in the West, but also in
Asia—have, as well, come to see environmental advocacy (if not outright
activism) as an important implication of foundational Buddhist teachings and
practices.2
Indeed, it is not hard to derive from the recorded teachings of early Buddhism
a basic and yet powerful formulation of what might be called liberation ecology.
The pivotal moment in the Buddha’s awakening was attaining insight into the
interdependent origination and relational nature of all things. This attainment and
awakening are then given explicit ethical expression in the Buddha’s compas-
sionate commitment to lifelong activity in service of liberating all sentient
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beings from suffering. Like the very concrete political implications of Christian
liberation theology, liberation ecology framed in Buddhist terms would seem to
imply not only metaphysical insight and concern but also relentlessly attentive
activism.
Because sentient beings arise through and as patterns of relationship, suffering
can be understood as relational disruption or distortion—that is, as an ill-directed
or errant disposition of relational patterns. And, as suggested by the frequent iden-
tification of ignorance as a key factor in the occurrence of suffering, ill-disposed
patterns of relationality can invariably be traced to failing to attend fully and care-
fully to the patterns of interdependence obtaining among all beings. Indeed, the
single most virulent cause of suffering consists of conduct undertaken on the
basis of presumed independence from other beings—the presumption of an
essential identity or self that is not only free from constitutive intimacy with all
other beings but is also in some degree capable of exercising freedom over and
against them. As succinctly stated by the Buddha, “is” and “is-not” are the “twin
barbs on which all humankind is impaled.” Suffering results from a denial of our
irreducibly ecological origins and flourishing, most notably when all concern cen-
ters on what “I” want, what should be “mine,” and what is good for “me.”
Suffering is resolved by eliminating “I-my-me” and restoring seamless continuity
among all beings, directed toward the mutual benefit and welfare of all.
It is important to note, however, that while a Buddhist liberation ecology can
be constructed along the lines just sketched, the Buddhist canon does not contain
any explicitly environmentalist teachings. This should not be any more surprising
than that the canon does not address such crucial contemporary concerns as
human rights, the proper roles of science and technology, or the equity and sus-
tainability of global economic institutions. Such concerns could have had no real
or even imagined place in the world of the fifth century BCE. Yet, one might go
further still to hold that the dissolution of the supposedly independent “self ” is
also the dissolution of the “environment” that surrounded it. The demise of the
ego as privileged subject is also the demise of the environment as alternately
resistant and compliant object. From this, it could be surmised that a central aim
of early Buddhist teachings and practice was arguably to overcome the very basis
of making a self/environment distinction in the first place.
As generally accurate as this characterization of the environmental import of
Buddhist teachings and practices might be, it is ultimately an unskillful one.
Whether in the earliest strata of Buddhist traditions or in the context of later
Mahayana, Theravada, and Vajrayana traditions, critical attention has always been
given to carefully attending to and appropriately responding to situations in such
a way as to clear them of karma conducive to further suffering or trouble.
Currently prevailing conceptions of the environment and the forces assailing it
are endemic to our particular place in human history. They are signal expressions
of how troublingly things have come to be, precisely as they have come to be
(yathabhutam). That is, these conceptions reflect a karma—a pattern of
values–intentions–actions—that is in many ways uniquely symptomatic of our
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own times. Addressing this pattern and skillfully orienting it away from trouble
and suffering are necessarily a part of contemporary Buddhist practice.
This deceptively simple point is of considerable importance in responsibly
framing Buddhist responses to the apparent need for environmental advocacy and
activism. Although the Buddha did not deliver any discourses on environmental
concerns as such and did not undertake explicitly addressing the issues, for
example, of conservation and sustainability that drive much of contemporary
environmental discourse, contemporary Buddhists are in a position of having to
address precisely such concerns and issues. That is, they must address the karma
of contemporary societies and the particular predicaments associated with it. And
because these predicaments are not only unique—a function of hitherto unreal-
ized scales of human activity and impact—but also matters of apparently
unprecedented urgency, there is no alternative to improvising appropriate
responses to them. At the same time, as Buddhist responses, they must not only
be practically effective, but they must also accord with prospects for universal
awakening. They must solve factual problems associated with environmental
degradation; but they must also resolve conflicts about the meaning of our pres-
ent situation and contribute to directing it, in whole and in part, toward liberation.
As a contribution to improvising appropriate responses to our environmental
predicaments, let us look briefly at the scope of the challenge as suggested by
different strands of Buddhist tradition and then follow through on their shared
implications regarding the roles of creativity and beauty as pivotal values in
altering our environmental karma.3
Three strands of Buddhist tradition on 
matters “environmental”
In the early Buddhist tradition, especially in the discourses and the body of literature
known as the Abhidharma, there is an emphasis on analyzing customary experi-
ence to reveal underlying—as well as overarching—patterns of interdependence.
Well-suited to oral recitation, many of the teachings are accordingly structured
around numerical lists of elements, factors, domains, or stages. Arguably strate-
gic in nature, they are not the attempts (in the parlance of contemporary philoso-
phy of science) to “cut the world at its joints” but rather to sketch out systematic
procedures for breaking down both individual and cultural assumptions about the
reality of existence or independent self-identity. Still, there is much to be learned
from these analytic formulations about early Buddhist concerns and consensus
regarding our nature as embodied and environmentally situated beings.
One such formulation—the schema of the 18 dhatu—is of particular relevance
in framing a Buddhist conception of the environment. This schema appears in
discussions of the complex nature of consciousness and its interdependent  orig-
ination through contact among sense organs and appropriate sensed objects. The
18 dhatu consist of the 6 consciousnesses recognized in early Buddhism, the
6 recognized sense organs, and their related sensory fields. Visual consciousness
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arises with the contact or meeting of eye and sight-objects, auditory conscious-
ness arises with the contact or meeting of ear and sound-objects, and so on
through olfactory, tactile, gustatory, and mental consciousnesses and their associ-
ated sense organs and sensed objects. The crucial point made by this schematic
formulation is that consciousness arises as a higher-order system relating sentient
organisms and their supporting, sensible environments. That is, consciousness
does not occur inside the organism and cannot be reduced to an epiphenomenon
or function of the organism. Rather, consciousness arises between and qualita-
tively integrates organisms and their environments. Consciousness occurs as a
higher-order, qualitatively inflected system constituted by complex, sustained,
and situationally focused relationships.
It is among the key teachings of early Buddhism, however, that all things arise
interdependently. It cannot be, then, that consciousness is conditioned by sense
organs and sensed objects without in some degree also conditioning them. And
while the Buddhist teaching of interdependence does not insist that this mutual
conditioning is always and invariably symmetrical, it does rule out drawing sharp
ontological boundaries among the relational foci or dhatu that are comprised in
the total environmental situation. This means that the more or less extensive and
refined system of sensed (or at least sensible) objects that we normally refer to as
“the environment” is not something that we live within but rather that which we
have incorporated as conscious or sentient beings.4 It also means that degraded
environments are necessarily correlated with degraded patterns of consciousness.
The ramifications of this, as we will see, later become central to Mahayana
narratives about buddha-realms and will also drive an advocacy for the centrality
of beauty as an environmental value.
The metaphysical schematic rehearsed in teachings about the 18 dhatu—and
the associated schematic of the 5 aggregates (skandhas)—makes it clear that early
Buddhism insistently denied the binary logic of the excluded middle and pressed
for increasingly refined appreciation of continuous shadings of relational depth,
extent, and intensity. But it must be kept in mind that relational depth, extent, and
intensity were themselves understood as dynamic and that the teaching of inter-
dependence is rooted in a denial of the ultimate reality of anything like static
identities or fixed states of affairs. Interdependence is, in short, a process. And, in
particular, it is a process that is both causal and nonlinear.
This apparently technical or philosophical observation can be given broader
relevance by recalling that insight into interdependence was the crucial turning
point in the awakening of Siddhartha Gautama as a buddha or enlightened being.
The metaphysical schematics of the 18 dhatu and the 5 skandhas, likewise, were
developed in the context of bringing others to similarly pivotal insight and awak-
ening—that is, to support effective Buddhist practice and the resolute disclosure
of the origins and end of suffering. And while the teachings and practices are framed
in appropriately general (and, at times, even generic) terms, their ultimate context
was invariably the lived experience of individual practitioners and the communi-
ties of which they were members. In short, the overarching context for these
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schematics, and the practices they were intended to support, is the drama of
resolving utterly specific patterns of trouble or suffering. More simply, their ultimate
context is the operation of karma. Finally, metaphysics and ethics are mutually
enfolding: there is no possibility of separating issues of reality and issues of
responsibility.
Human and non-human karma: implications 
of the Jataka tales
The karma, or patterns of values–intentions–actions, that join humans and
non-humans—the kind of karma most relevant to environmental advocacy and
activism—is discussed in three broad contexts in the early Buddhist canon. First,
there are teachings in which the Buddha comments disapprovingly on animal sac-
rifice, making clear that such practices are not effective in reducing suffering—
even human suffering—and are in fact causes of suffering both for those
performing and those subjected to them. Second, there are teachings about the
cycle of birth-and-death (samsara) that discuss the relationships among the five
destinies (i.e. as hungry ghost, animal, titan, human, or god) and the possibilities
each afford for liberation. Finally, there are the Jataka tales, or prior birth stories,
of Buddha Shakyamuni.
In the first two contexts, it is made clear that humans and non-humans are part
of a complex moral economy in which all sentient beings participate. No hard
ontological boundaries obtain among the five different categories of beings and
considerable (two-way) traffic takes place among them. Indeed, as underscored
by the teachings of no-self, impermanence, and karma, the nature of all sentient
beings, in all categories of destiny, should be seen as ultimately dispositional.
What matters most, in other words, is not what they seem to be, but the direction
in which they are heading, the meaning of their relationships.
Throughout the Buddhist cosmos, in any of its distinct domains of sentience,
all beings are constantly and meticulously presented with both the outcome of
past karma—past values–intentions–actions—and opportunity for either further
endorsing or changing their dramatic orientation. Fundamentally, this is the
opportunity to head either in the direction of samsara or nirvana. Whether we are
living as and among hungry ghosts, animals, titans, humans, or gods, each moment
offers both hellish and enlightening possibilities.
Such a directional or dispositional understanding of this basic contrast is
implicit in Nagarjuna’s5 claim that not a single hair can be placed between
samsara and nirvana, in the Huayen conception of an irreducibly relational under-
standing of all things and in the broadly Chinese Buddhist concept of buddha-
nature. This last concept is particularly relevant for framing a consistent, Buddhist
environmental ethic or liberation ecology. But before turning more directly to the
concept of buddha-nature and how it radically reframes the meaning of Buddhist
liberation, it is useful first to get a fuller sense of the erasure of dramatic bound-
aries between the human and the animal in the early Buddhist imaginaire and the
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karmic nature of transits between them. For this, let us turn to the third of the
canonical contexts mentioned here: the Jataka tales.
Dramatic ensembles in situational transformation
The Jatakas tales (547 in all) have received little critical attention from Western
scholars who have overwhelmingly favored more straightforward “doctrinal”
texts. But the Jatakas are particularly well-suited for shedding light on the place
of karma in early Buddhist worldviews. In them are found—in often fully fleshed
detail—not only significant bridgings of the normally excluded middle ground
between animality and humanity but also powerful evidence of the early central-
ity of dramatic community in the realization (over many lifetimes) of Buddhist
enlightenment. Taken as a whole, the Jatakas reveal the inner dynamics of dra-
matic ensembles or groups of “karmic cohorts” traveling together through time in
the shared realization of truly liberating conduct and relationships.6 Most often,
the main protagonist is the future Buddha, with other of his close associates in
major supporting roles. Significantly—for example, in the Mahakapi Jataka
(no. 407)—the characters demonstrating the most advancement in understanding
and acting in fullest accord with the Dharma are not necessarily the most highly
ranked in either the customary social hierarchy of fifth century BCE India or the
schema of the five destinies.
The Mahakapi Jataka centers on the bodhisattva actions of a monkey-king who
clearly demonstrates that one’s “destiny” as human or animal is ultimately less
relevant than the quality and direction of one’s relationships. Liberating other
beings from suffering is always possible, regardless of one’s position in the cos-
mos. In a reversal of expected relational hierarchies, this Jataka shows an exem-
plary animal—the monkey-king—teaching and, indeed, fully humanizing the
central human character, the King of Benesari.
Stories like this and others in the Jataka collection can be interpreted as simple
allegories for illuminating the lives and circumstances of those engaged with the
Buddha in the teaching process. But that would be to miss the crucial point
of their inclusion among the birth stories of the Buddha himself. Against this
narrative background, such stories also drive home the second-order points that
the path of enlightenment is not traveled alone and that one can be on the path of
Buddhist liberation regardless of one’s karmic endowments and bodily destiny. It
is not just in the future Buddha’s human or deva (godly) births that profound
bodhicitta or a “mind set on enlightenment” is manifested but rather in each and
every one of his human and non-human births.
This has two relevant implications. First, there is significant liberative continuity
implied across the boundaries of the five destinies—a continuity that is rein-
forced by the narrative device of referring to the Buddha in all his births as “the
Bodhisattva” or enlightening being. The quintessential dramatic community of
Buddhist enlightenment is not restricted merely to the human. Second, the narra-
tive climax of the Jatakas as a whole in the Vessantara Jataka makes it clear that
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the “mind set on enlightenment” is nothing other than the mind set on the
perfection of offering. The continuity among all sentient beings, including
ultimately plants and especially trees, consists of their readiness to benefit others.
Buddha-nature as relational beneficence
In the Mahayana traditions, a broad shift takes place that implies a revised
conception of environment. In the early Buddhist Abhidharma, an emphasis is
placed on the centrality of perception or awareness. Sensed environments—like
sensing organisms—are understood as moments in the perceptual process or the
realization of distinct qualities of consciousness. In the Jataka tales and in the
early teachings on karma, emphasis is placed on how these qualities of con-
sciousness—and, implicitly, sensed environments and sensing organisms—are
directed. That is, emphasis is placed on the intentional focus of specific relation-
ships and on the historical (if not evolutionary) dynamics of particular relational
ensembles. In the Mahayana traditions, concern shifts are from specific qualities
of consciousness or relational dynamics to situational direction. That is, empha-
sis comes to be placed on how the presence of buddhas or advanced bodhisattvas
inflects their situations as dramatic wholes, transforming them into buddha-realms.
Perhaps the most powerfully sustained expression of the situationally
transformative effect of bodhisattvas is given in the Vimalakïrti Sutra—a
Mahayana text in which the lay practitioner Vimalakirti demonstrates unparal-
leled virtuosity in opening up the meaning of non-duality, affirming repeatedly in
a range of dialogic encounters that, in the realm of a true bodhisattva or buddha,
all things and situations without exception do the great work of enlightenment.7
A buddha-realm is one in which all beings are continuously contributing to one
another’s welfare in an enlightening fashion, realizing together an ever deepening
ecology of liberation. As described in a great many Mahayana texts, buddha-
realms are astonishingly, even psychedelically, vibrant. Trees are laden with jewel
fruits, mountain streams run with ambrosial liquids, skies are strewn with dia-
monds, footfalls raise delicately fragrant dust, and the range of plants, animals,
and peoples is at once almost infinite in number and infinitely rich and refined.
In a buddha-realm, space-time itself sings in a liberating key, an excited crystal
resonating with and transmitting the pure Dharma.
Yet, as Vimalakirti makes clear, these spectacular attributes are not necessary for
doing the work of liberation. There are buddha-realms that accomplish the buddha-
work of liberation by way of light, others that do so by sound or fragrance or phys-
ical beauty; but there are others in which the buddha-work is accomplished by
devils and beggars or by poverty or illness. A buddha-realm is not essentially or
necessarily “this” way or “that.” It does not have any particular form or tonal qual-
ity or fragrance. What is distinctive about buddha-realms as opposed to the realms
of sentient beings—which, too, are often quite rich in aesthetic terms—is how they
are directed. They are places thoroughly and incontrovertibly disposed toward
liberation. Buddha-realms are nothing other than liberating environments.
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It follows from such a conception of buddha-realms that, because all beings
arise relationally, and because there are no hard ontological boundaries among
them, the presence of even a single enlightened being in a given world-realm
means that the ultimate nature of all beings in that realm must be buddha-nature.
This conclusion seems to have been drawn most explicitly and powerfully in
China, where the indigenous conception of nature was itself dispositional, reflect-
ing a general understanding of all things as fundamentally and irreducibly
relational. When Chinese Buddhists coined the term buddha-nature ( fo-xing) as
a logical outgrowth of teachings on the tathagatagarbha and claimed that all
things have or evidence ( you) buddha-nature, they were effectively claiming that
it is the nature of all beings to realize enlightening relationships.
The concepts of buddha-realm and buddha-nature came to be effectively fused in
Chinese Buddhist traditions as a function of a very thorough working out of the rela-
tional ontology implied by the teachings of interdependence and emptiness and with
significant ramifications for developing a contemporary Buddhist environmental
ethic. Fazang (643–712 CE), a lineage holder in the Huayan tradition, argued that all
things are not only interdependently arisen but also interpenetrating. Creatively
extending Nagarjuna’s claim that understanding emptiness (funyata) entails insight
into the mutual relevance of all things,8 Fazang developed what might be termed a
metaphysics of meaning in which each thing consists of a nexus of contributions
from all other things. That is, each thing situationally and uniquely expresses the con-
tributory force of all things. In one of Fazang’s famous examples, pieces of lumber
become “rafters” and “ridge beam” only when they are appropriately leaned against
and attached to one another. Things are what they mean for one another. In a buddha-
realm, all things mean one another’s liberation. They thus have the same, enlighten-
ing nature, precisely because they differ and contribute to one another in the specific
ways they do. The cosmos as described by Fazang is one in which all beings are the
same insofar as they all differ in ways that make a liberating difference.
This suggests considerable overlap between Fazang’s reading of emptiness as
both interdependence and interpenetration and an ecological understanding of
interdependence. Ecosystems are complex, porously bounded phenomena for
which history makes a difference and which incorporate an array of subsys-
tems—plant, insect, and animal species as well as abiding climatic, geological,
and hydrological systems—that subsist in and through mutually supporting rela-
tionships. That is, ecosystems consist of sustainable patterns of relationship. Most
crucially, an ecosystem emerges when a consistent set of plant, insect, and animal
species (and the individuals comprised in them) convert situational resources
(animate and inanimate) in ways that promote the welfare of both one another and
the entire system of their interactions or relations as well. Ecosystems arise
through sustained patterns of mutual contribution among all beings incorporated
within them. In ecological terms, diversity is not simply a function of numbers of
species but of the density and richness of contributory relationships.
Seeing ecosystems in this way means seeing individual species as situationally
defined, arising uniquely through cooperative, rather than competitive, functions
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within an ecosystem as a whole. In other words, ecosystems arise as functions of
dynamically sustainable patterns of meaningful relationship, while individual
species are or come to be as a complex function of what they mean to one another.
In this, all species are the same. But what allows them all to be the same in respect
of contributing to one another’s welfare is their specific ways of differing from
one another—in particular, differences in how they are situated and in how they
draw out the value (the resources) of their situation.9
The parallel to Fazang’s claims regarding the nature of all beings as empty of
fixed essence or identity, interdependent, and interpenetrating is, I think, both
striking and significant. When combined with the teachings on buddha-realms and
buddha-nature, it suggests a way beyond the appeals to intrinsic value that under-
gird so much of environmental ethics as well as a way beyond the sharp demarca-
tion often made between “natural” and “built” environments—a demarcation that
can easily lead to disregarding urban environmental ills and the suffering they
inflict on both human and non-human populations.
Environmental ethics and activism: going 
beyond conservation
Much of contemporary environmental ethics is motivated by what can be termed
a principle of non-interference.10 Natural systems are seen as inherently worthy of
preservation and freedom from distortion by activities undertaken by humans for
human ends. More moderately, and realistically framed, natural systems should be
conserved to whatever degree possible, where conservation aims at sustaining the
conditions for systemic, adaptive development rather than the “freeze-framing”
entailed by a strict commitment to preservation.11
In arguing for the preservation or conservation of natural systems, whether at
the species or ecosystem levels, contemporary environmental ethicists and advo-
cates often resort to three broad lines of argument resting on: claims that natural
systems have intrinsic value, claims that natural systems are reservoirs of both
current and as yet unrealized (and in principle, impossible to anticipate) practical
benefits, and claims that interactions with natural systems ultimately ground and
necessarily enhance human experience. Not infrequently, resort is also made to
two correlated cautions: there is considerable hubris in human intentions to make
a “better world” or to “improve on nature,” and we do not now (and likely never
will) have sufficient understanding of natural systems to alter them without
unpredictable and potentially ill consequences.
Each of these claims and cautions can be individually contested on quite
reasonable grounds. The epistemological caution applies, in fact, to all intentional
activities and there is scant hope of getting beyond the conclusion arrived at in the
fourth century BCE Indian text, the Bhagavad-gita: while we are in a position to
determine our intentions, we are never in a position to foresee or determine the
long-term or systemic consequences of acting upon them. If the arrogance of
“improving on nature” is deemed unnatural, so would the building of nests, of
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beaver dams, of beehives, and—at sufficient historical scale—the process of
evolution itself. The approach of arguing for environmental conservation on the
basis of human benefits—practical or otherwise—belies an instrumentalist bias
that: contradicts the claim that natural systems are valuable ends in themselves,
problematically reinforces the means–ends distinction, and offers scant reason to
question either the ultimate status of human ends or the imperfect understandings
(and lack of wisdom) on which they are founded.
From a Buddhist perspective, moreover, there can be no tenably strict claims
about particular systems or species having “intrinsic value” or an “essential
nature” which must be conserved. The teachings of impermanence, emptiness, and
no-self all point toward the dangers of establishing fixed identities for things and
even indirectly claiming the reality of independent existence. If all things are what
they are as a function of how they are related, value must rest on relational depth,
extent, and quality rather than on any supposedly inherent characteristics. Any
viable case for non-interference must be a highly qualified one, since a strict read-
ing would prohibit even a course of action undertaken with a mind set on enlight-
enment—a mind intent on directing relationships and the situations they constitute
away from their current (samsaric) heading toward liberation (nirvana).12
Finally, it is a consequence of the principle of non-interference that
environmental ethics tends not to include urban or other environments—like
farms, parks, and rural enclaves or villages—that result from human artifice.13
These environments can be seen as interrupting the natural, as punctuating them
in such a way as to turn nature into a form of human discourse, expressing human
meanings. An affront to nature, environments resulting from human artifice
might thus be excluded from concern, their degradation seen as reason for
elimination, not conservation or creative change. Granted that a majority of the
planet’s human population dwells in urban or suburban environments, to
exclude such environments is to warrant inattention to the suffering these envi-
ronments are causing to both human and non-human beings. Eliminating such
environments—a kind of radical “earth first” perspective—would “solve” this
problem but at the loss of the distinctive human difference as a contribution to
the overall diversity of the Earth’s biosphere. Some middle path would seem to
be needed.
One of the root insights of Buddhist teachings on karma is that we have no
choice but to work with the resources present in our own situation, as it has come
to be (yathabhutam). In terms of skillful means, this involves developing an acute
capacity for perceiving our situation in terms of the values–intentions–actions
that inform or structure its constitutive relationships. It involves sensitivity to and
abilities for creatively appropriating the karma of our present situation in its his-
torical context. Appeals to ideal states-of-affairs can thus have only the barest
strategic worth—the convincing demonstration of the possibility of alternatives.
But work can only begin when attention is focused on our situation, in all its com-
plexity and historical specificity. Effective environmental activism is necessarily
rooted in altering the disposition or valence of currently prevailing relationships.
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From conservation to creativity
In the context of a fully Buddhist environmental ethics, this process of dispositional
revision is best understood as one of relational enhancement directed toward lib-
eration. Granted the emptiness or interdependence and interpenetration of all
things, liberation is itself best understood as a process directed toward freeing up
situational resources so that the ways in which things differ can make more of a
difference in respect of their shared welfare. That is, as epitomized in the conduct
of consummate bodhisattvas, liberation or freedom is a function of relating freely
in mutual contribution. It is rooted in appreciative conduct that draws out previ-
ously unexpressed value, present in a given situation, in such a way that the situ-
ation as a whole is at once enriched and disposed toward still greater relational
freedom and clarity. This is what I will refer to as the functioning or enacting of
beauty. Buddhist liberation ecology is not grounded in duty but rather in aesthetic
commitment and consummation.
This claim will require substantial qualification, particularly with respect to the
meaning of beauty as a value with explicitly environmental traction. But, first, it
is important to understand the Buddhist precedents for a shift of ethical foundations
away from duty.
In a cosmos that is irreducibly karmic, the concept of duty has no ultimate
purchase and can function only conventionally. That is, in the context of a fully rela-
tional ontology in which values have ontological precedence over facts and which all
things are understood as abstractions from ultimately horizonless relational com-
plexes, there are no grounds for asserting that a given state-of-affairs commands a
particular course of action or a certain trajectory of correction. There is not ultimately
a way that things should be. Things are as they have come to be because of the com-
plex and still ongoing interplay of diverse streams of values–intentions–actions
(karma). Things are not as they are necessarily but rather as a function of patterns of
interdependence that are always open to revision. For this reason, there cannot be any
way that things—including us as ethical actors—must be. Any obligations we incur
can have only conventional or highly contextual force because we cannot, finally, be
compelled. No situation ultimately can make incontrovertible or irresistible claim on
us. “Should” and “ought” finally revert to “may.” Duties give way to vows.
To put this is somewhat different terms, Buddhist ethics are only conventionally
grounded on principles or standards of conduct. In the absence of a metaphysics
of being, the “good life” which ethics is intended to help realize cannot be under-
stood as something already given—an ideal state-of-affairs to be attained—but
only as a quality and direction of relationships. Process, in other words, trumps
product. Ethics is not a matter of realizing predetermined ends but rather one of
creatively revising the quality and meaning (direction) of our situation as it has
come to be. It is not grounded on the exercise of duty or appeals to fixed standards
but rather on liberating appreciation.
Buddhist ethics is not, however, consequentialist in the strict sense. In an
irreducibly dramatic or karmic cosmos, there is no way to predict the outcome of
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any given attempt at revising situational quality or meaning. There is an infinitely
deep past that conditionally factors into present situations. When conditions—
themselves always changing—are appropriate, different karma from this past
appears and affects the complexion of the present. At the same time, these out-
comes of prior values–intentions–actions are, within the present situation, also
opportunities for the meaningful revision or reorienting of our situation as a
whole. Precisely because outcomes are always also opportunities, consequences
are finally less directly relevant than commitments. The priority of moral or ethical
destinations is ceded to clarity of direction.
Karmic opportunity is of three broad types. First, there is opportunity to refrain
from conduct in accord with the values–intentions–actions that led to the occurrence
of the present, as it has come to be. Second, there is opportunity to intensify an
existing karma or pattern of value–intention–action. Finally, there is opportunity
to develop or improvise karma that will lead to new kinds of relationship. These
types of opportunity are not mutually exclusive but also need not take place
together. The former can be seen clearly in situations where, for example, the
ill-effects of lying are made situationally manifest and one is positioned to vow
never again to lie; the second when, for example, parents witness their child
growing troubled or distant and intensify their expressions of love, concern, and
readiness to help; and the final, for example, when the children of seriously ill
parents invert the relational dynamics of their family to take on the role of
primary care givers or when lovers find that they must learn to be best friends.
All three types of opportunity are ethically significant and together establish
the practical basis of operationalizing a liberation ecology rooted in appreciative
conduct oriented toward increasingly free and clear patterns of interdependence
and interpenetration. All are based on taking situational resources as currently
given and opening up new pathways among them to facilitate liberating change—
a process of realizing increased, and increasingly consonant, contributions to
shared welfare. Ecological liberation turns on enhancing diversity, where diver-
sity indexes the density and quality of contributions to sustainably shared welfare.
The driving questions of a Buddhist environmental ethics do not pivot on issues
of retention or restoration, on how to conserve existing natural systems or protect
existing patterns of interdependence. Rather, they pivot on how best to foster
diversification as a process of harmonious, relational creativity. For example, how
can we contribute to already obtaining environments (both natural and urban) in
ways that will enhance their contributory richness? How can we free up situa-
tional resources for achieving and sustaining shared welfare to promote deeper
and more extensive patterns of interdependence? How do we insure a common
direction in addressing environmental degradation at radically different scales?
Unlike some environmental ethics that effectively deny that human difference
might make a difference (other than a negative one) for nature, this approach
insures both that humanity is seen as part of the natural world and integral to it
and that urban and rural environments are seen as continuous with other more
apparently natural environments and open to equivalent consideration. To the
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extent that diversity is seen as a function, not of mere variety in coexistence but
of differences making a meaningful difference, the first imperative of an envi-
ronmental ethics that eschews a metaphysics of being is to take qualities and
intensities of relationship as having prime importance. Thus, any discussion of
corrective environmental change must begin with a consideration of the distinc-
tive difference of human capacities for contribution. What is it that humans do
differently, in a way that can make a meaningful difference in respect of realizing
environments that are liberating for all involved? What do we offer that will make
it possible for all the beings gathered in any given environment to find themselves
more valuably situated?
As a way of initially sketching this difference, let me invoke a discursive riff
used by Roger Ames in characterizing the early Confucian view of the distinctive
difference of humanity. According to the Mencius (4B.19), the difference between
the human and the animal is infinitesimal and pivots on the human capacity for
self-cultivation and for enchanting the everyday. Humanity takes the act of eating
and transmutes it into cuisine; takes the act of sexual reproduction and transmutes
it into lovemaking and romance; takes warning cries and vocalizations of pleas-
ure or pain and turns them into language and literature. In effect, the distinctive
difference of humanity is to take everyday occurrences and dramatically augment
their value by bringing them into new kinds of relationship with other parts of the
human experience and its broad contexts. This process entails making new kinds
of difference or distinction that are explicitly qualitative in nature and that gener-
ate new kinds of meaning. Humanity is not distinctive on the simple basis of
building things or language use or social organization. Beavers, dolphins, and
bees are quite adept at these activities. Human beings are unique in the degree to
which they continuously appreciate or add value to their situation.
Of course, humans are just as capable of depreciating their situation. In our
historically headlong rush into heavily polluting patterns of mass industrialization
and consumerism, we have managed to degrade our environments to the point that
all who continue dwelling in them are ever more poorly situated, increasingly
blocked from either contributing to or enjoying shared and positively directed and
sustained welfare. We can direct our own conduct and our situational dynamics
toward samsara as well as nirvana. It is, however, precisely this capacity of creat-
ing such radically opposed meanings for our own conduct and experience—as
well as for our situation as a whole—that underlies our distinctive capacity
for awakening or liberation. While sentient beings from all the five destinies
can develop bodhicitta (a mind set on enlightenment), it is only humans who
traditionally have been held able to realize full awakening.
It is not crucial whether enlightenment is literally possible only for humans.
This claim may be nothing more than a rhetorical device for stimulating resolute
and intense practice. If the primary task of liberation ecology is to deepen and
intensify diversity, and if diversity is a function of sustainable contributions to
shared welfare, then conserving and further cultivating contributory resources and
virtuosity are the primary task of environmental ethics. If human contributory
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capacities are distinctively characterized by their potential for situational
appreciation and meaning-making, and if any given environment is (for any
sentient being) a karmic complex of opportunities and outcomes, then environ-
mental ethics should rest strategically on enriching both the opportunities and
outcomes associated with appreciation or sympathetic value-enhancement.
This has three important implications. First, environmental ethics is directed as
much at self-cultivation as it is at protecting natural ecosystems. If a degraded
environment is inseparable from degraded forms of consciousness, realizing
liberating environments is also inseparable from realizing liberating forms of
consciousness. The absence of significantly new sensibilities is also the absence
of sufficient resources for changing the direction of environmental relations.
Second, for environmental activism to be effective, these new sensibilities or
capacities for meaning-making must have significant, practical traction. That is,
they must be capable of exerting sufficient “downward causation” to alter both
patterns of human/non-human interdependence, as well as the character of all the
systems present in any given environment. That is, they must bring all the rele-
vant systems into new kinds of coordination, eliciting new kinds of contribution
throughout the altered environmental system as a whole. Finally, to the degree
that environmental ethics centers on enhanced sensibilities promoting appreciative
and contributory virtuosity, which develop in turn the resources needed for mean-
ingfully deepened and extended diversity, the primary value of environmental ethics
can be seen as aesthetic consummation or the realization of beauty.
Beauty as relational creativity
This last claim requires qualification. In the history of environmental ethics,
appeals to the aesthetic richness of nature have fared poorly. Most typically, this
has been because a tension is created between the subjective value of untram-
meled nature for aesthetic experience and the objective, economic value of nature
leveraged toward the satisfaction of human ends. That is, assigning aesthetic
value to nature has tended to accentuate the opposition of natural environments
and those resulting from human artifice. Especially in the global South, where the
“benefits” of industrial and commercial development have been disproportion-
ately limited, debate surrounding this tension is especially complex. If the choice
is between subjective experiences of natural beauty and adequate food, clothing,
and shelter (not to mention health care and education), what right has the so-
called developed world to call for a halt to aesthetic trade-offs? What good is
beauty if the belly is chronically empty and in pain?
Especially in the West, beauty was long understood as an attribute or ideal that
was perhaps hard to define precisely, but nevertheless quite real and objective.
According to some interpretations of Platonic thought, beauty could even be con-
sidered ultimate reality—the aim and essence of all things. With the rise of
modernity, however, and as cultures with very different aesthetic canons inter-
acted, the view of beauty as an objective attribute was called increasingly and
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seriously into question. Stripped of its aura of universality, beauty fell from the
world of ideal forms to lodge “in the eye of the beholder”—a subjective attribu-
tion that varied with personal predilection, history, and culture and that could as
often blind as enlighten. More recently still, proponents of social constructivism
have insisted on the need to bracket the subjectivity of beauty in recognition of
how the conception and experience of beauty is conditioned by public practices
associated with, for example, the marketing of art and fashion and the increas-
ingly extensive use of “aesthetic surgery.” Today, beauty has arguably come to
signify an elective effect—a moment in the crafting of a specific impact, for
particular purposes, at determinate expense.
The concept of beauty, at least in the broad sweep of mainstream Western
thinking, has suffered steadily slipping fortunes. But I would argue that the fall of
beauty from its status of ultimate origin, aim, and essence to that of a constantly
shifting value associated with public artifacts is a function of an overwhelming
bias toward existence or being in mainstream Western thought—a bias toward sta-
tus or fixed and abiding independent identities. To the extent that we eschew the
metaphysical presumption of independent existence, beauty can be rehabilitated.
In the context of Buddhist relational ontology, the ambiguities associated with
the conception of beauty in the Western tradition are both unavoidable and mean-
ingful. Neither absolute nor relativist (individual or social) constructions of
beauty could ever be fully tenable because beauty is not, and could never be, an
independently existing thing or essence. It is impossible to state definitively what
beauty is or is-not because, like all things (dharmas), beauty has no self-nature.
If beauty obtains, it is obtained only as a function or quality of relationships
as such.
In this sense, beauty is like freedom. Although many of the world’s best minds
(again, especially in the West) have exercised themselves over how to define free-
dom, no final consensus has ever been reached. Freedom resists or eludes strict
determination. But from a Buddhist perspective, the epistemological difficulties
surrounding freedom are chimerical. Freedom does not exist in the way expected
of things designated by nouns because it is not a thing or a state, but a relational
quality. Freedom is adverbial. Although no thing is free and there is no state-of-
affairs that can be legitimately termed freedom, there is the dynamic of relating
freely.
Likewise, beauty is not either an attribute or an attribution. Simply stated:
beauty does not exist—at least, not in the literal sense of metaphysically “stand-
ing apart from” all other things. There are only things done beautifully, relation-
ships developing in a beautiful manner. As a noun, beauty can strictly speaking
only refer to an abstraction from such patterns of activity or relationships. And
like the individual self, which can similarly be abstracted from patterns of rela-
tionship, it cannot exist on its own. Beauty is a particular quality of ongoing
interdependence—a particular, qualitative direction.14
More specifically, beauty is evident in the appreciative inflection of a relationship
or pattern of relationships—that is, when situational dynamics are oriented
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toward increasing clarity and enrichment. Beauty arises as relational patterns turn
toward evoking new associations enabling all those related through them to be
more (and more) valuably situated—that is, in a position to both contribute to
their shared situation and be contributed to by it.
Because beauty obtains as a distinctive adverbial quality of the cycle of
outcomes and opportunities associated with appreciative and contributory virtu-
osity, it can also be associated with bodhisattva conduct or relating freely in skill-
ful liberation of all beings.15 Given these associations, beauty signifies relational
creativity directed toward realizing liberating situations or environments.
Considering how liberating environments are characterized in the Buddhist
imaginaire should, then, allow us to more fully characterize this particular directional
quality.16
In both early Buddhist and later Mahayana traditions, ideal realms—whether of
the wheel-turning monarch (cakkavatti) or a superlative bodhisattva or buddha—
are invariably described in terms that connote ultimate sensory richness. Such
realms are never represented as austere or categorically simple places. They
are lush with different forms of life and terrain, both rural and urban, and
always endowed with a capacity for almost psychedelically overwhelming the
bodily senses. In light of the Buddhist teachings that insist on seeing conscious-
ness as a higher-order relationship arising between sensing organisms and sensed
environments, this makes perfect sense. If the ideal realm is characterized by
liberating relationships, this implies unlimited qualities, depths, and ranges of
consciousness and, hence, unlimited diversity in terms of sensing organs/
organisms and sensed environments. The ideal Buddhist realm is one of aesthetic
consummation.
Especially in the Mahayana traditions, such realms are explicitly represented as
liberating environments. The most widely celebrated among these, perhaps, is the
Pure Land of Amitabha Buddha. But there are said to be infinitely many such
realms and going to any one of them is to head resolutely in the direction of ulti-
mate, unsurpassed enlightenment or the horizonless expression of buddha-nature.
Thus a mind set on enlightenment or directed toward entering into liberating inti-
macy or relationship with all things is, in practice, also directed toward aesthetic
consummation. A buddha-realm is a place in which all things do the great work
of enlightenment beautifully, infinitely enhancing the appreciation (heightened
value) and contributory capacity of all other things. In such realms, diversity
ultimately prevails as aesthetic consummation—limitless differences harmoniously
united in the creative intimacy of relating freely.
The conflation of liberation, enlightenment, emptiness and nirvana with aesthetic
consummation or beauty in the Mahayana imaginaire suggests that beauty—or,
better still, relating beautifully—can be seen as being oriented away from sam-
sara. Beauty means turning away from suffering as the experienced reality of
appreciative and contributory blockage toward greater diversity, relational
enhancement, and freedom. Understood in this way, beauty seems well-suited for
a central role in framing a Buddhist liberation ecology.17
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Operationalizing beauty in environmental ethics
It is important to draw out the relevance of a liberating relational orientation
toward aesthetic consummation for understanding and responding to environ-
mental problems and predicaments of the sort that we now face with respect to
pollution, waste management, natural resource depletion, extinction, and global
warming.
The environmental traction of beauty can, I think, be brought out through
further considering its conceptual ties to diversity and, particularly, to the realiza-
tion of appreciative and contributory virtuosity. First, as suggested by the refer-
ences to the Buddhist imagination of liberating environments, aesthetic
consummation involves both refining existing sense realms and opening up new
sensory fields. That is, it turns on developing new ways of attending. Second—as
anyone knows who has taken tests or performed on an empty stomach and too lit-
tle sleep—the topographic character of attention-energy is fundamentally cyclic.
That is, attention is an outgoing phase of a pattern of resource transformation or
energy circulation that necessarily includes an input phase. Attention-energy is
greatest when energy circulates most freely through the sensing organism/sensed
environment system.
Most fundamentally, then, operationalizing beauty in addressing environmental
degradation entails heightening of existing attentive capacities. In Buddhist
terms, this means realizing the emptiness (or interdependence and interpenetra-
tion) of all things through relinquishing our existing horizons of relevance. That
is, it means sufficiently relaxing the presuppositions associated with our present
position in our situation to effectively dissolve the horizon or limit of what we
take to be relevant in understanding and addressing the environmental problem at
hand, thus allowing more of the total situation to be taken into account.
This can be done at a “purely” conceptual or theoretical level by, for example,
resisting the categories according to which we customarily organize experience or
by making use of statistical models that show patterns in data which we could not
directly perceive through other means. Or it can be done at a biomechanical level
by making use of sensing technologies and associated tools like microscopes,
satellite photography systems, and air quality monitors. But in either case, the
point is not simply to add to the body of existing knowledge or bring about an
purportedly value-neutral increase in environmental data. Rather the point is to
augment the quality of our interaction with and attention to our environment—to
open up the extent to which we feel meaningfully related with our environment
and all that it comprises. Extending our sensory capabilities is carried out for the
purpose, in other words, of realizing a more intimate pattern of relationship—a
more profound karma—with the environments in question.
Doing so is already to enhance experienced diversity. It is the karmic groundwork
for contributing to our situation or environment in such a way as to create new
relational networks that intensify or extend the meaningful interrelatedness and
mutual benefit of all the elements comprised in our situation. And yet, it is with
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such contributions—or, at least, attempted contributions—that concerns arise
regarding the misdirection of situational or environmental dynamics. What keeps
intervention from becoming interference? What prevents our environmental
karma from resulting in occlusive rather than liberating outcomes?18
Here, the observation that attention-energy can be seen as part of a relational
cycle or circulation becomes crucially relevant. A general rule of thumb is that if
an intervention blocks or serves to cache rather than promote the freer circulation
of energy, then it will result in highly skewed slopes of advantage and the
compromise of situational diversity: the erosion of responsive flexibility on the
part of any affected ecosystem as a whole. Conversely, any manifest erosion of
ecosystem resilience is an evidence of effectively interrupted or block flows of
energy in the system as a whole—evidence of misdirected patterns of relation-
ship. These, in turn, are at a deeper level indicative of errant karma or patterns of
value–intention–action.
A few examples may be helpful here. Consider first the dynamics of global
warming. Some of the most powerful recent concerns about the effects of
global warming have centered on oceanic carbon loading brought about by industrial
manufacturing and fossil fuel use. Inappropriately displaced into oceanic waters,
carbon significantly disturbs the biotic systems for which these waters serve as
proximate environments, eventually leading to the decimation of oceanic flora and
fauna, with dire consequences for commercial fisheries and human food security
as well as the planetary atmosphere. The crucial link in this effect chain is com-
promised appreciative and contributory capacity on the part of microorganisms
like plankton and corals. Atmospheric carbon dioxide enters ocean water as car-
bolic acid that weakens the skeletons or shells of such microorganisms and renders
them ineffective transformers of oceanic resources into forms useful for animals
higher on the food chain, populations of which are weakened in turn and affect still
higher parts of the food chain. As such populations are weakened, they are no
longer in a position to contribute to the overall health of oceanic ecosystems. The
value of these ecosystems for the planetary biosphere as a whole thus undergoes
significant depreciation. Continuing present rates of oceanic carbon loading has
the potential of triggering a cataclysmic loss of total biosphere diversity.
Similarly, high-consumption economies rely on extracting massive quantities
of natural resources, both animate and inanimate—a process that significantly
damages a wide range of natural systems. These resources are converted into
commodities that, because of the dynamics of continued economic growth, will
be filtered through human consumers and quickly converted into waste. It is the
nature of high-consumption economies to ingest and excrete natural resources at
the highest sustainable rates possible. In the case of forestry products, for
example, high rates of extraction lead to a breakdown of inter-species patterns
of contribution and the eventual compromise, or demise, of entire ecosystems.
Consumer waste represents squandered resources for ecosystem resilience. Even
if these wastes are recycled, benefit typically is skewed decisively toward humans
(often with considerable inequity).
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The case of petroleum-based products like plastics is interestingly different. It can
be argued that the natural resource in question is essentially inert as a biological
resource and that any ecological impacts of its conversion are merely byproducts of
processing and manufacturing. With proper processing and manufacturing tech-
niques, ecological damage can theoretically drop to zero. Given that plastics and fos-
sil fuels originate from unused biological waste products, using them at an
appropriate scale and with appropriate techniques can be seen as an environmental
good insofar as it reclaims otherwise lost energy. Insofar as the availability of such
materials and fuels stimulates human creativity—human contributions toward real-
izing new kinds of relationships—then this is clearly a benefit as well in overall
terms, as long as using these materials and fuels does not lead to scale-related
problems like those associated with massive oceanic or atmospheric carbon loading.
From the distinctive position of Buddhist liberation ecology, however, the
entire pattern of new relationships brought about by such uses of biologically
inert natural resources must itself be addressed in directional terms. For example,
while overall human creativity is stimulated, is this true for all populations and for
all populations equally? Are economic systems depending on these materials and
fuels (and the peculiar efficiencies of scale to which they give rise) conducive to
productive diversity and hence widespread increases of appreciative and contrib-
utory virtuosity, or are they conducive to production monocultures that
inequitably skew creative benefits? If the byproducts of using such materials and
fuels are themselves no longer biologically inert—as is true for carcinogens—can
the use of these materials and fuels really be seen simply as reclaiming lost
energy? Are they not producing substances that powerfully disrupt otherwise
healthy patterns of energy flow and exchange?
Buddhist environmental ethics are, of course, not alone or unique in raising
such questions or in marshaling similar, cogent responses to environmental
degradation. Common to all environmental ethics is a shared recognition of the
crucial importance of interdependence in understanding and addressing ecological
dynamics. Contemporary environmental science can be traced to new conceptual
insights that emerged out of general systems theory and that brought interdepen-
dencies into focus as explicit research objects. This research, in keeping with the
observations made above, was fostered by the use of sensing technologies that
vastly extended the scope of scientific attention to the environment and brought
about the possibility of new kinds of (ecological) awareness or consciousness.
Plausibly, it is for this reason that while there have been long-standing traditional
concerns in virtually all the world’s cultures about nature and the non-human
world in general, environmental ethics as they are currently configured did not
begin being formulated clearly prior to the scientific advancement of under-
standing natural systems from especially the mid-twentieth century onward. The
growth of environmental science was in this way crucial for the growth of envi-
ronmental ethics, bringing into view new realms for explicit ethical consideration.
It was also a condition for the apparent convergence of Buddhist and both modern
and postmodern ethical concerns with respect to nature.
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The indebtedness of environmental ethics to environmental science has,
however, had significant limiting effects on the practical traction of environmental
advocacy and activism, as well as on their convergence with Buddhist practice.
First, it has restricted the reach of key environmental concepts and hence the effec-
tiveness of environmental arguments. Second, and more specifically, it has com-
promised the range of these key concepts in such a way as to reinforce distinctions
between natural and artificial environments, biasing much of environmental ethics
toward ignoring urban or other predominantly human-influenced environments.
Environmental ethicists have not had the easiest time convincing policy makers
and the broad public that the environment is deserving of direct moral consider-
ation. It is not difficult to make the case that the state of the natural environment
and human impacts upon it are ethically relevant. The close linkage between
changes wrought on natural environments and present and future human good is
an ample evidence of such relevance. Making the deeper case that natural envi-
ronments or specific aspects of them should be granted full and direct moral con-
sideration, without appeal to present or future consequences for human
experience, has been much more difficult. The tacit metaphysical commitments
held by most policy makers and the general public to the primacy of being and
the intelligibility of independent existence effectively restrict direct moral con-
sideration to apparent moral agents—that is, beings recognizably endowed with
capacities for determining their own futures or fates and manifesting explicit self-
interest. While the most radical proponents of, for example, the Gaia hypothesis19
are willing to grant ecosystems functional self-interests, most policy makers are
not convinced that any plants or animals are full moral agents. The case for complex
natural ecosystems, of course, is even more tenuous.
By contrast, Buddhist environmental ethics, by way of the teachings of karma,
does explicitly consider all sentient beings to have moral agency.20 All sentient
beings are capable of developing bodhicitta and conducting themselves in accord
with the Dharma, thus bringing about an appreciation of their lived circumstances
and the opportunities these afford. Moreover, since all sentient beings arise only
through complex situationally sustained interdependence, moral considerability
cannot reasonably be restricted to sentient beings as independent individuals. The
locus of moral consideration must be the patterned and directed relationships that
are ultimately constitutive of complexly situated sentient beings. Finally, given
the priority granted by Buddhist environmental ethics to diversity—understood as
a function of the manifest emptiness or mutual relevance obtaining among all
beings—it is part of a Buddhist environmental ethics to promote deepening the
moral relevance and agency of all sentient beings. That is, it is an ethics that
valorizes extending and refining contributory capacities and in which the
“natural”—as that which has not been subjected to intentionally activated
values—is understood as chimerical. In a karmic cosmos, at an appropriate scale
of consideration, all beings are intentionally situated.
This brings about strikingly different ways of dealing, for example, with the
ethicality of commercial livestock and scientific research practices. The most
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extreme animal rights activists advocate a completely vegan lifestyle, insisting on
the inherent value of all animals in their natural state, and their inviolable right to
be free from being used as mere means to human ends. Less extreme activists
argue (somewhat ironically) for humane treatment of animals rather than for a
complete ban on human industries for making use of animals. Here, the primary
concern is, at the very least, to insure a dignified existence for animals being
raised for human consumption (directly, as with beef cattle or indirectly as for
milk cows) or other human use (as in the production of leather goods).
Buddhist environmental ethics (at least as I am sketching it here) does not
appeal to such inherent rights or values, based on the so-called natural state of
animals. Instead, it appeals to animals’ capacities for achieving moral community
or conducting themselves in morally relevant fashions with respect to other
organisms with which they are interdependent. For instance, the most extreme
proponents of animal rights are logically driven to consider pets as animals that—
by virtue of becoming dependent on humans and incapable of surviving if
released into their so-called natural state—have had their rights, and perhaps their
basic “nature” violated. From a Buddhist perspective, however, the empathetic
relationships established among humans and their pets can be seen as new con-
tributory capacities being brought forth from both humans and animals. This does
not mean that the interdependence among humans and pets is assumed to be nec-
essarily good. Pets can be, and too often are, abused. But the benefits of pets for
children and the elderly are very well-documented as are the potentials for pets to
establish profound moral communities with individual humans and human fami-
lies. The relational repertoire of well-cared for pets is much more extensive and
refined than that of either their wild counterparts or industrially farmed animals.
With pets and commercial livestock, in particular, the shortcomings of appeals
to inherent nature are especially apparent, because most of the animals in ques-
tion are products of both natural evolution and human artifice. This can be com-
plicating for the conventional ethicist arguing for animal rights on the basis of
inherent nature or intrinsic worth. For Buddhist environmental ethics, however,
the issues remain the same whether the animals or other beings in question are
naturally occurring or the outcome of human activity. Do the patterns of relation-
ship in question bring about increasingly refined sensibilities and both more
extensive and more refined relational capabilities for all involved? Is overall sit-
uational diversity enhanced or diminished? Are the contributions being made—
for example, to humans—by new breeds of plants and animals different only in
degree, or in kind? How do these contributions to human benefit accord with ben-
efits to the situation more generally or to relevant natural ecosystems? Do they
increase the liberating potential of these systems?
The advantage of such questions is that they focus on intensities and directions
of relational development rather than matters of strict principle or fixed identity.
While the latter tend to leave no middle ground (or at least none that is practically
fertile), establishing precisely defined rights and wrongs, the former allow for a
more nuance-rich appreciation of the complexity of the situation—a middle
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ground for exploring how an existing relationship can be effectively redirected
rather than simply continued or terminated. Moreover, while moderate animal
rights activists are content with insuring that minimum standards of dignified
existence are identified and enforced, admitting the infeasibility of ending all use
of animals as means to satisfy human interests and concentrating instead on
redressing the worst abuses of animals, this approach suffers the same shortcom-
ings as human rights discourse. It establishes an existential situation or status
below which no animal will be legally permitted to fall but does nothing at all to
insure or even incite ongoing improvement of the quality of relevant human–animal
relations. Rights discourse does not aim at realizing truly flourishing relation-
ships but only at placing limits on existential degradation. This may be necessary.
But from the standpoint of Buddhist ethics, this necessity is an indictment of cur-
rent practices and associated patterns of attention and intention that, if not directly
challenged and altered, will practically guarantee that rights regimes will remain
necessary.
Rights regimes are like medical treatments that forestall worst-case outcomes
of progressive or chronically afflicted lives but do nothing to promote systemati-
cally enhanced ways of life.21 Put in Buddhist terms, rights regimes—whether
for humans, animals, or environments—do not address the karma that made
the institution of rights necessary. They leave out of critical account the values–
intentions–actions that brought about the conditions in which abuse is systematically
experienced, treating symptoms but not sources. Buddhist environmental ethics
insists upon redressing this lack: first, by bringing values and intentions, and not
just actions or practices, into full critical account; and second, by working within
present situations, as they have come to be, enhancing existing relational patterns
to realize their liberating potentials.
This becomes particularly relevant in the case of environments that are
predominantly (and perhaps almost exclusively) of human origin. There is a
growing movement among both academics and policy makers to reframe envi-
ronmentalism in terms that are inclusive of urban environments.22 Most of these
focus on the importance of building within the specific ecological limits of any
given locale and promoting “smart growth” as an answer to urban sprawl. These
movements grew out of sustainability-driven development studies and, as
endorsed for example by the World Bank, tend to assume the broad principles of
utilitarian ethics. That is, they intend to shape the development process by taking
as foundational more complex and comprehensive environmental cost–benefit
analyses.
The readiness of the “new environmentalism” to recognize the importance of
urban environmental realities is undoubtedly a positive trend.23 But it is also a
readiness that does as little to address urban environmental karma as rights
regimes do to address issues of relational flourishing. These new trends in envi-
ronmentalism do little, in other words, to critically assess the totality of existing
patterns of values–intentions–actions that resulted in the heavily degraded and
ecologically unsustainable urban environments that can be witnessed throughout
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the developed and developing world. The new environmentalisms emphasize, for
example, generating “smart growth” and not questioning growth as an economic
value. They are not focused on questioning consumerism as an economic driver
but only on shifting consumption toward the green end of the spectrum. And
while shifts like these may be necessary under present circumstances, they are not
enough.
The broad commitments of Buddhist environmental ethics suggest possibilities
for a deeper shift based on opening up of urban topographies that are conducive
to increasing diversity, systematically subverting cost–benefit analyses in favor of
aesthetic consummation, and, realizing reiterative and yet liberating patterns of
urban–natural interdependence.
Among the most commonly cited problems with contemporary urban environ-
ments around the globe are the pronounced tendencies to spatially segregate life
functions and to relationally distance urban and suburban spaces from their natu-
ral surroundings. The rationalization or compartmentalization of key life functions
in urban environments means that education, work, family life, shopping, and
entertainment take place in spatially distinct arenas, thus rendering their interde-
pendence practically invisible and serving as a primary condition for rampant
urban/suburban sprawl.24 The benefits of practically segregating life functions in
this way turn on scale-related efficiencies that reduce the costs of meeting basic
subsistence needs of food, clothing, shelter, education, health care, and social
interaction. They also, however, tend to obscure systemic effects resulting from
crosstalk among lifeworld domains that are no longer in intimate relationship.
Up to a certain threshold, there is clear utility in scaling up the production
processes by means of which such needs are met and, by implication, for func-
tionally segregating specific domains within the lifeworld as a whole. Increasing
specialization correlates strongly with heightened relational density and with
increasing productive quality. Under the correct conditions, it can also be con-
ducive to the cultivation of excellence. But, beyond this threshold, there is a
marked tendency for local production ecologies to be converted into global pro-
duction monocultures and for a corresponding constriction of locally available
opportunities for relational enhancement and expansion. As this process has
played out historically, in the context of consumption-driven market economics,
it has brought increasing variety in terms of life experiences, but dramatically
lowered diversity in the full, Buddhist sense of the concept—a severe compro-
mise of appreciative and contributory capacity and virtuosity.25 That is, while
post-threshold urbanization continues to increase experiential variety—especially
in the form of possibilities for commodity consumption—it decreases both capac-
ities and occasions for perceiving ourselves as meaningfully situated.
Experiential variety is institutionalized at the expense of aesthetic consummation.
The collapse of traditional neighborhoods is among the most commonly
lamented results of post-threshold urbanization processes. But equally, if not ulti-
mately, more lamentable is the tendency of these processes to delimit urban and
non-urban environments in increasingly sharp and stark fashions. Most of the
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major cities in the world, until the mid-nineteenth century, had relatively modest
ecological “footprints” and were quite porous with respect to the natural environ-
ments in which they had developed. That is, their scale and spatial organization
were consistent with the carrying capacity of the ecological systems in which they
were embedded. Cities were consistent with sustained bioregional integrity and
vitality. In the most successful of such alloys, the urban was sufficiently suffused
with the natural to bring both kinds of environment into appreciative focus—a
contrapuntal dynamic through which each effectively enhanced the aesthetic
value of the other.
A notable feature of such urban–natural alloys is that they were highly reiterative
or fractal in overall structure. That is, the interplay of the urban and the natural
tended toward the repetition, at different scales and with varying detail, of a
distinct pattern of relational organization. Instead of the spatial and functional
singularities typical of post-threshold cities, in ecologically sound cities there is a
marked similarity in the relationship between the urban and the natural at
different locations and at different scales. For example, contrary to the stark seg-
regation of industrial, residential, commercial, and natural (or park) spaces in
post-threshold urban areas, early urban complexes tended to merge these spaces
and to maintain considerable porosity in terms of their borders with their rural
environs. From the standpoint of efficiency-biased cost–benefit analysis, this
means substantial redundancy among adjacent production ecologies—a redun-
dancy that is particularly costly in terms of both technological and human capital
and that can be very profitably redressed by dramatically increasing scales of pro-
duction and distribution.26 At the same time, however, such redundancies—like
those that obtain in the organization of the human brain—are extremely impor-
tant in maintaining high degrees of meaningful interdependence, creativity, and
resilience. They also promote critically attending to the systemic imperatives for
reducing inter-domain crosstalk, thus fostering true coordination in the sense of
meaningfully realized shared priorities and values.27
The markedly fractal structure of successful early modern alloys of urban and
natural environments is significant for the present discussion in several ways.
First, it sets a precedent for seeing the tension between the urban and the natural
as both sustainable and creative rather than inherently conflicted. Second, it sug-
gests that a key factor in realizing functionally diverse environments is sensitiv-
ity to the role of scale thresholds in consolidating patterns of mutual contribution
and appreciation or value enhancement. Finally, the reiterative pattern of
urban–natural interrelatedness across scales establishes strong precedents for an
ethics of interdependence that is meaningfully inclusive of the urban and the
natural and would, in fact, promote their enhanced integration.
None of these is to suggest reestablishing the early modern city or foregoing
the tremendous health benefits that have accrued through better theoretical and
technical grasps of both natural and artificial systems. Instead, it is an argument
for substantially revising currently prevailing dynamics associated with meeting
basic needs to foster truly viable coordination among the natural and the urban
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and to dispel the conceptual and practical myths of their externality to one
another.
At present, there is a severe gap between the ideals of environmental ethics
based on attributing intrinsic value to species and to ecosystems, and the complex
realities associated with the fact that most humans now live in urban environments,
many of them undeniably both degraded and degrading. It is estimated that within
15 years 2 billion people will be living in urban slums—that is, in environments
that significantly and systematically subvert their capacities for contributing
to their own and others’ welfare. Roughly one-third of the planet’s urban human
population will dwell in circumstances of such low diversity that they are effec-
tively cut off from the circulation of energies and possibilities for qualitative
enhancement that alone sustain the possibility of truly flourishing rather than
merely existing.28
In a worst-case scenario, the public sphere may become so distorted by changes
propagating through the environment, but originating (as I hope will become appar-
ent over succeeding chapters) from a wide range of other sectors, that participation
in it will prove almost unavoidably degrading. A report commissioned by the US
Pentagon estimates, for instance, that within the next two decades, global climate
change and instability will make it impossible for as many as 4 billion people
globally to enjoy sufficient access to such basic resources as potable water to
sustain reasonable levels of sanitation and health. The report suggests further that
by 2025, ecologically driven military actions (both to secure scarce resources and
to stop cross border migration of deprived populations numbering in the billions)
will pose the single greatest threat to national and global security.29
I am convinced that it is possible to avert such a scenario. Doing so will
require, however, a significant change in how we understand and respond to
environmental change. Any viable liberation ecology must consistently and
meaningfully address both natural and urban environments, in conjunction with,
and in the service of, promoting and refining their sustained and mutually
enhancing interdependence. The concepts of beauty and diversity, as understood
in a broadly Buddhist context, open up a critical space for weaving together these
domains and for significantly revising environmental ethics and activism.
As a specific relational quality and direction, beauty insures that the temporality
of environmental ethics is deeply dramatic—that it is karmically apt. The concept
of diversity provides critical leverage in realizing the kinds of normative consensus
that are needed to negotiate among competing interests in situations characterized
by complex interdependence. This is especially important for any global environ-
mental ethic because of the astonishing range of ecological and cultural systems
that must be brought into mutually enhancing harmony and because of the full
range of forces—especially the socio-economic and the political—that bear on
the environment. In sharp distinction from values like justice that are thickest at
the local level and thinnest at the global, diversity becomes thicker or more robust
as one moves from local toward global contexts.30 As such, it is highly suited to
the necessary work of coordinating evaluative engagement with the dynamics of
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the public sphere and promising as a core value in a robust ethics of interde-
pendence—an ethics that enjoys critical purchase in the full range of domains in
and through which public good is realized.
An environmental ethics robustly devoted to enhancing diversity in both natural
and urban settings promises to be capable of enabling differences of norms and
values that come into focus with increasing global interdependence to truly make
a difference. At the same time it would enable infusing environmental sensitivi-
ties and sensibilities throughout the full spectrum of critical responses to our
increasingly complex global interdependence, generating perhaps unprecedented
potentials for realizing sustained and liberating ecological karma—the orienta-






Relating the personal and the public
Along with vitality, longevity and beauty, health is often cited in both early and
later Buddhist teachings as a general outcome of good karma and, in its ultimate
expression, as a specific outcome of correct and sustained practice and awaken-
ing. This suggests seeing health as a relational achievement correlated—either
positively or negatively—with sustained patterns of values–intentions–actions.
Because such abiding patterns of value–intention–action reflect both personal and
communal sensibilities and sensitivities, such a conception of health would seem
particularly suited to the task of evaluating and revising healthcare policy and its
contributions to realizing public good.
Perhaps inevitably, discussions of health as a public good and as a focus of
public policy have overwhelmingly focused on human health. That conventional
focus will be initially followed here in developing a fully relational conception of
health. But Buddhist teachings on the emptiness or horizonless interdependence
and interpenetration of all things ultimately command going beyond this conven-
tional focus on the purely human. To the extent that relationships are ontologically
basic, we are compelled to see that healthcare policy cannot be truly effective
unless it is rooted in a conception of health that has traction across all relational
domains and at all scales. That is, our conception of health must allow us to speak
usefully—and not merely metaphorically—about the health of environments,
economies, and political institutions. This means as well, however, seeing how
the values centrally involved in realizing liberating environments—appreciation,
contribution, beauty and diversity—are also relevant in realizing personal and com-
munal health. We should, in short, begin seeing the meaning of a fully coordinated
approach to public policy and the realization of public good.
The meaning of health
It was only upon venturing beyond the gardens and walls of his father’s exquisitely
managed and trouble-free estate that Siddharta Gautama was moved to undertake the
six-year journey that culminated in his realization of liberating intimacy with all
things. That is, only when his ignorance was dispelled about sickness, old age, and
death, along with the myriad indignities these inflict on us, did the young prince first
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realize bodhicitta—a mind intent on full awakening. Tellingly, as he began teaching
others to author their own liberation from trouble and suffering, his primary
metaphor for the work to be undertaken was that of “healing the wound of existence.”
Fundamental to the Buddha’s public teaching was enhancing awareness of
dukkha (“suffering” or, better still, “trouble”) and the conditional pattern of its
arising. Throughout his teaching career, the troubling exigencies of physical ill-
ness, old age, and death (along with losing what has been cherished and being
unable to attain what is desired) served as concrete examples of dukkha. This
apparent concern with bodily trouble and suffering did not, however, result in
treatment regimes that were specifically or even primarily somatic. In spite of the
custom of referring to the practices recommended for alleviating and eventually
eliminating dukkha as medicines, the Buddha’s evident and unwavering strategy
was to disclose and provide means of dissolving the general patterns of interde-
pendent conditions through which trouble and suffering arise. As summarized in
the teaching of the twelve-fold chain of interdependent origination, this general
pattern of conditions centers, not on factual or so-called objective conditions but,
on unskillful or unwholesome (akusala) patterns of attention and conduct.1
In the course of offering suitable illustrations of trouble and suffering and the
causes of their arising, the Buddha did address why it is that some of us are lame
or chronically ill and others are not, or why some members of a family will fall
to an epidemic infection while others will not. Such explanations were never
medical. Although the Indian Ayurvedic medical tradition was already well-
developed and afforded sophisticated diagnostics and treatment regimes, no sig-
nificant appeal was made to this body of knowledge and technique. Instead, the
Buddha’s explanations were consistently and explicitly karmic. That is, they
focused on how certain values and intentions—alone or in combination—can
troublingly shape the experiential space of sentient being.
Given the generally restricted availability of sophisticated medical knowledge
and attention, and the relatively limited control over illness and the effects of
aging that medicine afforded at the time, this focus on values and intentions might
be seen as simple pragmatism—a “best” response in the context of scarce
resources. In light of the power of modern, technologically driven medicine to
identify disease causalities and control both physical and psychic states, it might
be assumed that karmic explanations can be dismissed as no longer relevant
artifacts of a “less advanced” age. For reasons that I hope to make clear, this
would be a great mistake.
Prevailing mainstream conceptions of health in health policy
Until quite recently, the most widely prevalent modern conceptions of health have
been polarized according to whether they assume that health is most appropriately
and primarily defined in terms of disease or of well-being.
Conceptions biased toward the former assumption take health to be the natural
equilibrium that is manifest when an organism’s overall mode of functioning is
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not disturbed by disease or infirmity. Health, in other words, is simply the
absence of disease or abnormality. It is the default mode of organic functioning.
This negative approach to defining health has the advantage of allowing for rela-
tively precise quantitative assessments of an organism’s health status at any given
point of time, as well as for setting broad population baselines for normal func-
tioning. Most present day medical treatment and prevention regimes either tacitly
or explicitly invoke such an understanding of health.
Conceptions of health biased toward the centrality of well-being yield more
qualitative approaches to assessing health that are rooted in recognition of the
normative character of healthy functioning. Here, both individual subjective per-
spectives and culture are taken to have crucial roles in defining the meaning of
health. According to such a view, health is best understood as the optimal state or
functioning of an organism rather than a simple baseline status. This conception
of health is often found in connection with fitness regimes and in sports medicine
where the desired levels of bodily functioning are set well above baseline norms
drawn from the general population. Implicit in such a view is recognition that—
like gender and ethnicity, for example—health is to a great degree socially con-
structed and can only be assessed fully in broadly relational terms. This is
concisely reflected in the World Health Organization (WHO) definition of health
as “a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not simply the
absence of disease or infirmity.”
Current medical practice and policy tend to reinforce seeing the former
conception of health as ultimately more fundamental. Individual health assess-
ments are primarily based on standard measures of vital signs, the analysis of var-
ious body fluids, mapping the bodily interior, its skeletal structure, organs, and
electrochemical functioning through one or another scanning technology, and so
on. Medically addressing health problems means, first and foremost, restoring
normal patterns of functioning and hence the balance and integrity of the indi-
vidual patient’s bodily system. Treatment thus pivots on identifying the proximal
causes of functional or structural irregularities and either removing these sources
or deflecting their influence through surgical, pharmaceutical, or biomechanical
means. Granted secure levels of functioning with respect to population wide stan-
dards or norms, concern may then be directed to optimizing well-being, not just
in terms of quantifiably measurable physical fitness but also in terms of felt
experience and social reintegration.
Increasingly, however, it is being realized that the source causes of disease
and infirmity are not entirely or even most fundamentally biological. Thus, in a
1996 Institute of Medicine report—Global Health in Transition: A Synthesis—it
is noted that many major health sector problems are driven by “commanding
realities that lie primarily outside that sector.” In other words, “many major health
problems have social origins . . . and the most powerful levers for achieving
durable improvements in human health status in any country . . . lie outside the
health sector.”2 Indeed, one could well map the causality of health problems as a
series of concentric environs that include, in order of causal immediacy: the
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physical environment; social and cultural context; the sphere of commerce;
national, international, and global economics; and political forces from the local
to the global.3
The broad point being made in this and similar reports is that health lies at the
nexus of significant interdependencies obtaining among diverse physiological,
psychological, social, cultural, economic, political, and environmental realities,
and there is no sustainable way of promoting health and addressing existing
health problems without taking these interdependencies into critical account. The
most effective or crucially underdeveloped ways of responding to health problems
and promoting healing may not be medical, but cultural, social, economic, and
political.
At the same time that global health policy has begun to incorporate recognitions
of the relationally complex nature of health and the necessarily extra-medical
nature of perhaps the most important levers for bringing about sustained healing
and health, medical practitioners and researchers have begun to recognize a
parallel dissolution of boundaries between bodily health and mental and social
well-being. For example, the concepts of allostasis and allostatic load have
recently been gaining considerable currency as therapeutically useful means of
framing the central role played by the mind–body relationship in health and in the
treatment of health problems.4
Allostasis refers to the process of maintaining stability in the course of
responding to challenge and reflects an understanding of health as a capacity for
adaptation. Allostatic load consists of the cumulative somatic and psychic burden
of repeatedly responding to challenge. This includes not only the total effects of
chronic stress but also all the genetic, developmental, and environmental factors
that condition the effectiveness of adaptive responses to challenge. A rapidly
growing body of medical research now confirms the extent to which the capacity
for adaptation is conditioned by the interdependence of experience (mediated
by the central nervous system), the endocrine system (that chemically governs
body functions), and the immune system (which organizes responses to infection
and other challenges).
Most medical research focuses on gaining clarity about the process of allostasis,
as it plays out in—or throughout—the human body. But such a conception of
health as a function of adaptivity is broadly consonant with seeing environmental
well-being as a function of robust ecological diversity and begins approaching the
generality needed in a conception of health that is relevant—and, indeed, increas-
ingly so—at scales ranging from the microbial to the ecological. At the very least,
it urges affirmation that health arises through open and properly aligned and
balanced reciprocal interactions among physical, biological, emotional, cognitive,
social, and cultural dimensions of human being. Health is not a state to be
achieved and maintained—the model of homeostasis; it is a distinctively creative
quality of interrelatedness.5
In combination, such developments are beginning to elaborate connections
between Western medical perceptions of the human body and health, and those
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proper to some traditional medical systems—for example, Ayurvedic and
traditional Chinese medicine—that have treated the human body as a profoundly
open system through which a wide spectrum of forces and environments are
brought into qualitatively complex and sustained relationship. Although the psy-
chic, somatic, and social domains can be considered as functionally separate
for heuristic purposes, in actuality they are irreducibly interdependent. Truly
comprehensive healing must address all three.
With the ongoing dissolution of the kinds of strict, ontological differences
that—especially in Western intellectual history—have long been assumed to exist
between mind and body, individual and environment, or self and society, it
becomes possible to speak in other than purely metaphorical terms about the
health of a mind, a society, an economy, a political system, or an environment.
Indeed, it becomes possible and apparently imperative to perceive significant
continuity among them.
Nevertheless, there remains a tendency—particularly in medical and policy
circles—to pair physiological and environmental factors on one hand and
psychological and social factors on another. The logic of these pairings, as “nat-
ural” as they might seem, reflects persistent modern (Cartesian) biases toward
seeing body and mind as intrinsically separate, with the former reflecting the
domain of objective facts and the latter the domain of subjective (or intersubjec-
tive) meanings. But such pairings also announce the absence of a robust set of
concepts linking the practices through which physiological/environmental facts
and psychosocial meanings are discerned, attended, and understood. They
announce, in short, an epistemological and metaphysical lacuna—a missing
“middle ground.”
Thus, while medical research has clearly demonstrated that depression is
correlated with neurochemical imbalances, it is not clear if one is cause and the
other is effect or if they are in complex causal reciprocity. While it is evident that
community’s socioeconomic status independently affects morbidity and mortal-
ity, it is far from evident how that could be so. And while it is now widely docu-
mented that such psychosocial factors as characteristic thinking styles, relational
skills, and religious or cultural beliefs affect both resilience to and recovery from
illness or injury, as well as how successfully the effects of surgery or adversity are
overcome, it is not evident how this occurs. Resilience ultimately rests on cellular
processes that build and protect cells and tissues, and it is unclear, for example,
how character disposition (e.g. optimistic or pessimistic) or religious commitments
are linked to these processes.6
In short, what is lacking is a set conceptual resources for attending to and
appreciating patterns of interdependence as such—resources that can only
emerge in the context of a worldview and metaphysics taking relationality to be
more basic than any individual things being related. More specifically, what is
lacking is a set of conceptual resources that is sufficiently robust to render prac-
tically evident linkages between values, intentions, emotions, and relational skills
on one hand, and the factual realities of the body, the physical environment, and
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socioeconomic status on the other. This is precisely what the Buddhist teaching
of karma aims at enabling and encouraging us to cultivate.
Toward a general Buddhist conception of health 
as relational virtuosity
The conceptions of health that are embedded in Buddhist practice contrast
sharply with the most prevalent views circulating today both in the general pop-
ulation and among policy makers. Much like the concepts now emerging on at
least some stretches of the cutting edge of medical science, Buddhist conceptions
of health elide any clear demarcation between the psychic and the somatic, as
well as between the cognitive and emotional, and between the personal and social.
Cultural, social, economic, and political forces are no less crucial factors in con-
ditioning levels of health and patterns of healing than are beliefs, diet, and hered-
ity. From a Buddhist perspective, however, the degree to which individual
organisms or persons remain central to prevailing conceptions of health can be
seen as an index of the degree to which these conceptions fail to accept the irre-
ducibility of interdependence. Ultimately, health cannot consist as a quality or
condition of any individual body or mind, considered in even relative isolation
only. Rather, health consists as a quality of dynamically complex relational
wholes. It should not be seen as fundamentally a state-of-affairs, either normal or
optimal, but as a situational direction or relational heading.
Such an understanding of health derives from the signal aim of Buddhist
practice to resolve suffering or trouble and the centrality of karma in doing so. It
is thus an understanding of health in which values, meanings, and intentions are
pivotal. According to the core teachings of Buddhism, trouble and suffering orig-
inate in relational patterns that are inflected in unwholesome or unskillful
(akusala) ways, most crucially as a function of ignorance (avijja) and habit
formations (saÅkhara). These—along with the craving (tajha) to which they are
conducive—are the primary roots of illness or malaise; healing begins with their
situation-specific dissolution.
The term customarily translated as ignorance—avijja—literally means “not
seeing” but has the specifically Buddhist connotation of failing to see and to
appreciate the interdependence obtaining among all things. Thus, especially
in early Buddhist teachings, ignorance is repeatedly associated with the claim,
“I am”—the assertion of a self or ego that exists or literally “stands apart from”
from its situation as an independent thing or being. More generally, this was
understood as the assertion of any fixed identity or essential, abiding nature;
any absolute truth or falsehood; or any context-free good or evil. Trouble and suf-
fering derive from excluding the profoundly rich middle ground that obtains
among all things, cutting off “self ” from “other” and “this” from “that.” The
Buddhist practice of seeing all things as troubled or troubling, as impermanent,
and as having no-self, empty of fixed essences—the so-called teaching of the
three marks that is common to all Buddhist traditions—is the root practice of
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restoring that middle ground of interdependence and healing the “wound of
existence.”
It is important to understand the subtlety of the critique of self-existence in
which Buddhist conceptions of health and healing are rooted. Nagarjuna, the pre-
eminent second-century Indian Buddhist philosopher, concludes his major work
by claiming that the Buddha’s entire teaching career was an effort to bring about
the “relinquishing of all views.”7 It is through establishing views—that is, fixed
perspectives on what and how things are and are-not—that the “wound of
existence” is inflicted and our situation rendered ripe for calamity, contention,
and conflict.
As Nagarjuna makes clear, this is in part because no view can afford any more
than limited insight into the overall complexion of our situation—a single profile
of things and their contexts. Views arise only when the emptiness of all things is
no longer fully appreciated—that is, when their interdependence and mutual rel-
evance is in some measure effectively ignored. Indeed, what we refer to as
“things”—whether rocks or trees or clouds in the sky, individual persons and the
societies of which they are parts, or situations and historical moments—all
emerge only as functions of habitually compounding patterns of limited and lim-
iting relationship. Actions undertaken on the basis of such relationships neces-
sarily interrupt or at least deflect the free and horizonless play of relationships
that constitutes the emptiness or mutual relevance of all things. Ignorant actions
prevent realizing how each thing actually and potentially contributes to all other
things and thus what each thing could mean for us. To be ignorant is to be starved
of meaning, to be unaware of how to proceed in ways not conducive to trouble or
suffering.
When patterns of attention prevail that do not penetrate skillfully to the
relational origins of things and that are not open to the emptiness of all things,
action is formulaic and reactive rather than flexible and responsive. That is, igno-
rance is at once fueled by and fuels habit formations or karmic dispositions that
are at best only narrowly effective. It is important to stress that such habits and
dispositions arise as patterns of value-laden action that were originally under-
taken intentionally and effectively. But once these patterns become habitual or
sedimented, they are liable to persisting in spite of significant changes of cir-
cumstance or context. Should this happen, these patterns of value-laden activity
can cross the threshold of their own utility and begin generating problematic and
potentially catastrophic, ironic consequences.
Rather than blending and blending-in with the limitless, mutual relevance of all
things, attention and action rooted in ignorance impose a single meaning or set of
meanings on things—determining what things “are” and “will be.” In a world
composed of things with essentially fixed natures, this might not be troubling.
Determining what things really are and are-not is to be able to act precisely and
certainly in pursuing our own interests. But in a world in which all things are best
seen as impermanent or dynamic, in which our own interests are finally insepa-
rable from those of others, and in which the predictable and the unprecedented are
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often profoundly intertwined, deeply sedimented habits are ultimately violating
liabilities.
Again, this is not to deny that in their most rudimentary forms, habits formations
and dispositions can be quite useful. But their advantage is highly context-
dependent or conventional. It is, for example, habitual for American city-dwellers
to glance first left and then right before crossing a street. While traveling in Japan
or Thailand, however, where one drives on the left-hand side of the road, this auto-
matic safety precaution becomes disconcertingly out of place and dangerous.
When habits or dispositions are developed with respect to what things mean,
untoward consequences can compound with startling rapidity and complexity,
and with histories that cannot be as easily undone or reversed as the act of step-
ping off a sidewalk to find a previously unseen vehicle streaking by within inches.
Much humor pivots on two people attributing quite different meanings to an
apparently common situation or occurrence, bringing into focus distinct patterns
of relevance among the diverse aspects of the situation. As matters unfold, unbe-
known to our hapless comic figures, these patterns of both assumed and intended
meaning are ballooning and diverging ever more dramatically until something
happens that brings about their sudden, explosively comic collapse. Of course,
such collapses can be just as well be tragic.
What must be kept in mind is that all such habits and dispositions—whether
uniquely personal or culturally common—develop on the basis of consistently
maintained patterns of values–intentions–actions. In Buddhist terms, they are
karmic formations that will necessarily have experienced consequences.
According to the Buddhist teaching of karma, although the critiques of self and
existence are pivotal for meaningfully resolving trouble or suffering, just as piv-
otal is realizing precisely how things have come to be, “as they have come to be”
(yathabhutam), in meticulous consonance with our own abiding patterns of atten-
tion and concern, our patterns of intentional activity and values. What we attend,
value, and intend crucially shapes the habits of thought, emotion, communication,
and action that substantially make up what each of us refers to as “me” and that
fundamentally condition what we experience. In both direct and indirect ways,
these patterned and patterning habit formations shape our life stories and who we
are within them. And because these habit formations arise in the course of
ongoing interactions with others and our environments, informed by our specific
cultures and histories, the outcomes and opportunities they occasion are to some
degree always ours and never simply mine or yours. Karma is invariably shared.
To the degree that it is wholesomely virtuosic (kusala), Buddhist practice enables
a healing critique of both self and society.
The teaching of karma can be placed alongside the teachings of no-self and
emptiness as among those most crucial to Buddhist practice and, individually, as
perhaps the most profoundly challenging. It invites us to realize that we live in a
cosmos that is irreducibly dramatic—a cosmos in which all things are meaningfully
interdependent, a cosmos in which our own values and intentions are just as pow-
erful as such scientifically documented forces as gravity and electromagnetism in
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configuring our bodies, our lives, and our circumstances. Reacting or responding
to challenging situations without a clear understanding of their dramatic prece-
dents and consequents—the currents of meaning, outcomes, and opportunities
that constitute our karma—is almost invariably a guarantee of continued, if not
intensified, trouble or suffering.
In combination, ignorance and habitual karmic dispositions render us deeply
susceptible to compromised or eroded capacities for health and healing. On one
hand, this is because such dispositions effectively blind us to everything except
what we take to be good and relevant, what we want and intend—the meanings
we attribute to our situation. This, however, is to be blind to all but a very limited
range of the practically infinite resources always and everywhere present for
revising the meaning of our situation. It is to be almost exclusively concerned
with realizing desired outcomes and not with freely responding to opportunity.
On the other hand, such habits are at the same time slowly draining us of those
resources that we can claim—with qualified accuracy—as our own.
In early Buddhism, drains of vital—especially attentive—resources for
responding skillfully to trouble or suffering are referred to as asava (literally,
“infectious outflows”), the waning of which is said to be the advent of wisdom
(pañña). Such drains mark the misdirection of vital energies and resources—their
transformation into waste. At the same time, these wasteful outflows infect or pol-
lute our situation. That is, they degrade the relational processes and capacities
characterizing our situation.8 Consider, for example, how one person’s habit of
automatically declining or qualifying the advice or help of others will, over time,
lead them to feeling blocked from offering anything to him; or how a couple
slowly comes undone through a silent tyranny of the familiar as one or both mem-
bers fall into the habit of seeing their partner in essentially fixed and predictable
terms and as offering nothing new.
Early Buddhist teachings on the “four nutriments” (ahara)—material
nutriments (food, water, air), sensory contacts (through sight, hearing, taste,
touch, and smell, but also thinking), volitional complexes, and consciousness—
suggest that the long-term effects of habit formations can be conceived as analo-
gous to those of malnutrition. Ignorance and habit formations effectively restrict
the degree to which we are nourished by our situation. Just as there are material
diets that can be physically debilitating, there are patterns of experience—sensory
contact, volition, and consciousness—that bring about an analogous compromise
of emotional, cognitive, and social functioning, resilience, and coping ability.
Health depends upon realizing a proper range, quality, and balance among all four
nutriments.
Habit formations bring about restricted patterns of awareness or sensory
contact that can be just as corrosive of health as diets severely lacking in partic-
ular vitamins or minerals. But they necessarily also restrict our intentional range
and thus our capacity for meaning-making commitments—constraining the
extent to which we can creatively direct attention and action. They are impedi-
ments to realizing the meaning of vows and of honoring them, thus blocking us
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from being able to manifest the unlimited skillful means (upaya) of the
bodhisattva or enlightening being. Finally, granted the Buddhist understanding of
consciousness as a quality of relationship—a relationship out of which it is pos-
sible to abstract both “sensing organism” and “sensed environment” or “actor”
and “acted upon”—it is impossible to disentangle karma (values–intentions–actions)
for fouling our environment from karma for fouling our selves; karma for stress-
ing our environment from karma for stressing ourselves. Again, a habitually
degraded environment is inseparable from habitually degraded consciousness.
Yet habit formations with respect to sensation and intentional activities aimed
at managing the content of experience are basic to the construction of self-iden-
tity. They are the foundation on which we are able consistently to claim, “I am.”
The Buddhist critique of self and existence aims precisely at dissolving the sets
of fixed dispositions by means of which we channel the play of relationships con-
stitutive of our situation and carve out an ostensibly private stream of experience
that we then try managing to the best of our ability. This is the root expression of
unwholesome (akusala) attention and health-compromising conduct. The
Buddhist critique of self is aimed at ending our systematic malnutrition. Health is
virtuosity directed toward realizing liberating and nourishing intimacy among all
things.
Implications of seeing health as situational and relational
To this point, we are carried both by some current cutting edge scientific and
medical thinking about health and by traditional Buddhist analyses to an appar-
ently common recognition that healing depends on capacities for innovation,
adaptive resilience, and sustained yet flexible coping activity. But the paths taken
prior to and after this point of intersection differ in important ways. From a
Buddhist perspective, all illnesses and infirmity are to some degree karmic. Fully
restoring and sustainably enhancing health depends ultimately on reordering
existing values or developing new values to redirect situational meaning.
In a rudimentary way, this can be made concrete by considering what happens
when a child plays soccer intensely enough, on a day hot enough, to suffer dehy-
dration. From the prevailing medical perspective, this is a health problem that
occurs because the body loses more fluid in the cooling process related to high
levels of exertion than it can draw from either internal reserves or through exter-
nal intake of fluid. Unchecked, dehydration leads to increasingly severe overheat-
ing. In extreme cases, this can lead to fainting or even a shutdown of key bodily
functions that could potentially result in death. Treating dehydration is a matter of
slowly replenishing bodily fluids and depleted electrolytes.
From a Buddhist perspective, this familiar explanation is at best only partial.
Dehydration is not simply a problematic body state occurring as part of a purely
physical sequence of causes and effects. Rather, dehydration signals a peculiarly
compressed or narrowed quality of relationship, comprising both the child and
her situation, that results in the absence of thirst-quenching conduct. Dehydration
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depends on a contraction of awareness sufficient for the child to become
attentively isolated within her environment. In effect, she becomes so absorbed in
her play that she simply fails to notice that her body is producing more heat than
her immediate environment is able to absorb. She becomes a potentially danger-
ous interruption in the situational whole—a gap in the “allostatic” dynamic of the
playground.
The possible reasons for this contraction and breakdown are virtually limitless.
It might be that she knew she was getting hot and thirsty but didn’t want to stop
because she was on the verge of beating a long-standing rival. Perhaps she didn’t
notice her need for water because she was thinking of an argument with her father
and punishing her body as a way of punishing him. Perhaps she was driven
beyond her limits by a soccer coach focused on creating a championship team and
laboring under the impression that there can be “no gain without pain.”
The current medical view sees these “circumstantial” conditions as incidental
to the direct causes of dehydration and treats the child accordingly. A Buddhist
perspective insists on taking them fully into account, especially the roles played
by both attention and intention. Treatment and healing then necessarily imply
learning—not just an extended sequence of situational conditions leading to a
normally cooling body, but the incorporation of new insights and resolves into the
history of the child, her soccer playing friends, her family, and so on. Healing
does not simply imply a return to previous somatic norms but also meaningfully
heightened awareness and increased relational capacity. It is thus part of a
Buddhist conception of health that healing from an injury or illness leaves us
healthier—perhaps stronger and more flexible, but always more attentively astute
and actively attuned—than we were before the injury or illness.
Such an understanding of health and healing has the important policy implication
that healthcare systems can be evaluated, not just in terms of the extent and effi-
ciency of the services they offer, and the proportion of the overall population that
they reach, but also in terms of how conducive they are to increased resilience,
successful coping, heightened and more flexible patterns of attention and action,
and learning. In more common, conventional terms, it suggests evaluating health-
care delivery in terms of how successfully it brings about increased community-
based responsibility for both prevention and treatment.9 The most effective
healthcare systems will result in populations that are increasingly capable of
assessing and responding to their own health challenges. They will not result—as
do our present, globally standardizing approaches to healthcare—in populations
that are increasingly dependent upon being cured through professionally delivered
expert services.
The medical erosion of personal and 
public health resources
Over the past several decades, with only minor exceptions, the global trend in
healthcare has been to converge on the model of highly technological medical
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practice and healthcare delivery systems that has come to be the norm in most highly
developed nations. Historically, these systems are rooted in nineteenth-century
advances in scientific medicine that resulted in unprecedented abilities for address-
ing infectious disease. First through improved sanitation in medical environments
and through scientifically designed public water and waste systems, mortality rates
dropped dramatically. Through increased understanding of causal relations among
various physiological systems, and through technological advances like the X-ray
and EKG machines, early diagnosis and improved treatment regimes developed with
startling rapidity throughout the twentieth century, as well as improved abilities to
treat severe injuries of the sort that would previously have resulted in permanent
disability or death. In combination, the systematic improvement of public sanitation
and the delivery of modern, scientific medical care has enabled societies throughout the
developed world and in much of the developing world to undergo both demographic
and epidemiological transitions to secure remarkably increased life expectancies
and a shift from communicable to chronic or lifestyle illnesses as the greatest
contributors to the overall burdens of disease and disability.10
We have thus come to live in a world where almost god-like control over our
material afflictions is generally available. We can reattach severed limbs. We can
remove cataracts. We can transplant organs, replace damaged heart valves, and
manufacture arrays of chemicals capable of eliminating the experience of pain,
depression, and sleeplessness. We can change our sex and can map our geneti-
cally determined health liabilities virtually from the moment of conception. It is
not altogether a fantasy to imagine a day in which it might reasonably be consid-
ered the right of each and every human being to pass his or her life completely
free of experienced disease or decrepitude.
Most of us could not imagine forfeiting the control we have earned over the
factual dimensions of health and healing. By all standard measures, current state-
of-the-art medical practice and healthcare are good for each and every one of us.
But from a Buddhist perspective the further question must be asked whether such
technologically driven medicine and healthcare are truly good for all of us. That
is, do they bring about increased relational capacities and deepening community
resources for responding to challenge and adversity, or do they render us increas-
ingly dependent on expert services that, furthermore, cannot be made equally and
sustainably available to all?
As I have argued at length elsewhere,11 when carried out consistently enough,
solving problems through exerting control (technological or otherwise) is con-
ducive to a karma or pattern of values–intentions–practices and associated
outcomes/opportunities that eventually carries us across a threshold of utility
beyond which our problem-solving efforts and techniques begin generating fur-
ther, slightly different problems of the sort that render precisely these kinds of
efforts and techniques indispensable. That is, such efforts and techniques begin
reproducing the conditions of their own necessity. Thus, it is in societies with the
highest average speed of transportation that the greatest amount of time is spent
in traveling; it is in those with the most advanced medical care that the average
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person receives the most medical attention. For better or worse, increasing our
capacities and willingness to control means that there will never be a dearth of
things and conditions to control, and also that control itself will become increas-
ingly ambient as a relationship-biasing value. The “cyclic” nature of karma virtually
guarantees that phases of being in control will be matched by phases of being
subject to control. Being able to exert virtually unlimited control over our bodies
and our circumstances means living in circumstances and with bodies that are
almost always in need thereof.
The implications of this for healthcare policy can be brought into focus by
considering the grounds for Ivan Illich’s iconoclastic conclusion, “the medical
establishment has become a major threat to health.”12 Illich begins by admitting
that while average life expectancies have risen in all societies that have signifi-
cantly modernized, there is little evidence suggesting that institutionalized medical
diagnosis and treatment have played the dominant causal role in these gains.
Instead, the primary cause for decreased mortality rates would seem to be simple
sanitation practices, not sophisticated medical treatment. Illich then details the
specific counter-productivity of institutionalized healthcare through documenting
the epidemic rise of iatrogenic—or “physician originated”—illness. Beyond a
certain level of institutionalization and sophistication, medical treatment begins
producing illness, not alleviating it.13
While initial responses to Illich’s conclusions from within both the medical
community and policy circles were cool at best, research into iatrogenic health
problems has continued to build over the last quarter century and has become
virtually mainstream. For example, in a 2000 report, To Err Is Human: Building
a Safer Healthcare System,14 the Institute of Medicine conservatively estimated
that the number of annual deaths in the United States attributable to medical
errors or the side-effects of treatment exceeded that of the eighth leading cause of
death. In a study published the same year in the prestigious Journal of the
American Medical Association,15 non-error effects of drug treatments were also
included to bring the total of iatrogenic deaths to 250,000 per year—the third
leading cause of death behind heart disease and cancer.16
As made clear in the Institute of Medicine report and in the mission statement
of the American Iatrogenic Association, the prevailing understanding is that the
threats to health posed by institutionalized medicine are a function of human
error. From this, it follows that addressing those threats is primarily a matter of
better disciplining hygienic practices in healthcare settings and instituting more
effective medical training and accountability regimes. Illich’s most controversial
and radical point has largely been overlooked: that the threats to health posed by
institutionalized healthcare consist of ironic consequences of medical technology
and a restrictive definition of health. Modern medicine has not given rise to
miraculously healthy populations but rather to populations that expect, demand,
and eventually require ever more miraculous cures.
Anticipating much of contemporary medical science and quite consonant with
Buddhist conceptions of health, Illich defined health as “the intensity with which
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individuals cope with their internal states and environmental conditions.”
“[H]ealth levels,” he insists, “will be at their optimum when the environment
brings out autonomous, personal, and responsible coping abilities.”17 Human
health is not just somatic or psychic, but also ethical and political, and rests on a
foundation of actively cultivated critical consciousness. For Illich, institutionally
provided healthcare is conducive to systematic health denial insofar as it under-
mines the conservation and development of both personal and public health
resources by encouraging dependence on essentially commodified health serv-
ices. In Illich’s terms, a functional healthcare system should bring about greater
self-reliance and increased capacities for coping with both internal and environ-
mental challenges. Institutionalized medicine precipitates, instead, a recession of
responsive resources throughout the served population.18
In spite of recent protocols (motivated in no small part by the high cost of
malpractice insurance and litigation) which attempt to make the patient a partici-
pant in treatment decisions, institutionalized medicine continues to foster reliance
on healthcare professionals. Inviting patients to select among various care options
for the purpose of restoring “normal” psychophysical functioning is not the same
as fostering increasingly skilled attention to our own, always unique, circumstances
in a more virtuosic and responsive manner. Freedoms of choice are not a substi-
tute for capacities of relating freely. A quarter century after Illich’s iconoclastic
conclusion that institutionalized healthcare is a form of systematic health denial,
we are still being widely trained to ignore our own personal, relational resources
for healing in favor of habitually consulting with medical professionals who, we
believe, will be able to provide us with a scientifically proven cure.19
Illich is undeniably correct in countering the fallacy that universal individual
benefits entail necessary communal benefits and reasonably sees the counter-
productivity of medicine in contemporary society as a special case of the general
counter-productivity of technologies (in the broadest sense of the word) that have
crossed their threshold of utility. Illich’s own belief was that the key response to med-
ical nemesis should be establishing limits to the growth of institutionalized medicine.
But as pointed out by some critics, it is a peculiarity of this response that it could only
be carried out by a world-wide authoritarian regime and would for that reason be no
less self-defeating in Illich’s terms than the medical and technological practices it
would ideally restrain.20 Either way, the value of control would remain central to the
healthcare process. In Buddhist terms, the shortcoming of Illich’s analysis is his fail-
ure to recognize fully the pivotal role that is played in health and healing by karma:
the conditioning of outcomes/opportunities by values–intentions–practices.
Granted the broader conceptions of health that can be variously formulated in
terms of contemporary medical thought and research or in terms of Buddhist
teachings on interdependence, emptiness, and karma, disease and infirmity can-
not be adequately treated as disturbances of our bodies. Indeed, in a truly com-
prehensive healthcare system, treatment must be directed at the total complex
pattern of our interrelatedness. Healing cannot take place fully if restricted to
repairing damaged tissues or individual psyches. Damaged, atrophied, and
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blocked relationships, too, must be carefully and meaningfully repaired, revitalized,
and opened. Indeed, primary healthcare properly consists of enhancing meaningful
relational capabilities and commitments.
The total range of relational capabilities that must be considered relevant
necessarily spans the entire spectrum running from the biophysical relationships
linking organisms and the environmental systems of which they are parts, to per-
ceptually and conceptually mediated relationships, to relationships that are pre-
dominantly emotional, familial, social, economic, cultural, political, and spiritual.
In every particular instance, of course, the relationships most directly linked to
compromised health and the prospects of comprehensive healing will vary.
Different weights will be associated, in effect, with each of these centers of rela-
tional gravity, suggesting that some be given more urgent attention than others
depending on the degree to which they impede responsive flexibility and shared
meaning-making activity. Ultimately, however, it is the entire pattern of interde-
pendence comprising all such centers of relational gravity that must be seen as the
basic “unit” of diagnosis and treatment.
Thus, while it is certainly appropriate to address matters of diet in treating
patient obesity and associated risks of cardio-vascular disease, doing so is not
effectively separable from addressing issues related to family history and dynam-
ics, culinary capabilities, and food culture. Neither is it separable from addressing
issues related to global patterns of consumption, to the effects of advertising on
those patterns, and to the politics of international trade. It is not enough to make a
healthier diet known to and practically available, (e.g. in terms of preparation and
cost) to populations at health risk due to obesity if, at the same time, there is not a
concerted effort to revise food culture or to constrain the production and aggres-
sive marketing of fast food. That would be like building a roof over an individual
garden to keep it from flooding when all the surrounding area is subject to an unre-
lenting downpour of rain and pitched to direct runoff into the garden. Truly com-
prehensive health responses might well include activating capabilities for critically
assessing and altering existing biochemical conditions and personal habits but also
a range of relevant social, economic, and political dynamics and institutions.
At the same time, the capabilities for undertaking a healthy transformation of
one’s total relational complex are not, by themselves, sufficient to bring about
sustained movement in that direction. In the absence of sustained commitments
to change across the full range of relevant domains, changes are as likely to can-
cel as complement one another. Indeed, from a karmic perspective, health
responses or treatment strategies that are not framed in accordance with inducing
holistic commitments to healing patterns of relationship are, in time, very likely
to eventuate in mounting costs to overall health.
Going beyond the medicalization of health
Although health has long been considered a primary public good, and although
there is a long global history of publicly supported healthcare and of recognizing
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the role of broad environmental factors affecting health quality, our prevailing
conceptions of health and our healthcare institutions represent highly refined
products of the medicalization of health. They do not encourage treating personal
health, public health, and overall environmental health as an integral whole. They
do not establish practices for progressively enhancing the quality of interrelated-
ness obtaining among the personal, the public, and the environmental as such.
And they do not embody or express a keen and comprehensive sensitivity to the
crucial causal role of values in the emergence of both health threats and our
prospects for healing them. Especially in the context of twenty-first century real-
ities of complex interdependence and accelerating change, this constitutes an
increasingly acute health liability.
One need not look far for concrete examples. Contemporary scales and
patterns of globalization have driven and been driven by developments in trans-
portation technology that are actively transforming the spatial and temporal char-
acteristics of communicable disease transmission and creating conditions highly
conducive to the mutation and proliferation of disease agents. This was made
quite clear by the heavily reported outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) in 2003. Globalization processes are not just accelerating the
circulation of goods and services but also of bacterial and viral threats to personal
and public health. Yet, this specific kind of health threat—its media coverage and
very real and tragic human consequences notwithstanding—actually represents a
relatively minor challenge to existing healthcare regimes, as evidenced by the fact
that responding to SARS did not require any qualitative shift in health treatment
practices or strategies.
The extremely rapid accidental spread of a new pathogen presents a certain
kind of health problem. In the case of SARS, it was possible using current scien-
tific research methods to identify the pathogen and its characteristics with
remarkable efficiency, and to relatively quickly develop protocols both for safely
caring of those infected and for preventing the unintended transmission of the
pathogen through mass transportation systems. Although the global media cover-
age might have made it seem otherwise, the spread of SARS was halted in a
remarkably short period of time, with global fatalities held to under 1,000
(roughly 9% of cases reported worldwide). Problem solved.
The astonishing efficiency of the medical response to SARS contrasts sharply
with the ineffectiveness of the same globally standard medical research and
healthcare delivery system at coordinating successful responses to other, truly
major global health challenges. These include the global scourge of HIV/AIDS
with an estimated 40 million cases and 3 million deaths annually, the resurgence
of tuberculosis with 2 billion cases and 2 million deaths annually, the persistence
of malaria with roughly 500 million clinical cases and 1 million deaths annually,
and the lowered vitality associated with chronic under-nourishment. With the
exception of HIV/AIDS, these do not signal the advent of new pathogens. What
is new is their scale and apparent intractability in spite of the availability of
well-understood means of effective treatment. Globally entrenched HIV/AIDS,
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tuberculosis, malaria, and malnutrition are not health problems; they mark the
emergence of much more deeply challenging, globally conditioned health
predicaments. They make apparent a systematic distortion of global health and
healthcare outcomes and opportunities that cannot be traced ultimately to disease
agents, to medical/technological inadequacies, or to infrastructure shortfalls, but
to conflicts of values and interests. They cannot be solved by medically treating
individual patients or aggregated populations thereof but only by resolutely
redirecting complex and dramatically charged global interdependencies.
It is important to note that such predicaments are not a phenomenon confined to
the developing world as the aforementioned examples might suggest. They are
simply the largest-scale examples of a global shift toward predicament-compromised
health and healing. Consider the case of Washington, DC. The geography of health
in the capital of the world’s wealthiest country is so extremely and persistently
uneven that life expectancy is 57 years at the beginning of a half hour train ride
from the largely African-American and poor urban core and 77 years on arrival in
the predominantly white and affluent Maryland suburbs.21 This disparity exists in
a country with the world’s highest per capita spending on healthcare, in a city
where national health policy and research agendas are crafted, and within easy
commuting distance of the National Institute of Health (located, of course, in the
Maryland suburbs).
Contemporary globalization processes have brought about the interpenetration
of local and global spaces and are radically and fluidly reshaping the geography of
health in ways that apparently parallel the global reshaping of the geographies
of wealth, political power, and techno-cultural dominance. The dynamics of
increasing inequity that now characterize the global distribution of wealth and
access to resources both among and within societies are being meticulously repli-
cated in the health sector. In fact, these reiterative dynamics are most effectively
seen as interdependent expressions of a ubiquitous value-driven reconfiguration
of the topography of public space—a postmodern legacy of the global dominance
of modern values, especially the scientific values of universality and predictability,
the technologically embodied value of control, the market values of competition
and choice, and the political values of equality and autonomy.
Contrary to the speculations of conspiracy theorists, the inequity amplifying
effects of this reconfiguration are not planned consequences. Rather, they are the
result of a range of processes—social, economic, and political, but also scientific,
technological and cultural—that originally played out at relatively local scales
converging on a shared set of values and entering into relationships of mutual
reinforcement that eventually enabled them to develop global reach.
Contemporary patterns of globalization express the sustained (but perhaps not at
all sustainable) interdependence of these processes and the predominance of the
values informing them.
Over the past quarter century in particular, these global interdependencies have
crossed critical thresholds of scale and intensity to begin exhibiting complex behav-
ior in the technical sense of being both self-organizing and innovation-generating.
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That is, they have become systems of interdependence that are responsive to
the effects of their own behavior on both their environment and their own
constitutions—learning or meaning-making systems that are prone to changing in
ways that are consistent with their own interests and histories, but that neverthe-
less could not have been anticipated. In Buddhist terms, they have begun ramify-
ing karmically. They express in consistently configured patterns of outcome and
opportunity the meaning of an abiding set of values–intentions–practices that
have become globally dominant across virtually every aspect of the public sphere.
A crucially important characteristic of complex systems is that they not only
behave in ways that actively shape their environments, they also shape the lower
level systems that they comprise. In effect, lower-level systems are pressured to
become what the complex system comprising them would have their interde-
pendence mean. The interdependencies involved in complexity are forms of inter-
penetration that effectively place system values into common circulation and,
when lasting, eventuate in a symbiotic accommodating of interests across system
scales.
To use an example that will figure prominently in our further discussions:
complex market systems will, over time, engender the kinds of consumers they
require to continue developing according to their own values of competition, con-
venience, choice, and control. As this happens, consumers are of turn enabled to
exercise freedoms that ramify in the growth and evolution in markets. Illich’s con-
cerns about the commodification and marketing of healthcare emerge out of
insight into precisely this accommodation dynamic.22
The transition from health problems to health predicaments is a concrete
manifestation of the complex dynamics of global interdependence and interpen-
etration. To understand and address such large-scale and apparently systematic
compromises of health and healthcare as those resulting from HIV/AIDS or those
evidenced in the radically skewed geography of health in Washington, DC, it is
not enough to gain a detailed factual knowledge of how a given pathogen or nutri-
tional deficiency or set of lifestyle choices adversely affects the human body and
how best to intervene and avert or mitigate those adversities. Individual bodily
health is not an appropriate final unit of analysis and response. Neither is an
aggregation of individually treatable bodies. Medicine will not do the full spec-
trum of health work that now needs to be done. Healthcare must cease being
defined by medical practice. A shift must be made from healing bodies to healing
relationships.
This means, first and foremost, considering directly and systematically how
such values of enhanced relational capacity, situational attunement, and respon-
sive virtuosity are faring, at varying levels of enactment (from the personal to the
public and environmental), under the downward pressures presently exerted by
globally complex social, economic, technological, political, and cultural interde-
pendencies, and how more equitably to reorient the dynamics of their accommo-
dation. In an era of complex global interdependence, and the accelerating
displacement of health problems by health predicaments, healthcare measures
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that are not capable of and committed to redressing social, economic, political,
and techno-cultural inequity cannot effectively conserve or enhance either public
or personal health. The dynamics and global distribution of ill-health cannot be
changed without changing the processes that also distribute wealth, consolidate
power, and compromise diversity throughout the public sphere.
The realities ahead
A comprehensive, relational conception of health and healing like the one
sketched here is in many ways appealing. It affords a set of values for coordinat-
ing work undertaken across a wide range of scales and sectors to equitably
enhance the quality of our interdependence. But such an expansive conception of
health and healing is also challenging. As developed here along Buddhist lines, it
forces confrontation with our own implication in presently prevailing patterns of
globally deepening inequity. If from a Buddhist perspective, experienced realities
always imply responsibility, the work ahead of reorienting the inequities now
being generated by the dynamics of complex global interdependence is ours to
undertake.
Fortunately, it is also part of a Buddhist perspective that there is no place from
which this work cannot be done. In the parlance of Mahayana Buddhism, all
places are the place of enlightenment. Practicing according to the Buddhist teach-
ings of interdependence, impermanence, and emptiness brings about conviction
that there is no such thing as an intractable situation. At every scale of relation-
ship throughout a given situation, change is occurring at some rate, with some
quality, and in some direction (with some meaning). There are no immovable
blocks, no ultimate impediments. Trouble and suffering, inequity and ill-health—
these are not independently existing realities that must somehow be removed;
they are simply errant patterns of interdependence.
Enhancing personal and public health is a matter of altering rates, qualities, and
directions of already ongoing change. In some cases this will result in the even-
tual curtailing of particular patterns of change, as would be hoped in responding
to a deepening addiction or the progression of a cancer. In many cases, accom-
plishing a sustained turn in a healing direction may also mean altering a quite
wide range of collateral or coincident relational dynamics—associated, for exam-
ple, in the case of a substance abuse addiction with work and family, as well as
the socio-economic and political geographies of ethnicity and race. What we can
be assured of is that healing opportunities obtain at some level(s), across some
relational domain(s), in any given situation.23
A striking asymmetry obtains in Buddhist teachings on “healing the wound of
existence” or reorienting our interdependence to bring about the sustainable
resolution of trouble and suffering. They are extremely detailed with respect to
analyzing the general conditions that foster errant interdependence; but they are
notoriously lacking in similarly detailed instructions for how to resolve or redirect
them. The basic strategy is utterly simple: reverse the causal sequences (often
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netlike and multiply ramifying) that have brought a troubling situation, as it has
come to be. Buddhist practice is enhancing and demonstrating capacities for and
commitments to doing so, whenever and wherever possible. The repeated exhor-
tations of the Buddha to his students to vigilantly work out their own liberation
drive home the point that this training and redirecting of the dynamics of inter-
dependence are never generic endeavors. Healing involves resolutely facing the
total complexion of our errant interdependence, precisely as it has come to be,




TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF POST-MARKET
ECONOMICS
The global broadening and deepening of social, economic and political
interdependence is often celebrated as an unconditional good. To the extent that
increasing interdependence marks a decisive turn toward forging new global
communities based on relationships of mutual benefit, celebration would seem
warranted. Growing interdependence would then imply ever-widening circles of
concern. It would also imply at least tacitly questioning the justice of global
dynamics that have meant independence for some and dependence for (many)
others. Such implications are, I think, entirely laudable and very much in keeping
with efforts to skillfully and effectively secure public good.
From a Buddhist perspective, however, it is crucial to ask whether existing and
emerging patterns of interdependence are wholesome (kusala) and conducive
to relating freely, or if they carry us, personally and communally, in a contrary
direction. Buddhism affirms, along with much of contemporary science, that
interdependence can be seen as the deep nature of all things. But in contrast with
science, Buddhism insists on going beyond a purely factual apprehension of inter-
relatedness to cultivate dramatic insight into its meaning or direction. Affirming
that all things arise interdependently is not to affirm that they do so in a neces-
sarily liberating way. Increasing economic interdependence, for example, can mean
increasing wealth, skillful means, and happiness. But it can also mean deepening
poverty, trouble, and suffering.
We have seen that the relational dynamics of both environmental quality and
health are significantly shaped and directed by sustained patterns of value-
intention-action. We have also seen that while changing the overall meaning
or orientation of these relational dynamics is always possible, a limiting factor is
the presence of sufficient and appropriate appreciative and contributory
resources. That is, reorienting situational dynamics pivots on our capacities for
actualizing opportunity. In personal terms, this means being capable of initiating
and sustaining both discerning and enriching patterns of engagement with our
situation—patterns of contributory engagement that appreciate or enhance the
value of our situation, and at the same time enhance how valuably we are situated.1
In the broadest Buddhist sense, this is what is meant by appropriate development.
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Yet, like interdependence, development—the actualization of situational
opportunity—is not inherently good or positive. On one hand, this realization has
spurred increasingly sophisticated global discourse on the merits and, finally,
necessity of achieving sustainable development. On the other hand, it has galva-
nized global sensitivity to patterns of skewed benefit and mounting inequity
associated with historically prevalent trade and development regimes.
The broad landscape of trade and development concepts and practices is
particularly suitable for assessing the karmic implications of increasing global
interdependence and for critically engaging the dynamics of the public sphere.
The argument can be made that trade and economic development are the structural
basis for meeting the most fundamental or foundational needs for human security.
Failing to meet these foundational needs—failing to insure, at a minimum, the
availability and accessibility of adequate food, clothing, and shelter—effectively
makes it impossible to build the commitments and capacities needed to secure
reasonable environmental quality, healthcare, and education, or to go beyond
these six subsistence domains, for example, to secure civil and political rights. In
Buddhist terms, failing to secure these foundational needs means failing to secure
the minimum conditions for liberating practice aimed at the meaningful resolu-
tion of trouble or suffering—the orientation of our personal and communal
patterns of interdependence away from samsara toward nirvana.
Central to the karmic assessment of prevailing patterns of global trade and
development, however, is how or in what way trade and development meet (or at
least attempt to meet) our basic subsistence or foundational needs, and what this
implies for situational enhancement and capacity building. In short, do contempo-
rary patterns of globalization foster truly liberating relationships? If not, what do
the dynamics of these patterns—as expressions of consistently maintained val-
ues–intentions–actions and associated outcomes and opportunities—tell us about
the trajectories of innovation needed to insure that development processes and
greater economic interdependence are reoriented in ways that are indeed liberating?
Bluntly stated, it is possible to see present day patterns and scales of global-
ization as having both generated and been generated by the extremely rapid and
practically irreversible commodification of subsistence needs—a commodifica-
tion that has had the effect of institutionalizing entirely new and ever more rela-
tionally disadvantaged classes of the poor. Beyond a critical threshold, and unless
redirected—that is, informed by radically different values—present day patterns
of global interdependence threaten to steadily convert communities that have
been faring well into aggregates of individuals in need of welfare. In the absence
of a sustained shift in values–intentions–actions associated with trade and
development, the promise of globally extended, deep community will be broken.
Making the case for why this is so requires fleshing out the insight that present
day patterns of economic interdependence and global trade are systematically
translating diversity into mere variety. In particular, they are bringing about a
stunning collapse of locally sustained ecologies of production and trade. This has
the effect of affording remarkable ranges of consumer choice through reliable,
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efficient, and institutionally secured market operations. But these market operations
also significantly isolate producers and consumers and replace local-to-local
exchanges with globally mediated transfers. In effect, global interdependence is
presently inflected in such a way as to erode both personal and communal
resources for direct mutual contribution—depleting the very resources needed to
differ in ways that meaningfully make a difference. Development of this sort is
finally impoverishing.
Gift exchange, contribution, and trade: the roots 
of economic interdependence
As an initial move toward fleshing out these insights, I want to think through
some of the continuities among gift giving, contribution, and trade. Gift giving
has had a long and honored place in anthropological studies of social practices,
most of which have concentrated on relatively explicit levels of exchange and
offering. But there is a sense in which gift giving can be considered the original
and abiding nexus of all human sociality. Gift giving can be seen, in other words,
as among the first institutions for opening, expanding and qualifying the public
sphere. Yet, it is also intimately connected with the historical origins of trade
and, by extension, with the possibility of realizing equity-enhancing post-market
economics.
Perhaps the most apparent expression of the centrality of gift exchange to
human sociality is its persistent association with intimate partnership. Even in
today’s postmodern societies where brides and grooms are themselves no longer
thought of as gifts exchanged between families, and where formal dowries no
longer factor into finalizing marital arrangements, marriages remain among the
most extravagant occasions for gift giving. More generally, it is customarily
assumed that formally initiating a lasting intimate or romantic bond will include
some offering or exchange of gifts. Such practices and rituals can, of course, be
seen cynically, particularly where gift-giving and gift-receiving practices exhibit
gender asymmetry or are apparently and heavily influenced by consumer adver-
tising. What eludes cynical or politically correct bracketing, however, is the
fact that the most meaningful of human relationships continue to be ritually
acknowledged and sealed through the exchange of gifts.
Of course, human sociality is not limited to intimate unions, and the exchange
of gifts is by no means always intensely personal. Traditional hospitality customs
worldwide involve hosts and guests in paired offerings. Especially in Asia, initial
business meetings are formally structured around gift exchange. Worldwide,
heads of state ritually exchange symbolic gifts upon meeting. Neither are human
sociality and the giving of gifts restricted to human-to-human encounters.
Particularly among indigenous or first peoples, human-to-nature connections are
customarily mediated through the offering of gifts. Religious rituals aimed at
establishing or qualitatively enhancing human-to-divine connections have, like-
wise, often centered on making either actual or symbolic offerings. In sum, gift
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exchange is associated with establishing and affirming community—the realization
of lasting and meaningful relationships that are both rich in content and enriching.
The broader functions of gift exchange as the enriching nexus of human sociality
are nicely captured in the etymology of the English word “contribution” and its
links to such associated terms as attribute, tributary, tribute, and tribe. The root
noun to which all these can be traced is the Latin tribus, which literally means a
place-centered grouping of people. The verbal root is the Latin tribuere, meaning
giving or distributing. Keeping both the noun and verb roots in mind, contribu-
tion can be understood as a process of bringing together and fusing the horizons
of place-centered groups of people through gift giving. As suggested by constel-
lation of terms associated with contribution, although the original function of
gift giving might have been social, it very early on became inseparable from
establishing and affirming ongoing political and economic arrangements.
Intuitions of this process arguably underlie (and, because of infelicitous
metaphysical assumptions, languish within) much of modern Western social the-
ory. For example, in Hobbes’ theory of societal origins, the giving of gifts is read
and represented in highly schematized fashion as a contractual relationship rooted
in rational self-interest and directed toward establishing regulated or customary
institutions for mutual benefit. The different parties entering into a contract effec-
tively “give” one another assurances of future cooperation. In Hobbes’ view—and
it is a view that continues to be either tacitly or explicitly assumed in a great deal
of theory about and practices within the public sphere—human societies basically
consist of aggregates of competing and essentially self-interested individuals who
pool their various strengths with the belief that through combined numbers, each
one’s own major interests will be met as readily and securely as possible. For
Hobbes—and as affirmed in much of contemporary international relations
theory—should the returns on cooperation and community diminish sufficiently,
a reversion to directly self-interested competition naturally results.
Although partially occluded by his (empirically groundless) presupposition
that individuals pre-exist the (social, natural, and cosmic) relationships in which
they are embedded from birth, Hobbes correctly saw that social life is founded
upon consistently practiced (and often ritually enhanced) give and take. Far from
being accidental or forced associations, communities arise as a function of mutu-
ally sustained processes of exchange or contribution. This insight occurred, in
Hobbes’ case, during a time of a consolidated expansion of modern ideals, ideals
and aspirations, in which all aspects of human endeavor were being re-interpreted
in terms of the values of universality, certainty, autonomy, choice and control, and
in which trade was undergoing a remarkable shift in both scope and scale. The
origins of human sociality and community in processes of exchange came to
assume a quasi-metaphysical status: human sociality and community arise along
with institutions governing or moderating ongoing oscillations between competitive
and cooperative trade.2
Unburdened by the assumption that individual existence precedes relationality,
or by the distinctive set of values that shaped modernity, traditional Buddhist
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social narratives carry us in a rather different direction. These narratives, found
throughout the Pali Canon (generally regarded as the earliest strata of Buddhist
teachings), allow that while societies may now be accurately described as institution-
mediated aggregates of individuals, this is so only because there has been an
historically sustained deflection of the dynamics of interdependence according to the
prevalence of self-interest and exclusive claims to truth. This is neither natural nor
unnatural in any objective sense. Instead, it is a function of karma. When not so
deflected—as during the reign of a “wheel turning king”—societies arise and
develop as qualitatively distinctive patterns of relationships directed toward mutu-
ally enhancing contributions to shared, and ultimately liberating welfare. From a
Buddhist perspective, sociality is karmic—a dynamic process yielding distinctive
outcomes and opportunities in keeping with sustained values–intentions–actions,
and that can be directed well or ill, truly or errantly, toward liberation (nirvana) or
toward further suffering and trouble (samsara). Truly liberating sociality means
realizing consciously sustained and enriching interdependence. It is not competition,
but contribution that choreographs the emergence of community.
Perhaps the most pointed Buddhist statement of the cardinal role of contribu-
tion in liberating sociality is in the Chan affirmation that, “awakening is just the
perfection of offering.” In Chan, as in much of (at least pre-modern) Chinese
Buddhism, psychological events or experiences associated with awakening or
enlightenment were effectively displaced by considerations of the relational
meaning of buddha-nature, emptiness, and skillful means. Focusing on the liber-
ating relationships realized by the historical Buddha and other bodhisattvas,
Chinese Buddhists—and particularly the lineage of Chan Buddhist masters from
Huineng through Mazu, Baizhang, Huangbo and Linji—came to understand
enlightenment in terms of attentive and relational mastery. Liberation means
always and everywhere realizing consummate appreciative and contributory
virtuosity.
The Chan traditions, however, are not unique in this regard. There are strong
precedents for a relational understanding of awakening to be found in even the
earliest strata of the Pali Canon—those texts generally regarded as historically
primary. Indeed, for the purposes of shedding light on the linkages among sociality,
gift exchanges, trade, and the karma of now predominating patterns of globaliza-
tion, many of these early texts are especially useful. As a point of departure, let
us consider the Buddha’s somewhat lyrical description of his first insight into
the interdependence of all things as like coming upon a city long forgotten and
overgrown by dense jungle.3
For those familiar with the history of Buddhism and its early valorization of
forest dwelling reclusion, there is a certain incongruity in this striking image. The
Buddha’s enlightenment occurred in a rural setting as he sat in meditation under
a banyan tree. There, he realized the interdependence or irreducibly relational
nature of all things. It was this realization that the Buddha later alluded to as a
city lost and forgotten. His qualification of the city—that is, the content of his
insight—as “lost and forgotten” can reasonably be explained as an expression of
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humility. It made clear that the Buddha’s enlightening realization was neither
original nor independently arisen, but rather a recovered, shared heritage. But why
use a city as a metaphor for interdependence?
We have no direct answer to this from the Buddha himself. However, the
metaphor is rich with possibilities. To begin with, in a truly vibrant city, no one
lives long (if at all) under the illusion of being wholly independent. Urban life is
a continuous reminder of the extent to which we are not self-sufficient. We rely
constantly on the contributions of others, just as they rely on ours. Moreover,
cities both make possible and are made possible by degrees of specialization,
education, and cultural refinement far exceeding—especially in sixth century BCE
India—anything possible in traditional rural or village life. Cities have from
earliest times been attractors and amplifiers of excellence, and have practically
commanded reflection on the extent to which our lives emerge out of ongoing
patterns of mutual contributions and shared negotiations of meaning. Whether
this holds true at all scales of urbanization, under all modes of production, and
without severe ironic effects is, of course, open to critical debate.
Significantly, in the Sutta Nipata and other very early collections of the
Buddha’s teachings, those who have fared long and well on the Middle Way are
not described as aloof from community life. On the contrary, they are described
as leading lives of public wisdom, enjoying harmonious and calm relationships,
joyful, purified of negative qualities of thought, speech and action, and clear of
purpose. Equally interesting, early Buddhist teachings and their popular transla-
tions did not represent the ideal Buddhist world as an Arcadian paradise or as a
sensuously austere domain. It is a world teeming with people, animals, and plants
of every sort—a world that is explicitly worldly, with all manner of good food,
music, architecture, and activity. In later Mahayana traditions, narratives about
buddha-realms in which all things do the work of enlightenment feature sensori-
ally and socially lush descriptions of both natural and human environs and often
open in public gatherings of many thousands of people and beings sharing food,
drink and commitments to liberating practice. It is as if the “lost and forgotten
city” representing the culminating insight of the Buddha’s six-year quest had been
restored to its former vibrancy and brilliance.
Of course, interdependence is not necessarily enlightening or liberating. Cities
are not always ideal places. They can and, all too often, do go wrong. In the
Cakkavatti-Sïhanada Sutta, the Buddha relates a story chronicling how, over eight
“generations,” an ideal and highly urbanized society slides into intensifying trou-
ble and suffering and finally dissolves into a social maelstrom in which genera-
tional strife is rampant, social customs and rituals are ridiculed, violence has
escalated to a point that killing sprees become horrifically common and random,
and in which crude addictions and abusive relationships are almost universally
celebrated.
The turn toward social collapse takes place when a new ruler of the kingdom
elects to exercise his authority based on his own understanding of affairs, neglect-
ing precedents for regularly and thoroughly consulting with his ministers and
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advisors. As a consequence, he does not properly respond to mounting evidence
of poverty in the capital city and, for the first time in dozens of generations, a
theft is committed. In a series of well-intended follies, his attempts to control the
behavior of the people only drive matters spiraling ever further out of control.
This movement is reversed only when a few people retreat into the countryside,
refusing to adopt prevailing behavioral norms, and eventually band together in
shared commitments to developing capacities for coursing freely on the four
immeasurable relational headings of loving-kindness, compassion, joy in the
good fortune of others, and equanimity.
The account given by the Buddha of the conditions leading to poverty is both
remarkably simple and profound. Poverty arises when people are not able to work
in and contribute to their community in a meaningful way. Far from being a func-
tion of few possessions or not having the means to get what is wanted or needed,
poverty is a function of having too little to offer that is of value to others. It occurs
when either a person or an entire population is effectively blocked from con-
tributing directly to the welfare of others. As expressed in the narrative climax,
the ultimate antidote to poverty (and the kinds of social malaise for which it is a
crucial condition) cannot consist of either social welfare or legal and technologi-
cal controls. These eventually only exacerbate the root conditions of poverty.
Instead, poverty alleviation entails fostering increased capabilities-for (and com-
mitments-to) giving appropriately to others: development in the broadest sense of
capacity building and the restoration or deepening of situational diversity.4
Ending poverty, in other words, is a process of realizing appreciative and
contributory virtuosity.
Several forceful insights are embedded in this account and its framing narrative.
Poverty is a function of contributory impasse and implies a failure to appreciate—
that is, to sympathetically understand and add value to—our ongoing patterns of
interdependence. Both felt community and its objective expression in abiding
social institutions are compromised when interdependence devolves into patterns
of dependence and independence, and they disintegrate with the breakdown
of robust patterns of mutual contribution or situational diversity. Resisting or
reversing such devolution and disintegration cannot hinge on simply meeting
individual (or even collective) needs or wants. Emphasis must be placed on
relational quality, and success finally hinges on how these needs and wants are
addressed—that is, on the values underlying our strategies for redressing the
erosion of relational capacity and effective offering. Successfully alleviating
poverty is a function of realizing and sustaining patterns of interdependence that
enhance the capabilities of both individuals and communities for freely con-
tributing to one another’s welfare. Poverty is undermined by diversity. Or in more
explicitly Buddhist terms: true poverty alleviation at once results from and results
in bodhisattva action.
Together, these insights suggest at least superficial compatibility between
Buddhist understandings of awakening and social prosperity, and currently
predominant growth-oriented, free-market models of development. There is, for
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example, substantial resonance between the Buddhist focus on alleviating poverty
by enhancing contributory virtuosity and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen’s definition
of “development as freedom” or increased relational capacity. The basis for this
resonance, I would argue, is the crucial role played by trade in poverty alleviation
and development. At the same time, however, trade—at least as it has come to be
practiced at global scale—works against the expanded and enhanced diversity
that is at the root of a fully Buddhist approach to poverty alleviation.
In contemporary, idiomatic English, trade tends to be most strongly associated
with exchanges of goods, services, or ideas for the purpose of economic gain. But
we also speak of “trading places” (taking each other’s positions), “trading secu-
rity for adventure” (changing the global, narrative character of our situation), and
considering “trade-offs” (collateral effects of a present course of action on future
possibilities). These broader connotations reflect the origins of the English word
“trade” as a derivative of “tread” or “treading,” the Middle English and Middle
German roots of which referred to the making of a track, path, or course.
Footpaths and tracks are neither natural features nor the results of random
wandering. Rather, they develop as a function of steady traffic along preferred
routes connecting separate localities that have been drawn into some kind of
meaningful relationship. At the basis of this relationship are significant differ-
ences—differences of the sort that generate contributory potentials. The localities
might be two villages or family compounds, or they might be a human settlement
and a particularly productive hunting or foraging ground. Though the furious pace
of contemporary construction and real estate speculation tends to obscure the
fact, tracks, paths, and roadways at once arise through and facilitate meaningful
interchange. Thus, as evidenced in its linguistic roots, trade is inseparable from
trade routes and most broadly originates in activities that expand and deepen
community—activities that open, deepen and extend relationships and that can be
seen as rooted ultimately in the dynamic of gift giving.
To the extent that this is so, there are Buddhist precedents for affirming the
positive, even liberating, possibilities of trade. But given the teachings of empti-
ness and the absence of fixed or essential natures, it would be incorrect—just as
it is with regard to interdependence—to affirm that trade is always and inevitably
“good.” Indeed, these teachings enjoin careful and diligent awareness of the great
variability in what trade means. As an outcome of what processes has trade come
to be configured and practiced as it is now? What genealogy of intentions and val-
ues underlies this configuration and these practices? What opportunities do they
open? To what relational heading(s) do they commit us? In a word, what karma is
associated with (especially global) trade, as it has come to be?
Commodification and eroded diversity: the 
current karma of trade
It is part of a Buddhist understanding of trade that it not only promotes more
extensive patterns of interdependence, but also directs or orients these patterns in
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ways that express and reinforce particular intentions and values. Trade is karmically
significant. Because of this, snapshot understandings of trade are potentially (if
not necessarily) misleading. Short-term perspectives will almost invariably afford
insufficient insight into the axes of intention and value on which trade practices
have turned in coming to be, precisely as they have come to be, to assess their
characteristic structuring of outcomes and opportunities. Reasonably deep histor-
ical perspectives are thus indispensable in assessing trade’s karmic implications,
especially the kinds of trade now taking place at truly global scale.5
In keeping with the teaching of karma, we might begin assessing the
developmental or enrichment potential of trade—as it is now predominantly car-
ried out especially by developed nations and transnational corporations—through
considering the dramatic implications of their root motive: increasing material
wealth through expanding market share and accelerating profit. Given relatively
free rein, to what kinds of situational dynamics—what patterns of relational ten-
sion and release—do market-domination and profit-seeking lead? Patterns of
relationship aimed at amassing material wealth—rather than, for instance, gener-
ating noble wealth or alleviating poverty6—are not likely to be conducive to equi-
tably enhanced relational or contributory capacity. On the contrary, they will tend
to create and then institutionalize sharply inclined slopes of competitive advan-
tage that disproportionately privilege large-scale coordinations of interest
(national or corporate) at market distributed expense. Simply put, evenly distrib-
uting profits is not as profitable as establishing a market topography that permits
and promotes inequitable distribution. Moreover, market-domination—a primary
means to this end—is similarly likely to streamline and concentrate production
practices in ways that are at once efficient and toxic for both natural ecosystems
and self-sustaining, local production regimes.
As demonstrated, for example, in the era of European colonial expansion and
in the early twentieth century emergence of massive industrial monopolies in the
US, the natural outcome of this process of controlling the topography of advan-
tage (and trade) is a remarkable concentration of power in very few hands. And
this is by no means a now defunct historical trend. Globally, the kind of economic
interdependence that, over the last quarter century, has resulted from intensive
waves of market integration is clearly characterized by a widening gap between
rich and poor, with roughly 86% of global resources and wealth being controlled
by and benefiting less than 20% of the world’s population.7 At least at the levels
of national, regional, and global economies for which there are significant com-
parative data, currently prevailing patterns of trade promote developmental
inequality.
There has been a tendency to view the rise of developmental inequality as a
function of already developed nations taking too little responsibility for ratchet-
ing up the developmental cycle elsewhere and, perhaps, even taking severe advan-
tage of less developed economies. In other words, the tendency has been to call
into question the intentions of the developed world and of the transnational
corporations to whom disproportionate profit flows through rapidly integrated
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markets and global patterns of trade. Indeed, there may be cases where major
players steering the process of growing global interdependence can rightly be
charged with unduly selfish strategies and even morally deficient motives. But
because of the wide array of such players and the complex distribution of national
or corporate intentionality, this provides very little critical leverage, despite its
rhetorical appeal. An intentional analysis also falls short in not being readily con-
ducive to generating deep and critical historical perspective. The intentions of
even close associates are difficult to ascertain at times, much less those of actors
greatly distant in time or temperament. Moreover, charges of deficient motives
can be dismissed as an inversion of the “ad hominem” argument: they indict those
presently benefiting most greatly from prevalent patterns of globalization, rather
than the system of values informing and orienting such patterns.
To rephrase this in Buddhist conceptual terms, the karma of presently prevailing
patterns of global trade may be deflected in accordance with self-centered or
equity-denying intentions held by major economic players: the most highly devel-
oped nations and increasingly powerful transnational corporations. But karma
is—as stated earlier—always a function of both intentions and values. Focusing
exclusively on the former can produce a critical blindspot—a range of potentially
crucial phenomena left entirely out of consideration, especially when the karma
in question is not individual, but collective or systemic.
I have argued with respect to technology that such a critical blindspot arises
through a confusion of technologies with the tools to which they give rise, and an
inappropriate tendency to evaluate technologies in terms of how well these tools
serve us as individuals.8 In consequence, technologies are effectively exempted
from critical attention—that is, the values that technologies embody and render
ambient throughout societies deploying them are critically occluded by the indi-
vidual uses to which tools are put. And because these tools are designed and
redesigned with the overarching mandate of increasing utility and user-friendliness,
this leads to blindly endorsing continued technological development and deployment
in a particularly vicious form of critical circularity. The effects of technology
on the character and direction of relationships (personal, communal, national,
international, and global) are functionally ignored.
Similarly, it is particularly dangerous to neglect assessing the values underlying
global patterns of trade through assuming their “value-neutrality”—the oft-
invoked “invisible (and purportedly, justly blind) hand” of the market—and
focusing instead on how trade patterns are used by various actors. Indeed, while
many economists ostensibly view trade as a technology, they actually treat it as a
tool used by individual entrepreneurs, corporations, countries, or regional associ-
ations (e.g. the European Union or Association of Southeast Asian Nations).
Trade is thus assumed to be properly and adequately assessed in terms of how
well it meets the individual needs and interests of those engaging in trade. Many
economists then stress the fact that although global trade does tend to bring about
increased inequality, it also makes both the rich and the poor richer. From this,
they conclude that while the benefits may be greater for some than others, current
TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND POSSIBILITY
68
patterns of global trade are good for each and every one of the world’s people.
What they cannot conclude, at the risk of committing the fallacy of composition,
is that what is good for each and every one of us, must be good for all of us. The
effects on a whole may be something entirely other than the sum of effects on all
its parts.
Like technologies, presently prevailing patterns of global trade are not value
neutral and cannot be accurately or adequately assessed by measuring (even in
statistical aggregates) their impact on individuals as such. Neither can their ill
effect of fostering developmental inequities be traced solely back to unjust
motives in how they are used. Rather, contemporary patterns of trade can only be
critically evaluated by seeing how the constellation of values structuring global
trade affects how we relate, as individuals, as countries, and as members of
expanding global communities. At the center of this constellation, I would argue,
are the related values of competition, choice and control that structure the operation
of markets.
Global trade presently apportions unequal benefits to the already developed
and advantaged and disproportionately exports the costs of economic growth to
those least able to bear these costs.9 On one hand, this means that the present sys-
tem of trade fosters a growing “capacity gap” that results in the vast majority of
the world’s population being in a relatively, poorer and poorer position both to
contribute to others and to be contributed to by them. Although they may be bet-
ter off over time in absolute terms, in relative terms they will always be worse off.
On the other hand, by bearing the cost burden—for example, in terms of envi-
ronmental degradation—of benefits they do not receive, it is practically assured
that their capability for responding appreciatively to the challenges of their own
situation will prove increasingly inadequate. They will not enjoy the sensitivities
and sensibilities needed to skillfully add value to their own situations. As it is cur-
rently configured, global trade will never bring about true poverty alleviation
because poverty is its primary by-product.10
This admittedly iconoclastic claim is not in any way a claim about the
intentions of those who have initiated and sustained the kinds of global trade in
everyday we now experience. Neither is it a claim—like that central to Marxist
critiques of global capital—that rests upon an assumed historical necessity or
developmental teleology. Rather, it is simply a claim about the history of how
things have come to be, as they have come to be. It is a claim about how large-
scale patterns of relationship are systematically oriented toward the demise of
productive diversity in consonance with values embedded in globally intensifying
trade regimes directed toward increasing wealth through market domination and
accelerating profit, making maximal use of technologies biased toward the strate-
gic value of control to promote consumer freedoms centered on choice. Like the
efforts of the hapless king in the Cakkavatti Sïhanada Sutta who tries to restore
social order and prosperity through the increasing exercise of control, the inten-
tions of those promoting more extensive global trade may be quite positive. But
contrary to any such explicit intentions, the values embedded in their strategies
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for poverty alleviation—control, convenience, competition, and choice being
central among them—are sending things spiraling further and further away from
their ostensive goal.
A brief narrative history of global trade and the 
demise of productive diversity
Present global scales of trading activities and the transportation and communication
technologies that are associated with them are exerting historically unprecedented
influence on the quality and direction of relationships realized through trade. Prior
to the emergence of comprehensive monetary economies, trade pivoted on barter-
ing activity. That is, it turned on directly negotiating comparative values for the
goods or services being traded. Trades could be completed only if and when all
parties involved felt that fair values—often highly contextual rather than standard-
ized or absolute—had been placed upon the goods or services involved. Within
and among small-scale, subsistence economies, trade is an activity—heavily con-
ditioned by local circumstances—through which distinct communities meaning-
fully and with considerable immediacy contribute to one another’s welfare. In such
contexts, trade promotes both productive specialization and diversity.
Trade begins undergoing important transformations as technological,
bureaucratic, and political institutions make possible and come to depend upon
large-scale accumulations and transfers of goods. Relatively amorphous local-to-
local patterns of trade linking small-scale subsistence economies give way to geo-
graphically extensive patterns of periphery-to-center trade. Here, the economic
terrain is more or less steeply sloped from subsistence dominant village
economies toward rapidly growing urban centers with large populations engaged
in highly specialized activities. Already at this stage, the face-to-face trading of
subsistence goods (especially foodstuffs) begins being replaced by something
akin to the modern system of commodity marketing. As money enters the trade
process, a level of abstraction is added to the process of negotiation. Currency
values come to be established for commonly traded goods and services, which
then no longer need be directly compared and evaluated. Qualitative modes of
evaluation give way to essentially quantitative modes, and vernacular patterns of
goods exchange begin giving way to serial transfers.11
The interdependence of urban and rural communities and of individuals within
them begins already at this stage to be markedly occluded. Indeed, the roots of
modern economic interdependence can be traced historically to state-building
processes emerging out of periphery-to-center trade dating at least into the first
millennium BCE. But for the most part, local-to-local exchanges of goods and
services based on face-to-face negotiation remain dominant and continue as such
well into modern times. As long as the vast majority of the world’s population
remained rural—until the late nineteenth or early twentieth century in all but the
most highly developed industrial nations—subsistence needs continued to be met
almost entirely locally. Production ecologies—porously bounded domains of
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interlocked producers contributing to one another’s welfare in a sustainable
fashion—remained small in scope.
With the increasing sophistication of transportation technologies and
infrastructure, lines of transmission for more durable goods quite early became
long even by contemporary standards. For example, as early as the second cen-
tury BCE, the tributary system fueling the imperial Chinese economy covered an
area of perhaps 2,000 miles in diameter. By the fourth century CE, well-traveled
land and sea trade routes linked African, European, South Asian, Southeast Asian,
and East Asian societies. Still, because of the low capacities and speeds at which
transportation took place, trade at great distances tended to be in durable material
goods of high unit value like salt, spices, cooking oils, gems, precious metals, and
silk, but also included what would now be termed intellectual property (e.g. maps,
books, musical forms, and religious teachings). Thus, until at least the mid-
nineteenth century, most of the meat, dairy products and vegetables required by
the population of cities like Paris were produced within surrounding suburban
areas, if not within the city itself. The urban “footprint” remained rather small,
with specific dimensions effectively set by the quality of a city’s local “metabolic”
support system—the quality of its nearby environment. In effect, cities were
bio-regionally defined.12
This changes from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries through the steady
convergence, particularly in the European West and the Americas, of cumulative
technological innovations enabling much greater speed and control in transporta-
tion, industrial and agricultural production, and communication. The nineteenth
century invention of the clipper ship can be seen as a key turning point in this
process, after which transoceanic trade and the global colonization of subsistence
economies and markets shifted into apparently irreversible high gear.13
The history of global capitalism and competitive market-driven production is,
from the late nineteenth century onward, a history of rapidly growing production
monocultures that effectively disrupt local ecologies of production and consump-
tion. Dominance shifts from local-to-local exchanges rooted in meaningful nego-
tiations of value and need to local-global-local transfer currents, the velocity of
which come to be subject to relatively overt control through price manipulation
rather than as a naturally variable function of subsistence needs and values.
In the present era of global markets, trade is only incidentally a vernacular
activity that directly links members of nearby communities through local-to-local
exchanges for meeting basic needs. The benefits of this are very well advertised—
both literally and figuratively. Especially in the most developed countries, super-
markets carry fresh fruits and vegetables grown all over the planet. In even the
least developed countries under WTO governance, readily available grains and
other staples are no longer likely to have been locally produced. Agriculture has
given way to agri-business. And the same is true for virtually every other consumer
need from clothing, shelter, and entertainment to health care and education.14
The contemporary shopping mall—virtually identical across most of the
planet—is at the center of the new “global village.” It is a curiously structured
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village in which producers and consumers are not neighbors and never see one
another face-to-face. Yet, it is a village in which niche manufacturing and mar-
keting are able to provide a practically flawless semblance of direct and sustained
attention to personal needs and desires. It is a village in which markets guarantee
that the choices available to consumers are practically unlimited, with a remark-
ably similar range of goods and services (albeit at remarkably disparate prices and
qualities) available both to the very wealthy and the very poor. Although there are
clearly many inequalities in the village, the overall degree of security it affords
with respect to basic needs is, in absolute terms, quite high. The new global
village may not be perfect, but to a degree that is often amazing, it works.
Such are the familiar benefits of global markets and unrestricted trade
liberalization. As an economic system, it is remarkably well suited to meeting indi-
vidual needs and wants, benefiting some more than others, but clearly benefiting all.
From mutual contribution to consumer choice 
under mass-production regimes
As the idiom goes, however, we don’t get anything for nothing. The system has
its costs. The technologically triggered efficiencies that made possible the
remarkable geographic expansion of markets from especially the eighteenth cen-
tury onward also had a powerful effect on the content of those markets. Global
trade ceased being limited to highly durable goods, typically of high unit cost.
Trade in luxuries—for example, in silks, spices, and precious metals and stones—
continued to be important. But the overall ambit of global trade spread to include
ever-greater kinds and quantities of non-luxury goods. The economic logic is not
particularly complicated. Expanding markets require expanding consumer
bases—an expansion that can be driven only so far by falling prices associated
with efficiencies in production and transportation. Sustained market growth is
only possible if the range of goods traded undergoes similar growth. Especially
once markets have become global, trade expansion can only be stably realized
through increasing trade density.
This account should not be taken as a dismissal of the roles of greed, disregard
for the welfare of others, and ruthlessness in the pursuit of self-interest in the
global expansion of markets and the consequent disruption of local production
ecologies. But these factors—also of great concern for any Buddhist analysis of
trade dynamics as a whole—were not novel except perhaps in terms of their
systematic extremity. In the absence of the control revolution in technology and
its powerful resonance with patterns of modern political and social development
and aspiration, market globalization and intensification likely would not have
grown substantially beyond their pre-modern scope and scale.
The growth imperative of heightened trade density has resulted practically in
the commodification of all subsistence goods and services, effectively displacing
local production regimes and vernacular negotiations of value and fair trade.15
This has, in turn, eroded local contributory resources—the range of capabilities
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and knowledge relevant to sustaining local personal and communal welfare.
Importantly, as the range of goods transferred into a local economy nears the
point of natural saturation, meeting all extant needs, further market growth
depends on the creation of new needs and desires, and new problems to be solved.
This has been accomplished: through aggressive advertising regimes that have
systematically extended the spectrum of goods perceived as necessary and/or
desirable; through the increasingly detailed problematizing of daily life; and
through the emergence of industries that commodify an increasingly broad array
of previously “non-economic” services.16 Simply put, the continued increase of
market density requires the creation of new kinds and numbers of wants.
The global corporate outlay for advertising now exceeds by a considerable
margin that expended worldwide on all levels of public education. Tellingly, the
greatest increases in advertising expenditures appear in so-called developing
markets. In the decade ending in 1996, for example, advertising expenditures
in China grew by more than 1,000%; in Indonesia by 600%; in Malaysia and
Thailand by 300%; and in India, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines by
more than 200%. Such expenditures are not based on wishful thinking, but on
results: the realization of maximally broad and dense markets wherever and as
profitably as possible. The power of advertising to extend market reach and den-
sity is perhaps nowhere so evident as in such poor countries as Ethiopia and Nepal
where populations living on less than $1 per day, over just a 5 year period from
1993–1998, were induced to increase spending on such imported consumer goods
as cosmetics, cameras, and soft drinks by 400–500%.17
The expanded and dense markets that result from intensive commodification
and advertising have—for each of us individually—the generally desirable results
of greater reliability, standardized products and product compatibility, conven-
ience, and heightened possibilities for exercising freedom of choice. But increas-
ingly dense, globally mediated provision of goods and services can have an effect
on local economies that is similar to what happens when virulent alien species are
introduced into a sensitive ecosystem: indigenous species—that is, local modes
of production and patterns of exchange—are eventually choked out or granted
limited continued existence in specialized preserves or cottage industries.
Importantly, this does not mean local populations become indigent. The monetary
medium of global transfers of goods and services guarantees that wage-earning
employment invariably is fostered by expanding markets. In fact, the transition
from barter to cash is crucial to marketization processes.18 Markets are fueled by
consumption and consumption is facilitated by the use of cash and credit. In
advanced market economies, then, employment tends to be high and relatively
inclusive, at first available and then necessary not only for adult men, but also for
women and previously marginalized minority populations.
The picture just sketched is often tinted in fairly rosy hues. Greater employment
opportunities for all (but especially women and minorities) and greater access to
the goods and services offered by the market—these are typically celebrated as
signs of successful development. Futures that traditionally have been somewhat
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narrow in prospect are manifestly widened. Choices multiply. And there is
certainly no reasonable argument against this in principle: a life that includes
choices is surely better than one that does not. The professional opportunities now
open to women and minorities, for example, mark a real, significant, and entirely
welcome enhancement of their possibilities for social contribution. But focusing
on the positive effects on individual members of communities or individual
classes is, again, to dangerously restrict our ability to evaluate how such changes
affect qualities of relationship more broadly. If the poor are invariably worse off
in relative terms, it follows that they are in some significant degree relationally
disadvantaged by present patterns of global trade.
It is worth looking more closely at this result of inequitable trade-mediated
interdependence. Under present market-driven trade regimes, the poor have
proportionately less and less access to resources for direct use and capacity build-
ing, both personally and communally. In part, this means access to a decreasing
proportion of the total range of available market goods and services. The poor, for
example, will be less and less ready and able to take advantage of new informa-
tion technologies and the power afforded by the tools associated with them. But
additionally and much more importantly, it also means that the poor will be less
and less valuably situated with respect to contributing meaningfully to their situ-
ation. In other words, in comparison with those benefiting most from present day
patterns of global economic interdependence, the poor will suffer a steadily grow-
ing gap in relational capacity. They will fall steadily further behind in being
poised and able to take advantage of situational opportunities for building more
extensive, refined, and enriching relationships.
The range of relationships that might be considered in this regard is practically
unlimited. For present purposes, however, consider the relationships centered on
employment or labor. Focusing on the upper end of the scale of opportunities
opened by global trade tends to gloss over the phenomenological realities of aver-
age employment in the service of greatly expanded, efficient, and dense markets.
Most jobs in such markets no longer afford workers the opportunity to carry
through with a complete production process or service. The rationalization of
industries and workplaces to the end of maximum efficiency practically guaran-
tees that workers will not participate in or consider themselves responsible for the
full production (or service) cycle. Quite literally, they do piece-work. As anyone
who has done it well understands, piece-work does not promote worker pride
unless it is related to overall quantity of work accomplished. More work equals
more pay. But more is not necessarily better. Indeed, under most circumstances,
piece-work is not conducive to workers actively increasing product quality, but at
best to maintaining a minimum level of quality while maximizing output quantity.
This is quite different from what prevails in subsistence economies, where one
person or family may be involved in and responsible for the entire set of processes
required to build a dwelling or provide regular meals and clothing, and where
trade involves face-to-face negotiations of the value of goods to be traded.
Specialization greatly reduces inefficiencies, especially those that result from
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productive redundancy. Indeed, mainstream economists from Adam Smith
(eighteenth century) to the present day have been adamant in praising the transi-
tion from craft to commodity. But by translating the entire production cycle into
discrete units, the synoptic perspective needed to envision paradigmatic revisions
of the entire process is typically restricted to just one or a handful of workers who
are particularly suited to and hired for such work. This can yield very high qual-
ity results. But it does not promote creative development on the part of those
workers whose responsibilities and imaginations are confined to the narrowest
possible scope compatible with overall production efficiency.
For workers who remain in a given company or industry for an extended period,
there is some opportunity for personal growth and contributory maturation. But
personal growth and maturation in the work world, as elsewhere, rest on shared
commitments. And unfortunately, the market drive toward greater efficiencies
and lower costs tends to work against such commitment—a phenomenon now
painfully evident in the post-bubble economy of Japan. There is a striking and
significant trend in the more advanced economies for workers to undergo several
major career changes over the course of their working life, and for the work
histories of the majority of workers in lower-wage jobs to reflect an increasingly
random approach to employment. Far from supporting a coherent narrative of
professional development and personal maturation, scanning average work histo-
ries is much like randomly channel surfing a cable-supported television. For most
workers, jobs are strictly a means to an end—most often: access to a greater range
of choices for personal consumption.
Significantly, this means that there is little or no incentive or impetus for workers
to make the transition from doing “good enough” to cultivating the compounding
sensibilities and sensitivities that go along with the pursuit of excellence or vir-
tuosity in their employment. In the Buddhist terms introduced earlier, work then
fails to be conducive to kusala eventualities. It thus fails to meet a basic condi-
tion for work to meaningfully and sustainably resolve trouble or suffering. This is
true even if work does serve as a means to forestalling or actively countering
explicitly akusala eventualities. As stressed in the Sakkapanha Sutta, it is only
when an endeavor both decreases akusala eventualities and at the same time fos-
ters kusala eventualities that it undercuts the process of papañca or the mental
proliferation of situational blockages—the root condition for persistent and
increasingly acute trouble or suffering.
As market economies have matured, some significant counter trends have
emerged from a recognition of the profitable nature of distributed creativity and
responsibility, with many leading analysts now touting the importance of “f lexi-
ble specialization” and “network accountability.” But these efforts to fine-tune the
system do not restore the “old growth” or indigenous patterns of production in
which work concretely and meaningfully results in goods or services directly
exchanged in face-to-face realizations of shared welfare. In spite of the economic
imperative for innovation in terms of both product design and marketing and
work unit size and organization, global trade remains a composite of what are
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individually almost meaningless moments or links in a chain of production and
marketing. It is not just that “old growth” production ecologies are replaced by
more efficient systems. Their replacement signifies a loss of overall local pro-
ductive diversity and the depletion of the personal and community resources
required for responding to changing circumstances and meaningfully meeting
local needs. People lose the positions from which they were able to contribute
directly to their own and others’ welfare—a loss of capacities for innovation, for
shared improvisation, for on-site learning, and for appreciating their situation.
For many, this statement will seem overstated, if not simply false. Even if it is
allowed that most people are employed in jobs that they do not like, performing
tasks that have neither intrinsic nor perceived value and meaning, and would avidly
look forward to a future that would not include work at all were such a future
practically conceivable, many of us will still be inclined to insist on the creative
possibilities our lives include that were not open to our parents or grandparents.
But such a reading rests, I think, on an insufficiently robust understanding of
creativity and on inadequately distinguishing between freedoms of choice and
contributing freely. The kind of trade now dominant in the world functionally
depends upon continuous on acts of consumption.19 Although workers engaged at
any given point of the production and marketing process can intellectually or in
abstract terms see their efforts as important, the signal and culminating event
economically is the act of consumption. Inescapably, the most basic, concrete
meaning of trade—in spite of its roots in the realization of extended community
through gift exchange—now reduces to a transfer of possession.
This is not primarily a function of deficiencies on the part of workers or
consumers, but rather a dynamic necessity of present-day markets. Because of the
demands for expanded and increasingly dense markets, global scale trade com-
presses the utility of consumed goods or services to the smallest unit measure
possible. Through the advertised inculcation of desire and through the constric-
tion of the popular imagination, conditions are realized such that individual acts
of consumption only fleetingly answer needs. The classic example of this is, of
course, the institution of fashion (the history of which long predates the contem-
porary market, but on a much smaller scale). Fashion unabashedly sets strict tem-
poral, spatial, and cultural limits on product usefulness. It marks the justified
embrace of product obsolescence. But the phenomenon is quite general, and it is
finally such compressions of utility that “open” the space required for multiply-
ing choices. As a consequence of this, most goods, once acquired, are used very
briefly, if at all. Even goods used frequently are seldom used to the point of being
functionally worn out. Obsolescence—real or perceived—is crucial to growing
markets. As markets become increasingly extensive and dense, consumers begin
to function as producers of waste. Or, more graphically stated, they begin to serve
as organs of elimination by means of which the residue of profit-making—whether
material or experiential—is summarily disposed.
As long as there are more (and better) goods on the market, and as long as
employment remains sufficiently high to support continued consumption, there is
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a general tendency to turn away from the implications of practically collapsing
consumption and waste. There are those who would convince the general public
that there are, for example, simple environmental limits to growth. Planetary
resources will one day run out or become scarce enough to throw a wrench in the
works of the market. The cumulative environmental ramifications of waste will
render the planet inhospitable if not uninhabitable. But such proclamations are,
for most, unpersuasive. The broad public expects technological advances to afford
new capacities for exercising control over the production and waste management
processes—control intense and extensive enough to insure opportunities for
unlimited growth.
But when the exercise of control (technologically mediated or otherwise)
crosses the threshold of its own utility, it begins reproducing the conditions of its
own necessity. In short, it brings about conditions in which there are not only
increasing capacities for exercising control, but increasing need to do so as well.
The experienced consequences of this are dire: living in a maximally controlled
environment—a euphemism, finally, for prison. Technologies biased toward con-
trol and economies biased toward the proliferation of wants go quite well
together. But karmically, the continued interdependent growth of control-biased
technologies and global markets does not lead, as might be assumed, to finally
solving thorny problems of supply and demand, resource allocation, and poverty
alleviation. Rather, it rests on the continuous production of new wants and new
problems. As made evident in the classic representation of samsara as a wheel,
karma plays out in a cyclic (or at least spiral) manner.
The intentions and values associated with “getting what we want” are karmically
linked to finding ourselves “left wanting.” When trade is predominantly carried
out as a local-global-local transfer of goods that undermines local ecologies of
production and that compromises both personal and communal resources for con-
tributory virtuosity, trouble and suffering both sustain and are sustained by “good
business.” The more we rely upon the market to bring us what we want or lack,
the more we will find ourselves wanting or lacking. In other words, the more we
will find ourselves incapable of meeting our own needs, of seeing to our own wel-
fare, and acting in our own fullest interests. As local ecologies of production are
translated into marketplaces for the practically infinite array of goods and serv-
ices made available through geographically fluid production monocultures and
fully liberalized global trade, capacities for relating freely are converted into
ironic compulsions to exercise ever-expanding freedoms of choice.
Such translation and conversion processes are especially powerful in the attention
economy that began consolidating over the past quarter century in post-industrial
societies and that is now a global phenomenon.20 In this still emergent economy,
it is no longer material goods, services, or information/knowledge that are the
most basic resource commodities, but attention itself. Lasting goods and services
are no longer the focus of production, but rather the production of inherently
fleeting meanings. In such an economy, “value-added” signifies attention captured.
As attention is systematically exported from local contexts (e.g. family and
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community), primarily through intensive mass media consumption, it is no longer
available for appreciating and contributing to one’s immediate situation. And, in
much the same way that the conversion of capital to money makes possible its
maximally fluid distribution, the attention economy effectively converts aware-
ness from a qualitatively complex relationship to a minimally structured—that is,
minimally committed—energy source. As the attention economy grows, personal
and community capabilities for sustained appreciative and contributory virtuosity
diminish.21 World Health Organization projections of an epidemic increase of
depression in developed and developing economies (already rated as the most
important factor of morbidity and lowered life quality of women in the developed
world) is a particularly chilling commentary on the correlation of prevailing
development processes, their social ramifications, and the erosion of meaning-
making capability.22
Again, however, it is important to note that such effects are not a matter of
historical necessity. They are the experienced consequences of intentions and
(especially) values that have shaped and continue shaping currently prevailing
patterns of economic growth and interdependence. Crucially, the key conditions
for these karmic consequences coming to fruition as they have can be traced to
issues of scale and what has been termed “downward causation”—the tendency
of self-organizing and adaptive systems to affect the nature of the lower order
sub-systems comprised within them.23 These conditions are, in short, both karmic
outcomes and opportunities. And as I will try to show in the following two sec-
tions, they constitute the signal factors by means of which the liberating promise
of the Buddhist teaching of impermanence might be operationalized: no situation,
no matter how complex or conflicted, is intractable.
Some general implications
The Buddha’s metaphorical representation of insight into the interdependence of
all things as a “lost and forgotten city” suggests that urbanization, specialization,
institutional growth and development can be seen as processes capable of dis-
solving commitments to narrow self-sufficiency and independent existence.
Indeed they can be seen as conducive to establishing patterns of mutually enrich-
ing relationships, infusing daily life with ready opportunities for increasingly
refined practices of (what would ideally be mindfully) shared welfare. Yet this is
not a necessary result of urbanization and development, or of the transformation
of practices for meeting subsistence needs that they entail and institutionalize. As
evidenced in the cautionary tale embedded in the Cakkavatti Sïhanada Sutta,
these processes can be inflected in profoundly troubling ways, with socially dis-
astrous results. In the simplest Buddhist terms, whether these processes prove to
be constraining and coercive or expansive and liberating depends on whether they
are directed in alignment with ignorance, habit formations, and craving desires,
or else with wisdom, attentive mastery, and moral clarity. Development, in the
broadest, Buddhist sense, consists of movement toward realizing patterns of
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relationship that serve to bring increased productive diversity—that is, patterns of
mutual contribution that appreciate or add value to an irreducibly shared situa-
tion. Trade is then consonant with and is deepened through cultivating wisdom,
attentive mastery, and moral clarity.
Present-day patterns of trade and development do not meet this requirement.
On the contrary, they work against the constellation of conditions that might
sponsor a concerted turn in that direction, systematically converting local
resources for contributory virtuosity and relating freely into increasingly dense
arrays of consumption-fueled freedoms of choice. Beyond a certain threshold,
markets can only grow by problematizing present circumstances and delivering
appropriate consumer product solutions. Granted the scale of contemporary trade
and development regimes, but also the unprecedented rapidity with which these
regimes and their technological infrastructures undergo significant change, it is
hard to imagine what it would mean to turn the prevailing tide and begin restor-
ing local ecologies of production. At the very least, the global institutions that
now mediate the meeting of basic subsistence needs cannot be changed funda-
mentally overnight. Indeed, we cannot reasonably hope that they would: any cat-
aclysmic changes in these institutions could occur only at the cost of tremendous
suffering to the billions now dependent upon them.
Yet, as we have previously noted, a key entailment of seeing all things as
impermanent, troubled, and without any abiding, essential self is that no situation
can be seen as intractable. There is always opportunity for meaningful response
and—in keeping with the teaching of karma—a change in the direction of our sit-
uation and the relationships constituting it. What can and should be done, then, to
alter our karma with respect to trade and development to realize their liberating
potential? Is it possible to direct trade and development toward the realization of
viable and robust post-market economies?
Three initial observations can be made. First, there is no generic, one-size-fits-all
solution, no universal way of equitably redirecting our global economic situation.
Efforts to this end must be improvised, in context, in real-time. Secondly, the
scale and complexity of our situation make evident the need for a paradigm shift
from focusing on factual problems that can be solved within objectively determi-
nate parameters, to realizing our immersion in predicaments that can only be
resolved by grappling with contending goods, norms, and meanings, through
establishing harmonizing and yet open-ended commitments to appropriate values
and associated courses of action. Finally, resolving key trade and development
predicaments—key conflicts with respect to both ordinal and strategic values—
cannot be carried out unilaterally. Both the aim and measure of this work lie in
relational quality—in enhanced and mutually enriching diversity.
These observations can be seen as consonant with the traditional Buddhist
attribution of limitless resources for relational attunement (upaya) to fully real-
ized bodhisattvas. As such, they suggest that the path of liberating trade and
development is a particular manifestation of the path of realizing the emptiness
of all things—that is, realizing the potential of all beings for mutual relevance or
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meaningful difference. It is a path that can be taken up anywhere and traveled
without end. Truly liberating trade and development will promote opening our-
selves to one another in that utterly proximate way needed to truly make a differ-
ence for one another. It means committing to extending/enhancing community
rather than expanding/deepening markets. It means achieving high contributory and
productive diversity, not high commodity variety and consumption density. Only
in this way is it possible for each and every one of us to realize that the very place
in which we find ourselves is a place of immeasurable meanings and value—the
ultimate alleviation of poverty.
The case of Bhutan and the development measure 
of gross national happiness
What might this analysis of the systemic implications of currently prevailing
trade and development karma look like if translated into concrete policies? As a
way of answering this question, I’d like to consider the implications of the analy-
sis for the small, Buddhist kingdom of Bhutan and its efforts to operationalize the
development measure and goal of heightened Gross National Happiness (GNH).
GNH has been described as built on four interlinked processes: the preserva-
tion and promotion of culture; environmental conservation; good governance; and
socio-economic development. These very processes, however, have been claimed
(or could easily be claimed) as foundational by many developed and developing
countries, as well as by many transnational corporations and such intergovern-
mental organizations as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or World Bank—
for all of which the ultimate (and purely quantitative) measures of development
remain rooted in rising GDP, per capita income, and levels of consumption. And
although appeals are increasingly made to such “alternatives” as the Human
Development Index, these alternative measures generally only supplement rather
than supplant, or even set proper limits to, traditional quantitative models for
assessing economic development.
If measuring national development in terms of GNH is to be truly distinctive,
happiness must factor significantly—and not merely incidentally or consequen-
tially—into the development equation. That is, happiness cannot be simply an
unplanned collateral benefit or even a focal outcome of economic processes—a
pleasant, but entirely contingent by-product of existing economic imperatives,
values, and practices. Instead, happiness must factor crucially and critically into
resolving the sorts of predicaments and suffering sponsored by prevailing scales
and directions of global interdependence. It must, that is, have sufficient traction
to uniquely effect and orient development, exerting appropriate “downward
causation” on relevant economic and social processes.
The early Buddhist tradition is unparalleled for the thoroughness and clarity
with which it lays bare the constellation of conditions sponsoring unhappiness,
trouble, and suffering (dukkha), as well as the means of dissolving that constella-
tion to realize liberation (nirvana). The tradition is, however, notably muted when
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it comes to discussing happiness. When happiness (sukkha) is explicitly invoked,
it is almost invariably in the context of rehearsing what might be termed a con-
ceptual genealogy of awakening or liberation. It is said, for instance, that, “with
mindfulness comes wisdom; with wisdom comes tireless energy; with tireless
energy comes joy; with joy comes a tranquil body; with a tranquil body comes
happiness (sukkha); with happiness comes attentive mastery (samadhi); with
attentive mastery comes equanimity,” as well as the other immeasurable relational
headings of compassion, appreciative joy, and loving-kindness (Majjhima Nikaya
118.29ff). These interactive meaning vectors are not considered to be subjective
feelings—emotions as now commonly understood—but rather as relational qual-
ities that “suffuse” the entire world. Happiness marks a phase or modality of rela-
tional enhancement and refinement that is inseparable from public, social
transformation oriented toward enlightened and enlightening liberation. In par-
ticular, it emerges in the context of sustaining bodily tranquility and establishing
attentive mastery.
Granted this characterization, happiness will have demonstrated effective
economic traction when trade and development reduce overall stress and bring
about enhanced capacities for concentrated and yet flexible awareness, in the con-
text of realizing the kinds of mature emotional capabilities associated with sus-
taining meaningfully enriched and liberating relationships. In terms of the
analysis given earlier, such trade and development practices and institutions
would serve to counter the commodification of attention and the contraction of
awareness that lie at the roots of the global colonization of consciousness. And,
very probably, they would serve as a brake on the further commodification of the
very basic necessities of life. They would challenge the predominance of choice
and control as values structuring the operation of markets and practically mitigate
both the erosion of productive diversity and the inequitable patterns of economic
growth to which they lead. Finally, they would conserve and enhance local
resources for meaning-making, working against the consumption of commodified
meaning, particularly as institutionalized in global mass media news and enter-
tainment. If appropriately sustained, they would lead to the emergence of post-
market economies rooted in a paradigmatic value shift from individual freedoms
of choice to relating freely, and from consumption-driven to contribution-enhancing
patterns of growth.24
What might this mean concretely for Bhutan? Let me briefly address just three,
representative and interconnected issue areas that may have some general applica-
bility: meeting subsistence needs; technology transfer; and cultural conservation.
No economy can be considered healthy if it fails to provide basic subsistence
needs in an equitable and diversity-enhancing manner. These needs include, at the
very least, food, clothing, shelter, health care, education, sensory stimulation and
a sense of belonging.25 As Bhutan opens itself to global economic forces, it may
not remain feasible to address all of these needs through traditional local-to-local
patterns of trade, or in ways that conserve and promote robust, associated local
production ecologies. For example, it may not prove feasible to significantly
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improve health care provision without importing medicines and treatment
techniques and technologies. A reasonable aim, however, is to target key subsis-
tence needs as foci for strenuously conserving and developing local resources and
production ecologies. Education is arguably the central candidate for such treat-
ment. For instance, education practices in Bhutan might be revised in such a way
as to foster improvisational ability, emotional maturity and refinement, stress
reduction, and attentive mastery—all necessary to offset the predominant effects
of prevailing patterns of global interdependence and interpenetration. These
might be more or less explicitly Buddhist in nature, but should clearly reflect
indigenous, Bhutanese values and practices. Improvisational ability, in particular,
will be crucial in the adaptive work needed to truly conserve—and not merely
preserve—Bhutanese culture and Bhutan’s overall capability for contributing
effectively to global social, economic, and political processes.
As a very small country, with a comparably small national economy, it is sheer
folly to believe that Bhutan could ever develop or sustain competitive advantage
in manufacturing or other industrial modes of production. If, indeed, there is a
commitment to conserving local production ecologies, technology transfer must
be carefully orchestrated to insure that imported technologies (and the strategic
values they embody) are appropriate complements to existing Bhutanese production
practices and values. For instance, there is a wealth of new building materials and
technologies flooding onto the global market. In most cases, the transfer of these
materials and technologies has been accompanied by practically wholesale
conversion to imported building design protocols—often with both aesthetically,
socially and practically disastrous results. Care should be taken to introduce
only those materials and technologies that can contribute to the evolution of
already existing Bhutanese design sensibilities—that is, to extend the values and
practices that already obtain in Bhutan and have historically proven their appro-
priateness to the Bhutanese setting.26 Moreover, the pace of technology transfer
should, to whatever degree possible, be indexed to the availability of relevant
Bhutanese expertise. Excessive reliance on foreign experts practically guarantees
eventual dissonance between imported means and indigenous aims.
Of particular importance will be policies related to communications and
information technologies, and their role in effecting the export of attention from
local concerns. The recent, official introduction of television to Bhutan marks a
decisive move—understandable, and yet not without marked risks for the erosion
of Bhutanese cultural and contributory resources. The case for developing
Bhutanese competitive advantage in media production is no better than that in
relation to manufacturing and industrial production. Neither can it be assumed
possible to stem what is likely to be a flood of global media products into Bhutan.
It is, however, possible to establish policies restricting direct advertising—a key
component in the generation of desires for consumer choice in market-oriented
economies. It is also possible, with broadcast media, to establish policies requir-
ing, for instance, that a certain percentage of daily airtime be devoted to locally
relevant program content. As a counterbalance to the potentially overwhelming
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extent and density of cultural products arriving through global media, policies
might be established to fund the creative advancement of Bhutanese artists, per-
formers, writers, and commentators, making use of taxes pegged to audience size
for imported program content. Unavoidably, many new artists will engage in cre-
ative hybridization. What is crucial is that this process enhances and extends
Bhutanese culture. The aim is not to preserve Bhutanese culture (in effect ren-
dering it incapable of natural reproduction), but rather to conserve it—a process
that implies creative adaptation as well as sustained continuities.
Related to these three issue areas is a broader policy implication regarding the
institutional structure of integrating global and Bhutanese economies. Although
large nation states can reasonably anticipate some advantages, for example, to
membership in the WTO, Bhutan would appear to have much more to lose than
to gain in such arrangements. Much more is promised by Bhutan remaining in a
position to levy appropriate tariffs and import taxes than by adopting an “open-
market” approach to development. “Free trade” is by no means equivalent to fair
trade. Indeed, the flood of consumer products and its attendant ideology of free-
dom through choice would very quickly erode what real possibilities remain for
Bhutan to leapfrog the phase of postmodern market economics in achieving truly
equitable and just post-market trade and development.27
Post-market possibilities and present-day 
realities: a wary coda
In the frame narrative of the Cakkavatti Sïhanada Sutta, the Buddha instructs a
gathering of students to practice mindfulness in all aspects of the present as it has
come to be, keeping close to their own preserves, to the ranges of their ancestors.
In this way, he affirms, illusory thoughts and desires will find no foothold. He
then adds that it is only by cultivating wholesome or kusala eventualities that this
virtue will deepen and develop. Most generally, this would seem to mean skill-
fully discerning the realities of our present global situation, as it has come to be,
and responding to these realities through/in endless cultivation of wisdom, atten-
tive mastery, and moral clarity. There is no promise in counterfactuals—utopian
or otherwise—for faring well in the Buddhist sense of meaningfully and sustainably
resolving trouble and suffering.
Directly operationalizing happiness as a key value for effecting and orienting
socio-economic development may reflect an appropriate working out of the
meaning of this kind of mindfulness in Bhutan. The grip there of contemporary
global realities may still be weak enough, and the claims of indigenous cultural
sensibilities strong enough, for a decisive paradigm shift from GNP to GNH to be
seen there as both desirable and feasible. Bhutan may—and it is only may—be
able to conserve and further develop its distinctive difference as it carefully works
out the meaning of its own, fuller integration into global realities. But for the vast
majority of the remaining 6 billion human beings on Earth, such a decisive pre-
empting of the powerfully constellated values driving global market economics is
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no longer possible. We live in communities that are already so thoroughly
penetrated by and dependent on global scale interdependencies, so firmly embed-
ded in inequitably biased structures of empowerment, and so deeply imbued with
the ironic liberties of the market that any such sudden shift of paradigms for trade
and development will seem for most of us both patently impractical and (if we are
brutally honest) perhaps even beyond our ability to wholly desire.
In our complexly interdependent world, changing our situation is ultimately
impossible without changing ourselves. Of course, it is also just as impossible to
change ourselves without changing our situation. Far from signaling our entrap-
ment in a “catch-22” dilemma, these apparently contrary conditions of possibility
assert the primacy of bringing about new ways of relating. From a Buddhist per-
spective, this means at a minimum practicing mindfulness in all aspects of our
present situation, as it has come to be. Put somewhat differently, new ways of
relating arise with new ways of attending our situation, with new sensibilities and
sensitivities. This is ultimately what it means to activate the emptiness of our sit-
uation, restoring and even further enhancing its diversity. Without this, there is no
opportunity for changing the way things are changing and orienting our deepening
interdependence toward relating freely and equitably.
The first real step toward realizing post-market economic and developmental
realities, then, is to become mindful of the forces that presently define—literally
shape and set limits to—how we are attentive. In the present historical moment,
nothing so powerfully and widely affects the content and quality of our attention
than mass media. If a paradigm shift from market to post-market realities pivots
on skillfully revising our patterns of value-intention-action to activate situational
opportunity in ways that are diversely liberating, our first order of business is to
become mindful of the pivotal role played by mass media in eroding personal and
communal attentive resources.
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4
TECHNOLOGY, MEDIA, AND THE
COLONIZATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Every age has its central myths. In ours, one might cite the myth of universal
equality or that of realizing unlimited growth—the economic equivalent of
perpetual motion. But none has inspired as much determination and hope, or
demonstrated as much resilience as the myth of technotopia.
The myth asks us to see technological progress as a steady and often heroic
march out of fear and uncertainty into freer, easier, and more satisfying lives.
Morally transparent and culturally neutral, technology imposes no particular val-
ues. It is not only a primary driver of globalization, but one that can be promoted
both comfortably and universally, as useful to those in the third world as the first,
irrespective of political or religious affiliations. Although problems have resulted
in association with the rapid deployment of various technologies, these are sim-
ply “revenge” effects generated by their inappropriate or improper use. With more
complete knowledge of relevant environmental, biological, and social systems, it
will be possible to engineer safer and fully sustainable technological solutions
and development regimes. Eventually, conflict will disappear. Each and every one
of us will enjoy real autonomy—the freedom to get what we want, when, and as,
we want it. In technotopia, all good things will be available in abundance.
No single phenomenon is as emblematic of the power of this myth and its
practical effects on the character of contemporary life and the dynamics of the
public sphere as that of mass media. At the same time, no other single phenomenon
affords as much opportunity for catching sight of the myriad contradictions
hidden in the shadows of the myth and the ramifications of failing to challenge
its root values. Critically examining the media and our persistent difficulties in
subjecting them to robust ethical consideration opens a particularly succinct way
of locating and exploring the systemic effects of the karma—the values–
intentions–actions—associated with what is arguably the basic engine of
market-driven globalization and its utopian pretensions.
The design logic of this engine and the specific role of the media can be
relatively simply stated. Through the consumption of mass media (as well as other
commodities), attention is systematically exported out of our immediate situation.
This compromises relational depth and quality, effectively eroding presently
obtaining patterns of mutual support and contribution, and triggers further and
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still more extensive commodity consumption. As this recursive process intensifies
beyond the point at which all major subsistence needs have been commodified,
consciousness itself is effectively colonized. The relational capabilities of both
persons and communities atrophy, situational diversity is converted into circum-
stantial variety, and the very resources needed to meaningfully respond to and
resolve our suffering or troubles are systematically depleted. As they have come
to be, mass media help institutionalize value-driven patterns of action and
relationship that are conducive both to increasing autonomy and to decreasing
personal and communal capacities for relating freely. They are a primary factor in
the undermining of possibilities for realizing truly liberating environments,
fostering instead our deepening embeddedness within environments both open to
and in need of management or control. Mass media produce and market
commodified contents and qualities of consciousness, effectively (even if
unintentionally) compromising personal and communal capacities for deepening
and expressing appreciative and contributory virtuosity.
These are very strong claims, and they almost universally meet with vehement
objections. Mass media embody many of the values central not only to our
currently prevailing trade and development karma and the political dispositions
most compatible with them, but also to our most basic habits and ideals of self-
construction.1 Criticizing the media is criticizing our selves and our own personal
and communal karma—never an easy or entirely natural endeavor. Nowhere are
these difficulties, their precedents, and the stakes involved in failing to overcome
them more evident than in the critical fence-walk of media ethics.
The disjunction of form and content in media ethics
In 1964, Marshall McLuhan, writing about the nature of mass media, made the
provocative claim that the “medium is the message.”2 Media ethics, however, has
focused overwhelmingly on programming content, tacitly assuming the media
themselves to be inherently value-neutral tools or opportunity spaces that have a
moral valence only in respect of how they are used. Whether a particular use is
benign or malicious depends on who is using the media and why.
The logic underlying this position parallels that operating in the cliché that “guns
don’t kill, people do.” Guns can be used to commit crimes and acts of terror or to
prevent them. The media can be used to foster distrust and hatred, as they were in
Hitler’s Germany; but they can also be used to promote mutual understanding and
tolerance. As “natural” as this logic seems, from a Buddhist perspective it is also
evidently freighted with problematic assumptions about the nature of causality, the
separation of facts and values or means and ends, and the ontological priority of
individual existents rather than relationships. Together, these assumptions severely
constrain our ethical assessments of the media and the political, economic, social
and techno-cultural systems with which they form an integrated whole.
The most heated ongoing debate over the past fifty years of media ethics has
undoubtedly been the extent, if any, to which programming content affects moral
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development. In the half-century since the US Congress first convened hearings
on the psychological and social effects of televised violence in 1954, the debate
has broadened and become increasingly complicated. But it has not been
resolved. Evidence that powerfully correlates media content and long-term
patterns of behavior has been compounding, often quite strikingly, and yet the
controversy remains because the relevant studies fail to establish direct, causal
links between program content and behavior. For a significant camp of media
ethicists, this means that there are no clear grounds for determining, for example,
if violence in the media gives rise to or simply reflects increasing violence in
society. Thus, it remains unclear if the patterns of delinquency and crime found
among young males who have consumed the heaviest diet of violent program-
ming point toward the influence of the media on their behavior, or if they simply
provide evidence of pre-existing (perhaps genetically encoded) dispositions
toward violence and crime.3
From a Buddhist perspective informed by the teachings of interdependence and
emptiness, indeterminacies surrounding whether the media cause or simply
reflect behavioral changes can be traced to the blind spot resulting from an
ontological exclusion of the middle ground between “is” and “is-not”. Indeed, this
blind spot is the root form of ignorance—the most basic and finally debilitating
denial of meaningful interdependence among all things. It is also a blind spot that
makes plausible the disjunction of media form and content, as well as the
assertion that the moral valence of the media has to do with the specific content
that the media—as tools of communication—are used to convey.
Restoring the critical middle ground
A great deal of Buddhist practice is aimed at seeing that nothing literally exists
or “stands apart from” all other things. There are no independently originated and
sustained entities and no fixed and essential natures. Indeed, the teachings of 
no-self, interdependence and emptiness insist that so-called autonomous subjects
and objects are actually abstractions compounded or put-together out of habitual or
conventional patterns of relationship. Only through imposing consistent horizons
of relevance on the originally open and responsive nature of all things are we able
to clearly and categorically separate “this” thing or being from “that”. For those
who have realized emptiness, all things are mutually relevant, obtaining only
through their unique and continuous contributions to the meaning of all other
things.
Given this, controversies pivoting on the distinction between the “media-as-cause”
and the “media-as-mirror” are like those revolving around the question of which
came first, the chicken or the egg. They cannot be settled because they express a
category mistake—forcibly mapping recursive processes characterized by
complex feedback and feedforward onto the simple temporal structure entailed by
strict linear causation. The critical impasse endemic to prevailing approaches to
media ethics results from failing to take interdependence or relationality as
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ontologically basic, and says less about nature of the media than about our own
abiding patterns of ignorance.
Buddhism is not alone in focusing on the ontological priority of relationships.
One can find similar—though perhaps not as radical—moves being made in
especially quantum physics, systems theory, biology, and the environmental or
ecological sciences. As we have seen, however, Buddhism is distinctive in
addressing the emptiness and interdependence of all things as irreducibly karmic
in nature—that is, as dynamically meaningful and not a simple matter of fact.
There is a meticulous consonance between the quality and patterning of our
life experiences, the kinds of situations in which we find ourselves, and the
complexion of our own values and intentions.
Buddhist teachings make clear that karma is made or incurred on the basis of
actions undertaken to bring about an experienced result. Karma does not arise in
association with all actions, but only with actions originating in cetana, which can
be translated as “intention,” but which is perhaps more accurately rendered
as “motivation” or “heartfelt purpose.” It involves the experiencing of the results
of prior purposeful acts, but also the active inflection or orienting of things
as-they-are-coming-to be. Karma implies live interests as well as intentions—the
prevalence of particular values and sentiment-charged commitments.
The insistence that both values and intentions play a role in generating and
incurring karma has important ramifications for understanding the nature of the
media and for assessing them critically. Intentions consist of explicit and specif-
ically situated directives for action. Although we can speak of the intentions of a
community, this is a metaphorical use of the word. Intentions manifestly arise in
and through individuals. By contrast, values obtain generally as relational
dispositions or qualitative orientations. Rather than being tied to explicitly held
preferences regarding outcomes, values mark preferences regarding opportuni-
ties. They occur as abiding currents in the meaning of historically continuous
situations that shape the dynamics of interdependence and are, by nature, both
temporally and spatially ambient rather than specifically located. As a function of
value-laden intentionality, karma is thus always both individual and situational—
a dynamic nexus of the personal and the public, what is fundamentally “mine”
and what is undeniably “ours.”
Both of these dimensions of karma are crucial in considering the ethical
implications of the media. This has not been explicitly acknowledged in the usual
approaches to media ethics—a fact that underlies their overwhelming focus on
the moral valence of media content. Because the main focus is on the intentions
according to which the content of the media is developed and the intentions accor-
ding to which the media (and their content) are consumed, the middle ground for
critically assessing the media as such is functionally excluded. The media
are viewed as tools, used independently by a wide range of individuals for
purposes that can be separately and effectively evaluated in standard moral terms.
From a karmic perspective, doing this brings into ethical consideration an
important part of the total situation pivoting on the media. But focusing exclusively
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on intentionality—and not on both intentions and values—effectively exempts
the media themselves from direct ethical consideration.
Tools and technologies
The ethical blindspot that results from seeing the media as tools that—apart from
the intentions associated with their use—are morally transparent or ethically
neutral, is symptomatic of a broad category mistake that elides the significant
difference between tools and the technologies that generate them. In effect, it is a
mistake that blocks critical and comprehensive evaluations of the complex nexus
of political, economic, social, and cultural forces through which technologies are
developed and deployed. As such, given the role of technological change as a
driver of expanded market reach and density, it is a mistake that has worked
against the consolidation of resources needed to comprehensively evaluate market
operations and their affect on our personal and communal possibilities for
building relational virtuosity.
Tools quantitatively extend our abilities, helping us precisely and powerfully
promote our own interests. They are used by individual persons, corporations, or
nations, and are properly evaluated individually, on the basis of their task-specific
utility. If tools don’t work, we change them, put them in the closet, or commit
them to the dump. In ethical terms, tools allow us to exercise “exit rights”—we
can use or not use them as we wish. At least in theory, this allows us to avoid
personally any undesirable consequences associated with specific tool uses at the
manifest cost of not being able to benefit from their specific utilities.
Technologies are very different. Unlike tools, technologies do not take up
measurable amounts of space. We cannot point to a technology or walk around it.
We cannot dispose of a technology. Indeed, even though I have decided to not own
a television, I am nevertheless affected by the technologies associated with cable
and broadcast media. They influence the culture in which I live, the way people
speak and relate, the shared ground of public experience. With respect to
technology, there are no complete exit rights. Technologies are not built and do
not exist as identifiable entities. Instead, they arise in an ambient fashion,
consisting of widespread, quite literally horizonless patterns of relationship
embodying systems of strategic and ordinal values.
The technology of telecommunications, for instance, includes everything from
the extraction of raw materials to their manufacture into tools like phones, faxes,
and satellites. It includes marketing these tools, the services associated with them,
and the “worlds” to which they give us access. It includes changing patterns of
communication practices, the emergence of a range of industry-regulating legal
institutions, new modalities and domains of stock market investment, and alterations
in the politics of development.
As this example makes clear, we do not actually use technologies. We literally
invest ourselves in them. Technologies don’t help us carry out specific tasks.
Instead, they coalesce as complex patterns of conduct oriented toward responding
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to particular classes or types of problems. Technologies bring about a certain kind
of world or lived experience, qualitatively transforming how we are interdependent.
They systematize how we have conceived and promoted our ends, conditioning
the meaning of things, and embedding us in particular patterns of moral valence.
Technologies cannot be value neutral. And they cannot be effectively evaluated on
the basis of how well the tools they provide serve our individual interests. The
circularity of doing so only perpetuates the fallacy that “if something is good for
each and every one of us, it must be good for all of us.” Instead, technologies can
only be evaluated in terms of how their core values affect the quality of our
conduct or relationships and the kinds of predicaments into which they usher us.
In short, they can only be evaluated in fully karmic terms.
The technological bias toward control
The key strategic value informing the explosion of technological development
that began in the European West and that has spread globally from roughly the
sixteenth century onward has been control. Indeed, what we now refer to generi-
cally as “technology” is actually a particular family or lineage of technologies that
has arisen and been sustained through a complex of political, social, economic,
and cultural forces focused on the value of exerting control over our circumstances
to enhance felt independence.4
Seen from the standpoint of individually assessed utility, this lineage has been
remarkably successful. It has yielded—albeit with some serious “revenge” or
side-effects like global warming and entirely new kinds of pathogens—nearly
miraculous capacities for managing the nature and circumstances of our
experience. Technologies biased toward control have made possible and practical
the institutionalization of previously unimaginable freedoms of choice.
From a Buddhist perspective, however, intentions to control our circumstances
and enhance felt independence can be seen as a crucial nexus of conditions for
suffering that the Buddha gathered under the so-called conceit that “I am.” To the
extent that I insist upon being independent—or, for that matter, being dependent
(on a god, a random series of chemical reactions, or the inexorable operation of
natural laws)—I forcibly ignore my interdependent origin among all things. In
effect, I establish a horizon of relevance inside of which is “me” and beyond
which everything else is explicitly “not-me”.
Enhancing felt independence requires, then, some form of intermediation—the
introduction of means for securing a distinct difference from all other things and
beings, and at least tacitly denying any significant need to differ for them. As we
have been using the term, a strategic bias for control enables the assertion and
enhancement of independence through a sacrifice of diversity.
Although we remain related to others and our environment, the prevalence of
control fosters a dichotomous perspective on that relationship—a splitting into
the objective and subjective—that then facilitates treating our relations with others
as either actually or potentially instrumental. No longer intimately continuous
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with all things—that is, related internally—gaps open in what I can attend or hold
in careful awareness. By ignoring what intimately connects who “I am” with what
“I am not”, I render myself liable to being blindsided—subject to accidental or
fateful events of the sort that cause the experience of trouble or suffering.
Asserting independence through exercising technologically mediated control
almost paradoxically renders us subject to new vulnerabilities.
Seen karmically, it is clear that a sustained bias toward control does not just
commit us to getting what we want or lack; it commits us to the entire cycle of
wanting and getting what we want. This means that the better we get at getting what
we want, the better we will/must get at wanting; but the better we get at wanting,
the better we get at getting what we want, although we won’t want what we get.
A life centered on achieving autonomy through the exertion of control commits
us to an intensifying cycle of apparent poverty and fleeting satisfaction.
This might not be seen as such a bad thing as long as there are sufficient goods
and services to provide whatever we want. It is, in fact, what most of us mean by
“progress.” As long as there are enough goods and resources to carry us through
the next loop in the cycle, so what? Life will just get better and better. But from
a karmic perspective in which values always have precedence over so-called facts
things look rather different.
Consider once again Ivan Illich’s classic study of transportation technologies.
Against our tool-biased intuitions, Illich has convincingly demonstrated that
beyond locally specifiable levels of development, technologies become self-
promoting, generating precisely the kinds of problems they are suited to solving.
Generally stated, technologies have thresholds of utility beyond which they begin
producing the conditions of their own necessity, transforming relational patterns
in such a way that they generate problems of a sort that apparently can be
“effectively” and “efficiently” addressed only through more technology. This
means that the core values of these technologies become ever more deeply
embedded in the fabric of our lives and that our continued independence becomes
increasingly dependent on having access to the tools and techniques these
technologies are generating. Our question must be, then, what happens when a
technological lineage—a whole family of technologies—that is biased toward
control crosses the threshold of its utility? In particular, what happens when we
become dependent on technologically-generated mediation to meet our basic
subsistence needs, especially the needs for sensory enrichment and a sense of
meaning or belonging?
Generally stated, as more and more of our relationships are inflected with the
value of control, we find that our situation is not only increasingly open to
control, but in clear need of it. As we vest increasing energy in making control
karma, not only will we find ourselves living in increasingly controlled environ-
ments, but in situations that are continuously going out-of-control, requiring ever
higher investments of energy and attention: more technology, more legislation,
more schooling, more government intervention, and so on. As our control-biased
technological lineage crosses the threshold of its utility, we find ourselves with
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ever more autonomy or freedoms of choice, but also an ever-deepening sense of
constraint or lack.
Moreover, because technological values shape the world of our experience
itself, unlimited skill in controlling will mean being subject to unlimited control.
This irony might be comical if control did not imply unequal access to power and
thus hierarchies of status. The correlation of increasing technological globalization
with scandalously widening income gaps is no accident and no passing phase. As
the nations of the global South are fully aware, technologies biased toward control
are not compatible with level playing fields. This is because while control can
be alternated, it cannot be shared—not, at least, unless there is absolutely universal
agreement about what we want and how we are going to get it. Such universal
agreement, though a persistent and even noble dream, has never been anything
but a dream. And indeed, to the extent that our independence or autonomy is
asserted through control over our circumstances and the management of our expe-
rience, it must be in tension with equality.5 Autonomy and equality can co-exist
comfortably as social and political values only if my exercise of control and the
meaning I give to our shared situation do not affect you and the meaning you
attribute to it. We must exist, in other words, in essentially separate dramatic
spaces—spaces, as we will see, that have been opened and secured by globally
marketed and now practically universal mass media. Finally, it is only when any
differences between us make no difference at all that we can avoid conflict in
exercising control.
This point is important enough to restate. Unless technologies strategically
rooted in control bring about conditions that are compatible with mutual igno-
rance, they will not only produce the kinds of problems that will drive their own
continued development, but also create fertile conditions for the emergence of
predicaments expressing real and quite consequential conflicts of interest. This
effect may be trivial in the case of technologies narrowly deployed in situations
characterized by relatively low level and/or small scale interdependencies. But in
a world of deep, global interdependencies this effect assumes critical centrality.6
It is significant, then, that the technological history so carefully documented by
James Beniger7 is paralleled by political, economic, and social histories in which
there has emerged an ideal of undermining or at least greatly limiting the strength
of differences in service to equality. Politically, this ideal spawned widespread
conversions of autocratic or monarchic states into republics and democracies.
Economically, it has been associated with a breaking up of colonial empires and
hereditary wealth, the freeing of both material and human capital, market variation,
and an explosion of goods and services. Socially, it has brought about increasingly
porous and fluid societal boundaries and the erosion of long standing class,
gender, racial, and ethnic fault-lines.
All of this is, without any doubt, movement in the right direction—a corrective
for long-sedimented patterns of advantage for only a very few. For any individual,
choosing between continued oppression and increasing freedom of choice is no
choice at all. But, if we are not to commit ourselves once again to the fallacy of
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something being good for all of us (e.g. as communities) if it is good for each and
every one of us—or the related fallacy that if something is good for me to do in
any individual case, it will be good for me to do in all cases—we must pay
particular critical attention to how disarming meaningful differences might
adversely affect relational quality.
To repeat the point made earlier, the increasing ambience of control as a
technological value leads to situations in which conflicts of interest can be
deflected from escalating only at the cost of rendering difference impotent in
respect of truly making a difference. Put another way, at least when deployed at
sufficient scale, technological lineages biased toward control will tend to
orchestrate possibilities for their further deployment by systematically translating
diversity into variety. Patterns of relationship that are characterized by mutual
contributions to shared welfare based on differential approaches to appreciating
situational resources will be translated into patterns of relationship that eventuate
only in simple co-existence.
The sublimation of diversity into mere variety that is a crucial effect of the con-
temporary patterns of technologically driven globalization will never bring about
a homogenizing totalism. We need not worry about all dressing, eating, and
speaking the same way. But as we have seen, globalization of this sort is likely to
break down the local-to-local contributory networks by means of which
subsistence needs have traditionally been met—the local ecologies of production
that have sustained and enhanced both personal and communal capacities-for and
contributions-to shared meaning-making. The saturation of our ways of relating
by technologically mediated control over the contents of our experience will
generate seemingly endless potential for exercising freedoms of choice. But this
will also empty the public sphere of the resources needed to experience a creative
and immediate sense of belonging meaningfully and intimately together.
Control karma, media, and the colonization of 
consciousness
In examining the karma of contemporary trade and global market economics,
critical emphasis was given to the shift from locally produced means of subsis-
tence to a system of meeting subsistence needs through globally mediating
commodity markets. In broad outline, this process eventuated in a series of global
transitions from material colonization (sixteenth to nineteenth centuries) to devel-
opment economics (nineteenth through mid-twentieth century), the postindustrial
information age (over the last quarter of the twentieth century), and now to what
I have termed the attention economy.
The earliest phase of this transition was marked by the commodification of
natural resources and the extension of power over the distribution of material
goods. The classic era of material colonization gave way for a complex set of
reasons, technological as well as social and political, to a pattern of development
economics centered on the commodification of labor and exerting overt control
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over consumption practices. Revolutionary advances in information technology
served over the second half of the twentieth century as a compounding catalyst
for a global shift away from industries focused on producing material goods to
knowledge and service oriented industries. This transition marked the commodi-
fication of information flows and the consolidation of power over the distribution
of conceptual capital.
We are in the midst of a poorly recognized transition from industries focused
on knowledge production and information service solutions to an era in which
consciousness itself is colonized through the emergence of complex markets that
depend for their growth on the global extraction and redistribution of attention
energy—that most basic of resources needed to make differences of the sort that
make a meaningful difference. In short, we are entering an era in which attention
itself is becoming commodified, and in which power is now being exerted, for
profit, over the production of meaning and a sense of global belonging. This can
be seen as both a cause and a consequence of the epochal shift from an era
dominated by problem-solution to one dominated by predicament-resolution—a
shift in which global mass media play an indispensable and pivotal role.
As noted in our earlier discussion of trade and development, a primary effect
and enabler of the growth in scope and density of global markets has been the
successful displacement of locally produced goods and services by globally
circulated commodities, especially the goods and services needed for basic
subsistence. The culturally disruptive impacts of the global commodification
of food (cuisine), clothing (fashion), shelter (domestic space) and education
(knowledge generation, storage and transmission) cannot be overestimated. Marx
was particularly prescient in envisioning the coming role of mass consumption in
the continued growth and consolidation of global capital—this already by the
mid-nineteenth century. And Veblen, writing at the dawn of the twentieth century,
clearly identified the key role of mass advertising in the sustained growth of
perceived material needs or wants required by the expansion of market scope and
the complementary (and eventually even more important) intensification of
market density. Yet, as crucial as this role of mass media continues to be in
generating consumer preferences and desires regarding material goods and
services, its overall historical significance may prove to be—in relative terms, at
least—rather modest.
With the advent of widespread popular access to radio and film in the early twen-
tieth century, mass media began to play a new kind of economic role. Instead of
serving solely as an organ for advertising locally, nationally and globally circulating
commodities, it also began serving as a key producer of such commodities in the
form of entertainment products. From this point forward, the media began shaping
not only consumer sensibilities, but also consumer sentiment, creating new,
technologically intermediated and increasingly non-local communities of anticipation
and pathos, with shared excitements, expectations and feelings of belonging.
In ways unforeseen by visionaries like Marx, Ruskin and Veblen, mass media
rapidly came to play an absolutely central role in defining the meaning of the
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times. Indeed, with the accelerating global penetration of the public sphere by
television and film from the 1960s, the productive capacity of mass media
reached such an extent that Noam Chomsky could, in the mid-1980s write about
the power of mass media to manufacture consent.8 The confluence of lowering
costs for producing, distributing and marketing consumer electronics (radios,
stereos, televisions and, later, home computers with internet access), emerging
long-term effects of the commodification of subsistence, and the erosion of local
cultural sensibilities and familial structures resulted finally in the mass mediated
commodification of experienced belonging and participatory community.
But, contrary to the concerns of many media critics who, especially in the
1970s and 1980s, worried about the globalization of (Western or American)
culture as an inevitable outcome of unhindered mass media expansions of the
entertainment and information industries, market imperatives for maximally
dense and continuous regimes of consumption have led in an almost opposite
direction. While the media served to break down locally diverse ecologies for pro-
ducing sensation enriching experiences, shared sentiment and meaning, they did
not result in a unified global audience, but in the proliferation of ever-variegating
arrays of global audiences with distinctly ill- or un-coordinated patterns of pref-
erence and interest. Instead of global media monopolies as purveyors of global
monoculture—manufacturing globally monolithic consent—we have witnessed
the rise of transnational mass media corporations intent on creating/serving as
great a variety of audience niches as possible, thus exercising as great a control
as possible over global flows of attention-energy. Instead of a global “Big Three”
of media networks, there are hundreds of cable channels, thousands of online
magazines and blogs, and a myriad of internet sites catering to an almost
bottomless range of tastes and desires—all made available with maximal user
friendliness, invisibly connected perhaps through transnational flows of industry
profit, but manifestly differentiated and ostensibly oriented to the individual
management of the contents of experience.
With these changes has come a paradigm shift in the meaning of being in
community: it has become a mass mediated matter of choice. As enabled by
technological advances that now globally allow almost instantaneous access to
virtually any media content, the requirements for entering a community of inter-
ests and participating in the shared consumption of entertainment, information
and interpretations or meaning have been reduced down to a single, explicitly
reversible digital event. One need only electronically assert, by the click of a
computer mouse or a voice command, that “I want to experience this” or “I do not
want to experience this” for it to be so. Choice has been effectively disengaged
from commitment.
This severing of capabilities-for choice and commitments-to sustained patterns
of qualitatively charged relationality and community will undoubtedly have very
real consequences for how the public comes to be conceived. It may well be that
the public sphere, as digitally mediated, will come to be seen as a sub-domain of
the private—a likely plural set of spaces for affiliation within the overarching
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space of individually exercised choices. But the more immediate and globally
significant consequence of the present scale of mass media consumption is the
commodification and systematic export of attention itself.9
Attention export and the erosion of relational quality
The good or kusala eventualities associated with the prevailing scope and
intensity with which the public is penetrated by global commodities (particularly
media) are almost universally—albeit inequitably—familiar. Meeting our basic
human needs through the consumption of globally circulating goods and services
is not only convenient, the goods and services themselves are expertly designed
and delivered, with the result that our individual capacities for managing the
content and context of our experiences are arguably at a global, historical high.
Although there is considerable variability depending on one’s position in terms of
global slopes of economic advantage, even for the relatively disadvantaged global
majority there is now an unprecedented and daily expanding array of goods and
services that can be enjoyed in almost immediate exchange for cash or credit
representing some specific amount of our time and attention. In the case of the
entertainment, information and meaning commodities produced and purveyed by
global mass media, the unit costs to the consumer may seem so small as to seem
negligible. But they are not.
The single most important long-term cost of this convenience and control can
be stated quite straightforwardly: an overall erosion of relational quality resulting
in a mounting incapacity for appreciation and contribution. We have already laid
the basic foundation for unpacking this claim in earlier discussions of the com-
pression of the production-marketing-consumption-waste cycle. To the degree
that acts of media consumption become increasingly narrow in temporal scope,
they will tend to retard sustained focusing of attention and critical evaluation.
Among the most remarkable changes in mass media—especially television and
film—over the past quarter century, has been an exponential shrinking of the
average scene or shot length. Attention is literally not allowed to rest in place for
longer than a second or two and in most cases for quite small fractions of a
second. In practice, mass market media consumption consists of the iconic
experience of having one’s attention captured and redirected, with evaluation
inhibiting speed and force.10
In the consumption of mass media commodities, the act of consuming is in
effect digitalized virtually moment-by-moment. As such, it represents a limit case
in the new economy. But the overwhelming trend in contemporary commodity
consumption practices, regardless of the consumed good or service (whether a
food item or a healthcare intervention) has been to compress sufficiently the
spatial and temporal scope of consumption that it mimics a digital transition from
not-having to having—a transition that disallows any complex, improvised
relational ground being navigated or any qualitative shift in relationality being
initiated and sustained. The new economy effectively mandates the ideal of acts
TECHNOLOGY, MEDIA, AND COLONIZATION
96
of consumption that can—and, eventually, can only—be consummated without
building relational capacity.
This ideally minimal transit from not-having to having is ultimately what we
mean by convenience—the practically frictionless movement from one status to
another. With considerable implications for the nature and dynamics of the pub-
lic sphere, the market valorization of convenience and choice—now manifestly
being normalized across a wide range of sectors, including healthcare and political
participation—signals both a general narrowing of our horizons of personal
responsibility and, over time, a severe compromise of relational capability and
attunement. Each act of commodity consumption marks the smooth and efficient
paving over of opportunities for developing the complex attentive and relational
skills associated with contributory virtuosity. The karma of reliance on “expertly”
designed and manufactured goods, services, knowledge products, and meaning
(especially in the form of mass media news) renders us increasingly in need of
expert—even if globally mediated—care. Because they so profoundly effect
changes in attentive quality, and because they meet basic needs for a sense of
belonging and meaning, mass media are at the vanguard of the colonization of
consciousness.11
This is not due to any corporate or state conspiracy, or to any specific media
content. Simply stated, attention-energy that is not directed (ideally in a kusala
fashion) into our families, neighborhoods, and local communities is no longer
available to them. Neither are the ostensible recipients of attention captured and
spent on mass mediated program—for example, a family beset by political con-
flicts and ecological collapse in sub-Saharan Africa—able to benefit from this
export of our most basic human resource. It is, indeed, true that the media and
global economics practically deliver the great factual variety of the world into our
homes. With cable station access, we have virtually unlimited, globally informed
experiential options. But the media bring the world into our homes by means of
procedures that are, in terms of intimate patterns of interdependence, finally
“surgical”—procedures that dramatically dissociate the ostensive subjects
(human or otherwise) of mass media programming from their native relational
contexts, their natural patterns of becoming and unfolding toward excellence, and
so also their emptiness and capacity to meaningfully enhance our lives as our
teachers and intimate partners.
Calculated by sheer quantities of time involved, the greatest consumption of
commodities in the new economy takes place through the media. Just to cite a few
statistics, the average American watches just over 35 hours of television per week
and, in the course of a year, is exposed to approximately 22,000 commercials.
Children, it should be noted, now average a full “work week” in front of the
television: five hours per day, seven days a week, three hundred and sixty five
days a year. Sixty percent of all American children can be found at 10 am Saturday
in front of a television set. Listening to radio occupies approximately 20 hours per
week. Internet use, averaged for all Americans, is estimated at an average of
15 hours per week on the web. Altogether, Americans will soon spend an average
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of 66% of their waking hours in direct media use.12 This does not include
any media use required in the workplace or at school. Nor does it include the
time spent reading magazines or books dedicated to media stars, or the hours
we devote to conversations about favorite actors, movies, or sports teams and
personalities, many of which are carried out while consuming other media
products. By tragic contrast, the average American parents spend less than
40 minutes a week in meaningful conversation with their children; meantime,
the children are being exposed to 16,000 murders and over 200,000 acts of
violence on television prior to turning eighteen. The time given to direct commu-
nity service is, of course, even lower than that devoted to meaningful family
conversation.
What are we not doing with this time and attention? The deep penetration of
the media into our day-to-day lives marks a catastrophic export of attention from
our families and local communities. This is true regardless of program content.
Each hour spent consuming mass media commodities is an hour not spent attend-
ing our own immediate situation or actively and jointly improvising changes in its
meaning. Like gardens, families and communities left untended will eventually
go to ruin. As attention is systematically exported from unique and local patterns
of relationship, largely through the consumption of both subsistence and media
commodities, there occurs a depletion of precisely the resources needed locally if
a population is to meaningfully resolve its own problems.13 Beyond a certain
threshold of utility, the consumption of commodified goods and services ceases
to be merely convenient and becomes compulsory.
The global export of attention, primarily through mass media—but also in the
form of other acts of direct commodity consumption—is bringing about massive
relational degradation. As would be expected from the insight that degraded
environments are inseparable from degraded consciousness, this is a dual pattern
of degradation that at once devalues what is experienced and lowers experiential
quality. The systematic result of massively eroded attentive resources is ongoing
failure in appreciating and contributing skillfully to our immediate situation: we
find ourselves increasingly poorly situated, subject to an epidemic of boredom,
restlessness, and dissatisfaction.
None of this is to deny that there is much that is agreeable in a life of apparently
open-ended and convenient consumption. Even now, at this early phase in the
colonization of consciousness, we enjoy an astounding rate and variety of
experiences—a range of experiential possibilities unknown even to the royalty of
previous ages. But the karma of compulsory consumption is such that these expe-
riences must be forgotten or found wanting. The tangible goods we consume must
be consigned to closets, basements, second-hand shops or the dump. So, too,
must the intangible goods of information and knowledge, sensory enrichment and
stimulation, and senses of belonging and meaning be as rapidly as possible
rendered obsolete or otherwise undesirable or irrelevant. Again, in the body of the
global economy, the function of consumers is the production and elimination of
waste—employment that ultimately is neither dignified nor edifying.
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The colonization of consciousness is in many ways a more critical threat to our
possibilities for realizing truly liberating environments than is the depletion of
soil, the fouling of our rivers, lakes, seas, and skies, or the massive extinction of
plant and animal species. Because of it, we unwittingly forfeit the basic resource
needed to enhance our capacities for relating freely and fully with our environ-
ments and those with whom we share them. Because of it, we are hastening
(sometimes quite happily) into dependence on expert systems of communal
welfare. Because of it, we condition ourselves to pervasively fail at appreciating
our immediate situation, as a result of which we find ourselves ever more poorly
situated.14 And because of it, we find it progressively easier and more comfortable
to enjoy a sense of belonging together with people we have never met face-to-face
and with whom we may never even have communicated, than with our own family
members and neighbors.
There is considerable and entirely deniable irony in this. Making control karma
has brought us rich varieties of experience. But it has also cost us critical
capacities for evaluating our own conduct, for skillfully contributing to one
another, and for enhancing the value of our situation. In our world of securely
managed co-existence in which patterns of diversity are being systematically
translated into mere variety, it is becoming “natural” to feel bored or distracted,
to feel compelled to do something “more” or “different”, and to have our attention
freed from the here and now to travel decidedly elsewhere. The mass media are
rivaled perhaps only by pharmaceuticals, designer drugs, and legal substances of
abuse in serving this need to be able to exert control over the type, nature, and
duration of our chosen experiences, and to do so in what amounts to dramatic
isolation from others exercising similar degrees of control.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine any institutionalized arrangement that would more
effectively make this possible than the management of experience itself through
the consumption of mass media commodities. Although the media ostensibly
open up public spaces in which it is possible to get virtually whatever information
we want, and to which equal access is at least theoretically possible, the media
also quite dramatically export attention from locally available spaces in which
contributory and appreciative virtuosity might be cultivated. In effect, they make
irrelevant the ready availability of alternative perspectives and prospects. In
general, as individuals and as populations, we typically will not seek out and
make ourselves vulnerable to the full force of others’ differences from us. Media
consumption conditions us to make the kinds of choices that enable us to keep
choosing the content of our experience with as much autonomy as possible.
In the context of global patterns of interdependence conducive to the colonization
of consciousness, mass media institutionalize the possibility of experiencing
pretty much what we want, when we want, without any apparent conflict with
others exercising even glaringly opposite choices. As such, mass media are the
primary system through which the attention economy manages to be a net
producer of dramatic entropy or situations in which no matter what choices we
make, they will not ultimately make much of a difference. This has among its
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salient effects the conservation of an uncontested space for the perseverance of
liberal individualism and an ontological bias toward existents rather than
relationships. Unfortunately, as suggested by laboratory studies of animals
rendered incapable of meaningfully affecting their environment, the end result of
dwelling too continuously in this space will be mounting depression—an
epidemic of narcissism tragically alloyed with nihilism.
Has the case been overstated?
This may seem like an overstated case. Today, we enjoy a degree of autonomy and
equality—especially politically—that is without historical precedent. Some
commentators like Francis Fukuyama15 have celebrated this as the “end of
history”—our arrival at the endpoint of political and economic evolution. Such
pronouncements are, I think, very insightful, but also thankfully mistaken.
As I have repeatedly stressed, among the collateral costs of the colonization of
consciousness are decreasing capacities-for and commitments-to contributing
meaningfully to our situation—to literally engage in the making of meaning. This
is a kind of end to history, but a very threatening one. And it is inevitable that the
dramatic distance that makes it possible to simultaneously entertain autonomy
and equality as social and political values also makes it increasingly easy for us
to believe that, “if I’m okay; you must be okay” or, if you are not, then it is surely
no fault of mine.
The attention economy brings widely available “wealth” and constantly expe-
rienced “want” into an increasingly tight feedback loop. With the unrelenting,
media-enabled export of attention out of our immediate situation and the
consequent atrophy of our capacity for appreciative and contributory virtuosity,
we no longer feel that there is very much that we—uniquely—must do because
only we can. The great irony of the colonization of consciousness is that we
experience this as a kind of deliverance or liberation. Technologically trained to
get what we want, we become expert at controlling the results or outcomes of our
choices. But in exchange for the power to determine exactly what will happen, we
are forfeiting our ability to cultivate improvisational skill and virtuosity in regard
to how well things are done. Strangely, against all of our commonplace intuitions,
freedom of choice can easily work against our potential for relating freely.
Nevertheless, the Buddhist teaching of impermanence implies that no situation,
no matter how deeply conflicted, is finally intractable. In spite of the immense,
factual scale of the processes associated with the colonization of consciousness,
it is possible to resist being exclusively biased—technologically and otherwise—
toward the value of control. This means realizing that the spectrum running from
outright oppression to ideally universal autonomy is not exhaustive of our possi-
bilities. Indeed, the Buddhist challenge is to see that this entire spectrum is biased
toward control, and that while freedom as autonomy is surely better than oppression,
it is not the final word on freedom. The opportunity is always present to move
“perpendicular” to the practices and values arrayed along this spectrum.
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We can commit ourselves to counteracting our dramatic impoverishment and
attentive atrophy through directly cultivating appreciative and contributory
virtuosity. In Buddhist terms, this means realizing: wisdom or insight into the
interdependence and emptiness of all things (prajña); attentive mastery
(samadhi); and moral clarity (fila). As our karma for appreciative and contribu-
tory virtuosity matures, we will find ourselves with increasing responsibilities
and opportunities for contributing to our situation. But, necessarily, we will also
find ourselves more and more richly endowed, more and more valuably situated.
As the Vimalakïrti Sutra insists, when such a path is cultivated with horizonless
commitment, it finally means the realization of buddha-lands in which all things
do the work of enlightenment.
TECHNOLOGY, MEDIA, AND COLONIZATION
101
Broadly construed, governance centers on consolidating authoritative oversight
with respect to the depth, dynamics, and direction of change. By nature, then,
governance is highly context dependent. It expresses a working coherence of
concretely arrayed legitimacies, powers, and patterns of responsible supervision.
But precisely because governance centers on managing or orienting change, it is
also necessarily vested in the processes of creativity and conservation that result
in the transformation of context. Governance, in short, is necessarily reflexive.
Where change is both rapid and complex—as is globally the case at present—
achieving and securing good governance becomes a pivotal and critically
recursive concern cutting across all aspects of contemporary society. At the core
of this concern are questions not only about political institutions and formal
decision-making procedures, but also about the nature and meaning of freedom,
the prioritization of values and practices, and about how best to understand and
advance public good.
Global interdependence has contributed greatly to intensifying the need for
both asking and responsibly answering these questions. Just as it has become
apparent, for example, that many of the primary drivers of problems in the
environmental, health, and trade sectors lie outside these specific sectors, it has
become clear that many key drivers of political problems are not explicitly
political or ideological. Rather, the most trenchantly confounding challenges to
good governance in the political realm center on aptly and sustainably reconciling
differences in aims, norms, customary practices and values in such contested
arenas as those of culture, ethnicity, gender and religion, and in both coherently
and comprehensively orchestrating the full range of social and economic dynamics
that structure contemporary societies.
Here, I would like to address the interplay of politics and religion as a way of
cogently exploring the interplay of good governance, diversity, and public policy.
The interplay of religion and politics brings into particularly clear focus the
normative and practical stakes involved in arriving at significantly shared answers
to questions about the nature of freedom and public good in a world of increas-
ingly extensive and profound interdependence. While the terrorist attacks of





Religion, politics, and public good
an explicit focus of both national and global political discourse, the full network
of conditions involved in the foregrounding of religion extends well beyond the
causes and motivations for overt militancy and militarism. The accelerating and
complex dynamics of contemporary globalization have brought about patterns of
economic, social, political and techno-cultural interdependence that have at once
pointedly raised issues of public good (e.g. in the discourses on human rights and
environmental protection) and rendered palpable the inequities being generated
by these very patterns of market-driven interdependence. The specter of global
homogenization turns out to have been a reasonable, but entirely imaginary,
source of fear.
Religion has reemerged—along with ethnicity, culture, and the nation, for
example—as a crucial shaper of political discourse in answer to complexly
conditioned needs for at once conserving and creating identity. That is, the
renewed prominence of religion is in large part a response to identity crises
triggered by global dynamics that at once highlight and threaten differences that
make a difference. Distinctively, religion is centrally concerned with issues of
belonging and ultimate meaning, in ways that practically force it to play either a
complicit or critical role vis-à-vis these dynamics and crises of identity correlated
with them. Because of this, religion—as that sphere, irreducibly both public and
private, in which the ultimate reconciliation or reordering of goods and interests
occupies center stage—has come to assume surprisingly pivotal contemporary
relevance.1
There is a certain historical irony in this. The contemporary global norm has
come to be one of seeing the separation of politics and religion as a necessary and
positive result of modernity—an ideal which, although it is not always completely
realized, can no longer be fully and responsibly contested. This is particularly true
among the putatively democratic nation-states in which the liberal humanist
legacy of the European Enlightenment is most well established. But it has also
become increasingly characteristic of nation-states in Asia and the global South
where this legacy has taken historically more recent and often more tentative root.
Apart from certain Islamic states and a small handful of Buddhist nations—for
example, Bhutan, Thailand, and Myanmar (Burma)—politics and religion are
denied truly significant common ground. It may be part of the business of politics
to establish the parameters for and rights to religious practice, but religion is for
the most part denied reciprocal authority with respect to politics.2
The customary arguments given for carefully segregating the sphere of the
state and that of the sacred are, I believe, both valid and sensible. Millennia-long
processes of globalization—understood in the broadest sense of the term—have
brought about a nearly total dissolution of culturally, ethnically, linguistically, or
religiously homogenous polities. As a result, at virtually all scales, the contem-
porary body politic is ever more pluralistic, even where pluralism as an explicit
social and political ideal has not been seriously or deeply embraced. Consensus
and consent have thus come enjoy globally unprecedented privilege in the political
process, at the very least rhetorically, and often quite practically. But to an equally
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unprecedented extent, the sustained and significant development of pluralistic
societies requires the creation and conservation of public and politically potent
spaces for the expression and reconciliation of differences—including, but by no
means restricted to religious differences. The separation of religion and politics is
warranted, if for no other reason, by the indispensability of possibilities for
expressing meaningful dissent of the greatest imaginable scope in heterogeneous
societies where governing according to simple majority would effectively close
the space of fruitful difference.
My purpose here is not, therefore, to contest the functional separation of
politics and religion. Rather, I want to interpret their separation in such a way as
to foreground the possibilities for political redirection that are implied by the
unique resources of religion for bringing about meaningful, felt community. I will
be doing so by appeal to specifically Buddhist resources, and in ways that will
shed light on the place of religion in policy-making aimed at articulating and
securing public good. But I trust that other traditions could well be mobilized to
undertake parallel projects aimed at revitalizing religion’s capacity for engender-
ing critical countercultures with respect to prevailing political norms and
strategies of governance.
Buddhism and politics: possibilities for critical revision
It is often supposed that Buddhism began, at least, as an apolitical religious or
spiritual movement, and that its early teachings were focused on individual
enlightenment and release from samsara or the unending cycle of troubled
existence. Much of the early canon—in particular, the Sutta Pitaka or collections
of discourses by the historical Buddha—would seem to bear out this supposition.
The sutta literature consists almost entirely of the presentation of audience-
specific strategies for authoring liberation from suffering or trouble (dukkha).
Most often, these strategies emerge in the course of conversations between the
Buddha and individual monastic and lay students. Less often, but with equivalent
dramatic force, they arise on occasions in which the Buddha has been invited to
make strategic recommendations to political and social leaders who are faced
with an array of threats ranging from natural calamities to civil unrest and war.
On these occasions—and against the intuitions of many contemporary (especially
Western) Buddhist practitioners—the Buddha did not argue for or against any
particular form of government. At no point did he recommend rebellion or regime
change. Neither did he recommend the building of any particular political
institutions. Indeed, he did not seem to make any summary value judgment at all
among competing forms of political organization as such. Instead, he provided
situation-specific guidance and resources for entering into governing relation-
ships skillfully and consistently with the overall Buddhist aim of ending the
suffering of all sentient beings. This has led many critics to the conclusion that
early Buddhism was determinedly apolitical in orientation, carefully eschewing
any taking of political sides. Given the Buddha’s contrasting readiness to transgress
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the broad social norms related, for example, to caste and gender by taking
students from all levels of society, both male and female, other critics have been
led to presume a de facto agenda of seeking elite sponsorship in the context of a
conservative, political realism.3
Both approaches, however, evince what I take to be relatively shallow readings
of the Buddha’s pattern of response, taking it to be one of either blanket disen-
gagement or selective engagement with finally secular motivations. To begin
with, the absence of direct criticisms of governmental structures as such directly
parallels the pattern, for example, of the Buddha’s responses to matters of caste,
ritual propriety, and gender. Rather than essentially denouncing, for instance,
caste institutions—claiming, in effect, that they are inherently “bad” or
“harmful”—he focused on drawing out the true meaning of the distinctions
institutionalized therein. Thus, he would offer insight into the true character of
being ksatriya or brahmin, stressing its relational (rather than essential and inher-
ited) nature. Likewise, he did not directly forbid the performance of caste-specific
rituals like that of the “horse sacrifice”—rituals crucial to the expression and
consolidation of social and cultural authority—but instead guided his audience
toward understanding, in Buddhist terms, the truer meanings of sacrifice.
The same pattern of response is evident in the Buddha’s refusal to directly
contest prevailing forms of political practice and concentrating, instead, on
skillfully redirecting their force and meaning. In doing so, his emphasis was
invariably on illustrating liberating patterns of relationship and leadership as
distinct from those that maintained or further concentrated the conditions binding
us to unresolved suffering or trouble. Thus, the Buddha commented extensively
on the nature of good governance, and particularly on the conduct characteristic
of the dharmic leader or “wheel-turning monarch” (cakkavatti). And while it is
true that he did not try to convince leaders of the need for destroying or reforming
existing social and political institutions, he consistently and powerfully advocated
committed revision of the meaning of political and social relationships, focusing
in particular on the dramatically significant interplay of values and intention.
This pattern of response repeats, as well, the pattern established in the Buddha’s
more widely celebrated expositions of a Middle Way eschewing the opposing
positions of the eternalist and the annihilationist, the ascetic and the hedonist, or
the spiritualist and the materialist. Perhaps because of the spatial metaphor
invoked, the Buddhist path has often been understood as coursing “halfway
between” all such opposites and extremes. But in actuality, the Buddhist Middle
Way was not articulated (and certainly not traveled) as a kind of Aristotelian
“mean” between opposing beliefs and practices. Instead, it consisted of calling to
critical account the entire spectrum of beliefs and practices arrayed between any
such opposed positions.
During the Buddha’s lifetime, many well-defined and subtle philosophical and
religious positions were arrayed between, for example, those who claimed the
existence of an eternal soul and those who claimed the complete absence of any
soul whatsoever, insisting instead on the reduction of all existence to functions of
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matter. The Buddhist Middle Way was not an arithmetic average among all such
views or a composite of their best features, but a means of exiting “perpendicular”
to the conditioned axis of contestation established among them. To press the
metaphor, Buddhist teachings aimed at opening up an entirely new kind of
space—a new dimension. Taking up the Middle Way was not aimed at coming to
rest at a point of perfect balance among competing and thus mutually limiting
viewpoints, but at abandoning the very terms and conditional circumstances of
the competition itself.4
By refraining from any explicit ranking of political institutions as “bad,”
“better,” and “best,” the Buddha conscientiously avoided having the Middle Way
assume a rank among them. By concentrating on the values and intentions
deployed in leadership rather than the specific ritual and institutional forms sup-
porting it, the Buddha’s advice neither advocated nor met with direct resistance.
Understanding why such an apparently indirect approach was taken does not
involve unmasking “hidden agendas” or compiling lists of appropriate “realist
considerations.” It involves an appreciation of the Buddhist teaching of karma.
Karma and the politics of meaning
As we have seen in earlier chapters, a specifically Buddhist teaching of karma can
be derived through both the teaching discourses (suttas) and the previous life
narratives of the Buddha and his key disciples (primarily in the Jataka tales). It
alerts us to the meticulous consonance between our values and intentions and the
circumstances and dramatic movement of our life stories. That is, the Buddhist
teaching of karma invites us to attend to the ways in which our patterns of
priorities, preferences, and purposes actively condition the topography of present
and future experience.
An important implication of this teaching is that we always have a significant
share of responsibility in being present where, when, and as we have come to be.
If we had not made karma for being born into a world characterized by personal
and institutional violence, by gender inequities, or by ethnic strife, we would have
been born elsewhere. This should not be understood as an invitation to fatalism.
Other teachings—most succinctly, that of the three marks—enjoin us, for the
purposes of realizing liberation from suffering, to see all things as characterized
by impermanence, trouble, and the absence of any fixed and essential identity. If
all things—and hence, all situations—are seen as absent any fixed identity and as
in constant processes of change, no situation can be understood as inevitable.
By seeing all things as impermanent, we become aware that transformative
energy is invariably present. By seeing our situation as irreducibly karmic, we
become aware that what is in question is never whether things can change, but
only the direction in which they will do so. That is, even if the facts of our present
situation are relatively resistant to immediate alteration, the meaning of this
situation is always open to negotiation. In karmic terms, responsibility always
entails the possibility of meaningful response. While the particular situations in
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which we find ourselves are invariably the conditioned outcome of prior intentions
and continuing values, these same situations are also sites of opportunity for
revising presently obtaining patterns of value and intention.
This general description, and its implications for interpreting the Buddha’s
distinctively non-confrontational political counsel, can be fleshed out by more
fully rehearsing a story mentioned earlier in connection with a Buddhist
understanding of poverty and its alleviation: the Cakkavatti Sïhanada Sutta.5 In
this discourse, the Buddha begins by enjoining a gathering of his students to
practice mindfulness with respect to all aspects of their experience. While doing
so, he advises “keeping to your own preserves, to the range of your forebears” so
that the temptation toward unskilled and unwholesome actions will find no
foothold, no lodging. Immediately after uttering this apparently (and even oddly)
conservative message, the Buddha launches into the story of Dalhanemi, a
wheel-turning king, and his descendants.
Governed in accordance with Dharma, King Dalhanemi’s realm is a densely
populated one in which all beings live cooperatively, attractive in appearance,
long in life, and refined in customs and tastes. Nearing the end of his life, the king
wishes to dedicate himself to the holy life, but is concerned that his son has not
demonstrated the capacity for serving as a dharmic leader. He is assured by
his assembled ministers and sagely advisors that the capacity for serving as a
wheel-turning king is not inherent, and that all such kings must learn to govern in
accordance with the Dharma. As long as the inheritor of the throne acts with good
intent and consults with his ministers and the sages of the realm—all of whom
understand some part of the whole pattern of conduct required of a wheel-turning
monarch—then all will be well.
The story then chronicles what happens when the eighth in the line of
Dalhanemi’s royal heirs fails to conduct himself in this manner. Although he con-
sults with his ministers and advisors, he often is simply going through prescribed
motions. Acting according to his own ideas, it happens that he fails to properly
respond to evidence that a class of needy is growing in the realm. Neediness turns
into outright poverty and, for the first time in anyone’s memory, someone com-
mits a theft. In a series of well-intended follies, he tries to control the behavior of
the people, but everything he does only sends things spiraling further and further
out of control. First, having allowed poverty to rise to the point that theft occurs,
he decides to give money to the thief so that he might support his family without
crime. But when people hear of this, they understand that theft is rewarded with
money from the king! As a result, thievery spreads. The king then decides to
behead a thief as a warning to all who would steal. But seeing for the first time
what use can be made of well-honed metal hammered in the shape of a sword,
people get the idea of making their own swords and killing the people from whom
they steal so that no one will be able to report their crime!
Things spiral from bad to worse with each attempt to fix what has gone wrong.
And over several generations, traditions of lived community many thousands of
millennia old literally disintegrate into a roiling mass of free-floating individuals
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given to mad paroxysms of destructiveness—a vertiginous, free-falling society in
which children curse their parents, respect is ridiculed, family members murder
one another as readily as they do strangers, and in which addictions to crude
sensations and abusive relationships become celebrated as norms. With each new
collapse downward into moral and social abyss, the vitality and beauty of the
people decreases, and the average lifetime shrinks from 80,000 years to a mere
seven years. A turn around only comes when a scattering of people retreat from
society, refusing to participate in its degeneration, and eventually form a community
of their own based on cultivating mindfulness and the shared practice of good
deeds for the sake of other beings.
Three crucial themes are at play in this apparently simple moral tale. First is
the pivotal role of poverty in the erosion of community: the dissolution of con-
sciously lived interdependence is forewarned by the appearance of experienced
lack or want—the experience of not being contributed to as needed. Importantly,
however, this occurs when people are not able to work in and for their community.
That is, poverty arises when people are blocked from contributing directly to
the welfare of others. Trouble takes on a life of its own, spreading almost virus-
like, when diversity begins to be eroded and when unwholesome change in the
meaning or direction of interdependence is not skillfully reversed.
The second theme is the correlation among decreasing vitality and lifespan,
increasing ignorance about our interdependence, and the disintegration of
community life. In remarkably simple language, the narrative discloses the
interrelationships among the loss of personal and cultural memory and history,
the loss of a capacity for concerted attention and long-term commitments, and the
rise of dramatic or moral distraction. Healing the “wound of existence” depends
on carefully and caringly sustained sensibilities and sensitivities. Without
qualitatively appropriate, sustained attention, the asravas or rents in the fabric of
our interdependence deepen: the wound of existence becomes infected.
Finally, the story makes it very clear that the strategy of securing ourselves
against trouble and crisis through various kinds of control is eventually
self-defeating, committing us to courses of action that institutionalize conditions
under which more widespread and deep controls seem increasingly necessary. In
a thoroughly interdependent world, controlling the outcome of a situation is to
exert control over all those present—an act of coercion that draws objections and
stages further need for control in an escalating series that all too often culminates
in violence.
When this fall is finally halted and reversed in the story, it is correlated with
enhanced consciousness (meaning, in a Buddhist context, qualities of relationship)
and an increasing force of endeavor that together culminate in the realization of
dramatic clarity and exemplary demonstration of the four immeasurables: loving-
kindness, compassion, joy in the good fortune of others, and equanimity. These
are not fixed emotional states understood as subjective destinations, but rather as
situational directions—meanings that can only be maintained through the
systematic expression of wisdom (prajña), attentive mastery (samadhi), and
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moral clarity (fila). The restoration of society depends, not on increasing capacities
for control and autonomy, but on the realization of appreciative and contributory
virtuosity.
Rehearsing this story has particular salience for our present purposes because
it clarifies that karma—especially the karma made in the course of political
activity—comes to dramatic or meaningfully experienced fruition with the
confluence of conditions that resonate with both the intentions and values
informing consciously engaged conduct. Thus, in the story of Dalhanemi’s
hapless descendant, while his intention to stop theft is apparently good, the values
embedded in his strategy for realizing this end are liable to profound, ironic
consequences. Means and ends are not finally separable. Karma is as much a
function of the way we do things as why and what we do.
Karma is often referred to as a teaching about causation. But it is causation as
it occurs in an irreducibly dramatic cosmos—one in which space and time, in
important ways, are not structured linearly and mechanically, but recursively and
narratively. Buddhist discussions of causation are invariably in the context of
stressing the interdependent arising of all things, and the terms used for causes
(hetu) and effects (phala) metaphorically invoke a biotic understanding of their
relationship, with the later literally designating “fruits ripe to the point of
bursting.” Causes and effects, like seeds and fruit, are moments in an ongoing and
evolving pattern of relationships—a sort of open spiral—through which experience
is literally incorporated and communicated from generation to generation.
A major implication of the Cakkavatti Sïhanada Sutta is that the pattern of
relationships that results from institutionalizing the value of control can become
deeply troubling, in spite of the presence of positive intentions. As the narrative
makes clear, this is because control is exerted in order to determine or fix
the results of actions, to bring about a particular state-of-affairs, literally defining
or setting limits to what will be. In effect, control restricts situational possibilities.
For some kinds of crisis intervention, this is entirely appropriate—for example,
when treating traumatic injury. But for addressing other kinds of trouble, such as
poverty—which the Sutta characterizes as caused by the breakdown of contribu-
tory reciprocity—the ironic liabilities of control are especially acute. Moreover,
because control is irreducibly asymmetrical and never truly shared, the restriction
or constraint of situational possibilities is inevitably asymmetrical as well,
fostering inequity in the consolidation and exercise of power. The fruit (phala) of
control incorporates seeds (hetu) of conflict.
Politically, this has far-reaching and potentially iconoclastic implications.
From autocracy to autonomy: limits to the political imaginaire
The relationship between politics and power can fairly be claimed self-evident.
Politics is, of course, most explicitly concerned with issues of authority and
legitimacy in articulating and institutionally crafting public good. But just
beneath these explicit concerns revolve complex negotiations regarding who has
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power, how it is distributed and exercised, and to what ends. Politics is tied
intimately to issues of managing asymmetries in power. Indeed, the character of
any given political system or process can be seen as expressing an ethos of power
management.
A remarkable range of more or less well-formalized approaches to managing
power has evolved in the course of global history, ranging from unabashed elitism
to retributive egalitarianism, from liberal democratic principles to those drawn
from the neo-Marxist oeuvre. But although ideologies factor into these negotia-
tions, it is not debate among contending political philosophies that is at the heart
of politics as a transactional process, but the practical discourse of power. Politics
may invite gazing forward with an idealizing vision of things to come, but its
actual work revolves around sorting out the responsibilities and realities of
determining the immediate outcomes of the present.
There are, of course, many kinds of power and thus many kinds of politics.
There is power in and over sex and hence sexual politics; there is power in art
and thus a politics of art. Uses of power can be differentiated according to subtle
distinctions like that between imposition and persuasion. Politics can center on
amassing and exercising power, or on redistributing and censoring it. This can
involve coalition building or deadly earnest competition. In all cases, however, the
interplay of politics and power is centered on arrangements for framing how
things will be. Power indexes capacities for determining situational meaning.
This, indeed, is why politics is so often and so intensely emotional: it involves
arriving at substantially and effectively shared public sentiments regarding what
things will mean. To be empowered is to be freed toward what is desired and the
opportunity of making it one’s own. Power implies choice, and politics reveal
the imaginings and re-imagining of the chosen.
Politics is for all of the aforementioned reasons, profoundly and irreducibly
karmic. It is a continuous process of implicating intentions and values, folding
them into our lives both individually and collectively. In less explicitly Buddhist
terms, politics and history are intimately and recursively related. What is remark-
able, given the tremendous variety of the human experience in both personal and
cultural terms, is that this mutually constructive relationship between politics and
history has followed a globally consistent trajectory, along the central axis of
which are the value of control, the identification of freedom with autonomously
exercising choice, the emergence of the human out of nature, and an intensely
self-conscious diffraction of the political and the religious.
The specifics of these developmental dynamics must remain beyond the scope
of the present discussion, but it is useful to sketch them in broad outline. It is
virtually certain that there have always been struggles within sustained human
groupings or communities regarding how things are going to be. But as a distinctive
sphere of endeavor centered on the managing of power relations, politics arguably
emerged as a distinctive dimension of the human experience when the consolida-
tion of power by elite individuals and groups reached a scale compatible with
large public works—for example, the building of roads, bridges, irrigation
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systems, and protected harbors. Such works served to frame political identities in
terms of geographically extensive states, and to institutionalize lasting structures
for the display and transferal of power. The construction of such works at once
required and demonstrated what can be conceived as literally awesome or awe-
inspiring capacities for controlling labor flows, population sizes and distributions,
and the dynamics of the natural environment.
In effect, this amounted to the demonstration of powers that previously would
have been attributed solely to the spirit forces animating the world at large. The
twin birth of politics and history involved a novel partitioning of what we now
refer to as the “natural” and the “supernatural”—the realm of earthly, temporal
affairs and that of the heavenly and eternal. Not surprisingly, early conceptions of
those with political power and hence empowered to determine history tended to
stress their halfling status—living mergers of the terrestrial and celestial, the
human and the divine.6
Such massive public works could not have been undertaken, of course, in the
absence of advances in a range of technological and knowledge domains, including,
for example, metallurgy, transportation, and engineering mathematics and
geometry. This linkage remains crucial through to the present: global political
power is very closely aligned with distributions of technological prowess and
knowledge generation. Projects of monumental and often inter-generational
scale also could not have been carried out efficiently without the institutionaliz-
ing of work potential in standard currencies and the eventual displacement of
barter systems at all levels of society. The coalescence of monetary economies
made possible new scales of amassed fortune as well as new powers for exerting
control over economic activity. Finally, such works made necessary vastly
expanded management practices along both vertical and horizontal scales. In
combination with the specializations of labor that also emerged in the interest of
greater skills and efficiency, social stratification underwent marked changes,
opening routes for mobility with respect to status, but also a tendency toward
status segregations.
While the birth of politics and history took place at various points in time and
space as civilizational complexes developed in regions particularly suited to
intensified patterns of exchange and power consolidation, in each case, this
process of development was conditioned by a range of factors from climate to
geography to indigenous cultural traditions. But in spite of the many manifest
differences between state organizations and political processes, a globally
prevalent pattern has been the emergence and long-standing dominance of elite or
royalty-centered patterns of state governance in which power is literally
personified. This changes markedly, first in the European West, from about the
seventeenth century onward. Monarchial and elitist forms of government in
which power was vested in a sovereign individual or hereditary elite began giving
way to national forms in which power was vested in increasingly democratic
institutions and the sovereignty of entire peoples. By the end of the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, with demise of material colonization, this transition
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took on truly global proportions as decolonization initiatives helped destabilize
power structures throughout South and Central America, Africa, and Asia.
This modern development was not, of course, a purely political transition.
Stephen Toulmin has persuasively laid to rest the belief that the dawn of the
modern era marked an autonomous ideological or conceptual revolution; it
resulted from a complexly conditioned convergence on a distinctive set of shared
values across the social, economic, political, technological, scientific, and
cultural domains. For our present discussion, the implications of this convergence
for the role of religion in the public sphere are of particular importance. The
modern era brought about a radical reframing of the relationship between the nat-
ural and the supernatural and the politics of how they are humanly bridged.
Among the most significant aspects of this reframing was the explicit bifurcation
of the authority of church and state—that is, of religion and politics. Practically,
this bifurcation enabled expanding the scope of secular power—eventually to the
point that humanity could assume entirely the responsibility for making history.
Meanwhile the distinctive powers of the sacred were relegated to the margins of
the public sphere, where it shaded off (as then imagined) into the private.
Granted the tight linkages just alluded to among the political, economic, social,
and technological domains, it is not surprising that this should have been the
direction taken in the evolution of political forms and discourse. Neither should
it be surprising that the separation of church and state failed to effect a complete
severing of their developmental kinship. The political emergence of democratic
ideologies and the religious emergence of Protestant theologies were, from the
outset, commonly inspired and mutually reinforcing. Animating them, and indeed
all of the complexly interdependent changes taking place in the public sphere
from, was the “control revolution” in technology—a revolution that effectively
brought about means for empowering vast numbers of individuals to choose how
things will be, at least in the context of meeting their own basic needs. The
technological revolution in control not only opened up the possibility of realizing
truly global markets and commodifying the basic means (and meaning) of
subsistence. It also made possible previously unprecedented freedoms across a
wide range of scales—not only for corporations and states, and for certain elite
classes, but for virtually every individual member of society. The issue of
freedom, or at least the possibility of it, became for the first time an almost
universal and immediate reality.
The finality of this transition has become part of the ideological cant of
contemporary market liberals who, like Francis Fukuyama, proclaim an end of
history—our arrival at the end point of political and economic evolution.7
Sustained long and well enough, development economically and politically even-
tually means institutionalizing global free trade and universalizing democratic
governance. The merits of the “end of history” thesis are, of course, highly
debatable. What is not open to significant debate is whether there has been a
progression from the global dominance of a politics of elitist autocracy to one of
democratic autonomy. Perhaps the highest profile manifestation of this progress
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has been in the area of human rights, with key advancements in the estates of
minorities, women, children, and workers who had traditionally been excluded
from political participation and almost entirely barred from gaining and exercising
powers for determining the nature, quality and meaning of their own lives and
circumstances.
There is no doubt that this overall transition has been positive. There is little to
contest in the transition from what was often (if not typically) a politics of wide-
spread oppression to a politics of widespread liberality—that is, from absolute
freedom for one to shared (if limited) freedoms for all. Yet, granted the karma of
control as a strategic value, and granted the directional dynamics characterizing
the patterning of political, social, economic, and technological interdependence
in recent global history, we should perhaps exercise caution in wholly celebrating
the triumph of liberal democracy and the possibility of arriving at the end of (at
least, significant) political history. The cautions embedded in the main narrative
of the Cakkavatti Sïhanada Sutta are of particular relevance here. Valuing control
and autonomy can orient our interdependence in very troubling and yet ironically
appealing ways.
Liberty as political ideal: freedoms of choice or relating freely?
One of the major legacies of the modern era for politics has been the institution-
alization of freedom as a key ordinal value. Today, it would simply be impossible
to conduct a comprehensive discussion of politics or apt governance without
invoking or confronting issues of “freedom” or the range of concepts taken to
be cognate with it: “liberty,” “choice,” “autonomy,” “independence,” and
“sovereignty.” It is, in fact, quite remarkable that concerns about freedom run
through every level of political discourse, from discussions of individual rights to
the conduct of nation states, and that there obtains a fundamentally shared
conception of what freedom entails.
Across the entire spectrum of political forms from the autocratic to the demo-
cratic, appeal is made, whether explicitly or implicitly, to a conception of freedom
that centers on choice and autonomy—that is, the presence of options and the power
to select among them without being significantly pressured by outside interests or
acts of coercion. Freedom, conceived in this way, consists of being positioned to
independently determine the nature and course of one’s experience. At the autocratic
end of the political spectrum, very little space exists for being free. Autocracies are
notoriously liable to despotic manifestations of freedoms to exercise control within
and over one’s circumstances. History is sadly not lacking in examples of the
tragically broad range of abuses that are possible given practically absolute powers
of choice being wielded by a small minority or by a single individual. At the demo-
cratic end of the spectrum, the spaces for perceiving options regarding how things
will be and selecting autonomously among them are greatly expanded: virtually
every member of society is guaranteed the possibility of regularly making real
choices of one sort or another, especially choices about leadership.
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The modern trend toward democratic patterns of governance has involved not
only the expansion of spaces for choice both within and among societies, it has also
entailed activating sensitivities to and sensibilities for balancing the often contrary
needs and goods of various individuals, of individuals with respect to the commu-
nities of which they are a part, and of communities of various scales. Movement in
the direction of democratic governance has meant grappling with contrary impera-
tives for unity and commonality of interests and for a deepening valorization of
plurality—a tension that eventually frames the issue of limits to empowerment.
If it is accepted that the historical movement away from autocracy toward
democracy expresses in the dynamics of power management the modern bias
toward universality, autonomy, equality, choice and control that we have seen also
underlies global market economics, and if biases toward the value of control are
liable to generating ironic consequence (especially when deployed at sufficient
scale and intensity), then we are compelled to question whether or in what spe-
cific sense(s) this political trend promises to be globally liberating and equity
enhancing. That is, we are compelled to look beyond the evident kusala outcomes
associated with democratization and to ask whether democratization in its pres-
ent form (particularly as wedded to market liberalism) is also systematically
undermining the conditions of both actually and potentially akusala eventualities.
We must, in short, evaluate whether or not the process of accentuating freedoms
of choice and securing spaces for the maximal expression of autonomy is politically
enriching or impoverishing.
The point in such an inquiry is not to contest the valorization of government by
and for the people, to cast doubt on the desirability of freedom for all, or to suggest
that freedom should be subordinated to other political values like stability or secu-
rity. It is instead to question the kind of freedom that is now almost universally
assumed to be desirable, and whether it is compatible with enhancing diversity
throughout the public sphere—that is, compatible with ever-appreciating capaci-
ties for and commitments to sustained contribution to meaningfully shared wel-
fare, and with resolving the kinds of predicaments that are being amplified and
multiplied by our expanding and increasingly complex global interdependence.
After roughly four centuries of the control revolution in technology and steady
progress from autocratic or elitist modes of governance to those that are demo-
cratic and (at least ostensibly) populist, we dwell in a world that permits witnessing
both the greatest number of real choices being made by the greatest number of
people ever and the greatest and most deeply entrenched patterns of inequity that
have ever occurred within and among societies. This apparently schizophrenic
combination of heightened freedoms of choice and intensified inequity is not
accidental. It is a consequence of predicament-spawning conflicts among the core
values of modernity, and that postmodern critics have carefully acknowledged but
failed to address in any coordinated and effective manner—a function, finally, of
globally shared karma.
In the domain of politics, the pivotal conflict is that between autonomy and
equality—a conflict that, within the complex of modern values, directly raises
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issues of limits to plurality and tolerance. The internal structure of autonomy,
conceived as the freedom to act independently of others in pursuit of one’s own
interests, guarantees that it will grow asymptotically. Complete autonomy can be
approached, but never fully attained. Put somewhat differently, absolute
autonomy is inconceivable except in the complete absence of contrasting (if not
contrary) others. Yet the complete absence of contrasting (and, indeed, contend-
ing) others empties independence of any practical content. Autonomy is always
exercised in spite of, and ultimately only by virtue of, the presence of others. It is,
at bottom, a relative state of freedom, one in which relationships with others
matter most crucially as that which we must be able to treat as not really mattering
at all. It is only by ignoring or denying the claims of internal relatedness made
upon us by our concrete relationships with others, and by disregarding the effects
of our choices on them, that we exercise autonomy.
There is, then, a logical conflict between committing to the value of autonomy
and to that of equality in any situation that must be shared by those who differ
significantly. While we can dream of all members of a society having equal,
unlimited freedom to determine the outcome of situations they share, this dream
could be made real if everyone involved were in fundamental and lasting
agreement about what things should be and mean, or if any differences in how
individuals choose to act and experience themselves make no real difference to
anyone else. In fact—rather than in dream—as real capacities for acting
autonomously and exercising choice have become more widely distributed,
evident tensions among various members of a society with respect to both means
and ends have made increasingly apparent the necessity of confronting an ironi-
cally discomfiting truth: insuring maximal autonomy for each member of society
requires imposing limits to autonomy on all.
Addressing the tension between autonomy and equality has been an abiding
preoccupation of liberal democratic political discourse since its very beginnings.
Historically, the development of robust legal institutions and so-called rule of law
have emerged as the most widespread strategy for reducing and managing this
tension. In the United States, for example, major debates regarding abortion
rights, same-sex marriage, and the widely criticized Patriot Act, all pivot on the
apparent necessity and great difficulty of realizing robust consensus about the
positioning of legal thresholds for individual freedoms of choice. In essence, such
debates seek clarity regarding which choices should be held inviolable for any
individual, what limits need to be invoked with respect to who or what can count
as an individual, and the best means of reconciling commitments to the value of
plurality with the manifest need for political unity.
It is important to see that the liberal values of autonomy and equality are,
together, what drives the emergence of pluralism and tolerance as values struc-
turing the public dynamics of transiting from autocratic to democratic institutions
of power and authority. Yet, it is equally important to see that relieving the tension
between autonomy and equality through legal institutions and rule of law has also
driven the development of the peculiarly forceful modern distinction between the
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public and the private. This distinction has been instrumental in realizing the rule
of law precisely by establishing the need for limits to law.8 In practice, then, the
legal institutionalization of the public and private as distinctive realms—with
the latter strictly defined as exempted from the reach of the law—has served to
merge privacy and autonomy and to alloy the public value of pluralism with
tolerance. Freedom becomes constituted as something that can be exercised most
fully by individuals in private, or as the state-of-affairs that must obtain for
individuals to manifest their autonomy or apparent disregard for the effects of
their choices on others. Equality becomes constituted as a public phenomenon
tied to the legal definition of tolerable differences.
The legal segregation of the public and private in effect separates each
individual in society from every other, as well as from society as a collective
whole, interposing the public sphere between them as an insulating medium
capable of absorbing the permissible range of individually exercised freedoms of
choice. This conserves the possibility of enjoying the degree of differences
needed for significant pluralism. But it does so by establishing legal boundaries
within which one is assured of the right to be left alone.
The tension between autonomy and equality is thus not released by leveling out
all differences—the realization of absolute and universal agreement. That would
amount to a logical affront to pluralism (and, it might be added, the dissolution of
the basic conditions needed for continued market growth). Rather, the tension is
released by institutionalizing conditions that enable formulating and honoring
rights to ignore and be ignored. As we have been using the terms, this approach nor-
malizes converting the potentials for increasing diversity that attend the pluralizing
effects of complex globalization to imperatives for mere variation. Tolerance comes
to mean in political terms precisely what it means in engineering: the precise degree
of difference that will not make any difference.9 Tolerance, in this context, becomes
an affront to and, in extreme cases, even an assault on diversity.
This is a particularly unpalatable conclusion. Autonomy, equality, pluralism,
and tolerance can each function as highly positive values. It would seem safe to
say that none of us would want to live in a world shaped by their inversion as
ordinal values—a world, that is, shaped by lack of autonomy, inequality, unilater-
alism, and intolerance. Taken together, however, as a constellation of key political
and social values, autonomy, equality, pluralism, and tolerance bring about condi-
tions in which freedom is secured by institutionalizing ignorance and delimiting
difference in ways that are deeply troubling—especially from a Buddhist
perspective. The process of negotiating thresholds for the individual expression of
autonomy is not a process of revising the root meaning of freedom, but only of
establishing its allowable scope. At the same time, however, establishing the
allowable scope of freedom is to establish limits for actualizing the emptiness or
mutual relevance of all things. In other words, it is to set horizons for how much
we can mean (and expect to mean) both to and for one another.
As important and individually beneficial as the modern, liberal project of
moving from autocratic to democratic exercises of freedom has been, in a
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Buddhist sense of the term, it has not and cannot be ultimately liberating. The
liberties we have come to enjoy as part of the liberal project are liberating only in
conventional (paramartha) terms. They represent quite real and welcome
responses to problems in the distribution of power and claims of authority. And,
in a world less complex than ours has come to be, we might have little reason to
question their origins and ultimate meaning. But as we have seen, the complexity
of contemporary patterns of interdependence and change is bringing about an
epochal shift from a world in which problems could be sustainably solved in
relative isolation to a world in which this is no longer the case. On the contrary,
problem solutions in one sector or community or state now almost invariably
serve as causes for problems in others. In global terms, we have filled the empty
environmental, economic, social, political and cultural spaces that once served as
insulation between our independently formulated and executed solutions and their
disparate strategies, benefits, and costs. As a consequence of the disappearance
of this absorbent commons, we are experiencing globally a mushrooming of
predicaments that force confronting disparities in the meaning of a “good
solution” or an “appropriate resolve.”
As a result of complex globalization, we no longer have the relative luxury of
simply bringing the facts of a situation back into line with our own, individual
needs and desires. Instead, we must carefully align significantly plural needs and
desires, going beyond simple cooperation—that is, operating in relatively
problem free or frictionless co-existence—to true coordination, taking skillful
responsibility for the overall direction of our shared situation. Otherwise, and in
spite of the continued conventional value of the liberties insured by the rule of law
and the clear demarcation of public and private domains, our problem solutions
will only result in ever more complex troubles and suffering.
Ultimately, the strategic values and the practices being deployed to alleviate the
tensions between autonomy and equality—tensions that have been compounding
over the past three centuries—only have significant traction with respect to their
symptoms, not their ultimate causes. They will allow us to salve the “wound of
existence,” and perhaps keep it from entirely immobilizing us, but cannot
promote complete healing. They will work well in alleviating our day-to-day
suffering, but they will not help eliminate it.
The reasons for this are not merely complicated. They are truly complex,
arising out of patterns of relationship that are irreducibly historical, systematically
value-laden, and persistently self-organizing. As stressed above, the broad political
transition away from autocratic to democratic expressions of autonomy have not
been taking place in isolation from parallel social, economic, and techno-cultural
transitions, but rather in intimate and recursive relationship with them. To reiterate
a point made earlier, with the transition from material colonization, to develop-
ment economics, to the postindustrial information age, and now into the first
decades of the attention economy, a growing capacity for individual rights to
control or manage the content of experience has been realized along with a
pattern of institutional development that has made possible a colonization of
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consciousness itself. Addressing the politically ramifying tension between
autonomy and equality can only be undertaken in keen awareness of how it is
embedded in the much wider set of tensions and transformations that have
emerged as a result of modern and postmodern patterns of value–intention–
action—patterns that are resulting in the realization of conditions conducive to
the commodification of attention.
As argued in the previous two chapters, the commodification of attention
systematically erodes personal and communal capacities for relating freely. Over
time, personal and communal contributory opportunities and resources—and the
complex relational possibilities that they imply—are converted into compellingly
choice-mediated consumption processes. Globally, these processes constitute an
engine for waste and deepening poverty in both the material and more compre-
hensive Buddhist sense, systematically translating diversity into mere variety. Yet,
these very same processes are also conducive to deepening consolidation of both
dispositions and socio-economic and political spaces for autonomous decision-
making. While this can lead to conflict in the short run, to the precise extent that
freedoms of choice displace capacities for relating freely, power will tend to
coalesce around agreed-upon compromises with respect to controlling situational
outcomes where individual streams of experience cannot be neatly disentangled.
Compromise, like cooperation, alleviates tensions between the values of auton-
omy and equality by establishing clear horizons of relevance and ranges of
tolerance—effectively restricting possibilities for both conflict and contribution.
Insofar as it is dependent upon institutions for dramatic mediation and an erosion
of the relational capabilities needed for meaningfully shared and improvisation-
rich interdependence, there is substantial irony in the increasing independence
that characterizes political progress toward democratic autonomy. In an increas-
ingly complex world of both convergent and emergent change dynamics, the most
effective means of enhancing felt independence in ways that do not result in
conflict is to bring about conditions that systematically lessen depth of commit-
ment. Lowered levels of commitment mean a greater likelihood that agreeable
compromises can be reached in any given situation where outcomes must finally
be collectively experienced. Differences are not eliminated. They are simply
emptied of the distinctive kinds of relational quality and depth that would allow
them to make forceful differences. The combined valorization of expanded freedoms
of choice, autonomy and equality is thus correlated with a steady evacuation of
reasons for choosing any one thing or eventuality over any other. Eventually,
“I want to” becomes virtually indistinguishable from “why not?”
A summary of main points is perhaps useful here. Although there are clear and
wholesomely beneficial (kusala) eventualities associated with the steady migration
of political systems from autocratic to democratic expressions of power and
authority, this historically progressive movement does not sufficiently counter the
unwholesome (akusla) outcomes of autonomy as an ordinal value. The karma of
widely deploying control as a strategic or technologically embodied value in the
context of expanding and deepening market operations—which are themselves
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biased toward key values of control, convenience, and choice—produces and
sustains conditions that are particularly conducive to the emergence of equality as
a central political value, even as they foster broadband relational inequity.10 With
the structural transition from autocratic to democratic governance, equality and
autonomy combine to generate the paired second order values of pluralism and
tolerance. Ironically, once constellated and institutionally expressed in control-
biased patterns of development, these values spawn systems of social, economic,
and political interdependence that strongly favor the erosion of diversity and the
increase of what can be termed dramatic entropy—that is, the elimination of the
kinds and degrees of difference needed to make a meaningful difference.11
At the same time, the alliance of autonomy and control within an encompass-
ing conception of freedom in terms of choice generates a particularly ironic
pattern of outcomes and opportunities—a complex karma for experiencing our
situation as increasingly in need of control, and as making available a steadily
expanding array of options or choices for doing so. Having made a choice regarding
which among the available (and often mutually exclusive) means of control to
employ, we discover that doing so eventuates in realities that make further choices
not only possible, but also necessary. Headway proves elusive. Beyond a certain
threshold, progress toward enriched and expanded public good made by exercising
freedoms of choice becomes asymptotic. That is, choice becomes manifestly
impotent as means for realizing sustainably and substantially shared ends and
welfare. The karma of expanding freedoms of choice, especially by means of
control-biased technologies that allow experiential outcomes to be precisely
managed, commits us to a Zeno-like labor of proliferating choices—an infinity of
them, finally—between any present moment and a targeted future for it.12
There is thus a dark side to the entire spectrum of autonomy-biased politics.
Even in its most benign form, a politics of autonomy does not both undermine the
conditions for akusala eventualities and foster kusala eventualities or truly
virtuosic relationality. To the extent that we are committed to the constellation of
autonomy, equality, plurality, and tolerance, even as our choice-eventuated
proliferation of situational blockages continues unabated, resulting in yet more
and more varied forms of ever-pregnant conflicts or predicaments, we will
have the impression of making “progress”—of zeroing in on truly being free.
Unfortunately, like poor Zeno, we end up paradoxically having to choose (whether
sadly or cynically) between making continuous headway yet never arriving, and
admitting that there is no such thing as movement that is truly liberating.
Toward a counter-politics of valuing quality of 
commitment over quantities of choice
The complex liabilities associated with construing freedom—primarily or
exclusively—in terms of freedoms of choice can, from a Buddhist perspective, be
seen as rooted in the valuing of individual determinations of experiential
outcomes over relational quality. Granted the interdependence of all things, and
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hence the irreducibly relational nature of consciousness and experience, fully
determining what I experience in any given situation is in some degree to
determine what you will or can experience. Construing freedom as a function of
independently determining situational outcomes practically guarantees that
exercising freedom eventually becomes paradoxical in that it forces confrontation
with the need for limiting freedom (e.g. by means of legal institutions) in order to
avoid or collectively manage conflicts of interest with respect to desired
situational outcomes.
Whether freedoms of choice are limited by means of legal institutions that
establish and enforce the scope of individual choice or disarmed by means of
privatizing the management of experience via mass media, designer drugs, or
some yet-to-be developed technology for individually and independently controlling
the experience of even ostensibly shared situations, akusala eventualities obtain.
Instead of orienting situational dynamics toward increasing diversity and the
realization of relational virtuosity, such institutional or technological measures
effectively interpolate relational faults or lines of stress that, when differences of
interest are great enough, will result in a fracturing of the situation as a function-
ally and richly interdependent whole. Instead of the meaningful incorporation of
differences and the enhancement of situational diversity, there occurs a proliferation
of competing or instrumentally cooperating sovereignties.
The logic of this situational breakup can be seen quite clearly expressed in the
basic premises and operation of rational choice liberalism. Rational choice theory
was developed to understand and assess collective decision-making and to shed
light on the meaning of decision-making efficacy. At the basis of the theory is the
premise that choices are made by self-interested, rational actors equipped with
consistent sets of interests and acting with the intent of maximally realizing their
own chosen ends. In short, rational choice theory presumes the independently
existing individual as both ontologically and axiologically basic. Rational choice
liberalism combines the basics of rational choice theory with the conviction that
market economics are rational in the sense of placing all self-interested economic
actors into fair and open competition.13 For most proponents of continued large-
scale, market-driven, and market-directed interdependence, rational choice liberal-
ism has become a favored culture (or, less charitably, cult) of global governance.
The root structure of rational choice governance and a politics of autonomy is
neatly illustrated in one of the classic heuristics of rational choice theory: the
prisoner’s dilemma. On the assumption that all rational actors are ultimately
self-interested, the prisoner’s dilemma purportedly reveals the dynamics by
means of which thresholds of cooperation are reached and a decisive shift occurs
in the direction of competing sovereigns. In a nutshell, the dilemma aims to reveal
the inescapability of transactional cleavages in a world of rationally self-interested
actors: a time will come, in any collective endeavor, when the joint benefits of
continued cooperation will fall to a level that stimulates a calculation of risks and
benefits pursuant to breaking off cooperation and entering into direct and explicit
competition with former partners. Breaking too soon can be disastrous, resulting
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in a forfeit of existing advantages and a failure to consolidate superior alternatives;
breaking too late can mean losing the competitive edge needed to insure that,
once a cooperatively biased relational whole has reverted to a varied array of
competitive individuals and alliances, one’s own interests are most fully served
and promoted.
The prisoner’s dilemma effectively argues that imperatives for competition will
eventually slice through cooperative relationships whenever maximum self-interest
is resolutely and rationally pursued. In other words, relationships in which
individual fortunes and opportunities are seen as explicitly interdependent and
equitable are essentially contingent; eventually, they evolve to a bifurcation point
at which commitments to equitably shared benefits and felt interdependence must
rationally be broken to pitch the slope of situational advantage decidedly in one’s
own favor, securing one’s own, individual ends at whatever tolerable expense to
others. For any rationally choosing actor, self-interested coexistence will finally
trump equity-oriented interdependence.
Market liberalism translates the premises and arguments of rational choice
theory into a system for rational global governance.14 Whether the actors involved
in a situation are individual persons, corporations, states or other complex
entities, the dynamics of pursuing self-interest will eventually dictate seeing that
more is to be gained by competing than by cooperating. That is, there will come
a point at which meshing different interests will be less rational (and profitable)
than securing one’s own interests, ideally by means whereby the costs of security
are borne disproportionately by others. The logic of governance invoked by
rational choice does not and (by its own lights) cannot depend upon or ultimately
result in bodhisattva action. At least in a Buddhist sense, securing sovereignty in
the strict sense of a right and an ability to act vigorously in pursuit of our own,
individual interests cannot—in spite of any appearances to the contrary—be
ultimately liberating.
As the etymology of security—from the Latin securus or “without care”—
makes clear, securing our own interests is always a matter of breaking away from
all overriding concerns with relational quality and patterns of contribution to fully
shared welfare. It means falling into the conceit of existence—the conceit of
ontological independence—that the Buddha identified as the pivotal condition for
the arising of trouble or suffering. In the end, being secure or left “without care”
is also to be left uncaring and uncared for—it is to become at once care-free and
care-less in both the sense of inattentive and unattended.
Arguably, this is pushing too hard in the direction of a functionally impover-
ished reading of security. “Security forces” may, across large parts of the globe,
evoke images of night-time raids by dragoons enlisted to uphold state order and
maintain the political status quo, as violently as deemed necessary. But security
can also be prefixed with “human” to point toward the need for guarantees of
basic subsistence and dignity for all—a call for social and economic rights and
freedom from fear. Still, it is hard to get away from the rudimentary association
of security with protection. The liability of security as a core value is that it is
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inseparable from a karmic cycle that mandates living in a world in which
protecting one’s interests is, and remains, necessary—that is, a world in which one’s
interests are always under threat. There is an irony embedded in the quest for
security that no amount of prefixing can resolve.15
Here, then, are the roots of the Buddha’s consistent pattern of refraining both
from direct criticisms of political states and institutions and from recommendations
for their wholesale overhaul. Figures of authority in the Buddha’s India were—
much as they are today—much preoccupied with issues of security and sover-
eignty. Depending on whether the relevant authority was primarily social,
economic, political or cultural, or some complex interfusion of them, concern
might be somewhat precisely focused on a particular set of rituals, or on issues of
communal governance or inter-communal conflict resolution. Competing inter-
ests and conflicts resulting from unilateral claims to truth and from relentlessly
competitive approaches to promoting one’s own (or one’s own states’ or commu-
nity’s) interests were everyday realities, even if competition, sovereignty and
security were not widely or explicitly valorized. With respect to the full range of
concerns centered on authority and apt governance, the Buddha’s evident strategy
was not to adjudicate among competing forms of state organization or governance.
Rather, as an alternative to security and sovereignty biased discourse—a
discourse that in statist terms received early and incisive formulation in Kautilya’s
(fourth century BCE) realist tract, the Arthashastra—the Buddha focused on making
evident the conditions of leadership-biased concourse or “flowing together.”
As the story of King Dalhanemi and many others in the Canon make evident,
while issues of state security and sovereignty are not ignored altogether in the
Buddha’s discussions of the responsibilities of wheel-turning kings, they are clearly
subordinated to the need for demonstrating dramatic clarity about what is conducive
to movement in a nirvanic direction and what is conducive to ever more convoluted
movement in directions that are samsaric. Thus, although the Buddha is apparently
aware of the distinctive governance practices associated with clan-based chiefdoms,
monarchies, and small-scale republics, he is explicitly concerned only with direct-
ing leadership attention to the central importance of establishing societal conditions
conducive to the practice of the Dharma. That is, rather than debating the relative
merits of different forms of statecraft and calling for specific regime changes, he
invites a break from the entire spectrum of existing political conventions—from
wherever on that spectrum his audience happens to stand—focusing on the crucial
importance of revising the meaning of leadership as a catalyst for realizing a
qualitative shift in the full range of relationships constitutive of society.
At the roots of such a counter-politics is a recognition that truly meaningful and
sustainable change can only emerge from keen attention to our situation as it has
come to be (yathabhutam). That is, such a shift does not come about by identifying
an ideal state of political, social, or economic affairs, contrasting it with our own,
and then using these two points of reference to establish a vector of reform or
revolution. It is, of course, possible to engineer state transitions in precisely this
way, establishing a definitive destination for the process of political change and
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working to bring about compatible and often profound factual changes in our
material circumstances, our ability to exercise various kinds of choice, and our
capacity for crafting institutions suited to conserving these achievements. But
these achievements are not by themselves sufficient conditions for dramatically
reorienting our entire situation as a whole. Rather, a nirvanic shift in relational
quality can only be realized by taking into karmic account the complex inter-
weaving of diverse values and intentions that are presently constitutive of our
situation and appropriately contributing to them. We must, in terms often used in
Chinese Buddhism, realize our own “good roots” and grow out of our present
patterns of interdependence into qualitatively new ways of relating.
When, in the frame narrative surrounding the story of King Dalhanemi, the
Buddha advises his monastic audience to keep to their own preserves and the
range of their ancestors, as a condition for successfully and sustainably cultivating
the four immeasurable relational qualities of compassion, loving-kindness,
equanimity, and joy in the good fortune of others, he is advising them to attend to
their own karma—a karma they share with their families, friends, neighbors,
professional associates, and so on—and to work through its informing values and
intentions. No meaningful change in relational quality is possible in ignorance of
the karma of presently obtaining patterns of interdependence as well as the
patterns of denying this interdependence in the assertion of either independence
or dependence. The past can be discarded, but only by force of will, in an act of
ignorance, and with a corresponding decrease of responsive capability.
The movement from state security to directional or relational clarity suggests a
departure from the logic of autonomously exercised freedom of choice and its
liability of collapsing interdependent relationships into mere coexistence. It
opens, instead, possibilities for focusing on building situational diversity through
deepening responsive capability or the capacity for relating freely. Built into the
bias toward states—whether political or personal in nature, as in desired states-
of-affairs or fixed personal identities—as well as into the political narrative of
progress, is a tacit disposition toward linear or convergent models of history and
thus a bias toward universalizing (and often explicitly teleological) discourse. In
the absence of an ideal of full consensus and practical commitment to leveling
down differences that make a difference, state security and the logic of progress
tend to institutionalize the possibility of cooperative compromise and conflict—
the prisoner’s dilemma in extremis. Buddhism opens possibilities for a counter-
political narrative of realizing recursive and harmoniously improvised patterns of
meaningful difference. Such patterns are not disposed toward a universal conver-
gence on a single ideal, but rather toward qualities of interdependence conducive
to equitably and sustainably resolving the predicaments characteristic of suffering
or trouble in the broad community of sentient beings.
Political cultures—especially in the contemporary world—are overwhelmingly
oriented toward defining the scope and distribution of power, authorizing desired
states-of-affairs across a broad range from the personal to the international,
securing the material conditions needed to maintain these states, and, in this
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context, balancing individual and communal welfare. Political cultures, except
when circumstantially forced well beyond equilibrium, are not given to critically
evaluating presently desired states-of-affairs.16 Instead, in an ideally seamless
fashion, they coordinate responses to problems that arise in achieving or securing
such states. All political cultures—even when ostensibly “revolutionary”—are, in
this sense, conservative. It is thus not in the least surprising that while significant
numbers of international relations theorists have for decades been insisting on the
need for a concerted “normative turn”—a turn, that is, toward shared negotiations
of the meaning of a “good life” and the values associated with it—there has been
little actual movement in this direction.
It is true, of course, that globalization has brought with it an increasing array of
(especially economic and technological) institutions that have woven together the
interests of even very politically disparate states. Human rights conventions have
invited and then confirmed widespread agreement about the minimum estate to
which each and every human being is entitled—an increasingly well defined, basic
state-of-affairs about which it can be affirmed: “things will not get worse than
that.” But the “good life” cannot be reduced to any such institutionally mediated
forms of cooperation or agreed upon minimal conditions for human dignity. These
may be necessary and perhaps even sufficient solutions to specific problems in
realizing a world in which all people are guaranteed a desirable life. But they
cannot answer to the need for considering what kind of life is worth desiring.
The separation of religion and politics is a relatively recent historical phenom-
enon that not only allowed pluralism to emerge as a viable political value, but that
also made it possible for changes in the structure of both explicit and implicit
political values and practices to occur without immediate and isomorphic changes
in the much more expansive reach of patterns among religious values and
practice. That is, this separation conserved the possibility of religious values
serving as dramatic headings for broadly realized political, economic, social, and
technological movements. The separation of politics and religion allows, in other
words, religion to function critically as political counterculture.
The de-linking of politics and religion did not, of course, eliminate “gravitational”
effects between them. Influences continue to be bi-directional. But the separation
allows a clear demarcation of the distinctive resources that each gathers for
responding to the personal and communal experience of trouble or suffering.
Even in the most explicitly historical and ideologically driven political narratives
(e.g. Marxism or Maoism) these resources are deployed in service of solving
concrete problems. Necessarily, this entails setting clear boundary conditions.
Problem solutions are never total, but rather explicitly strategic and expedient,
implying clearly defined limits to what will be considered relevant. It is not an accident
of speech that political rhetoric is heavily laden with engineering metaphors—for
example, the laying of foundations, the building of bridges, the tearing down of
walls, the construction of safe harbors, and appeals to the merits of zero tolerance.
Religious resources are, by contrast, most often and consistently deployed in
addressing predicaments that are both perennial and profound. Unlike problems,
GOVERNANCE CULTURES AND COUNTERCULTURES
124
predicaments cannot be framed in terms of a simple contrast between what is
“unworkable” and what “works,” a contrast between a state-of-affairs gone wrong
or awry and a state-of-affairs that is as it should be. Predicaments arise in
situations characterized by the confluence of contrasting and, at times, explicitly
contrary or conflicting values. There is a parallel, then, between the deployment
of religious resources in responding to trouble or suffering and the practice of
ethics. In both endeavors, the hard work is never defining and choosing between
the “good” and the “bad,” but rather committing to a choice among multiple and
apparently contrary “goods.”
The depth and scale of interdependencies characteristic of the early twenty-first
century express a complex pattern of values–intentions–actions that are especially
conducive to the generation of predicaments—confrontations with meaningful
differences that can be viewed as outcomes we would just as soon have avoided,
or as opportunities without which our futures could not be as richly promising as
they now appear to be. Yet, if the preceding reflections on the liabilities of auton-
omy-biased politics are granted credence, there is little to encourage thinking that
explicitly and exclusively political action and interaction would suffice to bring
about a global shift from conflict-laden outcomes occasioning ever more incisive
competition to equitably-enriching opportunities firmly rooted in robustly
realized diversity—a full coordination of globally differentiated norms, interests,
and values. In short, political solutions are perhaps sufficient where the issues at
hand can be defined as political problems. But in a century of truly complex
interdependence, there is eventually no circumventing the realization of a need
for globally shared and equitably sustained resolve. It is hard to see how the
politics of autonomy and rational choice could ever meet this need.
This need not be cause for despair. The scope of efficacy for political systems
and institutions may be limited, but this should be no surprise. To the degree that
politics combines autonomy with equality and orients governance away from the
autocratic to the democratic, it must make provisions for recognizing its own
proper limits. Yet, as we have seen, it is also the very nature of such a politics to
enter into currency pivotal concerns for pluralism and tolerance that are institu-
tionally expressed as rights to ignore and be ignored. The admission of limits to
efficacy is finally grounded, in political terms, on identifying—with a measure
of strategic certitude—the degree of differences that can be allowed to make no
difference. Politics will not promote truly robust social, economic, political, and
cultural diversity. For that, we must look elsewhere.
The centrality of faith in religious discourse can be seen as a direct counter to the
bias toward calculated certainties that drives political expedience. Although open to
significantly disparate construal, faith can be seen as broadly reflecting the orienta-
tion of religious practices toward dramatic resolution—that is, a concerted and clear
ordering of values and desires in the service of affirming a shared meaning for our
situation.17 Thus, the deepening of religious practice leads to increasing resolution
in the sense of an increasingly clear and detailed appreciation of our situation as it
has come to be, but also in the sense of ever deepening commitment or resolve.
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Religious preoccupations with the eternal, infinite, and ultimate are, at bottom, an
expression of the dramatic impulse to go clearly and meaningfully beyond our own
present and foreseeable future. As such, they promise much in the way of locally
relevant resources for contributing to enhanced global diversity.
In contrast to the point of rights discourse—agreement that “things will not get
worse than that”—faithful religious practice rests on jointly resolving that “things
will get better than this.” Religion is thus positioned to provide substantial
resources for assessing the ordering of our political, economic, social, and tech-
nological practices and the qualities of interdependence toward which they direct
us. There are, of course, great differences in the particular resources afforded by
different religious traditions. And there are also assessments of politics—like
those, for example, mounted by ethicists and social activists—that are undertaken
through appeal to pointedly non-religious resources and practices. What is crucial
from the Buddhist perspective taken here is the extent to which a particular
religion or non-religious socio-ethical movement is able to function insightfully
and skillfully as a political counterculture.
Whether a given religion or ethicist/activist movement is able to function as a
political counterculture is finally an empirical question that cannot be answered
prescriptively. One need only consider the example of contemporary Myanmar—
where both the ruling authoritarian military government and the democratic
opposition appeal to Buddhist principles and practices to warrant their deeply
disparate approaches for realizing a well-ordered state—to be confronted with the
layers of irony that can occur when the critical resources of a religion are used to
promote a particular political culture rather than to perform the very different
function of a political counterculture. The same, needless to say, is true in the case
of politically coopted non-religious ethical and social activist movements.
Finally, any viable political counterculture should serve to question the impetus
for replacing one state-of-affairs with another when the problem-solving strategies
of the dominant political culture can be shown to be having severe, ironic conse-
quences. The countercultural move is not toward revolution—whether non-violent
or violent—but revision. In the Buddhist case, this must be a move toward deepen-
ing the potential of our situation for truly meaningful and liberating interdepend-
ence. Indeed, the signal event in the religious life of a Buddhist is the arising of
bodhicitta or a mind profoundly resolved on awakening to the interdependence or
relationality of all things and resolving the trouble or suffering that is presently
characteristic of it. Particularly in the Mahayana traditions, this is explicitly
understood as a commitment to the awakening of all sentient beings through the
cultivation of appreciative and contributory virtuosity. As a political counterculture,
Buddhist practice thus involves revising the meaning of our situation, as it has
come to be, to foster the systematic enhancement of shared commitments to
realizing horizonless capacities for relating freely. As such Buddhist practice can be
seen as affording distinctive resources for carrying out a paradigm shift from a
state-centered politics of autonomy to a globally expansive politics of diversity.18




International relations beyond competition 
and cooperation
International relations discourse maps an uncomfortable domain. Evident on the
one hand is the rock-hard necessity of managing the global commons upon which
any healthy present and future ultimately depends. Equally apparent on the other
hand is a striking absence of the kinds of universally shared values, theories, and
practices that would allow this managerial work to take place as a matter of
course. And so, while cooperation seems necessary, competition, conflict, and
failures of consensus seem inevitable.
Until relatively recently, international relations theories—like most contempo-
rary attempts at collaborative ethics—have attempted to make navigational sense
of this domain by weighing common causes against sums of individual interests.
These broadly utilitarian calculations have focused on how to maximize the
shared benefits of cooperation while minimizing especially disparate costs to
competing interest groups. Arguably, they have been less successful practically
than in demonstrating the importance of establishing shared values for each
variable in any relational calculus. Unfortunately, the ontological commitments
presupposed by utilitarian calculations of the common good also lead to
“naturalizing” a language of entitlements, rights, power, and proprietary and
legislative regimes that perpetuates an understanding of freedom standing in such
dark tension with equality that the common grounds for arriving at truly shared
values would seem either pitifully thin or simply chimerical.
Continued appeals to tacitly realist notions of utility will do nothing to actually
(and not just ideally) foster jointly improvising and evaluating the kinds of shared
norms required if managing the commons is going to go beyond describing and
legally enforcing adherence to a lowest global denominator. Establishing such
denominators may be quite useful in mapping supposedly “universal” grounds for
secure co-existence. But this will provide only the most minimal resources
for making the transition from mere co-existence to the sustained enhancement of
personal, communal, and national capacities for relating freely in global context.
For that—a transition that implies eliding the metaphor of management in favor
of one centered on improvisation—some other approach is in order.
Since the publication of Hedley Bull’s landmark book, The Anarchical Society:
A Study of Order in World Politics,1 there has been growing agreement that
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(especially economic) globalization fosters the recognition that there are values
we already hold in common, and that these values are catalysts for the consoli-
dation of various types of international societies. In turn, this ongoing consolidation
of interests feeds back into the processes by means of which the various actors
comprised in international society constitute their own identities. Granted this, it
is not surprising that as globalization processes have become both wider and
deeper there has arisen increasingly sophisticated skepticism about whether
rational calculations of self-interest are able to facilitate building the kinds of
international systems needed to address the management of the commons, much
less its conversion into an intimately shared and liberating resource ecology. If
nothing else, late twentieth-century patterns of globalization have forced
recognition that intersubjective meanings are just as important in managing or
cultivating the commons as formal constitutions and rights conventions. The
most crucial task of international relations is not to facilitate purely factual
cooperation, but to harmonize or systematically coordinate originally disparate
spheres of meaning.
In the absence of a sufficiently subtle concept of harmony, of any widely
accepted set of critical resources for assessing competing goods, and of any
substantially practical means for promoting greater and more consistent
improvisation and deployment of truly common values, this work has remained a
poorly expressed fiction. Thus, while the spectrum of mainstream international
relations theories from realism to neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism
have been useful in articulating the need for a normative turn in international
relations, and in raising important questions about how to articulate common
values, this spectrum has not yielded the resources needed for answering such
questions. In making a turn toward the normative, international relations comes
face to face with its own incompleteness.
Here, I want to explore why this is the case—why the cogent, eminently
rational directives of realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism lead
us, along disparate courses, around the same increasingly vicious circle. Doing so
will involve “scaling up” insights and conclusions drawn over preceding chapters,
sketching an alternative (or countercultural) Buddhist path “between” the horns
of the international relations dilemma and establishing some cardinal points
useful in orienting movement in a direction “perpendicular” to the prevailing
spectrum of beliefs about achieving lasting international accord. Pivoting as they
now do on key values of sovereignty and security, international relations are not
committed first and foremost to conserving and cultivating the global commons,
much less developing, sustaining, and enhancing truly global public good. In the
absence of such a paradigmatic reorientation of international relations, global
peace will remain content-less—an ideal state-of-affairs imagined by simply
negating the blunt realities and tragic arc of conflict, lacking any uniquely
positive characteristics of its own.
In brief, thinking through Buddhist critical resources enables seeing the apt
reorientation of international relations as a three-dimensional process of: first, of
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subverting the ontological commitments presently endemic to international
relations discourse; second, of de-centering the role of security/stability as a goal
for international relations practice; and third, of shifting away from the polar
tension between competition and cooperation (and its associated ethics of calcu-
lations for secured co-existence) toward an emphasis on coordinated contribution
and an ethics of virtuosity. Together, these open possibilities for seeing diversity
as the most basic global commons and the key to shifting the karmic axis of
international relations from consolidating power to cultivating strength.
Realism as a treasonous metaphysics of competing interests
Until quite recently, international relations were assumed to be stretched tensely
between the demands of a fundamentally competitive reality and the idealistic
promises of universal cooperation. According to such a view, the space of inter-
national relations is Darwinian. In it, individual persons, nations, and states are
assumed to be actively competing for limited resources, cooperating only when
circumstantially or directly coerced, and otherwise pursuing their own self-interest.
Any sustained evolution of political regimes takes place strictly as a function of
successful adaptations to changes in the objective contexts of competition.
This realistic view is no longer widely accepted, at least in its bluntest
formulations.2 The historically unprecedented consolidation of global interde-
pendencies over the last decades of the twentieth century led to widespread
disenchantment with radically realist politics, but also to equally widespread
convictions about the necessity of a decisively normative turn in international
relations. Among the signal effects of deepening and broadening global interde-
pendence has been mounting evidence of the porosity of all political identities
and the contingency of all claims to independent or sovereign status. Along with
this evidence has come growing clarity with respect to the severe costs exacted
upon the common good whenever significant resources are committed to securing
such identities and statuses. Whether conceived in economic, social, cultural, or
environmental terms, refusals to appreciate and contribute to our growing
interdependence are, in the end, debilitating.3
To date, however, interdependence has been understood in relatively shallow
practical terms as profitably mutual dependence. This is in part because the com-
petitive advantages of (at least limited) cooperation can be accounted for through
the same kinds of utilitarian calculation that undergird realistic approaches to
international relations. Although the collective gains realized through cooperation
can substantially outweigh the solitary benefits of conflict, these gains can
effectively be seen as forwarding rather than undermining individual self-interest.
That is, these gains do not command a critical reappraisal of the ontological
commitments informing the tension between dependence and independence.
Thus, political alliances like NATO, economic alliances like the IMF, monopolistic
business mergers, and the trading of known talents for future draft choices in pro-
fessional sports can all be seen as essentially self-interested forms of cooperation.
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Such forms of cooperation may make more and more sense as the stakes of
competition escalate. But they do not counter the fundamentally competitive
practice of finely calculating how most efficiently to realize desired hierarchies
of control over the slope of advantages in any given situation. Alliances that are
entered in pursuit of self-interest are, ultimately self-interested alliances.
That there might be limits to this calculus only began to become apparent when it
was realized that the space of international relations included actors of entirely dif-
ferent scales, competing for entirely different kinds of goods, within circumstances
that were becoming so fundamentally shared that separating their independent inter-
ests was no longer practically possible. By the mid-1970s, for example, the interests
of corporate capital were found to have already begun building up substantial bridges
between the economies of states separated by major ideological rifts and engaged in
very open political competition. Likewise, human rights focused NGOs came to be
seen as conduits for information exchanges crucial to coalition building across
national and regional boundaries. Because each of these bridges depended upon
establishing and maintaining shared norms and institutions in globally shared spaces,
it became difficult to insist that there were no such things as international societies
and not merely simple alliances of individual nations.
Among the central and, indeed, prescient insights of Bull’s (1977) characterization
of world political order, however, was that the principle of sovereignty and its cen-
tral importance in international relations can be seen as a function of recognizing
the normative pluralism that characterizes the contemporary world scene—a
recognition that fostered perceived needs to define both scopes of influence and
the limits of justifiably instituted slopes of advantage and disadvantage. With the
formal ending of the Cold War, some might have anticipated that nationalist and
unilateralist currents in international relations would fully dissipate. But this has
not happened. Instead, there has been a marked resurgence of radical individualism
in international relations over the past decade. This has resulted from the
multiplication of viably staked positions of self-interest, and thus stands as
evidence of the degree to which the ontological bias toward independent
existence has not been dissolved by expanding and intensifying patterns of global
interdependence. Far from yielding homogenously unified patterns of interna-
tional relations, globalization processes have also served to promote fragmentary
dynamics, perhaps nowhere more starkly apparent than in the post-September 11
surge of American unilateralism.
Still, there is general agreement that the question is not whether to cooperate
or not—that being a foregone conclusion—but how. According to proponents of
neo-liberal institutionalism, answering this question involves gaining clarity
about the fact that what actually limits cooperation is not lack of good intentions,
but good information. The key to cooperation is the development of institutions
that foster exchanges of information about the strategies and concrete methods of
each of the involved actors. As succinctly summarized by Robert Keohane, one




Opponents have argued that the neo-liberal approach to fostering sustainable
international societies, without recourse to coercive intervention, pivots on the
untenable supposition that human needs and values are, at bottom, universally
shared. The constructivist response to neo-liberal institutionalism is that the latter
does not sufficiently stress how the intensification of normative or value plural-
ism that attends globalization brings with it the need—at some concrete point in
each set of circumstances—to assess competing, equally resident values. It is
precisely because of such situational divergences that constructivists announce
the inadequacy of state consensus and the importance of citizen consent. Because
international cooperation can serve state or corporate interests while subverting
those of citizens and workers who are not partners in these forms of cooperation,
the horizons of relevance applied in evaluating the merits of cooperation must be
expanded well beyond, for example, the customary corridors of political and
economic power. Respect must be given to alternative constructions of the meaning
of a shared situation that might be undertaken by disparately powerful and
extensive actors, working at markedly different scales of consideration.
This insight involves seeing that the task of international relations is not to
compile and to organize a globally comprehensive set of presumably objective
benefits or threats, but rather to understand and enhance the process of arriving
at a shared understanding of what is meant by a benefit or threat. Responsibly
managing the commons or global public sphere includes, that is, making sense of
the disparate meanings given to “environmental health” by multi-national oil
companies and activist NGOs, or the contrary meanings given to such first
generation human rights as the right to employment or education by the World
Bank or the IMF and by anti-globalization organizations like the International
Forum on Globalization or the Sustainable Living Network.
Constructivists cannot avoid coming up against the realization that investigating
the norms of the international system in terms of their constitutive roles and in
ways that acknowledge their moral (and not merely instrumental) nature will
eventually pose questions of authority and legitimacy. Asking how norms have
come to play the role they have and why—questions answerable in factual
historical terms from either institutionalist or constructivist perspectives—is not
enough. Instead, it is imperative to ask pointedly ethical questions about the
meaning of a better, good, just or diversity-enriching world. But, as many
international relations theorists have stressed, neither institutionalists nor con-
structivists have managed to seriously address questions of this type.5 In spite of
continuous appeal to a discourse about norms and values as key concepts,
international relations has continued failing to articulate anything like a consis-
tent philosophy of the good life or the traits of suitably evolving and mutually
enhancing political orders.
As it is currently configured, even at present levels of economic, political, and
technological globalization, the practice of international relations cannot avoid
being confronted (ala Gödel’s Theorem) with its own incompleteness. On the
basis of its prevailing, axiomatic values, international relations is forced into
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posing quite intelligible directives that it cannot carry out. The paradoxical space
within which international relations is practiced can thus be adequately described,
but not traversed in its own terms. If we are not to remain transfixed by the
purported absence between what “is” and what “is-not,” and hence committed
to ironically mis-managing the global commons, we must develop a set of
practices—a way—to make precisely such a journey possible.
Political realism finally rests on a treasonous metaphysics of competing
interests. It is a metaphysics that denies ultimate reality to shared meanings of the
commons which international relations is in part intended to conserve and one
that strenuously maintains options for disloyalty to the commons. In spite of
efforts to move beyond a theoretical construction of the commons or the global
public sphere as a Darwinian space of competitive agents, the central presuppo-
sitions of realism (and the rituals of rationality through which they are most
substantially embodied) continue to persist in international relations discourse.
That is, the assumptions undergirding international relations belie conceptual
treason to the commons and serve as institutions for resisting the kind of
paradigmatic shift needed if the tyranny of a realist past is not going to force us
into believing, as Christopher Lasch has written, that “our future is predetermined
by the continuing development of large-scale production, colossal technologies
and political centralization . . .”—a belief structure that “inhibits creative thought
and makes it [very] difficult to avoid the choice between fatuous optimism and
debilitating nostalgia.”6
We can begin making sense of what sort of practices must be developed to
address the incompleteness of the current lineage of international relations and
the dramatically vacuous choices it affords us by examining precedents for
moving beyond the realist conception of competing interests to a conception of
international relations in which competition is supplanted, not merely by cooperation
and consensus—the values urged upon us by institutionalist and constructivist
revisions—but by appreciative commitment and contributory virtuosity. Posed as
questions, what kinds of paradigmatic conceptual and practical shifts are needed
in order to bring about a “Copernican” revolution in metaphysics by means of
which relationships and the values comprised in them—not individually existing
things and facts true about them—will be taken as most basic? What equivalent
revolution in ethics must be undertaken by means of which enhancing intimacy,
and not sustaining integrity, will come to be taken as the paramount aim of
international relations? In short, what would international relations look like, if
undertaken in terms consistent with Buddhist practice and conducive to enhanced
global diversity?
International relations as evolving systems
Some initial (and not entirely metaphorical) guidance in revising the conception
and practice of international relations can be derived by seeing them as evolving
systems. Just as contemporary theories of biological evolution have had to
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grapple with macro-level changes taking place beyond the “event horizon”
describable within a strictly Darwinian framework, currently contending theories
of international relations have had to chart similar courses in seeking to account
for the large-scale changes in social, economic, and political organization
that have been especially characteristic of late twentieth-century patterns of
globalization. Indeed, the parallels are salient enough to warrant, at least briefly,
our direct attention.
Contemporary theories of evolution have been largely intent on explaining the
kinds of major changes in morphology evidenced by fossil records, but which
cannot plausibly be explained on the basis of small, incremental and adaptive
changes undertaken by purely self-interested species. The evolution, for example,
of new sense organs cannot plausibly be accounted for by appeal to small changes of
existing morphology. Since none of the “half-way” steps toward new sense organs
would function in especially useful ways, they would provide no competitive
advantage and no grounds for continuing genetic selection. Neither can new
sensory capacities be seen as consistent with efforts to “selfishly” maintain species
identity since their realization must invariably mean an entirely unprecedented
transformation of existing patterns of species–environment interaction—the
realization, in effect, of a new species.
Evolutionary biologists are now in broad consensus in appealing to the concept
of “punctuated equilibrium” in accounting for major paradigm shifts in biological
organization. While gradual evolution does take place during long, near-equilibrium
phases of ecological history, when an ecological system drifts far away from
equilibrium, the “rules of the game” change. There, evolution takes place through
the “sudden” embodiment of strikingly new biological values correlated with
major, creative leaps in species identity. Granted this, the kinds of structural
reorganization associated with evolution can no longer be adequately explained
by reference to the “interests” of individual species, but only by appeal to
“allostatic” shifts taking place at the level of regional or global ecologies.
Evolution is always, irreducibly, co-evolution.
Such an understanding of evolutionary processes requires a severe bracketing
of reductionist, building-block models of change that are committed to the
adequacy of linear causation and the sufficiency of a metaphysics of competition.
Evolution is not most fundamentally the evolution of ontologically distinct
individuals, but rather of patterns of relationship. Especially in complex systems
for which histories and meaning-making are central, the importance of scale
heterogeneity and downward causation must be taken fully into account and with
this a recognition of the dramatic—and not merely factual—nature of the
evolutionary process.7
The development of evolution theory in the broadest sense can thus be charac-
terized as a conceptual movement away from a bias toward independently existing
entities interacting by way of linear causal processes, and in the direction of
seeing evolution as taking place through non-linear patterns of dynamic interde-
pendence. Rather than evolution pivoting on a steady accumulation of new traits
DIVERSITY AS COMMONS
133
gradually consolidated according to a logic of consequences, it is seen as crucially
reliant upon large-scale shifts in relational constellations followed by interpolative
processes through which the meanings of new patterns of relationship are further
diversified and extended. Rather than evolution being driven by individual
species competing over environmental resources, it is seen as correlated with the
increasing competence with which species contribute to consolidating new, fuller,
and more complex patterns of interrelatedness as such.
There has been a commensurate movement among international relations
theorists who have become aware of the need to address the “irrational” realities
of non-incremental change and to reckon consistently with the role of norms and
values in shaping new social, economic, and political identities. In general, this
movement has polarized along either neo-liberal institutionalist or constructivist
lines. In both cases, however, while ostensive appeals to the language of
evolutionary discourse is often explicit, there has, to date, not been a marked,
commensurate transition from realism’s underlying ontology of factual existence
to one of irreducibly meaningful interdependence. It is this failure to question the
ontological commitments of the realist worldview that has restricted both institu-
tionalist and constructivist revisions to the necessary, but insufficient, tasks of
describing and interpreting change in the structure of international relations.
Persistent failure in this regard can only insure continued blindness concerning
the possibilities of contributing to and carefully orienting the kinds of paradig-
matic changes needed if meaningfully free passage is going to be articulated
between the necessary and the inevitable in managing the global commons.
For example, in the context of discussing political institutions as a “complicated
ecology” of interconnected rules, routines, norms of appropriateness, and the
elaboration of meaning, James March and Johan Olsen assert that, “[u]nless we
assume that a political environment is stable, it is likely that the rate of change in
the environment will exceed the rate of adjustment to it . . . [and that] the disparity
between the rate of environmental change and the rate of adjustment is itself self-
sustaining.”8 In their view, although crucial to any viable form of international
relations, political institutions must be seen as a “shifting residue of history” that
necessarily fall out of step with the times and leave themselves vulnerable to para-
digmatic overhaul. Indeed, institutional efficiency with respect to near-neighborhood
changes—that is, adaptive success—tends to precipitate overall obsolescence
because these competences come at the cost of narrow focusing. Thus, political
institutions are subject to a paradoxical “competency trap” wherein adaptive
adjustments, particularly if successful, serve eventually to render the political
regime as a whole increasingly susceptible to radical change.9 “By constraining
political change, institutional stability contributes to regime instability.”10
March and Olsen see this as a general feature of adaptive systems, not as a
peculiarity of political systems. And in this, they are arguably correct. If evolution
occurs as a pattern of relational elaborations among overlapping rhythmic (rather
than static or structural) orders, changes articulated on strictly consequentialist
grounds must eventually run aground since they cannot be undertaken except
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from the perspective of a particular point of view on “what matters.” That is,
carrying out paradigm change according to a pure logic of consequences could
only make sense from the perspective of a “god’s eye” view from which all
rhythmic orders are equally present. Barring that, the cost of consequentially
ordered change will be increasing dis-coordination (or the prevalence of
coercion) and vulnerability to unanticipated shifts in situational gestalt. Thus, like
the consequentialist history of biological evolution, the evolutionary history of
political institutions will be characterized by long periods of great stability,
separated by periods of significant instability and sudden change.
As long as evolution is understood as the consequence of adaptive changes
undertaken from the perspective of particular individuals—and not an elaboration
of order taking place in and among relationships as such—it cannot avoid being
holistically blind. In other words, if individually existing entities are indeed basic,
evolution can only mean long stretches of slowly building ignorance punctuated
by brief moments of uncommon and effectively accidental insight. The evolution
of international relations—to the extent that it is “naturalized” or “left to nature”
in keeping with a realist metaphysics of individual existents—must, in an important
sense, be seen as a phenomenon about which can only “wait and see.” Yet in light
of such crises as global warming and the rampant extinction of local or vernacular
economies in the face of global capital, this is clearly not good enough.
If it is true that institutional and political changes customarily take place by
means of relatively mundane sets of procedures rooted in patterns of experience
and worldviews that develop only very gradually and in a neceesarily composite, not
systemic, fashion, then such changes will be characterized by considerable
indeterminacy of direction. In effect, the logic of consequences underlying our
interpretations of experience, the choices that these occasion, and the institutions
derived from them are bound to enmesh us in a competency trap and cannot be
the ultimate precedents for meaningful escape from it.
This is especially true in the case of twenty-first century realities. Initiating
change to bring about specific consequences can prove reliably successful in the
context of slowly and regularly altering circumstances. The evolutionary model of
small, incremental changes or reforms is adequate in conditions of relative equi-
librium. But in the context of complex and accelerating change—the situation
globally today—there are serious liabilities in remaining wedded to a strategy of
inducing change with the aim of bringing about specific and predetermined
outcomes. Interactions between complex systems and their environments are
prone to high degrees of non-linearity. Because complex systems are not only
self-organizing, but also novelty-generating, they are subject to changing in ways
that, in principle, could not have been anticipated, and yet that will, after the fact,
be manifestly in alignment with their own guiding values. In the context of
complex global interdependencies like those informing twenty-first century
realities, acting or inducing change to bring about specific outcomes cannot be
relied upon to produce the effects desired, regardless of how precisely undertaken
or with what level of relevant knowledge. In a complex world, freedoms to choose
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among outcome options can be exercised reliably only in the context of highly
controlled—effectively closed—circumstances.
To the extent that the logic of consequences underlying institutional adjustment
in the face of context variability continues pivoting on the value of control—most
fundamentally, control over experience and its meaning—its successful application
will bring about situations in which further and ever more complicated (though
not necessarily complex) institutions of control are needed. In terms of managing
a truly global commons, and facing the realities of complex change, commitment
to such a path is commitment to fighting a losing battle.
The complex realities that are emerging as a result of contemporary patterns of
expanding and intensifying global interdependence can be seen as commanding a
shift of emphasis from consequentialist determinations of outcome to resolutely
responsive opening of lines of opportunity. They are realities within which
freedom is not indexed by quantities of available choices, but rather by qualities
and depths of commitment. Every effort to induce change means incurring new
responsibilities, new kinds of intimacy or internal relatedness, and hence new
vulnerabilities.
It is upon the refusal to accept this in earnest that both the treasonous nature of
realist metaphysics and the shortcomings of institutionalist and constructivist
revisions of international relations pivot. To be sure, these revisions insist that we
go beyond realist assumptions of solipsistic actors in “accidental” interaction to
explain the shifting terrain of international relations. But they do not far enough
in challenging the ontological intelligibility of individually existing actors, the
ultimate objectivity of their situations, and the strategic dialectic of independence
and dependence. In result, while convinced of the need to go beyond the logic of
consequences endemic to political realism, neo-liberal institutionalists and
constructivists alike have remained at least tacitly wedded to political realism’s
underlying values of control and security. Most crucially, they are impotent to
address the karma of these values—that is, the particular patterns of outcome and
opportunity to which they give rise.
Thus, while appeals are now often made to an alternative “logic of appropri-
ateness,”11 it continues to be assumed within this logic that international relations
actors are essentially independent and choose what roles to play based on their
interpretations of prevailing behavioral norms. But regardless of what canons of
conformity or appropriateness to which actors turn in making such decisions,
they cannot be a source of paradigmatic innovations in the meaning of their
shared situation. If managing the commons is not a matter of factual adjustments
in how we interact, but a revision of our dramatic or meaningful interdepend-
ence as such, secure co-existence cannot be an adequate goal of international
relations and control cannot be a viable strategy for negotiating the dramatic
impasse between the necessity of cooperation and the inevitability of conflict.
For that to occur, it is not only necessary to change some of the individual




International relations as an infinite game
Although the Buddha did have occasion to counsel leaders over the course of his
teaching career, and although his teachings focused on the meaningful resolution
of conflict and suffering, he did not develop anything remotely resembling a
theory of international relations or a strategy for directly managing the global
commons. For these teachings and the practices out of which they emerged to
prove relevant to international relations, at least a temporary, metaphorical bridge
must be built between the personal and the political—a bridge that also joins the
very different worlds that result from conduct primarily biased toward appreciative
and contributory virtuosity and conduct biased toward competitively exercised
control. To this end, I would like to introduce an apt extension of “game theory”
suggested by James Carse in his book, Finite and Infinite Games.12
As defined by Carse, finite games—including everything from board games
like chess to world wars—take place among competitors who have agreed upon
rules that will allow them to determine who has won. In spite of the importance
of “spectators” and “referees” or “judges” in finite games, such games end only
when the “players” agree that play has ended, meaning one of them has emerged
as the winner and is thus granted an appropriate title. For this to be possible, finite
games must have initially agreed upon spatial and temporal boundaries. They
must also have a predetermined and agreed upon type of outcome.
Up until very recently, international politics was quite plausibly played as a
fully competitive finite game. But the kind of globalization that has taken place
over the past century has gradually eroded the possibilities of politics being
played sustainably in this way in the international arena. As evidenced by the very
early and wide distribution of common artifacts and narratives, globalization is
by no means a new phenomenon, but the scale and depth of globalization that has
been taking place over the past hundred years are historically unprecedented.
Simply stated, in contrast with previous eras, we are confronted with imperatives
for managing processes of interaction with one another and our environments that
extend indefinitely in time and space. It is no longer the managing of power
distributions and change dynamics in a single valley, on a single plain, or along a
given stretch of coastline that is at stake, but rather the distribution of power and
authority over change across the entire planet. It is no longer just the lifetime of
a despot or a beneficent ruler or even a dynasty that defines the scope of global
temporality, but “any foreseeable future.” Moreover, the relational dynamics of
globalization itself are no longer merely simple or complicated, they are truly
complex with histories of their own that are in the continual process of being
recursively revised from without and from within. The playing field of interna-
tional relations has undergone apparently irreversible changes. The metaphysics
of the game have changed.
If Carse is right in claiming that competition is a kind of play that implies
cooperative rules of engagement and conditions for victory and defeat, the field
of international relations has undergone an ontological/topological mutation that
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renders—at best—any attempt at finite play ironic. At the dawn of the “third
millennium,” international relations discourse maps the contours of a conceptual
paradox. That we are at a crisis point in assuming responsibility for the global
commons has become painfully apparent. Cooperation is not an option, but a
necessity. Only as Carse points out, we cannot truly play if we must play or if the
results of the game are given in advance. International relations discourse situates
us in a game that should end, but cannot, precisely because playing it has become
imperative and because there can be no clear winners. In managing the global
commons, if there are any losers, we are all losers.
It is not that the rules of a still-familiar game have substantially changed with
globalization; we have made the transition into an entirely new kind of game. In
this era of the “colonization of consciousness,” in which attention is being com-
modified and put up for grabs on the world market, and in which our personal and
cultural resources for concertedly meaningful change are being depleted with
alarming regularity and rapidity, there are no justifications for further maintaining
the horizons of relevance, responsibility, and readiness that are key conditions for
the possibility of finite gaming.
Borders demarcating spheres of interest and influence have evaporated. And
along with them have disappeared the kinds of fixed and unambiguous spatial and
temporal horizons that are necessary for claiming any kind of substantial
victories, or for seriously debating whether or not to cooperate. The question now
is not whether to cooperate, or even how to cooperate, but how well. This signals
a truly paradigmatic shift, and one that permits no turning back or reversal.
Contrary to the proclamations of global advocates for market liberalism, we have
not arrived at an end to political history or a culmination of the evolution of
systems for trade, development and international relations. Rather, we have come
to the point of needing to acknowledge that the complex processes global
interdependence have irreparably eroded the foundations of independence- and
sovereignty-biased international relations and brought to an unanticipated close
the season of comfortably finite games of global power and control.
We have entered an era of infinite games. In the context of finite gaming,
political problems are open to final solutions. This is not so in context of infinite
play wherein the future is purposefully held open on jointly improvised headings,
in conscious avoidance of any form of final outcome, in the absence of any
desired destination. In infinite play, solutions—political, economic, environmental,
etc.—give way to resolutions or abiding commitments rooted in shared and
sustained patterns of values–intentions–actions. Destinations give way to direc-
tions. In infinite games—like those into which we are thrust by the necessity of
managing the planetary commons, by the imperative to take account of and
conserve cultural differences that continue to make a difference, or by intimate
partnership—scripts are not only useless, they are ultimately distractive and
destructive.
Whereas finite play and power politics are theatrical in the sense that they
depend on roles that are scripted and performed for an audience and courses of
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action that are destined for conclusion, infinite play and the kinds of politics
proper to it can be termed dramatic or social. That is, they evidence commitments
to the shared improvisation of meanings for our situation, in the absence of any
anticipated or desired conclusion. In this type of play—which Carse illustrates by
contrasting the dramatic nature of committing to be a parent with the theatrical
nature of choosing to take on the role of parent—there can be no final results and
thus no power. What matters most is not arriving at a particular envisioned desti-
nation or outcome, but the way in which ongoing play opens opportunities.
Visions of manifest destiny give way to clarity about what constitutes improved
quality.
With trenchant simplicity, Carse argues that power only factors into finite
games because power cannot be accurately measured until a particular game—
political, social, economic, or sexual—is completed. Effectively, “one does not
win by being powerful; one wins to be powerful.”13 Indeed, being sufficiently
powerful to win before a game has begun insures that whatever follows is not a
competition after all, but simply a ritual of capitulation, the specific terms of
which may be negotiable, but nothing more. According to such a view, then, it is
possible to be powerful only “through the possession of an acknowledged title—
that is, only by the ceremonial deference of others.”14 This, however, means that
power is never one’s own, but always conferred by others, when all other players
have conceded that, “you have won”—perhaps even before play has begun. The
politics of power is thus always ironic, and always theatrically or societally and
not socially choreographed.15
It follows from this that power will always be possessed and exercised by a
small minority of selected players. As noted in earlier discussions of the karma of
control as a technological value, power is inevitably assymetrical and never
shared. By contrast, in infinite games, there is and can be no real power, but anyone
can be strong. In Carse’s terms, “[s]trength is paradoxical. I am not strong because
I can force others to do what I wish as a result of my play with them, but because
I can allow them to do what they wish in the course of my play with them.”16
Strength, unlike power, connotes a capacity to improvise new orders—new
patterns of value–intention–action—with others, not an ability to secure a certain
type of order in the face of potential challenges. Whereas power can be consoli-
dated and reinforces the boundaries without which independence and dependence
are finally unintelligible, strength obtains only in the relational expression of
virtuosic interdependence.
Globally, we have reached a crucial juncture: our shared history and the space
of international relations can no longer be effectively construed as theatre in
which wins and loses are played out. Rather, they must be construed as boundary-
less fields for infinite gaming on which the logic of existence has yielded to that
of dramatic interdependence. In bringing about such a paradigm shift in the
exercise of international relations, it is not the politics of power that is most
crucial, but the politics of strength. A distinctive characteristic of Buddhist
traditions of thought and practice is that they offer a diverse array of systems for
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seeing the world in fully dramatic terms and for cultivating precisely the attentive
and responsive skills needed to realize increasingly intimate forms of mutually
beneficial strength.
Toward a Buddhist revision of international relations
A metaphysical iconoclast, the Buddha claimed that “is” and “is-not” are the twin
barbs on which all humankind is impaled. At the root of all conflicts lie claims of
independence and imputations of dependence. Contrary to rationalist intuitions,
resolving conflicts and ending suffering cannot be accomplished by way of
achieving absolute certainty about how things really are and are-not—or, for that
matter, how things should or should-not be. Indeed, that kind of certainty—
whether our own, that of others, or provisionally shared—makes continued
conflict and suffering unavoidable.
To conclusively exit the path of continued discord, the Buddha enjoined seeing
all things as marked by impermanence, trouble (duhkha), and the absence of any
essential nature. This last practice is of particular importance in the present
context since it entails actively undermining the ontological foundations of essen-
tially competitive international relations. Seeing all things as having no essential
nature or self involves cultivating awareness of their emptiness (funyata) and
interdependence, and occasions an ongoing realization that nothing literally exists
or “stands apart” (existere) from all others. Autonomous subjects and objects are,
finally, only artifacts of abstraction.
In the formula rehearsed repeatedly in the (Mahayana) Diamond Sutra, seeing
all things as empty and interdependent is to actively realize that: [things] are not
really “things,” we only refer to them as “things.” What we refer to as “things”—
whether mountains, human beings, or complex phenomena like histories—are
simply the experienced results of having established relatively constant horizons
of value or relevance (“things”). They are not, as common sense insists, naturally
occurring realities or [things]. Indeed, what we take to be objects existing
independently of ourselves are, in actuality, simply a function of habitual patterns
of relationship.
In metaphysical terms, these teachings compose a system for challenging the
twin myths of “the given” and of “existence”—a concert of strategies for dissolving
the conditions of continued conflict and suffering. Buddhist metaphysics—if that
is not an oxymoron—is a metaphysics of ambiguity in which things are not
originally “this” or “that” but become such only by way of jointly undertaken
(often ritually constituted) acts of disambiguation. The particulars of our experi-
ence do not arise on the basis of objective processes in which our values and
intentions play no crucial role. Rather, they arise in the course of our projecting
well-maintained horizons for relevance. “This” becomes fully distinct from
“that” only through the process of excluding from attention their shared mid-
dle ground—that is, through ignorance of their emptiness or irreducible
interdependence. This amounts, of course, to a selective silencing of our partners
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in interdependence, a refusal to admit the full range of their contribution to the
changes presently taking place. And it is precisely by thus submitting things to
the hierarchy of our own determinations of what is important that we open
ourselves to conflict with them as well as with one another.
Because we are born into families and communities and cultures, the patterned
ignorance through which our experienced world comes into being is not some-
thing instituted alone, randomly, or according to inherently fixed principles.
Rather, it takes shape in compliance with our likes and dislikes, according to our
motivating values, our needs and desires, and our strategies for fulfilling them. In
a word, we project horizons for relevance—ignoring the interdependence of all
things—in an expression of our karma. Others—and here is the central dilemma
of taking the normative turn in international relations—do so from different
points of view from which different things do or do-not matter.
At a minimum, the Buddhist teaching of karma alerts us as to how the topogra-
phies of our life histories correspond meticulously with the complexion of our
own values and intentions. The conflicts that we encounter in the course of
our lives are not rooted in objective operations of so-called “natural law” or in the
capriciousness of chance, but in tensions among our own values and aspirations,
our likes and dislikes, our desires and dreams. Indeed, if our aim is to resolve all
troubles or suffering as they occur, our world cannot effectively be seen as
fundamentally factual or objectively given. Instead, it should be seen as irreducibly
dramatic—a world of unlimited, meaningful interdependence.
According to the teaching of emptiness, bringing conflict to an end is not a
matter of engineering universal agreement about how things are or should be.
Indeed, that can only be achieved by way of so thoroughly abstracting our
concerns from our immediate situations that none of the differences among us can
continue to make any difference. The realization of such a state of affairs in which
each thing fails to mean anything to any others does not mark a Buddhist
“perfection of wisdom,” but perfect ignorance—the denial of emptiness and a
collapse of all opportunity into increasing dramatic entropy. But neither do we
fare any better by having recourse to postmodern embraces of the relative truth of
all perspectives. Again, this is simply a way of asserting and making room for our
differences to not matter by excluding the middle ground of our interdependence
as such. Between the all-frozen sameness of universal agreement and the madly
swirling variety of relativist agreements to disagree, there is little to choose.
In contrast with such dispositions and their liabilities for increasing dramatic
entropy, Buddhist enlightenment can be understood as horizonless readiness to
turn our situation toward increasing dramatic intimacy. By eschewing exclusive
claims about what “is” or “is-not” and directing our attention instead to the
primacy of relationality as such, we open ourselves to the full range of meaningful
contributions being made by each thing to our shared situation. Because such a
turn takes place in a world in which nothing has any essential nature—in which
relationships are more basic than “things related”—and which is also characterized
by trouble and impermanence, these contributions and the partnerships they craft
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are necessarily improvised and dramatic. Minimally conceived, Buddhist practice
involves unrelenting commitment to improvising situational pathways through
dramatic impasse. It is a way, in other words, of continuously negotiating shifts in
the meaning of our situation away from samsara (the world of supposed autonomy
and continued suffering and conflict) toward nirvana (the world of dramatic
freedom and intimacy). Buddhist practice is not, then, a means to a final end or
destination, but rather the meaning of expressing and refining appreciative and
contributory virtuosity.
As we relinquish those habits of attention and conception that have brought our
experienced world of discrete “subjects” and “objects” into being, we begin
understanding that the cost of habitually ignored dramatic interdependence is an
inability of our situation to truly take care of itself. Seeing all things as empty is
to open ourselves onto the typically excluded “middle ground” where all things
subsist in relationships of mutual support and enjoy the meaningful liberty of
contributing as needed to the improvised, situational translation of samsara into
nirvana. This, in a Buddhist context, is what we have referred to as the activation
of emptiness—a disclosure of the profound diversity of our situation, as it has
come to be. It is also, I would argue, the meaning of international relations
committed to globally realizing sustained and equitable public good.
We have already seen that global interdependence, as currently directed, is
bringing about and further consolidating both kusala and akusala eventualities—
situational dynamics that are wholesome and good, as well as dynamics that are
deeply troubling. As the Sakkapanha Sutta makes clear, this effectively means the
continued proliferation of situational blockages and conflict. Global economics in
particular have become a primary engine of compounding inequities. The translation
of local production ecologies to global production monocultures, the commodifi-
cation of virtually all subsistence needs, and the powerfully compelled expansion
and increasing density of market operations are central features of economic
activity oriented according to the values of control, convenience, and choice—
values that ramify karmically in ways that work against both equity and virtuosity.
This economic karma, we have seen, reiterates in the political sphere as well.
There, the bias toward understanding freedom in terms of autonomy has led to the
consolidation of powerful compulsions toward sovereignty and security—values
that dispose political processes toward generating insulating media that effectively
institutionalize differences as what separate us as individuals rather than what
allow us to contribute to one another. So, while it is true that clearly demarcated
political boundaries, the rule of law, and human rights conventions, enable us to
enjoy steadily increasing autonomy and equality, they do so at the incalculable
cost of mutually enriching patterns of felt community.
In sum, the general pattern is this: the globally dominant constellations of
values being deployed to offset apparent troubles and address proximate
conditions of conflict and suffering in our shared situation, as it has come to be,
have crossed scale thresholds to begin ramifying ironically. We are discovering
that our present approaches to making things better are also, somehow, making
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them worse. From a karmic perspective, this is tantamount to admitting that there
obtain persistent dissonances among our favored patterns of values–intentions–
actions. Conventionally, it can be claimed that the work of international relations
is to solve concrete problems arising with respect to failed cooperation or unduly
aggressive competition among members of the world community. But if interna-
tional relations is to have any functional connection with the realization of global
public good, then its ultimate work must be predicament resolution. This work is
ultimately one of developing globally the strengths needed skillfully to resolve
dissonant patterns of value–intention–action, disclosing differences as opportunities
for mutual contribution: the realization of robustly shared commitments to
appreciating (or adding value to) our broadening and deepening interdependence.
The need for such a normative turn in international relations—that is, a turn
toward the task of negotiating significantly shared senses of what we mean, for
example, by “good environments” or “healthy economies” or “free trade and
development”—is immediate. It is also a need that can only be met by fundamen-
tally challenging the logic of existence, the polarization of presence into dependence
and independence, and the discourses of power to which these inevitably lead.
In traditional Buddhist terms, mounting these challenges is a matter of practic-
ing sustained insight into the interdependence and emptiness of all things: the
realization of wisdom. This is not a purely (or even primarily) cognitive matter. In
Buddhism, wisdom is understood as coeval with compassion, which in turn is
understood as arising along with three other immeasurable headings for enhanced
relational quality: equanimity, loving-kindness, and joy in the good fortune of
others. Wisdom and compassion can be seen, then, as interdependent and inter-
penetrating qualities of relationships that are oriented toward the meaningful and
sustainable resolution of suffering and trouble. Especially in Mahayana Buddhist
traditions, the realization or activation of emptiness is thus seen as inseparable
from alloying enlightening patterns of sentience and sentiment in unswerving
commitment to bodhisattva action—that is, in the compassionate demonstration
of limitless relational virtuosity or skillful means (upaya).
International relations oriented toward sustainably enhancing global common
good must, first and foremost, engage in countering the economic, political,
social, and cultural karma that have come to mean the systematic conversion of
diversity to mere variety. Its primary work, then, is to bring about conditions in
which differences are increasingly realized as opportunities for virtuosic mutual
contribution, harmonizing values–intentions–actions in ways conducive to the
emergence of resolutely appreciative and appreciating relational orders. From a
Buddhist perspective, however, the improvised negotiation of shared situational
meaning—that is, of the intensity and direction of our karma or dramatic
interdependence—is precisely what is connoted by emotion. This leads to the
controversial, and yet ultimately liberating, insight that the function of international
relations is emotional refinement.
From a Buddhist perspective, just as we do not “have” thoughts, precisely
because there is no self that stands apart from thinking as its source and owner,
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we do not “have” emotions. Emotions, like all things, are situationally focused
relational processes. In particular, they arise as situation-specific negotiations of
the intensity and direction of the interdependence among all things, as they have
come to be, in this specific situation. Emotions appear when and where currents
of meaning converge, representing regions or spaces of dramatic confluence.
Emotions are expressions playing across the face of emptiness, disambiguating
the interdependence of all things. Given such a definition,17 it is clear that all
negotiations of shared meaning are not merely laden with personal or subjective
feelings and sensations (emotions in the more common sense of the word), they
are irreducibly emotional in nature. This is as true at the national and international
levels of negotiating shared meaning as it is at the personal.
Yet, in a karmic cosmos shaped and oriented as a function of the interplay of
sustained patterns of values–intentions–actions, it can equivalently be said that all
situations—as complexes of shifting outcomes and opportunities—are in some
degree emotional. Negotiating shifts in the tenor or direction of our situation can
take place as the committed expression of familial and romantic love, under the
dark compulsions of vengeance, through the cool exercise of existence-biased
rationality—itself a particular emotion—or as the evolution of complex ecologies
(whether natural, economic, political, or cultural).
This means that diversity, as a measure of situationally realized capacities for
contributing to improvised and yet resolutely shared welfare, can usefully be seen
as a measure of emotional maturity. Conversely, translating situational diversity
into mere variety can be seen as conducive to dramatic immaturity—a way of
directing interdependence that practically insures the necessity of competition, if
not conflict, and the erosion of contributory resources. In Buddhist terms, emotional
immaturity most commonly manifests as habitual recourse to anger, hatred and
greed—emotions that dramatically split our shared situation as a result of refusals
to share fully in negotiating its meaning and value. These emotions—and their
countless permutations—play out in both the personal and the international
sphere. Courses of action informed by convictions that “our way” is “the only
way,” that ruthless competition is the globally most favorable way of determining
slopes of advantage, or that war or more structural forms of violence are simply
effective means to good ends justifiably imposed on others are all common
expressions of emotional immaturity in this sense.
There is, then, considerable emotional immaturity in the perceived necessity of
choosing between either adopting universal, but thin principles of global prosperity
and fairness, or insisting upon the relativity of all norms in a capitulation to thick,
but strictly local values for “the good life.” Either way, the vulnerability of engaging
in truly shared negotiations of the meaning of our situation as a whole is effectively
refused. Although these alternatives express insight into the ill-consequences of
persisting in finite quests for power—for the ability to determine what things will
mean—they are not yet commitments to the infinite path of resolving all conflicts
and differences by way of contributory and appreciative virtuosity. A normative turn
in international relations may be considered, but not actually taken.18
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Beyond competition and cooperation: converting power to strength
International relations oriented toward enhancing diversity in pursuit of global
common good necessarily involve turning away from playing finite games
(whether informed by theories of rational choice, by heroic simplicity, or by
autocratic arrogance). They require resolutely embarking on a path—like that
taken by the bodhisattva vowing to save all sentient beings—that is infinite in
length and from which all things can be seen as opportunities or resources for
awakening. On such a path, and in the playing of international relations as an infi-
nite game, advance is always qualitative—a function of enriching relationships
that are, necessarily, irreducibly shared. While finite games progress by way of a
dialectic of empowerment and disempowerment, infinite games carry on by
means of strengths begotten by and begetting other strengths in extending the
meaning of relating freely.
During the era of cold-war realism, relatively solipsistic actors on both sides of
the iron curtain assumed that they alone stood on firm moral ground, with good
on their own side and something approaching (or even expressing) evil on the
other. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, market-reform in China, and the
continued acceleration of global interdependence, things became significantly
more complicated and complex. The myth of separate existences seems to have
dissolved irreversibly and the perniciously digital moralism of good versus evil
has faded considerably—at least in the space of international relations. The recent
invocation of an “axis of evil” by the second Bush administration in the United
States, unfortunate though it is in virtually every respect, can serve positively as
a ironic reminder that any appearances to contrary notwithstanding, the global
situation is now such that international relations must be seen as taking place in
deeply shared ethical space.
To a historically unprecedented extent, we are being forced to confront and
accommodate our differences. At least for now, there is simply nowhere to turn
that allows us to fully turn away from others who differ from us.19 We are faced—
in virtually every domain of human endeavor—with needing to take into account
undeniable trade-offs as we meet ever shifting needs to accommodate and not
simply adjudicate among contrasting goods. Conserving and (perhaps, even
enhancing) the global commons—the primary responsibility of international
relations discourse—is now manifestly a process that cannot help veering into
ethical or karmic straits that have the very unusual feature of being impossible to
navigate independently.
These straits represent sticking points where differing sets of values–intentions–
actions have come to converge, entangling one another in ways that block being
freely interdependent. The unique topography of these karmic straits has not been
widely or deeply enough appreciated: while any independent actor presents a
much smaller axiological profile than do any collaborative actors, it is the latter
and not the former who are able to negotiate clear passage through these bottlenecks
in things, as they have come to be. The counter-intuitive topography of these key
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features in the space of international relations requires us to take interdependence
as basic if we are to succeed in traversing them.
An important ramification of this topographic peculiarity—again, very much
counter to rationalist and realist intuitions—is that navigating through or around
apparent conflicts is not most effectively or surely undertaken on the basis of
either instrumental reasoning and/or ideally “thin” moral concepts. At least since
Rawls’ classic book, A Theory of Justice,20 there has been considerable and favor-
able recognition of the pertinence of “thin” conceptions of core concepts
in ethics, especially when ethics seeks to claim relevance across cultural or
political boundaries that are understood as having become irreversibly porous.
The general assumption has been that any concepts or values suited to brokering
truly global agreement about the good life are likely to be minimalist in nature.
Hence, the widespread call for minimum standards in respect of working conditions,
dietary regimes, or health care, and the negotiation of such minimalist frames of
reference as the United Nations’ universal declaration of human rights.
But if the shared ground of international relations has the peculiar topographic
features just claimed, axiological minimalism is likely to be counterproductive in
alloying the kinds of common norms and values needed to resolve international
conflicts and crises. In a space of irreducible interdependence, the thicker the net-
work of explicitly shared resources and felt relations maintained by collaborations
of actors, the more likely it is that their negotiations will be successful. Thus,
rather than effectively minimizing the contributions of individual collaborators in
crafting commonly held values, these contributions must be vigorously cultivated
if we are to realize the kind of ethical consonance needed to successfully manage
the commons. Moreover, because the negotiations of meaning that take place
through such patterns of mutual contribution are—as suggested earlier—
inescapably emotional in nature, their success depends on cultivating ever deep-
ening capacities for emotional sensitivity and maturity. Bringing rationality to the
negotiating table—no matter how important an emotion it has come to be—is
simply not enough. At the very least, practices like those associated in Buddhism
with realizing the four immeasurables are needed to provide basic training for the
kind of emotional refinement needed if international relations is to be played as
a truly infinite game. Barring such refinement, we will simply be in no position
to respond as needed within troubled situations—be these personal or political.
Deeply shared meaning will remain elusive.
It is instructive, then, that Rawls and other advocates of universal liberalism
have been criticized as implicitly overwriting uniqueness in the service of overar-
ching principles that fail to democratically order the international sphere. As an
alternative, many critics have insisted on maintaining locally thick concepts as the
sine qua non of any viable approach to international relations. For them, global
order consists, both necessarily and ideally, of a quilting of persistently distinct
value systems.21 Value pluralism is not simply an undeniable twenty-first century
reality, it should be conserved as an ideal at all scales of interrelatedness. Critical
commitments of this sort are, I think, an important corrective to conducting
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international relations as a universalist discourse based on thin and practically
traction-less conceptions of the good. But they are not enough.
In addition to recognizing and conserving alternative value systems as
inherently valuable products of human history, it is necessary to engage in their
sustained appreciation. For those faring on the infinite path of bodhisattva action,
the virtuosic qualities of attention and commitment that are needed to truly
appreciate—or enhance the value—of all things are most fundamentally (and
continuously) cultivated through mindfulness and insight meditation. In sharp
contrast with a relativist acceptance or tolerance of alternative value systems—
systems that thereby remain steadfastly other, if not alien—these rudimentary
Buddhist practices aim at attending to the ways in which each thing is relevant to
all other things, contributing uniquely to their meaning. This is basis of the
bodhisattva’s limitless capacity to accord with any situation, responding as
needed to direct it, as a relational whole, toward consummation as a maximally
diverse and truly liberating environment in which all things are strong: that is,
capable of relating freely.
It can reasonably be objected, of course, that this realization of the relevance of
all things is in itself of scant relevance for real-world international relations.
It may be that mindfulness and insight meditation yield personal benefits:
increasingly refined capacities for attending to and attuning with situational
dynamics. Undoubtedly, these capacities have a direct bearing on our readiness
for innovation and improvisation—skills that are very much needed in a complex
world requiring us to face and respond to changes that we literally could not
have anticipated. But apart from this generic relevance at the level of personal
self-cultivation, what possible bearing might they have on how we conduct and
orient international relations?
Mindfulness and insight, from a Buddhist perspective, develop sensitivities and
sensibilities relevant to reorienting processes of change and interdependence. They
engender conditions under which the conceit of existence unravels and with it the
fixed positions and identities that are a primary cause of conflict and suffering.
Although international relations ostensibly focuses on relationality and change, it
has done so in keeping with the same metaphysical assumptions—or ontological
convictions—that undergird prevailing patterns of economic and political activity.
International relations are thus considered external relations between sovereign
states that exist first and foremost as autonomous and self-interested individuals.
Mindfulness and insight in international relations mean seeing through the
conceit that relations are second-order realities contingent upon pre-existing
actors. They involve realizing that we—for example, as nations, ethnic groups,
religious communities, or non-governmental organizations—are only what we
mean for other and what we allow others to mean for us. This amounts to an
ontological gestalt shift from taking independent and dependent actors to be first
order realities and relations among them as second order, to seeing relationality
as first order (or ultimate) reality and all individual actors as (conventionally)
abstracted or derived from them.
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An immediate result of such a shift is seeing that power is not something
differentially possessed and wielded by individual actors. Rather, power consists
of a polarizing relationship; empowering on one hand, disempowering on the
other. Exercising power cannot, in short, be a sustained approach to doing good
in the sense of realizing truly common good. Eventually, power means power-over
others who will only accept their disempowerment if their contributory capacity
has dropped to such a low level that they can no longer protest their powerlessness
and dependency. This, however, is a status that renders them less and less valuable
to those with power who stand to gain little if anything from the relationship. The
disempowered become a burden; the relationship weakens.
The polarizations of power—the empowering of some and disempowering of
(many) others—undermine strength. That is, they undermine capacities for
relating freely. Over especially the past half century, empowering the previously
powerless has come to be celebrated as a course for redressing histories of exces-
sively consolidated and unfairly exercised power. The aim generally is, through
empowering marginalized groups and individuals, to achieve an abiding balance
of powers and to redistribute more fairly the benefits of power. Unfortunately,
while this may work to assuage recently wakened consciences, it does little to
build strength. In an important causal asymmetry, the ravaging of strength by
power cannot be healed by more, or better distributed, power. Strength is a
relational quality, the loss of which amounts to a situational degradation. Whether
granted by those in power or wrested violently away from them, new or renewed
abilities to act autonomously in pursuit of one’s own self-interest does not, and
cannot, signal an abandoning of the metaphysics of individual existence. Strength
can only be regained when the conceits of existence—tragic or ironic, competitive
or cooperative—can be fully relinquished.
In traditional Buddhist practice regimes it is acknowledged that while mind-
fulness and insight together are all that is required to launch this process, not
everyone in every situation can sustain restorative commitments to building
the liberating strengths needed to revise the meaning of change and interdepend-
ence from samsara to nirvana. Two provisions are made: practicing under the
guidance of a skilled master, and retreat from the full range of relational dynam-
ics constitutive of daily social life. In the Cakkavatti-Sïhanada Sutta, for instance,
when society has reached something very close to a moral nadir, no skilled mas-
ters remain extant and there are no communities of people devoted to practicing
the Dharma. Those few people unwilling to be drawn into the collapse of society
have no alternative but to withdraw, doing so individually at first and then band-
ing together as they recognize their shared commitments. Over time, they form a
counter-community based on their distinctively shared values–intentions–actions.
Historically, Buddhist monastic institutions functioned as places of retreat in
which practicing mindfulness and insight could be carried on continuously and
with as few distractions and obstructions as possible.
By analogy, it can be argued that while restoring strengths in the context of
international relations may in theory be globally possible, this may not be actually
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the case. Indeed, there would seem to be many actors for whom developing
sustained, mindful insight into the outcomes and opportunities associated with
prevailing patterns of global interdependence is not practically possible—not, at
least, as long as they are fully embedded in those patterns of interdependence.
Ironically, some independence from those patterns may be required if the
discourse of power is to be ultimately subordinated. In terms of the Mahayana
teaching of the two truths, the ultimate reality of strength may need to be at first
provisionally expressed through the conventional reality of power.
There is a superficial similarity between the discourse of empowering the
powerless and the course of building strengths or capacities for relating freely by
first retreating into practical independence from the relational polarizations of
power. But closer examination makes evident that a crucial difference obtains
between the characteristic patterns of value–intention–action associated with
each strategy. The former aims at the balancing of powers, and is therefore
committed to continuing to have resort to them. A world of balanced powers
among resolutely self-interested actors is a world of managed competition or
cooperation in the strict sense of “operating together” in secure co-existence. The
strategy of provisional retreat, however, aims at overturning biases toward
autonomy, control, and secured sovereignty to subordinate power to strength.
Only on the basis of this subordination is it possible to commit to a course of
relating freely—a course that goes beyond competition and cooperation to robust
coordination.
In practical terms, this might mean, for instance, that countries being pressured
to open up to the regime of “free trade”—a regime that has been steadily skewing
global interdependence toward increasingly inequitable distributions of income
and access to resources—may wish to remain un-integrated into global markets.
They may wish instead to develop counter-communities with like-minded actors
dedicated to sustaining local economic strengths by resisting the commodification
and aggressive marketing of subsistence goods and services by global production
monocultures.22
A turn in international relations away from the conflict-prone dynamics of
competition and cooperation to robust contribution requires those related
within a given situation to arrive at common karma—a common pattern of
values–intentions–actions—oriented away from control grounded freedoms of
choice toward relating freely in mutual contribution and appreciation. Yet, as we
have seen, good intentions must be paired with appropriate values and actions to
sustain kusala or wholesomely virtuosic eventualities and at the same time reduce
those that are akusala.
Rawls’ appeals to justice and fairness as key values for reorienting governance
practices so as to effect positive social change can be seen as rooted in keen
intuitions about the central importance of values in shaping how, and how well,
we live. Justice and fairness are offered as values suited to reducing conflict and
trouble—the sum total of human and planetary suffering—and steadily building
better lives toward the end of realizing good lives for all. As we have seen,
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however, Rawls’ good intentions have run up against substantial real-world
resistance—resistance that, from a Buddhist perspective, can be traced to the
indebtedness of his (arguably a priori) construction of justice and fairness as
universal values grounded metaphysically on generically conceived autonomy
and individual existence.
While it is possible to derive from Buddhist teachings and practices values
that play out relationally in ways not dissimilar to those accorded justice and
fairness by Rawls, they would be rooted in the metaphysical irreducibility of
dramatic interdependence. Ultimately, they would consist of values distilled
“after the fact” from things as they have come to be and would thus
represent embodied resources for shared meaning-making. That is, they would
be values engendered relationally, not theoretically, in active improvisation of
shared commitments to common goods. Autonomy and existence-derived
concepts like justice and fairness have the advantage of being “thin” enough to
pass through the permeable boundaries of virtually all the actors engaged in
international relations—values that can comfortably be affirmed by all. By
contrast, values derived through mindfulness and insight in accord with Buddhist
commitments to realizing liberating intimacy among all beings would be
globally thick and locally thin. As such, they offer a middle path between
“universal-but-thin” and “thick-but-local” approaches to achieving viable inter-
national community.
Throughout our conversation, I have been forwarding diversity as a primary
value for realizing strong coordination in public policy. Unlike ideally thin
concepts distilled through universally enjoined experiments in rationality,
Buddhist diversity is thinnest at the local level and thickest at the global.
Unlike the quilted order envisioned by opponents to moral universalism, however,
the order expressed by the Buddhist concept of diversity does not assume the
ultimate independence of contributors, but rather their ongoing, meaningful
interdependence. Instead of an unmitigated pluralism of quilted orders—a regime
of variety in which persistently autonomous, neighboring value systems are
effectively stitched together by focusing only upon selectively salient aspects—
Buddhist diversity invites ever fuller participation of whole communities in
relationships of mutually articulating support and dramatic furtherance.
In specifically international relations terms, diversity means opening viable
courses around both the apparent necessity of cooperation (as managed competition)
and the inevitability of conflict, turning decisively away from an exclusive focus
on the external relations between essentially autonomous actors and shaking fully
free of realist contentment with articulating lowest global denominators for
secure co-existence. As a passage between claims of absolutely universal goods
and claims of irresolvable moral and cultural relativism, the path of increasing
diversity challenges the logic of the excluded middle, the priority of facts over
values, the metaphysical centrality of existence rather than creative ambiguity,
and the supposition that meaning is essentially a function of subjective interpre-
tation and not of improvisationally shared offering.
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International relations based on the values of control, stability, security, and
institutionally mediated co-existence can reproduce the conditions of their own
necessity, but cannot give rise to an alternative world in which the ideal of
virtuosic, mutual contribution and the primacy of constitutive, felt relationships
is no longer taken to be fundamentally “unrealistic.” In such a world of continu-
ously negotiated diversity, agreements about universal norms give way to inter-
weaving improvisations of surprisingly shared meanings. This clearly requires
attentive and responsive skills that far exceed those of populations that have been
dramatically impoverished by subjection to ways of life in which opportunities for
appreciatively and directly contributing to one another’s welfare have been all but
submerged in market-delivered floods of occasions for commodity consumption;
in which political participation has been reduced to instantiating the myth that
democracy is simply “one person, one vote”; and in which the unrestricted
exercise of freedom can only take place in a state of utter privacy and privation,
or infinite want and desire.
Building various kinds of civil society may suffice to provide at least
temporary stepping stones across the widening dramatic gulf that results when
autonomy and equality are heralded as irreducible communal values, when
differences are institutionally prohibited from truly making a difference, and
when control prevails as the central technological value. Civil society, at least as
customarily conceived, arises at the interface of society and the state as a concrete
medium for consolidating and exercising power for political (but also economic
and social) change. Civil society, in this sense at least, is not contrary to the
polarizing discourse of power, but emerges as a force for balancing or redirecting
that discourse. As such, it cannot ultimately reverse the dramatic impoverishment
that power and the valuing of autonomy and control occasion, whatever its
conventional benefits.
Similarly, building institutional bridges of the sort that link various players of
different scales and perspectives on the field of international relations will not
provide the resources for breaking free of the karma of control and its underlying
logic of consequences—a karma according to which the better we get at getting
what we want, the better we get at wanting, only to be left wanting by what we
finally get. The bridges and the societies thus realized may well revise the terms
of competition and cooperation, but they will not eventuate in robust coordination.
In Buddhist terms, they may soften the akusala eventualities brought about by
existence-biased international relations and power. But they do not take the
further step of building strengths, so long as their very possibility is dependent
on technologies through which control is most efficiently exercised, and through
which the colonization of consciousness is most systematically deepened.23 The
karma of control is such that commitment to it as a value—even for the purpose
of positive social change—eventually helps bring about situations that will
be perceived as increasingly in need of control. Civil societies can, indeed,
mediate the articulation of appropriate kinds of control. They will not, thereby,
eliminate the need for more of the same.
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The dramatic gulf opening up between individual persons, ethnic groups,
religious traditions, nations, and regions through late twentieth- and early
twenty-first century patterns of inequitable globalization cannot be addressed by
appeal to the same values that have made this type and degree of globalization
possible and then inevitable. Fighting fire with fire is possible—but only if the
fire to be extinguished can be isolated within an encircling band of controlled
burning. This is not possible when the fire to be extinguished is global in extent.
If diversity is, indeed, a counter-value capable of stimulating a gestalt shift in
the meaning of change, it is so only to the extent that it means developing
the kinds of attentive and responsive skills needed if international relations is to be
played as an infinite game in which strength—and not power—prevails. Unless
built by actors who are capable of horizonless civil virtuosity, civil society is a
useful, but finally self-defeating response to the crisis of community now taking
place worldwide.
It is becoming painfully apparent in this first decade of the “century of
interdependence” that the major issues in international relations cannot be
resolved by appeal to balancing or adjudicating among separate interests and
identities as ontologically basic building blocks. Neither can these issues be
solved by simple factual measures: they have the nature of predicaments than can
only be resolved on the basis of first allowing that they arise as impasses in
situations that are shared but poorly recognized as such, pointing to conflicts
among our values, many of which are absolutely crucial to who we take ourselves
to be. Committing to the resolution of predicaments in the public sphere means
placing our “selves” at risk. Whether aiming to resolve conflicts between
Myanmar’s SLORC and NLD, or between the PRC and Tibet or Taiwan, or
between the “developed” North and the “developing” South, success and failure
swing on how well we improvise (or prove incapable of improvising) shared
meanings for our increasingly undeniable interdependence, and how consistently
and creatively we are able to appreciate and contribute to our diversity as our most
precious global commons.
As a global commons or public good, diversity denotes the totality of relational
resources for making meaningful differences in realizing sustainable patterns of
intimately shared welfare. The primary function of diversity-oriented interna-
tional relations is not hammering out agreements that level down differences in
pursuit of a universal ethic. Neither is it institutionalizing tolerance, preserving
difference by insuring that it no longer makes a difference—a relativist version of
universalism. Rather, the primary function of international relations becomes
strengthening differences in the sense of appreciating how they can be related in
order to foster relating freely. As diversity is globally enhanced across all domains
of endeavor bearing on public good, international relations will—in terms of
present ideals—work paradoxically against increasing security and for deepening
vulnerability shared among all relevant actors. There is, ultimately, no other route
to truly liberating intimacy.
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Yet, because diversity consists, in Buddhist terms, of the activation of emptiness
or the mutual relevance among all beings, the increasing vulnerability that comes
with increasing intimacy is always also an enriching opening-up of what we mean
for one another. There are risks in resolutely orienting international relations
toward diversification. But they are the kinds of risk that must be taken if the
interdependence and emptiness of all things is to manifest as our shared realiza-
tion of unlimited skill in means: horizonless capacities for contributory and
appreciative virtuosity. Failing to commit to reorienting international relations in
this way, the very conditions that might otherwise have been turned to creative
consummation will draw us inexorably into continued conflict and suffering.
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There is much to recommend an approach to international relations that aims at
inflecting our growing global interdependence toward enhancing diversity and
bringing about environments in which relating freely is possible for all. At least
in theory, it offers a way of conceiving alternatives both to the choice between
competition and cooperation, and the moral default of mere tolerance. But in
practice, such an approach can be charged with being insufficiently grounded
in the realities of early twenty-first century geopolitics. It is one thing to
theoretically espouse opening ourselves to the contributions of all beings in the
achievement of meaningfully shared and ultimately liberating environments. It is
another thing to open ourselves to the kinds of threat to both national and basic
human security that have become so tragically widespread over especially the past
quarter century.1
Of all the threats to our overall sense of security and the promise of diversity-
driven international relations, perhaps none is so challenging as that of terrorist
violence. No single threat has so effectively brought into focus how deeply shared
personal and public fortunes can be. None, certainly, has so pointedly and
viscerally driven home the basic truth that we are all vulnerable.
Although acts of terror are not a new development in global history, global
terrorism can be seen as among the emergent (and very much unintended)
consequences of contemporary patterns of technology-driven globalization and
interdependence. In the absence of international air travel, electronic transfers of
capital, trans-continental arms trading and satellite mediated communication
networks, terrorism would have remained a relatively local phenomenon. But, as
the rhetoric of many terrorist groups make clear, global terrorism is not just made
possible by the interdependencies and technological systems that have developed
as a function of contemporary scales and rates of globalization, it is also a
response to them—one that seeks to disrupt present patterns in the distribution
and management of power through the calculated and yet apparently indiscriminate
infusion of fear into the global public sphere.
Here, I want to critically engage our present ways of understanding and
responding to global terrorism. The declared “war on terrorism”—a central part





Responding to the realities of global terrorism
spread and intensified over the past 5 years. As parents, sons, and daughters
continue to be killed—by terrorist insurgents and by both military and mercenary
counter-insurgency campaigns—the ineffectiveness our present approaches to
understanding and responding to terror is becoming evident. The elusiveness of
peace is being transmuted into tragic impossibility.
It is not my intention to analyze the complex geopolitics of the “war on terror,”
the regime changing wars that are—in all but name—still being waged in
Afghanistan and Iraq, or the ethnically and religiously charged battles for
sovereignty that continue to afflict much of Middle East, Central Asia, and
sub-Saharan Africa. Neither is it to critically assess either specific policy
decisions or their effects on the quality of daily life and civil liberties. Instead,
I want to use Buddhist conceptual resources to make clear that our prevailing
strategies for responding to global terror remain wedded to the politics of power
and will therefore remain ineffective.
Terrorists do not agree to internationally established rules of engagement; by
that, they demonstrate their refusal to play the finite game of power change,
regardless of how interested they may be in exercising powers of their own.
Although our prevailing strategies might afford short-term solutions for some
aspects of the overall problem of terrorism, they will not develop the strengths
needed to sustainably resolve the predicaments brought to light by terrorism.
Those strengths will come only through playing the infinite game of peace by
globally coordinating the enhancement of commitments-to and capacities-for
appreciative and contributory virtuosity.
The meaning of terrorism and tragedy
In today’s media and in both popular and political discourse, “terrorism” is most
often used to denote something like “irrational acts of calculated violence, con-
sciously and callously perpetrated on innocent people.” In addition to being quite
common, such a description of terrorism is also oddly inconsistent (asserting
terrorism to be both “irrational” and “calculated”) and prone to concentrating atten-
tion on the horrific actions undertaken by terrorists rather than the conditions under
which terrorism recommends itself as a strategy for initiating or directing change.
Both etymologically and literally, terrorism is rooted in terror. Terrorism is
carried out through acts that evidence a brutal adherence to the dictates of rational
choice, and that will have the desired outcome of injecting the target group or
society with debilitating fear. Such acts are not undertaken in a vacuum.
Terrorism marks an extreme manifestation of conflict between actors of very
different scale—actors who have failed to establish any usefully shared sense of
a common ground for addressing chronically troubling differences in norms
and values. It is never the first response to normative tensions. Terrorism
arises through the experience of utter frustration with respect to even the
possibility of negotiating a mutually satisfying direction or meaning for situational
transformation.
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Where the actors involved are of similar scales—for example, if both are
well-established nation-states with clearly defined institutional structures and
histories—such normative impasse has tended to result in war of either the cold
or hot variety. It is only when the scale of the actors is sufficiently different for
direct confrontation not to be a viable option that terrorism arises. In this case, the
actor least likely to survive direct confrontation and most likely bearing galling
witness to the overwriting of its own norms and values by the actor of greater
scale finally feels compelled to drop the pretence of cooperation. In a rational and
yet shamelessly violent attempt to further its own ends, this actor tries to produce
conditions ripe for meaningful and desirable change. This is not done by directly
dismantling the other’s institutions, but by inoculating the other with fear.2
There is thus some truth in the corollary popular association of terrorism with
threats to democracy. Terrorism marks a refusal to respect widely accepted norms
for inter-communal relations, and thus a refusal to participate in the consensual
ordering of the relational commons. Indeed, terrorist acts explicitly aim at bringing
about disorder. Because of the relatively small scale of actions undertaken,
however, terrorism is generally not able to effect any direct and broad destabi-
lization in the targeted community. In spite of their grievous consequences for
those directly victimized, the direct factual effects of acts of terrorism are relatively
modest. The crashing of a plane, the sinking of a ship, the explosion of a car
bomb, the destruction of an embassy building, and the loss of life associated with
them—these cannot bring an entire people or society to its knees. Neither will
they significantly destabilize a targeted nation or global system of order.
Without pushing the analogy too far, terrorist acts can be seen as successfully
destabilizing in much the same way that viral infections are. The tiny beings
communicated into a human body by a mosquito bite or by eating spoiled food,
in and of themselves, could not cause a single hair to move on that body. Once
inside the body, however, and given certain conditions, they are able to so
profoundly disturb the body’s organic order that it collapses in malignant exhaus-
tion lasting days or even weeks. If the infection is severe enough, the body cannot
carry out any of its normal activities, take in nourishment, or effectively rest. In
the worst case, destabilized and debilitated beyond the point of recovery, it
succumbs and dies.
Fear violates the naturally open process of being human that is seen with such
endearing evidence in babies and small children—an utter readiness to explore
and literally incorporate things, to make them a part of ourselves. Fear brings
about defensive recoil from our situation—a movement of simultaneous closing-off
and closing-out.3 Though it is often associated with the realization of vulnerability,
fear is actually a quite distinct phenomenon. As nicely captured in the classic
identification of fear with “fight or flight” responses, fear is the embodiment of
a profound need to change the meaning or likely development and outcome of a
situation. By contrast, vulnerability signals awareness of potentials for interde-
pendence and interpenetration. Vulnerability can be discomforting; but it can also
be exciting and positively charged as when we realize suddenly that we are falling
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head-over-heels in love. Vulnerability marks awareness of a qualitatively distinct
sense of being exposed, of being internally related in ways that both can surprise
and satisfy.
Of course, if fear is confronted and the relational complexion of a frightening
situation is appropriately enhanced, it can be converted to vulnerability.
Conversely, the excitement of being vulnerable can be turned to fear if openness
to others becomes intense enough to seem explosive—often when the relational
demands of a situation begin outstripping one’s experienced relational capabilities.
Vulnerability gives way to fear when relational limits are transgressed; fear is
dispelled with mounting relational virtuosity.4
At the public level, the experience of fear is most commonly caused by a threat
to national integrity or a community’s overall way of life—an event that signals
relational inadequacy. Much as a terror-stricken person will often close-off from
the source of their fear, attempting to close it out, a nation or community will
often react to terror—perceived as an “external” threat—by closing in on itself
and by closing off its borders. Just as it does with terror-stricken individual, this
means a collapse of horizons of relevance, a desperate inattention to nuance and
detail, a potential for lashing out at suspected or real “enemies,” and a refusal to
acknowledge any still present common good with them. As witnessed in the
exercise of extreme political unilateralism, fear is capable of systematically
undermining the basis of truly open societies and relations among them. As so
poignantly stated by the Burmese democracy advocate, Aung San Suu Kyi, there
is no democracy where there is not “freedom from fear.”5 A terrorized popula-
tion—regardless of whether the terror is induced randomly or systematically—is
incapable of undertaking and sustaining democratic processes. It is a morally
paralyzed body politic in frightful danger of dissolving into autonomous and
narrowly self-serving constituent parts.
The effects of terrorism on those victimized by it are almost invariably deemed
tragic. The paralysis of the body politic that occurs when whole populations are
effectively terrorized is no less so. But to deem events and their consequences
“tragic” is not simply to add an emotional intensifier to their brute factuality. It is
to say of them: “they should never have happened, and yet could not have happened
otherwise.” Tragedy takes place in the peculiar world region lying at the intersection
of the positive moral space of what ought to happen and the negative factual
space of what could not happen—a place where the moral and the ontological
come into explicit conflict. In tragedy, ought no longer implies can.
In classical Greek drama, tragedies were narrative-driven performances centered
on the fateful interactions of human beings and the Olympian gods—interactions
that were depicted as the means for putting right either a human-divine relationship
that had gone profoundly astray or the order of the cosmos itself. The central
characters in a tragic drama are, of course, essentially innocent of wrongdoing.
Like the victims of terrorism, their fault or flaw is not a result of their own doing,
but something inherited or imposed on them—perhaps for no other reason than
they happen to have ended up in precisely the wrong place at just the right time
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for being drafted into service as a means to the end of a reestablished cosmic
harmony. Tragic heroes have the (ill) fortune of being subject to dramatically
unanticipated fates and forces utterly beyond their control.
Together, terror and tragedy seem almost to force us into shrinking away from
freely engaging our situation and being responsible to and for it. This seems
understandable, even quite reasonable. It is not uncommon for the terrified and
tragically afflicted to simply “shut down” in a state of shock—a state that is
usually, but unfortunately not always, temporary. Often, such traumatic withdrawal
is taken to be a “natural” and even “necessary” part of the healing process—a way
of consolidating our resources, regrouping, finding within ourselves the means of
becoming again wholly present.
The idea that personal wholeness and a sense of sound identity might result
from withdrawal and what often amounts to a refusal of intimacy is very much
culturally freighted. It reveals a bias for constructing personhood in terms that are
predominantly individualistic and essentialist rather than thoroughly relational.6
Still, even in cultures where persons are understood as complex patterns of
relationship, traumatic withdrawal does occur. In such contexts, the healing
process is perhaps more often understood as taking place with re-integration into
the situation as a whole, rather than as something that took place “inside” the
afflicted person during their de facto absence. Either way, however, it remains true
that pulling back from full intimacy with our situation involves closing ourselves
off in some degree from our environment and those with whom we share it. In
effect, this is dramatically impoverishing. It is to cut our selves off from others’
contributions to the meaning—and not just the bare facts—of who we are and
might become. Closing ourselves to the experienced outcome of things, as they
have come to be, is also to close off to all that is (or might be) opportune in them.
This is especially apparent in the worst cases of traumatic withdrawal, where
the interruption of normal relations is nearly total. But all instances of terror and
tragic withdrawal bring about an impoverishing break in our normal pattern of
sustaining relationships. When our fear is of sufficiently low intensity and where
our sense of tragedy is less severe, we may simply gather our wits and run out on
what we perceive to be a troubling and potentially avoidable situation. Whether
our escape is “internal” or “external,” however, it constitutes an assertion of man-
ifest objection—a blocking out of both what is threatening and what is potentially
a crucial contribution to our own welfare. Anyone who has had the experience of
approaching a terrified infant or someone in shock with every intention of
helping only to be pushed aside as irrelevant or threatening knows quite well the
degree to which fear can block situational contribution to one’s welfare. When
communities or nations close their borders in “self-protective” withdrawal, they
become no less blinded.
Moreover, in pulling away from our situation, contracting in upon ourselves,
there typically occurs a condensation of present qualities of attention and
relationship. That is, among the terror and tragedy stricken, characteristic qualities
of attention and patterns of relationship tend to become both smaller in scope and
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more concentrated. Especially as fear, suspicion, and anger intensify, the potential
for explosive reactions increases—the potential for incandescently lashing out in
objection to how things have come to be. But because these objection-driven
emotions also consist of admissions of ignorance regarding what we might do to
favorably dispose our situation, a concentration of attentive and relational
qualities associated with them means ever greater tendencies toward ignoring our
immediate situation, thus reproducing and intensifying the conditions of further
conflict and objection.
Together, terror and tragedy bring about an implosive collapse of our customary
horizons for relevance, responsibility, and readiness—a profound shrinking of the
horizons within which we are willing and able to admit things as relevant, as our
responsibility, and as rightly evocative of our readiness for fully engaged action.
Ironically, such a “protective” contraction of horizons does not finally lead toward
invulnerability, but its opposite.7
The trouble with terror and tragedy: a Buddhist perspective
These general points can be sharpened by appealing to a broadly Buddhist
interpretation of terror and tragedy as particular expressions of trouble or suffering
(dukkha).
The Buddha often described his way of practice and teaching as comprising
only four basic insights or truths: all this—our present situation—is troubled;
trouble arises because of particular patterns of relationship; these patterns can be
dissolved; and, there is a way or practice for doing so. The first of these Four
Noble Truths does not seem, at first glance, to be true at all—not at least as a
statement of literal fact. Every one of us can name many, many situations in
which we have been quite happy and untroubled. But on closer examination, the
specific phrasing used by the Buddha—“all this is troubled/troubling
(dukkha)”—resists being understood in ether purely subjective or purely objective
terms. By including the indexical term “this” in framing the first noble truth, the
Buddha invites resisting our natural tendency to believe that, “if I’m okay, you
must be okay.” The first truth is an injunction to discern the troubling currents
present in our situation, as it has come to be, and to do so regardless of the
apparent factual nature of our circumstances and no matter how pleasantly we
may be disposed within them.8
Stressing that “all this” is characterized by trouble or suffering is also to insist
that trouble or suffering is always unique. It may arise through a general, inter-
locking set of conditions, similar for all sentient beings. But, like fingerprints
arising through analogously general sets of causal conditions, each actual
instance of suffering or trouble is finally unlike any other. The importance of this
realization is that while it is possible—and often very instructive—to craft
universal solutions for human suffering and conflict, they can only solve equally
universal problems. Our own sufferings and troubles, unfortunately, are always
particular. We never suffer from the “untimely loss of a family member,” but—to
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take a particularly tragic example—from the utterly senseless shooting of a
fifteen year old daughter by pathologically confused classmates as she went from
math class to history. Because no two instances of human suffering or trouble are
precisely identical, truly workable problem solutions—as well as predicament
resolutions—must be improvised.
The Buddha’s key insight, the one that enabled him to see how the tendencies
within our experienced situations toward trouble and suffering might be entirely
resolved, was that all things arise interdependently. Relationships are more basic,
finally, that things related. Failing to realize and respond in accord with the
dynamics of interdependence obtaining among things in any given situation, as it
has come to be, is the root condition for all trouble, suffering and conflict. The
second, third, and fourth truths provide general guidance in deepening our capacity
to skillfully redress this failing. The primary teaching device for deepening
insight into interdependence is the twelve-fold chain of interdependent origination,
of which three links are traditionally regarded as crucial: ignorance, habit
formations, and craving desires. In keeping with the Buddha’s description of his
transforming insight into interdependence as like coming across a “long lost city,
overgrown by dense jungle,” ignorance, habit formations, and craving desires can
be seen as the root, trunk, and fruit of dukkha.
In a Buddhist sense, ignorance is paradigmatically associated with the conceit
of independent existence. The English word “existence” derives from Latin roots
meaning to “stand apart from” and neatly captures the arrogance inherent to
claims of independence. Consistently imagining our selves as autonomously
existing individuals is possible only on the basis of successfully ignoring our
common ground—the relational field out of which each one of us emerges. But,
because trouble/suffering arises through particular patterns of interdependent
relationships, ignoring our relational common ground is also to ignore the sources
or origin of trouble/suffering. Simply stated: it is to endanger our selves. To the
degree that we take ourselves to be independently existing beings, trouble will
always seem to take us by surprise or unaware—a product of chance or fate in
which we had no hand of our own.
Especially in Mahayana Buddhist traditions, insight into the interdependence
among all things entails insight into their emptiness—a realization of the inter-
penetration and mutual relevance of all things, and thus of the constitutive or creative
nature of differences.9 Experiencing our independence or our co-existence,
regardless of how secure it may be, effectively involves a denial of emptiness. It
means ignoring the ongoing and dynamic presence of differences that truly make
a difference—a collapse of the shared space within which each thing actively
contributes to the welfare of all others. At the same time, it involves entry into an
“inherently” tragic domain in which there is no clear correlation between our
efforts and actions and their ultimately experienced consequences, a domain in
which the operation of karma is not evident. Ironically, we find it increasingly
easy therein to believe that “nothing really makes a difference”—in particular,
that we do not and perhaps cannot really make a difference.
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Few beliefs or experiences are more likely to generate depression, frustration,
and anger. Such emotions have been the object of consistent and careful critical
regard in Buddhist traditions. As situational energies—that is, as expressions of
both force and direction—they reflect a breakdown of consensual meaning. They
evidence basic normative conflict or a failure to realize patterns of relationship
that are experienced by all involved as mutually beneficial and conducive to
meaningful and sustainable situational (and not just merely individual) welfare.
As they play out, whatever rationales we attach to them, they will mean an inten-
sification of qualities of relationship or interdependence that are attentively
impoverished, profoundly divisive, and conducive to suffering.
The practices summarized in the fourth noble truth—the Eight-fold Path—
provide a systematic method for actively breaking down the conceit of existence
and for both developing capabilities-for and refining commitments-to liberating
engagement with the interdependence of all things. This is not a path aimed at a
specific destination or experienced outcome, but rather at opening opportunities
for improvising shifts in the direction of our situation away from trouble, conflict,
and suffering toward their sustained and meaningful resolution. Traditionally, this
path has been represented as a three-dimensional system of contraries or antidotes
to the three crucial links in the pattern of conditions giving rise to trouble or
suffering. These are cultivating wisdom, attentive virtuosity, and moral clarity.10
While it can be seen as a troubling eventuality that is in many ways unique,
global terrorism and its tragic consequences can be traced back—as can all forms
of dukkha—to relationships gone awry. More specifically, terrorism arises as an
outcome of conflicts among patterns of values–intentions–actions that are severe
enough to result in violent objections of a sort that signal a glaring absence of nor-
mative consensus and a rejection of the possibility of moving toward it. Terrorist
acts are an attempt to bring about a severing of relationships that are perceived as
crucial to things having come to be as troubling as they have come to be.
Three primary, sponsoring conditions of conflict and violence were frequently
identified in the Buddha’s discourses. The first is claiming that “this is true, all
else is false”—asserting, in effect, that reality does not admit of second (or third)
opinions and that the admission of multiple meanings or diverse perspectives on
a given matter is an admission of ignorance if it is not an expression of evil in the
broad sense of the term.11 The world is not ambiguous. It is not an ongoing,
shared improvisation. Things are truly either “this” or “that”. In between, and in
any act of combination, there is only falsehood. Views like these are at the heart
of conflict and violence.
The second key condition has to do with strategies for resolving the kinds of
difference that arise when two or more parties take opposing stands on matters of
fact and meaning. Conflict and violence ensue whenever such differences are
resolved in ways that lead to some winning while others lose.12 Victory confirms
the existence of disparate selves—those vindicated by the conflict and those
vanquished. It refracts patterns of interdependence into apparent patterns of
independence and dependence. Victory is thus conducive to anger, hatred, jealousy,
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and dejection. The defeated live in pain, in fear, and all too often in hope of
revenge.
Finally, the Buddha identified disparaging and extolling individuals as
conducive to conflict and as blocking access to and movement on the Middle
Path. In the Arajavibhanga Sutta, for example, he instructs a group of students to
avoid making such claims as “all those who practice in such and such a way have
entered onto a wrongful path” and “all those who practice in such and such a way
have entered onto a rightful path.”13 Both claims, apparently offering concrete
examples of wrong and right conduct, implicitly establish sets of practices and
practitioners as pairs of opposites. This seems simply to be a clear way of making
a useful distinction. But in actuality, “anger, confusion and dishonesty arise when
things are set in pairs as opposites.”14 The Buddha recommends instead talking
about practices in terms of patterns of relationship, identifying which patterns
are conducive to suffering, vexation, despair, and feverishness, and which are
conducive to their dissolution. This not only undercuts the tendency to talk about
individual people as “good” and “right” or “evil” and “wrong,” it also undercuts
the association of good and ill consequences with such individuals. Instead, the
stress is placed on how qualities of relationship vary according to different
practices.
If ignorant misdirection of the interdependence among all things is the root of
suffering or trouble, then relational rejection or contraction—the “natural”
outcome of fear and of tragically unanticipated and uncontrollable turn of events
for the worse—is a particularly egregious mistake. It amounts to a hardening of
the trunk and branches of suffering—the consolidation of rigid and habitual
patterns of attention and relationship. Securing our own existence, to the extent
that it succeeds, blocks skillfully activating the emptiness or mutual relevance of
all things to redirect situational meaning in a more liberating way.
Closing borders—personal or national—fosters conditions for continued and
intensifying trouble/suffering. Importantly, this is true even if it leads to apparent
victory. Mounting a “war on terrorism” that aims to destroy the individual people,
groups, and national bodies constituting a global “axis of evil” is eventually
counterproductive. Setting up stark oppositions between “enemy” practices and
peoples and our own may be appealing in many ways; it may help galvanize
support for particular political and military agendas. But such oppositions finally
generate only more anger, confusion, and despair. Their ultimate fruit is not truly
sustainable peace, but rather still more intense and extensive conflict.
A Buddhist alternative
The general outlines of a Buddhist alternative can be sketched by looking at the
core Buddhist practices associated with cultivating wisdom, attentive virtuosity,
and moral clarity.
Broadly speaking, Buddhist wisdom consists of skillful insight into how things
have come to be as they have, and implies a keenly attuned capacity for revising
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the meaning of situations that have gone astray. Among the teachings most closely
associated with cultivating wisdom in virtually all Buddhist traditions is the
teaching of the three marks: for the purpose of dissolving the conditions of
suffering, one should see all things as troubled, impermanent, and without any
abiding self or essence.
Although it is often represented as “deconstructive” in nature, the teaching of the
three marks is carefully phrased as an injunction to practices that bring about pro-
foundly constructive insights, especially when undertaken systematically. For our
present purposes, perhaps the most crucial is the realization that no situation—
regardless of how hopelessly conflicted it appears to be—is finally intractable.
Indeed, seeing all things as impermanent is to see that change is always, already
taking place. The question is not whether change is possible, but in what direction
should it proceed? Because there are no such things as permanent selves or
essences, all situations are open to meaningful revision or redirection. Finally, see-
ing all things as troubled is to resist the tendency to believe that if things are okay
for me or for us, then they must be okay for everyone. It is also an exercise in refus-
ing to see the end of conflict as a state of affairs arrived at once-and-for-all.
Dissolving the conditions of suffering or conflict is not a one-time affair, but an
ongoing, always improvised activity. Thus, especially in the Mahayana Buddhist
traditions in which a strongly social sensibility is expressed, wisdom is associated
with the development of unlimited upaya or skillful means.
From the foregoing, it should be clear that Buddhist wisdom rests on a capac-
ity for increasingly flexible and subtly attuned responsiveness. Training for
insight into the interdependence of all things has thus always been strongly
associated with meditative discipline or attention training. At times—as in the
Chan Buddhist tradition—they have even been claimed inseparable. In much the
same way that stretching and yoga are most effective in developing a supple body
when practiced intensely and with unwavering commitment, Buddhist meditation
and attention training are said to build a capacity for clearly focused and concen-
trated awareness that results in supple and finely attuned qualities of relationship.
That is, meditative discipline and attention training undermine the habit
formations that constrain our capacity for situational response, while at the same
time building a capacity for situational attunement.
Attention implies attending or a capacity for caring response to the needs of the
situation. Indeed, because consciousness is understood in Buddhist terms as a
quality of relationship between a sensing being and a sensed environment—and
not, that is, as a property of an individual organism—meditative discipline and
attention training are best understood as directed toward the realization of
relational virtuosity. Thus, truly enlightening beings are said to demonstrate
unlimited skill-in-means in responding to the needs of the situations in which
they find themselves. To return to the metaphor of the neglected city of interde-
pendence overgrown by dense forest, attentive virtuosity clears the great highways
connecting the city with all other parts of the realm: the four “immeasurables” of
compassion, loving kindness, equanimity, and joy in the good fortune of others.15
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A capacity for flexible and profoundly attuned attention is, of course, no
guarantee of being able to respond to a given situation in such a way that the
conflicts and suffering that trouble it are fully resolved. Even with a detailed
understanding of how things have come to be as they have, it is often not clear in
which direction things must move in order to meaningfully resolve the trouble or
suffering they evidence. This is especially true when the “problem” is not choosing
between something “good” and something “bad,” but rather among a complex
array of functionally competing “goods.” In the absence of moral clarity, even the
most keenly attuned person may fail to respond when and as needed.
This is true because the world in which we find ourselves as sentient beings is
shaped by karma. Moral clarity arises with skillful appreciation of the meticulous
consonance between our values–intentions–actions and the topography of our
lived experience. According to the Buddhist teaching of karma, every event is at
once an outcome and an opportunity—both a specific consequence of prior value-
laden, intentional activity and an occasion for creatively revising the meaning of
the situation in which we find ourselves. Although the signal practice associated
with moral clarity is the making and keeping of vows, it is clear—particularly in
Mahayana Buddhist sutras—that, far from constraining relational capacity, vows
serve to consolidate our potential for relational virtuosity. Vows mark the realization
of unwavering dramatic commitment—an unshakeable sense of direction without
which dramatic or moral innovation is effectively blind. Moral clarity is the basis
of any fully sustained revision of the meaning of our situation, especially those
that would redirect it from further experiences of crisis and conflict toward their
continuous and creative resolution.
The general Buddhist pattern of skillfully responding to trouble—be it an
unanticipated crisis or an all-too-familiar chronic difficulty—can be seen as a
systematic relinquishing of our present horizons for relevance, responsibility, and
readiness, whatever these may be. More positively phrased, it consists of devel-
oping the kind of appreciative and contributory virtuosity needed in order to fully
accord with our situation, and respond to it as needed to orient its further dynamics
away from samsara to nirvana: from trouble and suffering toward their ongoing
and meaningful resolution. This is not a transition from a deplorable or troubling
state of affairs to one that is desirable and free of trouble—a transition from a hell
to a heaven. Rather, it is an active and necessarily improvised process of
continuously and skillfully reorienting the pattern of relationships in which we
find ourselves. Buddhist liberation does not mean being free, but relating freely.
Some specific implications
This suggests a major difference between Buddhist responses to terrorism and
those that recently have dominated especially American public discourse. Made
tragically aware of its vulnerability, the dominant public response by the United
States has been increasing security measures and turning to preemptive violence
as a means of averting future acts of terrorist violence. The karma of this response
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centers on control as a primary value, improved security as a root intention, and
assertions of power as an overarching mode of action. It is a karma that involves
denying truth to any view that does not coincide with America’s own; adopting a
basically oppositional stance toward others (“you are either with us or against
us”); and identifying evil and ill with particular people or peoples and their
beliefs and practices rather than with qualities and directions of interdependence.
According to the Buddha’s analysis of the causes and conditions of conflict and
violence, it is a karma that will have conflicted and violent outcomes and that will
prove most opportune, not for initiating the infinite play of peace-making, but for
carrying on an interminable series of finite campaigns to establish ever greater
control and security—campaigns that will prove America’s power while sapping
it of the strengths needed for relating freely with others.
Responding to violence with violence—like fighting fire with fire—a strategy
that will work (if at all) only so long as the sources or causes of violence can be
identified clearly, isolated, and contained by executing a controlled “burn” that
makes it impossible for the sources of violence to draw in new “fuel”—new arms,
new recruits, and new rationales for infecting the world with terror.
Unfortunately, in the case of combating global terrorism, these “burns” take place
in the midst of the general public, starkly dividing the public sphere into those
who are “with us” and those who are “against us” by sacrificing whoever or
whatever might lie in-between. Although the US government has not tracked
civilian casualties of its “war on terror,” a reasonable estimate is that in Iraq alone,
somewhere around 100,000 non-combatant men, women, and children have been
sacrificed in the name of bringing peace and democracy to their country and
destroying its capacity for sponsoring global terrorism.16 The numbers of Iraqis
who have been maimed and left homeless are, of course, much higher. The parents,
sons and daughters of these “uncounted” casualties, if they are not already
inflamed, can be counted with a high degree of certainty to be easily ignited.
America’s control, security and preemptive violence based strategy for winning
the “war on terror” is generating the conditions of its own necessity.
In a world in which change and novelty are ineradicable, the increasing exercise
of control must, at some scale, correspond with increasing ignorance of our
situation and its meaning, as a whole. Control promotes experiential solipsism, a
self-justifying closed-mindedness without which it would become quite apparent
that controlling our experiential circumstances not only subjects others to control,
but ourselves as well. Since control cannot truly be shared, its successful exercise
depends on being able to keep the playing field as much out of level as possible
and sloped to our own advantage. Alas, the steeper the slope of the playing field,
the harder it is to negotiate or exit. Control becomes not just increasingly
possible, but necessary, just to keep from falling.
Against the immediate “goods” offered by a strategy of control, Buddhism
recommends the karmically sustainable strategy of developing appreciative and
contributory virtuosity. If appreciation is taken to mean both sympathetic
understanding and a process of increasing value, the better we get at appreciating
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our situation, the more fully we will find ourselves attuned with it and the more
valuably we will find ourselves situated. The better we get at contributing to our
situation, the more we will find ourselves in a position to contribute to it. This,
however, can only be possible if we effectively have more and more to contribute.
Contribution is, in this sense, self-enriching or strengthening. And since contri-
bution pivots on making a meaningful difference—not simply doing anything at
all under the circumstances—as contributory karma matures, we find ourselves
increasingly in a position to make a meaningful difference.
The challenge of the Buddhist alternative is that it requires exercising the sort
of courage needed to more fully understand and value the perspective of the
terrorist—at least to the point of being able to contribute to their circumstances
in ways that they themselves appreciate and value. This is not a matter of giving
“the enemy” what they want. It is a matter of cutting through the pattern among
our horizons of relevance, responsibility, and readiness that opposes them to us
and leads both sides of the opposition to identify the other as “the enemy.” It is
the challenge of finding truly shared common ground.
There is no simple prescription for how to do this. It is a process that must be
improvised, on the spot, in full awareness of all the unique specificities of
the moment. At the same time, the general principle holds that any sustainable
approach to establishing truly common ground will, at least from a Buddhist
perspective, involve shared insight into our shared realities and, because of this,
our shared responsibilities. This insight is inseparable from a recognition and
acceptance of intimacy. Sharing responsibility is to share in shaping what things
are and will mean. But granted the interdependent origins and sustenance of all
things, engaging in the shared shaping of what things will be and mean is to
commit to our own shared becoming.
This should not, however, be imagined as taking the form of an assimilation of
one party to the other. A major shortcoming of the softer side of the public
response to terrorism has been to offer, for example, aid and assistance that is not
desired, that leaves “us” unchanged, and that expressly disregards differences that
truly make a difference. Such so-called contributions aim to promote others’
welfare by eliminating their differences from us. But “helping” others to become
“like us” blatantly and shamelessly ignores the reality that our mutual opposition
is rooted in the fact that they neither like us nor want to be changed so that they
can be liked by us. No truly meaningful and sustainable solution can be based on
insisting that we are all the same or all equal. The first is a patent falsehood and
the second an appealing fiction, but only that.
Any viable solution must, in short, not only respect diversity, but further
enhance it. Enhancing diversity is not compatible with efforts to promote
tolerance or to establish the grounds of secure co-existence. Diversity can only be
enhanced by realizing patterns of complexly meaningful interdependence
oriented so that each member of a situation is not only capable-of, but also com-
mitted-to contributing to the welfare of all others. A basic condition of enhancing
diversity, then, is exercising the kind of creativity needed to insure that no
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member of a situation is seen as being without anything valuable to offer. Yet,
even creative support must be mutual if it is not to be ultimately impoverishing.
Taking the attitude of the “teacher culture” or the “global peacekeeper” is to arro-
gantly refuse participation in the realization of diversity, and that is to impoverish
who we are and what we are capable of meaning to and for others.
A further challenge of the Buddhist perspective is that the teaching of karma
enjoins realizing that the realities of global terror and the tragedies resulting from
it cannot be dissociated from our own values–intentions–actions. The Buddhist
teaching of karma does not insist that those victimized by terrorism or impover-
ished by global markets deserve this as their payback for ills previously committed.
Karma is not a function or expression of moral bookkeeping. Neither does the
Buddhist teaching of karma suggest seeing that all that happens to and around us
is predetermined—a function of destiny or fate. Even less so, of course, does it
legitimize appealing to chance in explaining how things have come to be as they
have come to be. We are not determined by our karma. On the contrary, the
operation of karma insures that we are given opportunity—again and again,
without fail—to alter how and why we do things as we do, and thus how and what
we experience together. Karma insures that we are always in a position to revise
the meaning of the situations and events into which we find ourselves drawn. In
a literal sense, there are no such things as tragedies because there is no entirely
objective set of causes or any transcendentally scripted fate to which we are
hopelessly subject. The Buddhist cosmos is not one created at some distant
moment in the past and playing out inexorably ever since; it is being continuously
co-created, moment by dramatic moment.
For those who have experienced tragedy in association acts of terrorism, enter-
taining the truth of such co-creativity is likely to afford very little in the way of
solace. It will not return the dead among the living. Yet, it is basic to healing—
and not merely salving—the wound of existence. Whether it is by terrorists,
counter-insurgency forces, global markets, autocratic leaders or social institutions
that privilege according to gender or skin tone or religious affiliations, being
victimized is wrong. It is evidence of interdependence having gone seriously
awry. Barring a deep appreciation of and insight into karma, it is easy to think that
the wrong we have suffered should be righted. It is easy to believe that it is both
right and our right to seek and perhaps even celebrate retribution. In a world of
distinct causes and effects, where events are determined by clearly defined
“inputs” or “influences,” the mechanics of blame would mirror the structure of
responsibility already present and given in the world. But, in a world that arises
through horizonless patterns of mutual conditioning or interdependence, identi-
fying who or what is to blame or who deserves what payment for either suffering
ills perpetrated or for perpetrating them is to fall into the kind of oppositional
thinking that perpetuates rather than mitigates trouble and suffering. Retribution
is not a viable Buddhist option.
Retributive justice reflects the general strategy of exercising control over our
circumstances and over the possibility of particular experiences within them to
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determine a final outcome. For all its appeal, it cannot open significant new
opportunities for reframing the meaning of our shared situation. If time and
attention lost in compelled consumption of global market commodities can never
be regained, how much less can the loss of loved ones to violence be repaid?
Vengeance alleviates neither tragedy nor vulnerability. There is no compensation
for a life sacrificed. Imagining that there is constitutes a self-inflicted form of
defeat which is itself liable to initiating yet another turning of the wheel of con-
flict and violence. Retribution is a strategy that in karmic terms can only result in
moral devolution—a strategy that, in actuality, blocks possibilities for engaging
tragedy with real strength. Seeking retribution—either in lives or means of
livelihood—for the hundreds of thousands of parents, sons and daughters already
sacrificed in these first years of the twenty-first century to either creating or
combating terror is to turn aside from the much more difficult and yet infinitely
more promising work of insuring that each of these lost lives becomes a turning
point in our global patterns of interdependence.
It is one of the peculiarities of a karmic cosmos that there is not ultimately any
chance of “getting even.” Doing unto others as they have done unto us or extracting
payment from them after the fact can only lead to escalating a pattern of interaction
that we already know to be troubling and conducive to suffering. To be sure,
protecting ourselves, our families and our communities is necessary. The karmic
issue is not whether one does so, but how and why, with what values–intentions–
actions. The very difficult task facing us is to commit to a strategy of mutual
protection in which we go more deeply into the tragedies already inflicted by
global terrorism and our responses to it, and discover ways through them to insur-
ing that no further “sacrifices” will be necessary, that no more beloved innocents
will need to be laid out to build the bridges needed for meaningfully revising our
relationships with those who have become our “opponents.” The classical tragic
hero was represented as being sacrificed to the end of restoring cosmic balance.
Present day tragic heroes—hundreds of thousands of them around the world—are
perhaps better seen as having been offered up to the end of revising our situation
in such a way as to realize truly liberating environments in which each and all are
enabled to relate freely.
These environments will not and, indeed, could never be characterized by
lasting equilibrium. Liberation is not a destination; it is a direction. There is no
once-and-for-all solution to the problem of global terrorism. Indeed, global
terrorism is, at bottom, not a problem at all; it is a predicament. The persistence
of global terror signals our failure, thus far, to develop appropriate kinds and
qualities of coordinative and liberating resolve. Addressing this failure requires
deepening intimacy with our situations and with one another. It means increasing
our capabilities for appreciating differences—a process that is inseparable from
developing and demonstrating contributory commitment. Resolving the predica-
ments driving global terrorism requires working through our vulnerability to a
resolute virtuosity born of wisdom, attentive mastery, and moral clarity, in ways
that open up further opportunity for still greater virtuosity.
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Concluding remarks
At the most general level, Buddhist responses to terror and tragedy proceed from the
realization that all states-of-affairs and fixed identities are either convenient fictions
or functions of thoughtless ignorance. Any sustainable corrective to the arising of ter-
ror and tragedy must grow out of a commitment to revising the quality and meaning
of relationships—our individual and communal patterns of interdependence.
But what specifically does this mean? What would a Buddhist answer have
been to the presumed threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction? What is a
Buddhist response to a continued nuclear program in North Korea or Iran, or the
rise of anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world and the widely professed
sympathy there for acts of terror against the US? Admissions of co-responsibility
for the conditions that have precipitated such sentiments are, perhaps, all well and
good. But what concrete steps can be taken to safeguard our way of life and the
lives of our children? Yes, we should not respond to terrorism and tragedy out
of ignorance, habit formations, and craving desires. Yes, we should cultivate
wisdom, attentive mastery, and moral clarity to insure that we respond with
virtuosity in whatever situations we find ourselves. But what use are such ethical
generalities when confronted with defiance and belligerence, or with values so far
from and contrary to our own that reconciliation seems flatly impossible?
There can be no prescriptive answers to such questions. Or rather, prescriptive
answers are possible, but they will not prove to be both skillful and sustainable.
In a world characterized by impermanence, emptiness, and interdependence, any
skillful and sustainable responses to conflict, violence and terror must emerge
from within our present situation, as it has come to be, in real time and with
currently available resources. Abstractly derived solutions or responses will only
solve or address abstract problems and eventualities—not those directly
confronting us. In a world of irreducibly dynamic and dramatic interdependence,
it is possible to prescriptively recommend the avoidance of particular strategies,
on the basis of the karma informing them. It is possible to identify, in advance, what
will not work. But there is no similar possibility of asserting—with certainty and
concrete specificity—what will work.
It is often believed that in spite of such uncertainties, we must nevertheless do
something. We must act, one way or another, and the more decisively the better.
There is some truth to this. We actually do not have the option of not acting at all.
Even refraining from overt response is a response, an action undertaken on the
basis of some values and intentions. Inaction, too, is the making of karma. And it
is surely better to respond with immediacy rather than after the interruption of
drawn out deliberations that allow the situation we hope to address to change in
ways that our deliberations keep us from attending. But interventions undertaken
on doubtful bases cannot be expected result in resolutely focused opportunity or
deepening virtuosity.
Buddhist practice entails working through doubt, not around or in spite of it.
Acknowledging our present lack of clarity about what will redirect our global
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interdependence to dissolve the conditions of persistent and expanding global
terrorism is crucial in freeing us, in our present situations, to do those things
about which we have no doubt. In practicing Buddhism, the default position when
we are confronted with a predicament—when we do not know what is best, under
the circumstances, as a response to a troubling situation where competing goods
are in play—is not to wait, or to deliberate further, but to undertake more inten-
sive training for virtuosity. Much as the basic training for different sports or arts
often bears little direct resemblance to the final expression of athletic or aesthetic
virtuosity, training for appreciative and contributory virtuosity may seem
strangely distant from the relational dynamics of situations to which we must
eventually respond. But this does not diminish the effectiveness of such training
and its practical necessity.
From a more specifically Buddhist perspective, it is also the case that the more
insight we have into the karma of our situation—that is, how it has come to be,
precisely as it has come to be—then the better prepared we are to respond
skillfully, when and as opportunity arises. This requires a deepened and
broadened historical perspective and growing dramatic acuity—greater sensitiv-
ity to the dispositional or directive play of values, meanings, and intentions in the
complex course of events. In combination, then, what we can begin immediately
to cultivate are more fully and finely attuned attentive and responsive capabilities
in combination with expanded dramatic horizons and historical sensibilities. In a
word, we can deepen and extend our education to the end of realizing appreciative
and contributory virtuosity. Indeed, for the purpose of reorienting global
interdependence, nothing is perhaps so vitally important.




Education plays a crucial role in conserving and enhancing the public good. From
all available historical evidence, it would seem that this is a perennial and virtually
universal conviction. The precise nature of education’s role in the realization of
public good, however, has been—and continues to be—subject to considerable
controversy.
At present, a wide range of views on the meaning and function of education are
being actively translated into concrete educational practices and institutions, both
formally and informally. Some of these views are grounded on the most up-to-date
research in learning and social theory; others are rooted in millennia old cultural
traditions; still others are almost brazenly aligned with contemporary political,
religious, or ethnic ideologies. Given the intimate linkage between the meaning of
education and the meaning of becoming whole and fully functioning persons-in-
community, this wide—and often quite deep—variation is perhaps to be expected
and even cautiously applauded.
Education is not only crucial, however, in shaping relationships within
communities, but also in shaping the complex interrelationships among them. In
the present era of profound and rapidly changing patterns of globalization, this
has important implications. If the twenty-first century can rightly be called the
“century of interdependence,” it is a century almost surely destined to continu-
ously challenge educational aims and assumptions. At the very least, progressive
global interdependence accentuates the precedents for consolidating tolerance
and mutual respect among both individuals and communities with disparate
social, political, economic, cultural, and spiritual heritages. Global interdepen-
dence practically commands, for example, that teaching “our history” be construed
in increasingly broad and accommodating ways. But, as has been argued with
respect to a range of issues bearing on public good from the environment to inter-
national relations, complex global interdependence is also generating deepening
imperatives to move beyond tolerance or the accommodation of plural perspec-
tives to the realization of robust and abiding diversity. Education, in other words,
is poised to become key in fostering the conditions under which increasing inter-
relatedness builds contributory capacity for all in service of realizing sustainable,
free, and equitable mutuality.
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Ironically, just as education is being globally pressed toward center stage, it is
also being pressed into wide-ranging crises of competence. Never before has edu-
cation seemed to be so poorly equipped for living up to its promises with respect
to public good. Differences in the assumed meaning and function of education
insure that the perceived crisis differs from locale to locale. The issues of equity
and exclusion that dominate discussions of educational malaise in many develop-
ing countries appear marginally, if at all, as critical concerns in the most highly
developed societies. There, attention may center on a crippling mismatch among
teaching methods, school curricula, and the shifting needs of the employment
marketplace. In some locales, building the necessary material and professional
infrastructure to make universal access to secondary school education a func-
tional reality is a major challenge. In other locales, retaining students through
high school graduation is proving remarkably difficult, with some cities in the
United States for example, experiencing dropout rates of up to 40%.
What is most remarkable is not the sheer range of crises that presently or will
soon afflict education worldwide, but the fact that a sense of crisis characterizes
the full spectrum of educational systems and scales. While the specific difficul-
ties vary, there is a common experience of education having come to a point that
the limitations of existing models can no longer be denied or discounted.
Although incremental changes in educational methods and aims continue to be
implemented, in some cases successfully, there is a growing recognition that such
changes will not be enough.
Over the past century, a groundswell of paradigmatic shifts has taken place,
especially and most obviously in technology and science, but also in politics, eco-
nomics, social institutions, and the expression of cultural values. And there is
every indication that conditions continue to be ripe for further, quite fundamental
and inherently indeterminate or unpredictable shifts across the full range of
human endeavor. Yet, to date, education has escaped such radical, paradigmatic
transformation. Educational change has been both piecemeal and incremental—
reforms aimed at correcting for failures in delivering long-standing educational
goods rather than systematic departures from prevailing presuppositions about
the meaning and function of education.
The past century has also been characterized by powerful tendencies toward
global institutional convergence—in banking and financial management, for
instance—as well as toward the tacit consensus on basic norms that is needed to
realize such convergence across national, ethnic, and cultural boundaries. These
tendencies have, in many ways, been hallmarks of the distinctive postmodern
realities broadly captured by the term “globalization.” As a premier institution in
all societies, education has not been exempt from these tendencies. In spite of
tremendous historical and global variation in educational aims and practices,
there is now a remarkably consistent grounding of education in three interrelated
foci of norms and practices. These are: the effective dissemination of information
or knowledge; the transmission of specific, circumstantially useful skills; and,
principle-structured character development and socialization.1 In Buddhist terms,
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these foci and the patterns of values–intentions–actions underlying them can be
seen as expressing a broad karmic paradigm, in accordance with which educa-
tional systems are disposed toward generating similar patterns of outcomes and
opportunities. It is this paradigm that is in deepening crisis.
In very broad terms, it is a paradigm that orients education toward engendering
individual and collective competencies that embody highly context-dependent abil-
ities to take part in reproducing (and incrementally extending) contemporary norms
and practices. It is not, in other words, a paradigm oriented toward engendering vir-
tuosity with respect to improvising context-revising, anticipatory norms and prac-
tices. Yet, it would seem that it is precisely the latter paradigm that would best
answer emerging social, political, economic, and cultural realities—a paradigm that
does not center on conserving and modestly extending abilities to fit into antici-
pated social, political, economic and cultural conditions, but rather on cultivating
the complex virtuosity required to skillfully accommodate conditions that could not
have been anticipated. Education in this sense would serve to innovatively enhance
personal and communal capacities for innovation. It would serve, that is, as a
creatively evolving driver for changing the means and meaning of change.
Here, I will be considering what distinctive light Buddhism can shed on the
prospects for changing our dominant educational karma along these lines to
better respond to the complex range of crises besetting education worldwide.
Buddhist teachings and practices afford systematic resources for re-conceiving
the meaning and function of education, coordinating a shift from the centrality of
competence to that of virtuosity, in ways that would contribute to enhancing
diversity globally.
The imperative: global interdependence,
as it has come to be
Education serves both conservative and creative ends. On one hand, education
serves to transmit historically embedded patterns of understanding and practice.
Or, put somewhat differently, it conserves the particular traditions through which
peoples shape their often complex and distinctive identities. On the other hand,
education provides resources and insights relevant to adaptively responding to
changing circumstances.2 In practice, education both transmits and transforms
understanding and practice.
This suggests that educational depth and development will be greatest at the
margins of cultural and social equilibrium—that is, at their growing or leading
edge. Where social, political, and economic conditions remain relatively stable,
the imperatives and opportunities for developing new approaches to meeting both
conservative and creative educational ends will be correspondingly minimal.
Conversely, however, where such conditions are undergoing rapid alteration—as
they are today—maintaining or only slightly modifying existing educational insti-




The rate and scales of changes currently taking place across the full spectrum
of lifeworld domains are at an historical peak and still accelerating. And, because
change is taking place in such a way as to deepen links across a wide range of
domains and scales, it is increasingly complex.3 That is, present day rates, pat-
terns, and scales of change are bringing about systems of relational transforma-
tion that are distinctive in two important ways. First, they are systems that do not
simply aggregate the characteristics of previously existing relational systems.
Indeed, they are systems marking the appearance of novel characteristics or
behaviors—systems that are greater (or, at least, significantly other) than the
sum of their component parts. Secondly, they are systems for which history
makes a difference. Rather than behaving in identical fashions over time, they
are systems that evolve new characteristics and behaviors, incorporating the
effects of past behaviors into their own futures in terms consistent with sustained
systemic values.
Taken together, these attributes of contemporary change insure that there is—
and will continue to be—considerable indeterminacy and non-linearity in the
nature and direction of change. That is, we will continue finding ourselves faced
with situations that, in very significant ways, could not have been anticipated.4 In
spite of increasingly detailed modeling of present conditions and the most likely
trajectories of their further development, the meaning of change is, and will
remain, open to continuous revision. In part due to their greater interdependence,
systems of interaction that previously were not conditioned directly or intensively
by values and intentions are now subject to increasing influence by them. In
Buddhist terms, these systems are ramifying karmically.
In the context of such rapid and value-inflected change, there can be no
possibility of effectively addressing the crises confronting education through
either piecemeal or strategically fixed reforms. Neither can there be any reason-
able hope of discovering any one-size-fits-all or once-and-for-all approaches to
educational change. Needed instead, are diverse and responsive trajectories of
innovation that go beyond summarily reconsidering and revising what is taught
and how—educational content and methodology—to continuously and harmo-
niously extending and deepening the overall purposes or meanings of education.
This imperative follows from the fact that keeping apace with the rates and
depths of changes taking place outside the education sector in political, economic,
social, and cultural systems entails continuous attunement to paradigmatic, mean-
ing-generated and meaning-generating transformations of those systems. In such
a context of transformation, education increasingly becomes both situationally
reflexive and ethically charged. That is, it assumes rapidly compounding, direc-
tional salience. In effect, education is being poised to serve as an amplifying
nexus of both feedback and feedforward processes by means of which communi-
ties (at scales from the local to the global) actively sustain and revise the patterns
of values and intentions shaping their own development. While it has long been
recognized that there are significant social, economic, political and cultural drivers
for educational change, it must now be recognized that growing interdependence
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consolidates potentials for education itself to serve as a driver of social, economic,
political and cultural transformation.
Looking more closely at these processes and their structural dynamics will help
to refine our intuitions regarding the kind of paradigm shift needed if education
is to assume a vibrant role in sustainably directing global interdependence toward
greater equity and diversity.
Changes in development dynamics
In a world where basic economic, political, and social infrastructure changes at a
pace slower than the rate of generational transition, it is possible—and arguably
sensible—to educate local and national populations to participate effectively in
the workplace by providing them with basic information and skills. But when
important changes in infrastructure are already taking place several times in any
given generation and still accelerating, this is no longer feasible or acceptable
even as an ideal. Bluntly stated, school curricula and resources (textbooks, lesson
plans, etc.) cannot change fast enough to keep up with the complexion of the end
“market” for an educated public. It is impossible to train a population to enter
the workplace when the needs of the workplace and competence within it alter
fundamentally, perhaps several times, over the course of such training.
For nations well advanced in terms of educational infrastructure, a typical
response has been to hold onto workforce preparation as a primary aim of educa-
tion and, by way of concession to current rates of change, to accept the need for
“lifelong instruction.” For such nations, it is believed necessary to first and fore-
most grapple with the economic implications of this need. The recent General
Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) implicitly offers one strategy for doing
so, institutionally opening a space to experiment globally with educational priva-
tization as a potential answer to the demands of lifelong instruction. There are,
however, very real and concrete worries about for-profit education and its impulse
toward increasing market density—in particular, worries about creating educa-
tional stratifications and niches that work against building skills relevant to
highly complex and newly interdependent industries and service sectors. A pop-
ulation of lifelong consumers of ever-changing educational commodities is
not the same as a community of lifelong learners capable-of and committed-to
adaptive inquiry and creativity of response.
Moreover, granted the necessary institutional periphery that must be maintained
for the privatization of education to be successful in its own (essentially) eco-
nomic terms, serious questions arise as to its sustainability as a strategy for
achieving truly equitable interdependence. After all, global competition for
educational contracts implies the presence of globally institutionalized standards
that must—for obvious reasons—be legally fixed, and thus unresponsive to both
local conditions and rates of change. For nations still lacking universal primary
and secondary education and thus suffering from the developmental sluggishness
typically occasioned by this lack, the situation is even more complex and dire. For
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them, global privatization of education threatens to further institutionalize already
galling inequity.
So-called developing nations are not alone in confronting the gap between
educational aims and realities. The Japanese educational system, once praised for
its ability to deliver the intangible, systemic goods needed for a population to
excel in the late-industrial world economy, has over the past two decades come
under mounting criticism for its inability to foster profitable levels and types of
creativity. In the post-industrial world—centered economically on the commodi-
fication of information and the consolidation and control of conceptual capital—
knowledge implementation (a forte of the Japanese education system) becomes
increasingly subordinate to knowledge generation. Engineering solutions ironically
yield to innovative problem formulations as the vanguard of forces accelerating
economic growth. In the context of a fully post-industrial economy, without
a continuous generation of new problems, growth is functionally arrested. With the
consolidation of truly complex and recursively structured markets, this means
that economically viable solutions to existing problems will at the same time
occasion the emergence of new kinds of problems—ultimately, problem complexes
characterized by contrary patterns of valuation. As we will see, this has crucial
importance for the function and meaning of education.
Until fairly recently, American education programs—especially at the tertiary
and post-tertiary levels—have been seen as particularly well adapted to the dynam-
ics of post-industrial development. Values central to the complexion of American
national identity, including a stress on autonomous decision-making, critical think-
ing, competitive genius, and individualism accorded well with key developmental
imperatives to maximize market density, to commodify basic subsistence goods
and services, and to systematically translate diversity into variety. In short,
American education functioned well in promoting precisely the intellectual
freedoms and social dynamics associated with problematizing the familiar and
accepted order of things. Not surprisingly, just as the American economy boomed
and became a benchmark for global developmental health and vitality, American
education came to set a de facto global standard for education, especially at the
tertiary level. To date, with few exceptions, doctorates earned at American
institutions continue to be considered unsurpassed marks of creative promise.
Yet, the ironic nature of this excellence is making itself increasingly manifest
and it is perhaps in America that the karmic liabilities of the dominant paradigm
of education are most readily recognized. With the transition from an interna-
tionally quilted, post-industrial economy into a virtually seamless global system
based on the commodification of attention and the exertion of control over the
production of meaning, American “cutting edge” education has started to show
signs of dulling. As preparation for full and creative participation in today’s
highly complex and interdependent world, American education is increasingly
both inefficient and ineffective or incomplete. This is now manifestly so in
the primary and secondary sectors, but is also becoming evident at tertiary and
post-tertiary levels as well.5
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The consolidation and carefully channeled acceleration of information flows
were basic to organizing and driving economic activity of varied scales and
orientations in the discretely knitted domains of post-industrial economics. To a
considerable extent, control over information, its contextual transmutation into
efficacious knowledge, and its technological deployment in both production and
service industries were definitive and determinative of post-industrial patterns of
developmental excellence. But in the emerging, complexly relativistic space of
the new “attention economy,” this is no longer the case. While control over the
conditions of knowledge generation and dissemination are still important, it is
now skill in creating and sustaining the conditions for shared meaning-making
that has ultimate precedence. Increasingly, ethical issues and value judgments are
coming to the fore as key factors in sustainable patterns of development—issues
and judgments of the sort that are crucial in negotiating through differences
to secure meaningfully shared common ground and the possibility of equitably
harmonized growth trajectories.
In the context of a maturing attention economy, it is possible to state as a general
rule that: whenever the economic viability of problem solutions becomes tied to the
generation of new problem complexes that are characterized by contrary patterns of
valuation, economic growth will come to be tied to the emergence of increasingly
broad and profound predicaments. In post-industrial economic language, this phe-
nomenon is simplified as the tendency for problem solutions to become increas-
ingly colored by apparently ineradicable trade-offs. But this language obscures the
complex dynamics of contemporary patterns of economic development and social
change by tacitly denying any difference in kind between a given solution and the
“trade-offs” it triggers. Beyond a certain threshold of interdependence—especially
interdependence among sectors and normative systems that previously enjoyed
relatively high degrees of autonomy—this is no longer tenable. Instead, the
“trade-offs” associated with any given solution express complex conflicts among
significantly differing goods and interests, across a range of types and scales.
Thus, as attention and meaning supplant information and knowledge as the key
resources of the global economy, fundamentally quantitative approaches to sus-
tainably linking economic and political activities give way to necessarily qualita-
tive approaches suited to grappling with irreducibly normative issues. It is no
longer simply questions of how much production and consumption are feasible
that must be effectively and fairly answered, but questions about the sustainabil-
ity of a complex range of social, political, and economic ecologies in the face of
emerging production and consumption regimes. At bottom, and for reasons that
we will explore in the next section, answering such questions finally depends on
seeing how the problem complexes and predicaments generated by the new con-
ditions for economic growth—including the mass production and consumption of
meaning commodities—actually affect our shared lifeworld and, in particular, the
depth and diversity of our attentive resources. It is in the context of these specific
changes that the full meaning of bringing about paradigmatic educational change
can begin to be articulated.
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Turning point: from problem solving to 
predicament resolution
In the Buddhist canon, the single most widely noted condition leading to suffering
or trouble is ignorance—in particular, ignorance of the interdependence and empti-
ness of all things. On the basis of ignorance arise dramatically ramifying habit for-
mations and clinging desires, and from these follow specific situational blockages
or relational impasses—experiences of being incapable of relating freely.
This generic account of the origins of trouble or suffering is presented, especially
in the earliest strata of Buddhist teachings, as an account that is plausible, but one
that must be verified personally—most commonly through the practice of mindful-
ness and insight meditation. These practices make evident the dynamically rela-
tional nature of all things, including trouble and suffering and their root conditions
of ignorance, habit formations, and clinging desires. A crucial realization following
from this is that ignorance is itself never generic. Ignorance is always mine, or
yours, or ours. It is arising here and now, as a function of how things have come to
be, as they have come to be, in reflection of consistently maintained patterns of
value–intention–action (karma) that inform what we take things to be and how we
relate to and with them, powerfully limiting our resources and readiness for appre-
ciating and skillfully participating in the interdependence of all things. Sustainably
resolving suffering and trouble is inseparable from revising karma—mine, yours,
and ours.6
Put somewhat differently, trouble and suffering are ultimately the fruit of
unresolved predicaments—that is, conflicts among competing goods and inter-
ests; the coming together of contrary (and often contradictory) patterns of values,
intentions, and practices. This is perhaps easiest to see in the context of intimate
relationships—in romantic liaisons, in the life of the family, in close friendships,
and in our career endeavors. But as a function of the scale and depth of global
social, economic, and political interdependence, forceful expressions of this truth
are making themselves felt in the conventional realities of contemporary life.
To take a single example, despite rising global wealth, global hunger is at an
historical peak and rising. The UN food and agriculture agency reports that in
2002, the most recent year for which data is available, some 852 million people
were chronically hungry.7 The combination of increasing global wealth and
global hunger points, at the very least, to the inequity of prevailing patterns in the
distribution of new wealth. But as the UN report also makes clear, inequities in
the distribution of wealth reflect patterns of values that ramify in complexly inter-
dependent ways politically, socially and culturally, and not just economically. It is
to these values that we must look in explaining the fact that global hunger is
growing even as there is a rise in global food surpluses. There is no food short-
age. People who go hungry do so because their suffering is considered a lesser
“cost” than that of rethinking the values and intentions presently structuring the




Advances in science and technology have yielded such extensive and precise
control over our circumstances that the key limitations on problem-solving are no
longer objective. At least with respect to the range of factual problems associated
with basic life needs, there is very little that we cannot take care of, given suffi-
cient time, money, and commitment. We can supply adequate food, clothing, shel-
ter, health care, and basic education to each and every person and community on
Earth. We can reconfigure atoms and genes, examine the soil of other planets, and
tune into galactic events that took place 13 billion years ago. We cannot keep nat-
ural disasters from striking (indeed, we may even be contributing to their rising
incidence), but we possess almost angelic capacities for minimizing resulting
death and disruption. We can speak, neither madly nor altogether dreamily, even
about putting an end to aging.
Yet there is a sobering corollary to realizing that our capacity for intervening
in natural processes in pursuit of our own interests has reached such a level of
sophistication that only time, money, and commitment apparently block us from
solving whatever factual problems lie between us and the living of decent lives by
all: the persistent elusiveness of a decent life for all must be seen as rooted ulti-
mately in the complexion of our abiding values and priorities. We have crossed a
threshold beyond which it is no longer possible, with respect to the vast majority
of conditions leading to human suffering and trouble, to claim that there is noth-
ing we can do about them. The question is no longer whether we can address these
conditions, but whether we will affirm that it is worth doing so.
In Buddhist terms, we have arrived at a point in human history where we are
forced to see that limits to relevance, responsibility, and readiness are nothing but
horizons that appear as a function of own fixed self-interests and ignorance. They
mark the scope of our attentions and commitments, not any inherent features in
the interdependence of all things. Between us and the living of decent lives by all
there lies only our own doing, our karma.
In more conventional terms: it is no longer generally the case that the most taxing
troubles or difficulties we face are fundamentally factual in nature—matters that
can be satisfactorily addressed through technical and institutional means, within the
horizons of currently prevailing norms and values. On the contrary, our troubles and
difficulties increasingly express tensions and cleavages among incompatible sets of
norms and values: a disharmony with respect to what our shared situation should
mean. In short, we find ourselves embedded in situations ineluctably shaped by
competing and often contrary goods and interests and undeniably divergent futures.
Solutions that are viable for some aspect of the situation as a whole—or for some
group or groups of stakeholders in it—intensify and/or produce problems else-
where. In studies of technological development, this phenomenon has been referred
to as the emergence of ironic consequences or revenge effects. But more generally,
it can be stated that beyond a certain threshold of situational complexity, solving a
particular problem within some agreed upon parameters for what must be deemed
relevant will entail incurring costs, manifesting beyond those parameters, which
could not have been anticipated. Under such circumstances, solutions become
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increasingly risky—matters of last resort when the costs of not responding to
particular troubles are themselves manifestly unacceptable.
As we transition out of an era when most of the troubles and difficulties facing
us could be successfully treated as problems soluble in strictly factual terms, with
little or no debate about values and meaning, the distinction between so-called
means and ends collapses. Along with this collapse come imperatives to system-
atically invert the long-standing assumption that facts can rightly be given prior-
ity over values in establishing the parameters of situationally apt response. In
Buddhist terms, the irreducibly karmic nature of our situation is making itself
unmistakable. As meaningfully emergent systems of outcomes and opportunities,
each moment, each situation, is open to revision in terms of its meaning or direction.
As problems give way to predicaments, solutions give way to resolution.
The distinction between problems/solutions and predicaments/resolutions is
crucial to critical engagement with processes of truly complex interdependence,
and has been invoked repeatedly over the course of our examination of the change
dynamics now characteristic of different public domains. Let us examine the dis-
tinction in somewhat more detail, with a focus on how discerning how the transi-
tion from problems to predicaments must factor into considerations of revising
the basic meaning and aims of education.
Problems arise when, for a variety of circumstantial reasons, existing
approaches to meeting certain needs or interests stop being effective, often
because they cannot be appropriately scaled up or scaled down. Problems center
on the failure of specific means for arriving at ends we intend to keep pursuing.
Solutions can be seen as effectively removing factual blockages in a given pattern
of situational development or meaning. They consist of either improved or
entirely new means to abiding ends. Predicaments, however, consist of situations
that are blocked or troubled by the co-presence of contrary patterns of develop-
ment or meaning. That is, predicaments announce the incompatibility of situa-
tionally relevant ends and interests. They express dramatic impasses—conflicts
about the direction of interdependence in a given situation—and are therefore not
open to solution.8 Predicaments must be openly negotiated and resolved.
As a mode of response, resolution has two distinct dimensions. It implies
detailed insight with respect relevant patterns of interdependence and their com-
plex dynamics, but also clarity of purpose or meaning. In the first sense, resolu-
tion is a function of scale and focus. This sense of the term is familiar to anyone
who has worked in photography. The degree of resolution possible in a given
photo is a function of the densities of both the recording and print media (whether
film and paper, or silicon chip and computer screen). Differences between high
and low quality media may be marginal when the photographic print is quite
small. But when printed large enough or when viewed under sufficient magnifi-
cation, the differences can be astonishing, with the higher resolution photo yielding
remarkably greater clarity and detail.
The second sense of resolution is most familiarly invoked in the popular practice
of making “New Year’s resolutions.” Clarity is implied in this sense of the term as
EDUCATING FOR VIRTUOSITY
180
well, but here it connotes directedness rather than detail. A New Year’s resolution,
at least ideally, consists of a solemn commitment to realize a particular course of
action, on the basis of clearly understood values and interests. In Buddhist terms,
this sense of resolution is most fully expressed in the taking and honoring of
vows. As such, it implies an unwavering orientation, a capacity for engaging each
and every situation in such a way that it’s change dynamics are directed as
entailed by one’s vow. And, because of the changing nature of all situations and
thus their dynamic unpredictability, resolution necessarily implies both dramatic
clarity and responsive flexibility.
In the context of a world where problems are displaced by predicaments,
heightened resolution—in both of its senses—assumes paramount importance
across the full spectrum of social, economic and political realities. These realities
and the changes taking place continuously in them, command both ever deeper
and more detailed insight into the interdependence among all things, and ever
more clarity about how to harmonize situationally complex flows of meaning.
This mandates, in turn, a concerted revision of educational aims and practices—
a paradigm shift from competency-focused forms of instruction and inquiry to a
focus on complexly realized virtuosity.
The competence trap and recessive change in education
The now dominant orientation of schools and schooling is toward fostering
broadly standardized sets of competencies in both individuals and communities,
for the purpose of furthering both private and public good. This orientation
expresses commitment to an educational paradigm suited to enabling problem-
solution in a world characterized by high normative consensus and dramatic or
moral homogeneity.9 For reasons of both effectiveness and efficiency, this has
cashed out as an approach to education systematically focused on: the dissemi-
nation/acquisition of knowledge; the transmission of specific skills, useful in
present-day and anticipated lifeworld conditions; and, principle-structured character
development or socialization.
As we have already noted, contemporary patterns of change and globalization
are rapidly pluralizing societies world-wide, eroding the dramatic and moral
homogeneities within which a competence-biased educational paradigm can be
argued to have served well both private and public good. These patterns of change
and globalization have also entailed significant convergence, especially at the
institutional level, but have not tended to result in truly robust normative consen-
sus. Indeed, it is defensible to say that the apparently successful movement in this
direction evidenced by the emergence of such institutions as internationally rati-
fied human rights conventions and environmental protocols has masked until
quite recently the reality that globalization processes have more generally been
intensifying rather than eliminating both actually and potentially divisive patterns
of association. Universalist sensibilities certainly remain important in the dis-
course on globalization, but global actualities have been characterized by the
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consolidation of normative enclaves centered on the conservation (and in some
cases, defensive creation) of particularist (religious, national, ethnic, and local)
identities. As it has been coming to be, global interdependence brings with it pro-
found imperatives and opportunities for confronting the need to take difference
seriously, and eventually for sustainably enhancing global diversity.
Educational systems that aim at fostering the acquisition of presently relevant
skills and knowledge are ill suited to meeting the imperatives and opportunities
associated with critically engaging difference and enriching global diversity.
Especially in the context of rapid and deep social, economic, political and cultural
change, the presently dominant educational paradigm is highly susceptible to
institutionalizing competency traps that will serve to erode situationally relevant
improvisational resources and compromise responsive virtuosity, effectively
intensifying frictions between available attentive and responsive resources and
actual needs.
As long as situational needs are well established and reflect continuously
abiding values and norms, an educational bias toward standard competencies is,
in fact, entirely sensible. But when situational needs are rapidly shifting and
reflect often quite complex confluences among distinct and often contrary sets of
values and norms, a focus on standard competencies can be quite counterproduc-
tive. Under such circumstances, present needs are moving targets. Because com-
petence is developed over time, this leads to a lack of immediacy in patterns of
response at both individual and communal levels. Indeed, merely “competent”
responses will tend to introduce drag in the overall pattern of situational devel-
opment. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, present needs are not mov-
ing targets with smooth and predictable trajectories. On the contrary, they are
liable to unprecedented changes of direction. In part, this is due to the complex
(and not just complicated) nature of the systems by which we now meet our
needs. But, it is also due the fact that as previously disparate individuals and com-
munities are brought into intimate and transformative interdependence our needs
are continually being shaped and reshaped by newly interacting currents of value
and meaning.
When contemporary realities compel innovating innovatively, a focus on building
specific competencies not only fails to be a sufficient educational aim, it becomes
counterproductive. Mounting dissonance between continuously changing needs
and relatively fixed educational aims and practices compromises both the con-
servative and creative functions of education. Unless resolved, this dissonance
results in conditions unfavorable to realizing truly robust diversity. The ineffi-
ciencies and frictions that manifest when existing competencies prove inadequate
for responding to the realities of accelerating, non-linear change work decisively
against the sustained appreciation of situationally revealed differences as oppor-
tunities for relational improvisation. Especially where control and autonomy
remain dominant values, experienced friction and emergence of conflict-prone
differences will tend to encourage further and ever more calculated resort to the
exercise of power as a means to better competing for what will appear to
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be increasingly scarce resources for meeting present needs. This will in turn tend
to block realizing precisely the kind of relational dynamics needed to foster the
emergence of new self-sustaining systems of meaningful and mutual contribution
to resolutely shared welfare. Competence-biased education is poorly suited to
eliciting and refining the relational capabilities required to sustain and enhance
social, economic, political, and cultural diversity. Continued commitment to it
can only result in the intensification of global educational crises.10
To the extent that education remains focused on developing specific competencies
based on determinations of present needs, educational change will not break out
of a broad pattern centered on institutional and curricular reform. Given the
accelerating and complex nature of global change, this means that educational
change will become increasingly recessive. Whatever its merits with respect to
the retention (and perhaps even accentuation) of power, it will tend to weaken
capacities for relating freely. Finally, it will fail even at sustaining current levels
of performance in terms of its primary functions: conserving traditions of under-
standing and practice through which shared identities have been historically artic-
ulated and evolved, and providing resources and insights relevant to adaptive
innovation.
Undoing the educational segregation of knowledge and wisdom
The relational capabilities and commitments required to sustain and enhance
social, economic, political and cultural diversity in an era of complex global inter-
dependence are not a focus of the dominant educational paradigm. Their absence
can be traced back to a constellation of conditions that, for a number of reasons,
is most clearly and ironically evident in the history of change in American edu-
cation.11 There are considerable ironies in this. American society is often imag-
ined as one of (if not the) most diverse on the planet. Indeed, American society
has imagined itself as founded on the principle of creating space for difference,
and while its iconic metaphor of being a “melting pot” nation suggests that the
space made for difference may not be a space of lasting difference, it is true that
in terms of ethnic, racial, and religious mix, the US population may well be
among the most varied in the world. But variety is not the same as diversity. While
American society has high potential for diversity in the robust sense we have been
stressing throughout our examination of the dynamics of the public sphere, it is a
potential that has been relatively poorly realized. At the roots of this shortcoming
are values central to the American national imaginaire as well as to the project of
modernity—values that found educational expression in a system of mass educa-
tion remarkably well-suited to fostering instrumental creativity, but at the substantial
exclusion of relational refinement and maturity as educational aims.
The biasing of mass education toward knowledge transmission, market-relevant
skill acquisition, and problem-solving was not without precedent. It reflected a
distinction made very early in Western thought and maintained throughout most
of its history between knowledge and wisdom. As filtered through modern lenses
EDUCATING FOR VIRTUOSITY
183
and in a context of public education aimed at furthering national competitiveness,
the American model was: to treat knowledge as objective and as laying well
within the delivery capabilities of institutional, public instruction; and, contrast-
ingly, to treat wisdom as personal (if not entirely subjective) and as to be culti-
vated privately, if at all, as part of intimate self-realization. This division of
educational labor fared particularly well in the environment being shaped in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century by key American values of freedom-
of-choice, autonomy, equality, tolerance and control. The result was an explosive
growth of knowledge generation capability; the emergence of the United States
as a leading player in global economics and politics; and a gradual atrophy of the
relational strengths and moral genius that, in an era of predicament-rich complex
change, assumes crucial importance throughout the public sphere.
The educational segregation of knowledge and wisdom effectively classified
moral development and personal self-cultivation—as well as the skills in shared
meaning-making that they entail—as private matters best relegated to either
home or church. In principle, this allowed pluralism and tolerance to be institu-
tionally acknowledged as key values while insuring that the primary venue for
cultivating and expressing (potentially divisive) value difference would take place
in the realm of the private. By centering educational aims and practices on con-
solidating the competencies needed to secure national interests and prepare
citizens for participation in the experiment of democratically exercised freedoms
of choice, education of the public could be conducted fully in public, for the
public good.
The exclusion of moral development and the cultivation of wisdom from the
American public classroom continues to be celebrated as a logical extension of
the clear separation of church and state—one of the cornerstones of constitution-
ally establishing and maintaining full, “democratic” freedom to decide what kind
of life each of us (as ideally autonomous individuals) most actively values.12 And
in contrast with the ways in which, for example, Soviet and Maoist regimes tasked
education with inculcating public moralities, there is much to recommend the
American approach to public education. Nevertheless, it is a solution that has
begun generating unintended negative consequences.
Until the second half of the twentieth century, the educational segregation of
knowledge and wisdom arguably solved a range of problems associated with
meeting nation-building needs, recognizing the reality of value pluralism, and
formulating a strategy for successfully serving both public and private interests
through social institutions aimed at what can be broadly referred to as human
capacity building. Schools became key institutions for generating capital in intel-
lectual and work skills; families, neighborhoods, churches, social groups, and
common interest societies took on roles for building social capital—the relational
skills and bodies of insight needed to function wisely in society. This institution-
alized “division of labor” functionally rationalized the “production” of knowl-
edge and wisdom in a way that can be seen as having afforded greater efficiency
and freedom in the pursuit of both public and private goods.
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This success, however, can in retrospect be seen as also having been dependent
upon material conditions—widespread in the US until the second half of the
twentieth century—that were still favorable to maintaining ways of life pro-
foundly informed by cultural and religious affiliation. That is, conditions obtained
in which it was both possible and natural to maintain largely traditional ways of
life expressing distinctive approaches to meeting the full range of subsistence
needs from food, clothing, shelter, health care, and aesthetic enrichment to a sense
of belonging. The social networks and relational complexes through which these
ways of life were maintained and kept viable were prime conduits for individuals
and communities—both rural and urban—to engage in directly contributing to
shared welfare. Heavily informed by history, culture, and shared aesthetics of dis-
cernment and commitment, these daily patterns of mutual contribution served as
primary enactments of culturally, ethnically and religiously distinct practices for
cultivating the relational virtuosity that is fundamental to wisdom.13
Along with the ways of life in which they were embedded, these patterns of
direct, mutual contribution atrophied, slowly at first, and then with increasing
rapidity as the commodification of goods and services progressed in parallel
with the consolidation of increasingly extensive and dense market economics.14
In effect, the daily life practices through which communities conserved the resources
for expressing and enhancing diversity were gradually converted to forms of
practice focused more on convenience than commitment, more on meeting
momentary demands rather than refining discernment. Very quickly undermined
were the merits associated with segregating knowledge/public education and
wisdom/private self-cultivation. While knowledge generation and transmission
can be sustained in the public sphere, wisdom cannot be sustainably cultivated in
private, in isolation from daily life.15
In sum, among the crucial legacies of the historical progression from premodern-
agrarian to modern-industrial and then postmodern-postindustrial orders have been:
an almost total compression of the practical (as opposed to spiritual) authority of
religious and cultural institutions; the emerging “normalcy” of highly rationalized
or instrumentally compartmentalized patterns of identity and affiliation; and a pro-
found reconfiguring of family dynamics.16 All three have important implications
for any attempt to rethink or redress the educational exclusion of wisdom and its
impact on both personal and communal capabilities for shared meaning-making.
Here, however, let us consider in some detail the transformation of the family that
this progression has involved, how it reflects larger changes taking place in a range
of social sectors, and how these have come together—over the past quarter
century—to render the globally dominant educational paradigm increasingly ill-
equipped to meet the educational imperatives emerging with truly complex global
interdependence.
Since the early twentieth century in so-called developed societies, the
extended, multi-generational family has undergone a series of fragmentations that
have been accepted and even embraced as effects of increasing affluence and
social mobility. In the United States, for example, the multi-generation extended
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family had all but broken down into the nuclear family by mid-century. Since
then, an array of steadily intensifying forces have continuously enough stressed
the nuclear family that it has now all but given way to the single-parent family as
a national norm. Like the splitting of the atom, the breakdown of the extended
and nuclear family structures occasioned the release of tremendous amounts of
economically significant energy.
First, and perhaps foremost, this breakdown led to the practical necessity of
duplicating such high-ticket commodities as living space, household goods and
appliances, tools, entertainment equipment, and automobiles. A second phase is
associated with the conditions required to sustain the growth of post-Second
World War economies: the steady accession of women to the wage-earning work-
force, initially with markedly lower wages than men, and their contemporaneous
acquisition of growing independence as consumers. Over this period, an intensi-
fying need arose for an extended and explicitly gender-neutral definition of basic
education (in the United States, nominally the completion of high school, but in
actuality now carrying over into post-secondary education or training of some sort).
This then led, relatively rapidly, to massively expanding educational infrastructure
from primary through tertiary levels and the eventual duplication—within the
family unit—of job-training certificates and advanced academic and professional
degrees. All of these interconnected effects—especially the duplication of house-
holds and requisite major investments of both financial and human capital—were
of immeasurable utility in spurring and maintaining economic growth.
As the extended family dissolved, as mobility within society accelerated, as
opportunities for both parents in the nuclear family to work became a de facto
necessity, and as dual-parent families eventually began giving way to single-
parent families, very powerful needs arose for earlier and earlier placement of
children in professional care, and for greatly extended school schedules. But this
was not all. The range of responsibilities assumed by and for schools with respect
to child development were also greatly extended and amplified. This range
has come to include (but is by no means limited to) the socialization of infants
and toddlers, instruction in basic life skills, sex education, personal and career
counseling, conflict mediation, and citizenship training.
While the multi-generation, extended family provided a powerful context for
refining relational capabilities-for and commitments-to caring, contribution, and
moral development, this is true of neither the single-parent or nominally nuclear
family in which both parents work and in which care is often professionally
mediated (e.g. by doctors, nurses, babysitters, and preschool workers); in which
contributions to family welfare are increasingly commodity-mediated; and in
which moral oversight is either delegated to institutional surrogates (e.g. religious
specialists, classroom teachers, and sports coaches) or compressed into the few
minutes per day that in most households are all that is not absorbed by school, for-
mal after-school programs, employment, household chores, shopping, and media
consumption. Yet, the default mediators or motivators of increasingly refined
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relational capabilities and commitments are, for a host of reasons, not adequate
substitutes.
Basic relational norms and awareness of the course of emotional and social mat-
uration are, in most societies communicated in the context of early life experiences
taking place in the home and neighborhood. With both parents working, much of this
communication is—to state the matter bluntly—being outsourced to early learning
centers or schools. These, however, are typically organized around segregated
age/maturity groups supervised by adults with limited time and authority and are
manifestly unsuited to naturally nurtured moral development. To be sure, the demise
of extended families and true neighborhoods has practically institutionalized a need
for secure environments in which children can be placed for safe play and learning
activities, and daycare centers and schools provide such havens. But their organiza-
tion and dynamics are such that they also have the untoward consequence of
effectively closing precisely the kinds of spaces within which children are both free
and situationally compelled to resolve their own disputes and moral dilemmas,
creatively improvising their own rules, rights, and obligations. With the closure of
these kinds of spaces, children are not only barred from contexts in which they might
learn (from one another) to meaningfully contribute to one another’s welfare, they
are increasingly being trained simply to consume externally (adult/corporately)
produced and regulated meanings and to seek ready-to-hand solutions to problems
which, given sufficient examination, might well turn out to be predicaments.
If moral development depends on growing relational awareness and maturing
sensitivity to both the contexts of and customs for meaning-making in commu-
nity with others, then simple exposure to ethically charged issues—for example,
through mass media or the internet—does little to compensate for the loss of
these spaces. Buddhist moral development involves in addition, deepening aware-
ness and wholesomely skilled or kusala appreciation of karma—the irreversible
and dramatic shaping of outcomes and opportunities by consistently held
values–intentions–actions. Moral development implies cultivating the relational
maturity needed in any given situation to contribute as needed for directing
the dynamics of interdependence away from trouble or suffering, toward their
meaningful resolution. The more secure/predictable an environment is and the
less consequential actions are in terms of shaping concrete outcomes and oppor-
tunities, the harder it will be to witness and attend the operation of karma and to
develop morally.17 The safety-focused, objectively organized, highly disciplined
and constrained environment of the school is not an ideal space within which to
develop and nurture insight into moral virtuosity.
Following out the logic of the educational segregation of knowledge and
wisdom, the American response to perceptions of worsening moral atrophy
throughout society, but particularly among the younger generations, has been to
increase the responsibilities borne by schools. Citizenship courses, the advocacy
of emotional intelligence and character development as parts of school culture,
and the encouragement of service learning are all attempts to address and bridge
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the gap between what students are relationally equipped to do and what a changing
society asks of them. An additional alternative strategy has been to acknowledge
the tensions among the ideal of standardized public schooling for all, increasing
pluralism, and the customary nature of traditional moralities, and to encourage
greater private response to the public atrophy of moral sensibilities. This has
taken the institutional form of legally insuring and—through, for example, a
voucher system allowing public funds to be diverted into private schools—
encouraging parental use of the right to provide children with a morally-inflected
education of their own choosing. But given present day realities, neither of these
approaches will have more than a minimal effect. Indeed, given that we now live
in a truly complex world in which there are both no possibilities for excluding the
unanticipated and mounting imperatives to conserve and promote robust diversity
(politically, economically, socially, and culturally), privatizing moral instruction
is likely to be counterproductive while publicly conducted moral training is likely
to be so safely de-contextualized and generic as to be ineffective in any real world
application.
Atrophy of the moral sensitivities and ethical strengths needed to responsibly
negotiate differences of core values and meaning will not be reversed by priva-
tized moral instruction—whether in faith-based schools or the home. These forms
of instruction—whether conducted, for example, in the United States along
Christian lines or in Afghanistan or the Philippines along Islamic lines—are con-
ducive to conserving particular traditions of value and meaning-making.
Although they may be effective in their customary settings, in the context of a
rapidly pluralizing world of complex global interdependencies, they are counter-
productively liable to result in what amount to moral ghettos, with each distinctly
instructed community separated from the others, not by physical boundaries of
distinct neighborhoods, but by the intangible and equivalently unassailable
redoubts of moral absolutism or moral relativism. As a response to the growing
moral vacuum in post-industrial societies, moral segregation is insufficient and
potentially damaging.
Still, if there are now important risks associated with relegating responsibility
for normative engagement and development to private discourse and instruction,
there are comparable and parallel risks in requiring that these be unilaterally
undertaken. History urges profound caution in any course of action that might
open possibilities for institutionally fixing “right thinking.” On one hand, there is
the authoritarian specter of state engineered moral absolutism. On the other, there
is the worry—succinctly stated by Ivan Illich in his classic work, Deschooling
Society—that the commodification of any need eventually institutionalizes a new
form of poverty and a new class of poor. Standardized and commodified moral
instruction, whether delivered by education systems competing for market
shares—either for profit or for evaluations that translate into higher public fund-
ing—is likely to create and segregate classes of the morally rich and the morally
poor: those well equipped to engage in live negotiations of meaning and those
cripplingly ill-equipped to do so.
EDUCATING FOR VIRTUOSITY
188
Against these very real concerns, however, it should be kept in mind that moral
unilateralism is finally sustainable only in a highly homogeneous world in whicn
the pace of change is modest and the dominant power structures are relatively
impervious to challenge. We do not live in such a world. The very realities that
command reinstating the marriage of knowledge and wisdom in public education
also make it impossible to sustain an absolute approach to doing so. What the
world demands is not just moral engagement and commitment, but moral genius
and diversity—capacities for improvising meaningfully shared, difference-
conserving, complexity-sensitive, and coordination-enriching responses to funda-
mentally changing circumstances. Indeed, the public, educational promotion of
moral genius and diversity affords the only clear middle way between moral
absolutism and moral relativism—between the narcissism of “one way (that is,
‘my way’) for all” and the nihilism of “one way for each.”
Moral absolutism and moral relativism are in underlying agreement that it is
possible to determine what is right or wrong in a given situation, what conduct is
or is not appropriate, and what values best order the public sphere. The absolutist
and relativist disagree about the possible scope of determining what is right, apt
and of ordinal value. The absolutist considers the scope of moral determination to
be unlimited: claims of moral truth can be, and ideally are, universal. The rela-
tivist considers the scope of moral truth to be unfixed, but denies the possibility
of any truths that are not tied to a specific perspective: there is no god’s-eye view
from which particularities of situations and positions in them can be wholly dis-
counted. In a world of complex interdependence and interpenetration, where
change is non-linear and yet recursively structured, neither moral absolutism nor
moral relativism are adequate as approaches for critically promoting public good.
As we have seen, the public sphere of the twenty-first century is characterized
by emergent patterns of relationship and by the generation of new kinds and
depths of predicament. No stable set of values, norms or moral truths—whether
universalist or particularist in nature—can be assumed sufficient in the context of
such dynamics. Instead, there is a need for responsively improvising new sets of
values, norms and approaches to shared meaning-making. Ours is a time in which
established moral truths are of lessening effectiveness and must as at some point
give way to continuously evolving practices for collaboratively truing situations
that are prone to going awry at times and in ways that could not have been anti-
cipated. Ours is a time, in other words, in which moral genius and ethical
creativity become crucial to the pursuit of public good. These terms are jarring to
ears conditioned by paradigms of moral and ethical theory and practice that
presuppose the validity of moral and ethical constants. To be morally innovative
or ethically creative is, from the perspective of such paradigms, tantamount to
being immoral. Yet, the need for coordination across sectors and societies under
conditions of accelerating changes that in principle cannot be anticipated makes
it imperative to cultivate precisely these convention-challenging attributes.
Appreciating the complex interdependence characteristic of the world of the
twenty-first century makes evident that the continued segregation of knowledge
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and wisdom and the public divorce of the intellectual and moral spheres is not a
sustainable strategy for balancing personal and community interests. Yet, the
commanding realities of this increasingly interdependent world make equally evi-
dent that redressing the segregation of knowledge and wisdom cannot be carried
out unilaterally through promoting a universal ethic or a singular vision of global
moral agreement. Rather, the complex dynamics of these realities mandate an
approach to restoring intimacy between knowledge and wisdom that centers cul-
tivating virtuosic capabilities-for and commitments-to endlessly opening oppor-
tunities for all to relate freely in distinctively contributing to equitably and
sustainably shared welfare.
Conserving differences in addressing issues of 
exclusion and equity
The global realities of accelerating, complex change and interdependence can be
seen as threatening or as opportune. They clearly threaten the idealization of self-
interested action, disclosing its manifest liabilities in a world where predicaments
displace problems as primary structures of trouble and suffering. But they are also
realities that very clearly pose the question of how best to differ. That is, they can
be seen as fostering concern about qualities of relationship and generating oppor-
tunities for greater diversity, opening prospects for both equitably and sustainably
differing in ways that are mutually beneficial.
Insight into the importance of difference, and the need to conserve it as the
basis of opportune contribution, is now perhaps most commonly expressed as a
conviction about the importance of eliminating social, economic, and political
exclusion. In keeping with the metaphysical presuppositions of liberal democratic
thinking, this conviction has most often been practically interpreted as a call for
increasing pluralism and active tolerance. That is, it has been interpreted restrictively
as a process requiring no intimate changes in the “pre-existing” identities of actors
newly recognizing their interdependence. In effect, this involves constructing
interdependence as a fundamentally external (not internal) relationship—a denial
of the ontological force of mutual relevance or emptiness (funyata) and the merits
of subordinating power to strength. Cooperative competition continues to trump
coordination as a principal strategy for differing well.
Reflecting this bias, much of the talk in education circles about overcoming
social, economic, and political exclusion has tended to confuse mere co-existence
with meaningful interdependence. Calls for “multicultural” curricula have
accordingly most often resulted in programs that merely juxtapose various cultural,
ethnic, or religious traditions rather than placing them in intimate normative inter-
action. This has led to more varied student bodies and curricular offerings. But it
has not fostered the realization of new qualities of interdependence based on
deepening mutual relevance. Increased variety is not the same as enhanced diver-




To the extent that equity is included among our core values, growing
interdependence eventually forces critical appraising whether valorizing plurality
and tolerance constitutes a sufficient strategy for responding to the predicaments
now being brought about by patterns emerging in the meaning of social, eco-
nomic, political, and cultural difference. Equity, as opposed to equality, turns on
the virtuosity with which we succeed in placing such differences in creative inter-
action. In Buddhist terms, difference must not only be reconciled in ways that
decrease the akusala or unwholesome eventualities that are associated with exclu-
sion. In addition, difference must be directed toward meaning the rise of kusala
patterns of relationship eventuating in skillful and wholesome excellence: the
enhancing of truly diverse capacities for appreciation and contribution.
Revising educational aims and practices:
a Buddhist approach
At present, the globally prevalent educational paradigm is oriented toward
empowering knowledge, cooperative autonomy, and identity consolidation. By
excluding the cultivation of wisdom from its own direct purview, public education
has taken on a form that only poorly serves to strengthen persons and communities
in the ways needed for them to play valued roles in negotiating meaningfully shared
resolutions, critically evaluating and skillfully engaging the dynamics of predica-
ment-rich and truly complex realities. Education is not now serving to conserve and
creatively enhance differences in ways that might make a real difference in achiev-
ing and sustaining public good under presently prevailing conditions. And, yet the
globally dominant educational paradigm—in virtually every one of its local mani-
festations—is not even doing the job that it does set out to do. Education is in crisis.
To be sure, the dominant paradigm has attempted to initiate and sustain useful
innovation and the development of better (if not “best”) educational practices. This
has typically meant reforming education in ways that enable educators to do better
what, in a sense, they have already been trained to do well. Reforms can make edu-
cation more efficient. But educational systems constitute some of the world’s
largest public institutions, and institutions are by their nature not geared toward
rapid change and redirection. When subjected to internal critique—that is, when
placed in the position of questioning its own assumptions and practices—the glob-
ally dominant educational paradigm has tended to spawn a host of inversions
broadly expressive of “postmodern” sensibilities centered on radical pluralism,
interpretative multiplicity, and adaptive relativism. The resulting practices and aims
are, in effect, shadows of those found in the dominant paradigm and are no better
suited than it to enhancing capabilities-for and commitments-to diversity in the
ways mandated by contemporary realities and the promises of truly robust interde-
pendence and interpenetration. Initiating truly paradigmatic change in education is
very unlikely to come about from within the dominant paradigm itself.
Our critical engagements with the dynamics of the public sphere suggest
the merits of a paradigm shift toward educating for the primary purposes of
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strengthening: insight into interdependence (wisdom); relational maturity;
improvisational excellence; and, coordinative virtuosity. For a wide range of
reasons, Buddhism recommends itself as an important source of insight for
accomplishing such a paradigm shift.
Buddhist training as educational paradigm
As instantiated in the training of exemplary practitioners, Buddhist education
culminates in an embodied realization of how to author liberation from trouble
and suffering. Especially in Mahayana Buddhist traditions, this realization is
often referred to as fully attained skill in liberative techniques—the realization of
one’s “buddha nature” or capacity for entering into liberating relationships with
all beings. The central aim of Buddhist education is thus the expression of relational
virtuosity: a limitless capacity for relating freely.
Because trouble and suffering are understood as irreducibly karmic—that is, as
deriving from a samsaric inflection of sustained patterns of values–intentions–
actions—liberative virtuosity implies freedom in both responsively and responsibly
revising situational meaning. Importantly, this is not understood as an exercise of
power resulting in the imposition of an alternative meaning on a given situation,
but rather the expression of strengths needed to elicit such a change from within
situational dynamics as they have come to be. Moreover, because the conditions
that together bring about experienced trouble or suffering are both complex and
dynamic, freely negotiating or bringing about changes of situational meaning cannot
rely on following set patterns of response. As repeatedly stressed throughout
the Mahayana canon, bodhisattva action requires dwelling on nothing and
responding from no fixed perspective. Liberative virtuosity is an emergent of
kusala patterns of unhesitating, live engagement.
In the teachings of early Buddhism, considerable emphasis was placed on the
importance of being able to teach across cultural and linguistic horizons or
boundary-enforcing patterns of self-identification. This could be as relatively
simple a task as developing vocabularies suitable to different audiences. But at
times it also quite clearly entailed domain-crossing communication—metaphori-
cal improvisation of sufficient depth and skill that insights beyond the purview of
everyday experience were afforded by means of everyday experience.
Philosophically, this domain-crossing aspect of Buddhist teaching (and thus,
Buddhist learning) resulted in such assertions as the functional coincidence of
conventional and ultimate truth (the so-called two truths) and claims that the
interdependence among all things consists of their infinitely dense and meaningful
interpenetration (e.g. in Fazang’s Huayen Buddhism).
In addition to these explicitly communicative dimensions of early Buddhist
teaching, there was also a traditional focus on the centrality of personally mediated
learning or person-to-person transmissions of the meaning of Buddhist practice.
Novices (both lay and ordained) were expected to draw guidance from relationships
with elder practitioners and to seek out “good friends” with whom to resolutely
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take up the path of Buddhist practice. Buddhist teachings were not, in essence,
fixed and textual in nature. Rather, they were actively relational. The early Sangha
can, with justification, be referred to as a learning community in which tremen-
dous emphasis was placed on qualities of engagement. Those most skilled in the
Dharma or Teachings were not those with the most detailed and voluminous com-
mand of the Buddha’s discourses, but rather those most virtuosic in engendering
resolute or committed understanding in others.
In sum, the embodied realization of liberative technique or skillful means (upaya)
can be seen as consisting in the demonstration of appreciative and contributory
mastery—limitless capabilities for sympathetic enhancement and meaningful offer-
ing. Thus, while Buddhist education has always formally pivoted on a conservatively
transmitted axis of teachings (sutta-pitaka) and behavioral norms (vinaya-pitaka)
traced back to the historical Buddha, Buddhist education in the fuller sense has never
rested on the inculcation of predetermined competencies.19 Rather, it has centered on
engendering, in both individuals and communities, the virtuosity needed for attun-
ing themselves to dramatically dynamic situations and bringing about a sustained
orientation of each situation toward the meaningful resolution of trouble or suffering.
Buddhist education—or more properly, Buddhist training—did not function as
preparation for problem-solving, but rather for predicament-resolution. As such, it
commends itself as source of insights relevant to aptly revising the globally dominant
educational paradigm, and effectively alloying knowledge and wisdom.
Virtuosity as educational orientation
Here I would like to focus on how a Buddhist concept of virtuosity might be useful
in coordinating the alliance of knowledge and wisdom and educationally enhancing
diversity. As demonstrated by the best musicians and artists (but also, for example,
by extraordinary researchers, organizers, care-givers, and conflict resolution spe-
cialists), virtuosity is an expression of situationally specific contributory genius—
an utterly fluid and productive power of live engagement. Virtuosity connotes
superlative skill. But more than that, it connotes a stunningly graceful capacity for
dramatic immediacy and innovation. Virtuosity does not express itself as a decisive
freedom from limits, but as passionately coordinating strengths for relating freely
within situationally focused limitations and opening concrete opportunities for
moving in new and enriching directions. As such, it is subversive with respect to the
conflicted mythology of free will and determinism, as well as to ontological
commitments to the tension between independence and dependence. Virtuosity ele-
vates and harmonizes, literally inspiring an appreciation of all that is gathered
immediately at hand in a present at once unprecedented and aesthetically consum-
mate. In Buddhist terms, it might be said that virtuosity expresses consummate
interdependence: emptiness activated as liberative interpenetration.
For the vast majority of us, virtuosity is something we hope to witness. It is not
something to which we believe we can realistically aspire. Virtuosity is assumed
rare. But this is preemptively to hold virtuosity at a distance as some kind of
EDUCATING FOR VIRTUOSITY
193
yet-to-be (and, perhaps never-to-be) achieved state of affairs—an extraordinary
order of being. The tendency for some Buddhists to see the aim of practice—
enlightenment, for example—in a similar fashion led the Chan master Linji to
exclaim that “if you should ever see the Buddha on the road, kill him!” Our
buddha-nature or innate enlightenment is not something “out there.” It is, instead,
precisely that which cannot be objectified or pointed out. Buddha-nature cannot
be made to exist or to not-exist. As boldly stated in the Chan and Zen traditions,
Buddhist training is not a means to enlightenment, but the expression or demon-
strated meaning of enlightenment. Virtuosity is not a rare state beyond the reach
of most. It is movement in the direction of ultimate meaning and value—a direction
that is open, always and everywhere.20
Buddhist virtuosity is inseparable, ultimately, from lifelong training. In sharp
contrast with our existing educational prejudices, Buddhist training or education is
not something that one might hurry up and finish. Neither is it amenable to analysis
into basic competencies that can be acquired in a standard sequence.21 Instead, as a
virtuosity-oriented form of education, to the extent that Buddhist training can be
measured, it is in degrees or depths of commitment and overall relational quality.
Thus, a common description of those who have fared well in their training, is
that they are capable of facing each of the four quarters (i.e. in all directions) and
suffusing all that they encounter with compassion, loving-kindness, appreciative
joy and equanimity. Faring well in Buddhist training means of eliciting and sus-
taining these relational headings in all situations, qualitatively transforming all
that is present in terms of them. In Mahayana terms, this signals movement in the
direction of realizing that this very situation we share is itself a buddha-realm in
which all things are capable of doing the great work of enlightenment, contributing
to the meaningful and enriching resolution of trouble and suffering.
There are two important educational implications in this description. First,
granted that all things arise as karmic outcomes/opportunities that are best seen
as marked by trouble or suffering, the absence of any fixed identity or essence,
and impermanence, sustaining these relational headings cannot consist of adopt-
ing fixed perspectives. Indeed, fixed perspectives (ditthi) are explicitly identified
as primary conditions of conflict and suffering. Sustaining compassion, loving-
kindness, appreciative joy and equanimity depends on continuous attunement to
shifts in the currents of meaning in any given situation and responding as needed.
Because of the irreducibly karmic nature of how things have come to be as they
have come to be (yathabhutam), there can be nothing formulaic about achieving
this. Moment by moment, the values–intentions–actions that have informed the
coming-to-be of a given situation are themselves open to change. It is, indeed,
only because of this possibility for the meaning of things to change that the
Buddhist path can be traveled at all. The very conditions that make it possible for
a situation to be characterized by trouble and suffering also make possible the
liberating intimacy of relating freely with all things as they have come to be. In




Secondly, educational achievement is not primarily a function of commanding
more extensive knowledge or developing specific pre-established competencies.
Rather, educational achievement correlates with contributory skill and the confi-
dence that emerges with dramatic maturity. The concept of dramatic maturity can
perhaps best be explained through analogy with the more familiar maturation
process that takes place as we go from infancy to childhood, adolescence, and full
adulthood. While infants are sometimes lauded as having pure and clear minds, they
are in relational terms almost entirely self-centered. Their range of responses to both
internal and external stimuli is so limited that, were it not normal for humans at this
early stage, we would most likely consider it pathological. As infants’ perceptual and
motor skills develop, they are able to explore and engage their situation ever more
fully. Along with this come ever more complexly emotional, intellectual, and physi-
cal relationships, but also more complex responsibilities. Maturation means an
increasing capacity for taking in the diverse currents of significance gathered within
a situation and responding both freely and accordingly, especially in the context of
interpersonal relationships. It is not a simple function of aging or adding experience
and knowledge, but of qualitative transformations in how we are present.
The dramatic maturity correlated with Buddhist educational achievement—
that is, with liberative virtuosity similarly expresses a qualitative transformation
of presence. But it is not simply an index of the degree to which we have become
socialized. Because of the karmic roots of trouble and suffering, because karma
reflects both individual values–intentions–actions and those embedded in shared
communal and cultural practices, and because the liberating resolution of trouble and
suffering consists of revising hitherto prevailing patterns of value–intention–action,
dramatic maturity necessarily entails well-developed capacities for constructively
critical, and at times countercultural, conduct.22 Virtuosity—at least in the sense
appealed to here as the aim of Buddhist training—does not culminate in getting
things right, but in improvising situationally apt ways of coordinating shared
movement in the direction of continuing enhancement or excellence. Education
means cultivating and coordinating creativity and responsibility.
Training for dramatic maturity
Traditionally, Buddhist training or education has been seen as a three-part system
comprising wisdom ( prajña), attentive mastery (samadhi), and moral clarity
(fila). All three dimensions or elements of training are considered necessary, and,
ideally, all three are undertaken at once. Through their systematic cultivation prac-
titioners clear situationally relevant ways of realizing truly liberating relationships.
This system of training is, however, also suited to the more general aim of
cultivating personal and communal capacities for mature improvisation. Taken
apart from the specifically Buddhist commitment or vow to resolve the troubles and
suffering of all sentient beings, it is a system for engendering diversity-enhancing
virtuosity. Put somewhat differently, it is a system that both enables and encourages
building sustainable patterns of mutual contribution to profoundly shared meaning.
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As it is used in Buddhist contexts, wisdom connotes effective and caring
insight into the interdependence among all things. Capacities for knowing that
(and even knowing how) all things are interdependent can be developed relatively
easily. Indeed, many people today find nothing in the least difficult or objection-
able about intellectually allowing that everything arises interdependently. But the
same cannot be said of developing the kind of insight into interdependence that
triggers knowing to act in certain ways, in certain circumstances, so that the rela-
tionships constituting the situation as a whole are aptly and appropriately revised
to bring about environments that are liberating for all. Realizing this kind of
effectively careful insight or wisdom rests on deepening the other two central
aspects of Buddhist training: attentive mastery and moral clarity.
The concept here translated as attentive mastery—samadhi—is more commonly
rendered as concentration. It refers, however, to a cultivated capacity for sustained
awareness that is both precisely directly and highly flexible. By rendering samadhi
as attentive mastery, both of these aspects are invoked, and stress is placed on the
way samadhi alloys responsive skill and responsibility. Attentive mastery means
being able to attend freely and carefully to one’s situation, without compulsion
or habit. Much as the English word “attend” at once connotes “being aware” and
“tending” (or “taking care”), samadhi alloys concentration and concern.
Both informed by and informing attentive mastery, then, is moral clarity.
Again, the customary translation for fila—“discipline” or “morality”—is mis-
leadingly restrictive. To be sure, among the original connotations of fila as a key
element of practice, there was included attention to and compliance with the
codes of conduct for monks, nuns, and lay practitioners that developed along with
the emergence of institutionally distinctive Buddhist communities. But as made
clear in the vinaya-pitaka—the body of texts relating the origins of (in particular)
monastic rules and regulations—these codes of conduct emerged in the dramatic
context of daily lives brought into heightened resolution by Buddhist training and
the vows associated with ordination. Fila thus refers to training directed to the
maintenance of specific dramatic headings in the changing contexts of complex
social life. As most powerfully illustrated by thinking through the meaning of
honoring bodhisattva vows in the dramatically complex contexts of daily life, fila
is not a function of simply obeying fixed rules and regulations. Daily life is
shaped by karmic currents or meaning-laden flows of both outcomes and oppor-
tunities. Because of this, maintaining a given heading requires a clear perception
of these currents and how to work with them, as they have come to be. For this
reason, it seems apt to translate fila as moral clarity—training aimed at critically
engaging the complex flows of values, intentions, and actions that shape the
problems and (especially) the predicaments encountered in daily life.
Caring and effective insight into interdependence, focused and yet flexible
awareness, and clarity of response in dramatically or morally complex situations—
these constitute the central axis of a paradigmatic shift in educational methods
and curriculum. Although the particulars of this shift must vary from situation 
to situation, a common characteristic will be an emphatic turn toward taking
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relationships—not individually existing things or people—as primary. Measuring
educational progress and success necessarily means measuring the extent to which
education fosters individual and communal capabilities for relating freely and
meaningfully in complexly interdependent situations. What matters most is not what
we know, but how we are present—bodily, mentally, emotionally, and spiritually.
According to such a paradigm shift, the more highly educated individuals and
communities become, the more readily, relevantly, and responsibly they will be able
and inclined to demonstrate truly appreciative and contributory virtuosity.
Peoples and communities educated along such lines, in whatever situationally
appropriate ways, will be capable and concerned to orient their growing interde-
pendence in sustainable and equitable directions, fostering deepening and ever
more extensive diversity. They will have the resources needed to note the ironic
consequences of a bias toward exclusively self-interested problem-solving and
the growing imperatives for engaging instead in innovatively resolving the
predicaments that twenty-first century patterns and scales of global interdependence
make both manifest and unavoidable.
Educational means and ends committed to enhancing global diversity must
subordinate the competencies associated with competitive success to the capaci-
ties for innovation needed to enrich differences in ways that are situationally
appropriate and conducive to meaningfully coordinated mutual contribution.
Alloying knowledge and wisdom makes evident the crucial importance of emo-
tional refinement as a marker of educational achievement measured in terms of
enhanced diversity. But it also makes evident the importance of systematically
linking advances in empirical studies and research with deepening ethical sensi-
tivities and sensibilities. As the counterpart of wisdom, knowledge can no longer
consist of an outcome of investigative closure. Instead, knowing consists first and
foremost of disclosing new opportunities for deepening and extending relation-
ships. Knowledge—even scientific knowledge—ceases being identifiable with
power and becomes instead a reflection of strength: the capacity for unimpeded,
creative commitment to relating as fully and as well as possible.
Policy prospects and improvising public good
As a primary resource or element in promoting and consolidating public good,
education should not simply reflect existing norms and values. In addition to this
conservative function, education should also engender both commitments-to and
capabilities-for for evaluating and revising currently prevailing norms and values.
Only in this way will education live up its own creative possibilities as a force for
directing our growing interdependence toward increasing equity and diversity.
Granted the complex (and not simply complicated) nature of global change
now taking place, education will be incapable of living up to either its conserva-
tive or creative functions if it remains centered on standardized competencies
rather than embodied virtuosity. Having crossed certain global thresholds
with respect to rates, scales, and depths of interdependence, the promotion and
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consolidation of public good increasingly rests on sustainably coordinating what
are often contrary (if not conflicting) values–intentions–actions. Capacities for
shared meaning-making come to the fore; generically pragmatic aims of knowing-
that and knowing-how yield to the dramatically particular aim of knowing-to;
accumulating knowledge gives way to engendering wisdom.
Among the major policy implications of these transitions are that the familiar
distinction between educational means and ends must be collapsed. Education that
promotes flexibility and commitment in the shared making of meaning must itself be
flexible and committed to harmonizing values, intentions, and actions in the shared
realization of meaningful change. Education directed toward greater equity and
diversity through cultivating appreciative and contributory virtuosity must be equi-
tably and diversely practiced, innovating continuously in ways that are surprisingly
and gracefully apt. Educating for virtuosity cannot be undertaken generically or with
standardized and standardizing methodologies. It must be custom made and kusala
in its orientation—excelling recursively so that it capable of innovating innovatively.
The oneness of the practice and the purpose of education—like the oneness
invoked when it is said that Chan (Zen) training is itself demonstrating enlight-
enment—is oneness rooted in horizonless, live engagement. It is oneness forged
through relentlessly flexible attunement and utterly resolute care. Ultimately, it is
not possible to heighten responsivity without also heightening responsibility;
developing the concentration needed for innovating innovatively is inseparable
from ever expanding and refining concern. Education that expresses this oneness
of practice and purpose places extraordinary demands on all—especially students
and teachers, but also families, communities, administrators, and policy makers.
Singly and together, all must embody this oneness that is both flexible and res-
olute, both tirelessly attentive and compassionately liberating. This is education
with infinite ambition.
A question of applicability insists on being asked at this point. What are the
chances of such a vision of extraordinary education being translated into educa-
tional realities? Limitless ambition may be suitable in the context of educating
toward the virtuosic resolution of all trouble and suffering. Indeed, this charac-
terizes the practice and purpose of Buddhist training. Extraordinary efforts are
directed to so utterly realizing the truth of the ordinary that even the most
mundane and conventional of its expressions are enchanted with the ultimate.
This, according the Vimalakïrti Sutra, is the meaning of successful Buddhist
training: realizing that all things are doing the great buddha-work of initiating and
sustaining truly liberating relationships.
But what relevance do such ambitions have in establishing practically effective
education policies? What do they have to do with making basic education—the
opportunity to develop, at a bare minimum, literacy and numeracy—available to all?
Even if public policy could be informed by such ambitious aims, could such aims
ever be given sufficient traction in the complex, day-to-day workings of our con-
temporary lifeworlds to actually accomplish the transformation of educational prac-
tices, much less the practices appropriate to other sectors in which education seems
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poised to serve as a driver of change? Is it possible, for example, even to imagine
(much less practically realize) a fully coordinated and diversity-enhancing curricu-
lum—one sensitive to personal and communal differences with respect to age, gen-
der, culture and politics, and capable of systematically engendering and nurturing
wisdom, attentive mastery and moral clarity? If imagined, what would the chances
be of actualizing such a curriculum in a world wherein contesting the meaning of
age, gender, culture, politics and education is a growth industry of unprecedented
virility? What is the merit of infinite ambition in a world wherein upwards of one out
of every five people live in what is termed “absolute poverty”—poverty so deep and
so powerfully encompassing that they cannot even hope to escape it? Are the
absolute poor realistic candidates for wisdom, attentive mastery and moral clarity
when eating daily would be extraordinary and eating well miraculous?
To be sure, there is no shortage of ambitious and even unabashedly idealistic
proposals for educational reform. To take a single explicitly global example, the
UNESCO-sponsored International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first
Century envisions the possibility of a transformative educational paradigm, suited
to the complexion of the new millennium, that rests on four pillars of learning:
learning to know (content instruction), learning to do (skills training, including
group work skills), learning to live together (through intercultural understanding
and appreciating interdependence), and learning to be (through the development
of personality and a capacity to act with greater autonomy, judgment, and respon-
sibility). Open-ended in terms of its aims, rooted in commitments to realizing dig-
nified co-presence for all, the UNESCO vision is, if not spiritual, then profoundly
and hopefully spirited.
Yet, even with the kind of international respect and backing that UNESCO
commands, questions of relevance and real-world traction persist, and this is quite
revealing. In any attempt to translate the spirit of such visions into concrete edu-
cational realities, there is a temptation—one that I believe is ultimately fatal—to
take as given the ontological characteristics of our present world situation.
Policies must finally do their work in the “real world” where vision matters less
than seeing what can be done, here and now, to make things even just a little bet-
ter. In the patently realistic interest of being practical, policies aim to work within
(or at least, with) existing structures to bring about meaningful and apt reforms.
The very real worry, however, is that these existing structures do not just frame
our lived realities and give concrete shape to our efforts toward meaningful
reform. They also serve to institutionally reproduce the very conditions that con-
sistently render such reform either ineffective or deeply ironic. Granted the
exception-less interdependence and relationality of all things, working within
(or with) existing structures cannot be ultimately effective as a means to a
paradigmatic shift in education (or any other policy domain) except on the basis
of a resolute revision of the ends or meaning of those very structures.
It is an implication of a karmically-informed, Buddhist understanding of
interdependence that facts and values are always mutually shaping and that
our conduct should be guided by insight into things as they have come to be
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(yathabhutam), in all of their dramatic complexity. It is also an implication of this
understanding that innovative values and intentions make up the leading edge of
transformative changes in how things come to be, as they are coming to be. That
is, changing values and intentions constitute the leading edge of changes in situ-
ational direction or meaning. At best, by too quickly passing over the relevance of
new values and intentions to concentrate on taking thorough account of the “facts
on the ground,” strictly realist approaches to educational reform run substantial
risks of failing to dig deeply enough to establish the kind of paradigmatically new
foundations that might conceivably support and extend what has worked within
existing educational structures, while at the same time sustainably changing the
way those structures face and effect change. More typically, realist reforms only
sharpen already painful intimations of what global dynamics suggest will con-
tinue to be a rapidly compounding policy paradox. In the language introduced
here, such reforms may be effective in responding to immediate, history-informed
problems, but not the predicaments that drive our continuing encounters with them.
By effectively furthering movement in the present direction of global
interdependence, realist reforms—whether in the public domains of the environment,
health, trade and development, the media, politics, international relations or educa-
tion—will eventually begin yielding ironic consequences. They will not just result in
patterns of diminishing returns, but returns that are constantly and ever more rapidly
eroding the strengths of attention and commitment needed to go beyond reforming
to truly revising the means and meaning of our deepening interdependence.
It is perhaps especially obvious in education, however, that refraining from
making any effort at all to redirect existing change dynamics and patterns of inter-
dependence—leaving things to continue coming to be more or less as they are at
present—will only lead to greater inequities and lowering prospects of sustain-
ability. The predicaments already embroiling education will intensify while
momentum alone carries us toward a future wherein opportunities for coordinated
movement in the direction of relating freely will be paved over with increasingly
familiar (and, alas, apparently intractable) problems. And, if this were not enough,
the option of suddenly and thoroughly dismantling existing educational structures
in the hope of something better rising phoenix-like out of the ashes is at best
naïve. As would be true of an analogous strategy for curtailing the ills associated
with our global technological juggernaut, derailing the present educational para-
digm and its practices would never result in a miraculously clean slate, but only
in worldwide wreckage—personal, social, economic, and political.
What, then, can actually be done? Embedded as we are in the very systems that
must undergo paradigmatic change, what leverage do we have—in policy and in
practice—for directing our growing interdependence toward equitably sustained
and enhanced diversity? If the leading edge of transformative change—a change
in the very meaning or direction of our situations as wholes—consists of a novel
configuration of values and intentions, and yet we are ourselves products of
values–intentions–actions that are not at all novel, what can we possibly do to
transform education? And if the complexity of changes taking place all around us
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insure the ultimate and mutual collapse of means into ends, any policies for
paradigmatic change in education practices must themselves emerge as expressions
of consonant paradigmatic shifts in the aims and making of public policy. Isn’t the
policy paradox confronting us a paradox of infinite regression?
In spite of their presentation here as a kind of catch-22 burlesque, these are
actually very real questions. They are questions that express the frustration of seek-
ing creativity, or planning spontaneity, or trying to pick ourselves up by our own
bootstraps. Fittingly, I think, they are questions that bear a striking resemblance to
the kinds of questions asked by Buddhist practitioners at crucial points in their
training. They are questions about faring well in changing our own karma. Perhaps
the most pointed grappling with this in Buddhism arises in working through what
might be called the paradox of practice. How could the self that claims “I am” even
while forming intentions to “attain enlightenment” bring about the realization of
no-self ? As a primary function of ignorance and a pivotal condition for suffering,
how can the self—all that I claim “I am”—take up and course well on the path of
enlightenment and the resolution of all suffering?
As raised by the Buddhist practitioner, there is really only one traditional
answer to such questions and the paradox they beg us confront: find and enter into
horizonless, trusting relationship with an enlightened master. Over time, through
witnessing the meaning of the enlightening non-duality of means and ends in
action, there dawns an ever keener and fully fleshed appreciation of our own non-
duality. Seeing the buddha-nature of the master as buddha-nature finally means
recognizing—and with sufficient commitment, activating—our own buddha-
nature. To have entered a relationship with an enlightened master is already to
have activated our own potential for engaging in enlightening relationships—that
is, for expressing the emptiness of our present situation, as it has come to be: the
absence of obstructions and a limitless capacity for embodying ultimate truth.
Asked by policy-makers, questions about faring well in changing our shared
karma translate into questions about revising our existing patterns of
values–intentions–actions so that our situation will be better and more surely
directed toward virtuosic and diverse public good. If the analogy holds, policy-
makers intent on realizing an educational paradigm shift are in need of witness-
ing the non-duality of practice and purpose in active transformation of the
meaning of our educational realities, as they have come to be. Is the answer to
their paradox about how to proceed kin, then, to that given above? Seek out and
enter trusting relationship with a truly liberating policy-maker? At this point in
global history, I think that is not yet an option.
We are in many ways, positioned very much like those unnamed few people in
the central narrative of the Cakkavati Sïhanada Sutta who left the highly
degraded and degrading environment that had come to be after the dissolution of
King Dalhanemi’s wheel-turning kingdom, retreating into the hills to train them-
selves—singly at first and then together—in the ever-deepening expression of
compassion, loving-kindness, equanimity and sympathetic joy. This retreat repre-
sents an engendering of heart-felt commitment to enlightenment (bodhicitta) and
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the vigilant cultivation of wisdom, attentive mastery and moral clarity. By retreating
to the social periphery, space opened for redirecting their energies, developing
their own unique resources, and eventually occasioning a turning about in the
very society from which they had retreated. Changing the dynamics of the public
sphere is a process that culminates in virtuosic action, but that begins with the
intimate and resolute consolidation of new values and intentions.
This suggests that resolving the policy paradox requires policy-makers to realize
sufficient insight into interdependence, attentive mastery and moral clarity to
bring their own ends and means into working harmony. They must cultivate their
own virtuosity, in ways that are virtuosic, building their own virtue and strengths
for live engagement. This is the root of contributing effectively to revising the
dynamics of the public sphere. Given the global nature of the predicaments into
which we are being drawn by complex globalization processes, prior to actively
enhancing public good through public policy, policy-makers must also share a
robust understanding of the desired fruit of reorienting our global interdepend-
ence. Although the conservation and enhancing of differences is crucial to enrich-
ing contributory capacity, there must be shared commitments to values capable of
coordinating change across sectors and societies. Especially in the context of com-
plex, non-linear change, focusing on specific goals or destinations is liable to
prove unproductive. But arriving at a robustly shared sense of the appropriate
direction for change is indispensable. Once these conditions obtain, appropriate
outcomes and opportunities for transformative change will naturally follow.
This can easily be dismissed as a glibly simple-minded response: the key to
social change is personal change; to change the world, first change your self. But
the simple-mindedness is only apparent—a function of misreading the linkage
between social change and personal change as an external relationship. Matters
appear quite differently with sincere appreciation of the interdependence and irre-
ducible relationality of all things. There is ultimately no cleavage between world
and self. Changing one is changing both. Realizing this frees us to engage the
issue of reorienting the dynamics of the public sphere by asking a very practical
question: in light of presently available appreciative and contributory resources,
which can be redirected most readily and responsively—the values and intentions
embodied in existing educational, social, economic and political institutions or
those embodied in our own conduct? Personal change and social change are not
linked logically (“if this, then that”), but dramatically (“first this, then that”).
This freedom acknowledged, we are nevertheless faced with the discomfiting
realization that we cannot detail in advance the meaning of faring well on the path
toward enhancing diversity throughout the public sphere to allow all to enjoy the
conditions needed for relating freely. The admonition of Chan master Huairang to
his student Mazu remains valid: one cannot see the path of ultimate liberation,
one can only see from it. It is only upon embarking with confidence and courage
on that infinite path that we find ourselves wholly capable of critically facing the
conditions giving rise to trouble and suffering and going resolutely crosswise to
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serves the purpose of diverting attention away from seeking to specify the “result” of
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cannot be reversed in the degree or time frame needed. Given a well-advanced cancer
in an elderly patient, there may be little that can be done forestall a relatively imminent
death. But even in such cases, psychological, social, and emotional aspects of the
situation remain open to change and redirection, as do—especially in the case of
elderly or indigent patients dependent upon public support—the medical, legal, and
political institutions that bear on caring for the terminally ill. In short, there is always






3 TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE POSSIBILITY 
OF POST-MARKET ECONOMICS
1 Looking more deeply at this pattern of values-intentions-actions—the karma of
bodhisattva action—will occupy us later in this chapter, especially in discussing
poverty and the means of its alleviation. More broadly, it constitutes a central concern
of Chapter 8, which examines the degree to which contemporary realities command a
paradigmatic shift of educational aims and practices.
2 This idea is far from outdated. Evolutionary economist Jason Shogren argues in a
paper forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, that homo
sapiens displaced homo neanderthalensis, not because of a larger brain or better tools,
but because of extended trade networks. Report in The Economist online September
30, 2005: http://www.economist.com/science/displayStory.cfm?story_id3839749
3 See, for example, the SaÅyutta Nikaya II-1–65(5).
4 The distinction I am drawing between capability and capacity is, perhaps, worth making
explicit. Capability refers to a consolidated body of specific resources for concretely
sustained action. Capacity refers to the overall extent of one’s ability to take on concretely
sustained action.
5 There are parallels—and not at all insignificant ones—between Buddhist and other
critical historical analyses of trade and economic activity, those offered by Marx being,
perhaps, the most sweeping in historical and critical terms. But the Buddhist approach
to history differs markedly from Marxist or Hegelian models in being neither teleo-
logical nor dialectical. There is not a “point” to history in Buddhist terms; history, it
might be said, is just point-making and re-making.
6 For a traditional account of the meaning of noble wealth and poverty, see the
Rattaphala Sutta and Ina Sutta.
7 1998 Human Development Report, United Nations Development Programme, available
online at: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1998/en/
8 Peter D. Hershock. Reinventing the Wheel: A Buddhist Response to the Information
Age, State University of New York Press, Albany, NY: 1999b.
9 See, for example: Alternatives to Economic Globalization, A Report of the
International Forum on Globalization, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, San Francisco, CA:
2002; and David C. Korten. When Corporations Rule the World, Kumarian Press,
Bloomfield, CT: 2002.
10 It is on this dual disadvantaging in terms of contributory capacity that state welfare
approaches to alleviating poverty founder. The poor are caught in a systemic cycle of
depreciation. Critics of welfare who pin total responsibility on the poor for their own
poverty, alleging that their poverty is a result of laziness or a desire to take advantage of
government support are simply ignoring the profound downward causal influences exerted
by the systematic need of markets for a growing class of the those able only to consume.
11 The distinction between exchange and transfer is intended to highlight differences
between the explicit reciprocity of vernacular trade practices, rooted in more general
practices of mutual gift-giving, and the lineal transmission of goods and services
through global markets.
12 An interesting discussion of the relationship between bioregional urbanization
processes and capital flows can be found in David Harvey. Justice, Nature and the
Geography of Difference, Blackwell, Oxford: 1996 (pp. 410ff.).
13 For an extended discussion of this process, see: James Beniger. The Control
Revolution, Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Age, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge: 1986.
14 It should be kept in mind that the “benefits” thus enumerated can be substantially (and
perhaps entirely) offset if goods were marketed at prices reflecting true costs. True cost
accounting on most agricultural products, for example, would include the environmental
costs of pollution related to mass transport (especially air transport) of such products.
For more on true cost pricing, especially in relation to tax issues, see Ernest U. von
Weizsacker and Jochen Jesinghaus. Ecological Tax Reform: A Policy Proposal for
Sustainable Development, Zed Books, London, UK: 1992.
15 Subsistence needs are understood here in a quite broad sense, based on Buddhist
teachings of the four nutriments (see Chapter 2, p. 47) and the material bases for prac-
tice. Included are food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, aesthetic enrichment
or sensory stimulation and a sense of belonging.
16 Extending the spectrum of goods offered by the market to foster continued growth is
nicely illustrated by the historical turning point in automobile sales that occurred when,
in 1923, General Motors addressed moribund sales growth and an inability to steal
away market share from Ford Motors by introducing annual model changes and a range
of colors. The resulting boom in sales was phenomenal.
17 1998 Human Development Report.
18 A wonderfully concise and powerful fictional account of this process and its motivations
are given in the early chapters of John Nichols’ novel. The Magic Journey, Ballantine
Books, New York: 1983.
19 This is, admittedly not new as a phenomenon. Thorstein Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure
Class, a classic of economic history, made this point already in 1899. What is differ-
ent now is that this is not a phenomenon any longer restricted to a rarefied elite, but
the norm worldwide.
20 See Chapter 4 for a more detailed consideration of the attention economy and its
dynamics.
21 See Part Three of Reinventing the Wheel for a sustained discussion of the transformations
of awareness that attend the conversion to an attention economy through the global,
technology mediated colonization of consciousness. For a concise treatment of the role
of media, see Peter D. Hershock. “Media, Attention, and the Colonization of
Consciousness: A Buddhist Perspective,” in Reason and Insight, edited by Robin Wang
and Timothy Shanahan, Wadsworth/Thomson Publishing: Belmont, CA, 2003b.
22 See, for example, the WHO’s World Health Report for 2001, accessed 11/15/2004 at:
http://www.who.int/whr/2001/chapter2/en/index4.html
23 For a wide range of papers exploring the concept of downward causation, see
Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies, and Matter, edited by P.B. Andersen et al.,
Aarhus University Press, Ärhus: 2000.
24 There is a significant body of Buddhist literature that addresses the problematic
ontological commitments underlying the act of choosing, and notably the Chan works
associated with the lineage from Huineng through Mazu, Baizhang, Huangbo, and
Linji. Here, the tendency toward “picking and choosing” is forcefully depicted as
rooted in a denial of the emptiness of all things and a failure to practically realize the
meaning of non-duality. To be bereft of possibilities for enhancing our way of life is,
indeed, a horrific prospect. But being in a position to choose is not equivalent to being
positioned to contribute to and enrich our irreducibly shared situation.
25 Education, sensory stimulation and a sense of belonging have not typically been
considered primary necessities of life. Yet the more typical list restricted to adequate
food, clothing, and shelter reflects a material bias that is substantially at odds with
seeing all things and all beings as interdependent. If subsistence needs refer to the basic
conditions for living whole lives as whole persons—and not just existing—then
opportunities for sustained learning, sensory stimulation and a sense of community
and intimate interconnectedness would seem to be required.
26 The work of Susan Murcott and her Institute for Sustainable Living can be referenced






27 These last remarks suggest an important role for governance in both orienting and driving
the operationalization of GNH. Much of the development literature in the West—
particularly that originating in the US—asserts a strong correlation between development
and democratization. And, as customarily defined, both processes indeed embody shared
and strong commitments to the preeminence of choice as both an ordinal and strategic
value. Some commentators, however, have identified reasons to qualify the implied
causal relationship. Amy Chua, for example, in her book, World On Fire: How Exporting
Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability (Doubleday, New
York: 2002) has discussed the ironic consequences of importing democratic patterns of
governance into countries with market-favored minorities. Others have noted that author-
itarian states have been successful in generating rapid development—Singapore, for
instance—and that many democratic states have undergone developmental regression.
Yet others have claimed that the only clear correlation is between overall development
and the degree to which leadership and governance practices are committed to securing
basic human welfare. In short, the meaning of any substantial correlation between
democratization and development is open to contest.
4 TECHNOLOGY, MEDIA, AND THE COLONIZATION 
OF CONSCIOUSNESS
1 Here, I want to set quite wide horizons for what fits into the category of the media and
mass media. Included are the standard print (newspaper, book, magazine) and broad-
cast (television, radio, cinema) media, but also electronic (especially internet-mediated,
but also video-game) media.
2 McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, McGraw-Hill,
New York: 1964.
3 The literature on media and violence and media and aggression is large and varied. An
interesting summary of scientific findings and media misinformation about those findings
can be found in Brad J. Bushman and Craig A. Anderson. “Media Violence and the
American Public: Scientific Facts Versus Media Misinformation,” in the American
Psychologist, 56(6/7), 477–489, June/July 2001. Another good overview study is:
Centerwall, B.S., “Exposure to television as a cause of violence,” in Comstock G. (ed)
Public Communications as Behavior, Academic Press, Inc., Orlando, FL: 1989.
Another piece on violence and media that focuses on the role of unconscious imitation
and threats to the consolidation of liberal democratic citizenry is Susan Hurley’s
“Bypassing Conscious Control: Media Violence, Unconscious Imitation, and Freedom
of Speech,” in Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour? An Investigation of the Nature
of Volition, edited by S. Pockett, W. Banks, and S. Gallagher, MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, February 2006.
4 Hershock, Peter. Reinventing the Wheel: A Buddhist Response to the Information Age,
State University of New York Press, Albany, NY: 1999b.
5 This will be more fully examined in Chapters 5 and 6.
6 Although Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis can be discredited on
many different kinds of grounds, there is a sense in which the rise of terrorist activity,
the fragmenting of states along ethnic and religious lines, and the emergence of
increasingly acute failures to negotiate robust and global normative consensus can be
seen as a predictable effect of global technological change. The complexity of the
relationship between conflict and technological change, however, is such that it draws
attention not only to the inevitability of conflict as an outcome of technological domi-
nance, but also to the signal opportunities for reordering or revising our norms and
values in ways conducive to global resolve on the promise of conceiving of freedom as
a relational quality rather than as a matter of exercising individual choice or autonomy.
7 See his book, The Control Revolution, Technological and Economic Origins of the
Information Age, Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 1986.
8 See Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman. Manufacturing Consent, Pantheon
Books, New York: 1988.
9 A study conducted by MediaWeek in 1995, “Media Consumption in America,” found
that the average American consumed media products for a total of 636 minutes per day
out of a total of 1,000 waking minutes. The totals were: 287 minutes consuming TV
and video media, 116 minutes reading print media, 53 minutes using interactive media,
and 161 minutes listening to audio media.
10 For an extended examination of these phenomena, and of iconic patterns of attention,
see Reinventing the Wheel chapters 9 and 10.
11 An interesting, cross-cultural and historical examination of the media colonization of
domestic space and its impact on the construction of meaning is: Ingrid Volkmer,
“Dialectical Spaces in the Global Public Sphere: Media Memories across
Generations,” a working paper of the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and
Public Policy, 2003. Accessed 10/02/05 at: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/presspol/
Research_Publications/Papers/Working_Papers/2003_5.pdf
12 There are many sources of data on media consumption. These figures represent
averages of reputable studies. For a listing of media consumption habits and effects,
with references to sources and studies, see: http://www.tvturnoff.org/images/facts&figs/
factsheets/FactsFigs.pdf.
13 To put this in economic terms, Americans watch a total of 250 billion hours of television
per year, which at $5 per hour, translates into $1.25 trillion dollars of lost productivity.
While such a translation raises issues of its own, the point should be clear: the
American public sphere would be quite different if even half of the time currently spent
in television consumption were spent instead on promoting public good.
14 The general relationship among colonization, consumerism, and poverty is poignantly
laid out in Helena Norberg-Hodge’s “The Pressure to Modernize and Globalize,” in
The Case Against the Global Economy: and For a Turn Toward the Local, edited by
Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco: 1996.
15 Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man, The Free Press, New York: 1992.
5 GOVERNANCE CULTURES AND COUNTERCULTURES: 
RELIGION, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC GOOD
1 This way of characterizing religion begs the question of how religion differs from
non-religious approaches to issues of ultimate import. Science and secularism each
also define positions with respect to ultimate meaning, albeit by bracketing “ultimate
meaning” as having at most a subjective or private reality. But, I would argue that while
science, secularism, and traditions like Confucianism and Buddhism are decidedly
non-theistic—and for this reason often denied the full status of being religions—they
nevertheless do the religious work of discerning how things can be tied meaningfully
together. That is, standard definitions of religion are, perhaps, too narrow in scope to
reflect the full range of possibilities for framing globally responsible answers to deeply
searching questions about belonging and meaning.
2 Setting the parameters of religious observance takes different forms in different states.
In China, religions are registered with the state and subjected to considerable oversight
with respect to beliefs and practices—at least where these might be politically charged.
In the United States and many European countries, the state ostensibly exerts such
explicit oversight only in respect of religious groups (“cults”) engaged in potentially or
actually criminal activities or activities that seriously affect the public good. What does
not vary is the legal restriction of the flow of authority to one direction in the relation-





3 The more cynical among these critics have seen this as evidence that the Buddha and/or
his successors entered into “expedient”—perhaps even self-serving—relationships,
currying favor with those in power to insure possibilities for continued growth of an
eremetic tradition that might well be seen as contrary to social or state interests.
4 This is, of course, another way of stating that the Buddhist path emerges in the course
of carefully and caringly “facing the world, going crosswise.”
5 No. 26 in the Dïgha Nikaya or Collection of Long Teachings of the Buddha.
6 The birth of politics and history can be seen as the birth also of a new kind of religious
sensibility—one that tended globally to result in envisioning the divine in terms of a
single, supreme being or spirit who is at once creator, ruler and judge of all things and
beings. The similarity of the roles of terrestrial and celestial powers became almost
comically precise in medieval Chinese conceptions of the supernatural or ancestral
realms, but even in that case should likely not be read as an indication of a forcing of
terrestrial categories onto the imaginary of the divine. Rather, it would seem that the
terrestrial/historical and celestial/eternal have from the very outset been co-implicating.
7 Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man, The Free Press, New York:
1992.
8 Speculatively, it would seem that the relative cultural weakness of the public-private
distinction in, for example, China can be seen as a limiting factor in the appeal and/or
purchase there of rule of law. Rule of law at once drives and is driven by the clear
marking off of the spaces for state and personal sovereignty.
9 In engineering parts for a high performance automobile engine, for example, the
machining tolerance may be set at 1/1,000th of an inch. Any imperfections less than
this will make no difference in performance of the engine; any imperfections greater
than this are defined as unacceptably compromising engine function.
10 Arguably, Marxist universalism depends on a phase of market capitalism, but teamed
with an autocratic rather than fully democratic approach to power and a teleological
understanding of history. The result is no more liberating in Buddhist terms than that
produced by unconstrained market liberalism.
11 Physical entropy refers to the disappearance of sufficient differences in energy for the
emergence of ordered rather than random patterns of change. Dramatic entropy brings
about an analogously random distribution of intentions and values—a distribution of
meaning-energy that is incompatible with the emergence of new patterns of shared and
sustainable dramatic order.
12 We have already seen that in economic terms, this translates into compulsory
consumption—the necessity of constantly choosing what to buy, to eat, to wear, to do,
to feel, and to think. In the realm of politics, perhaps its most apparent result is the need
for continuously refining and adding to the body of laws that define the proper limits
of free choice. That is, the space between what can be freely chosen and what cannot
turns out, over time to be infinitely wide; or at least infinitely convoluted, which
amounts to the same thing.
13 For a sterling treatment of the origins of rational choice liberalism, see: Sonja Amadae.
Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice
Liberalism, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL: 2003.
14 It is important to stress, perhaps, that my use of “rational” in this context is purely a
matter of contemporary convention. In fact, the kind of rationality appealed to by
rational choice theory is but one type of rationality and by no means the most likely to
discern paths to the sustainable and equitable resolution of trouble and suffering in
dramatically complex or karmically interdependent world.
15 Considerable delicacy must be exercised in making this point. It parallels making the
point that while affirming the present necessity of human rights conventions, we must
also admit that this necessity is conditionally arisen and by no means either natural or
inevitable. The need for human rights and human security is, as mentioned earlier, an
indictment of our way of life, as it has come to be—a way of life in which minimum
levels for human dignity must be set legally and forcibly because of the sad and tragic
fact that, were no such threshold of impermissible indignity strictly enforced, there
would be nothing to stop the fathomless deepening of human misery. Human rights are
like emergency surgery for the body politic—necessary for its overall survival, but a
procedure that we should admit wishing our history would have allowed us to avoid.
16 This is true, of course, of all cultures. To my knowledge, there are no cultures that in
the normal course of things question their own premises in a deep or ongoing way. This
occurs, if at all, only in severe crisis, when a culture’s own explanatory and strategic
resources have been manifestly exhausted.
17 Such an understanding of faith is manifestly pertinent across the full range of Buddhist
traditions. Faith is not first and foremost a “belief in” some transcendent other, but
rather an alloying of commitment and confidence—a manifest readiness to do what
is conducive to turning our situation away from samsara toward nirvana. This is true
even in Mahayana traditions, like that of Pure Land Buddhism, in which faith in a
particular cosmic Buddha is a core practice. It is only confidence in one’s own capacity
for making a meaningful difference that allows this practice to function in Buddhist
terms. This said, it may be that other religious traditions—especially those that are
monotheistic—might be conducive to expressions of faith that do not fit as well into
this general reading. In a divinely created universe—especially where creation is the
act of a single deity maintaining continuous oversight on the workings of the
universe—the issue of making a meaningful difference, and of the meaning of freedom,
becomes fundamentally metaphysical, and faith an expression of allegiance or sub-
mission to divine will. Even in such traditions, however, there are usually readings
of faith that resist the dialectic of freedom and determinism and the conundrums asso-
ciated with making room for both human and divine will—the Sufi tradition within
Islam is a good example of such a reading.
18 In this, Buddhist commitments have much in common with existing global movements
dedicated to mobilizing religious resources in the construction of a universal or global
ethic. UNESCO initiated in the mid-1990s, for example, a Universal Ethics Project to
identify key ideas, values, and norms to help humanity meet the challenges of global
interdependence and achieve lasting peace. This project aimed to articulate an array of
trans-cultural, “overlapping” values capable of providing guidance in working toward
equitable and sustainable social, economic, and political relationships. A marked lia-
bility of virtually all such calls for a universal or global ethic, however, is the tendency
for such arrays of overlapping, trans-cultural values to be conceptually “thin.” That is,
these values tend to consist of what remains when people from widely varying cultures
and societies embark on a path of discovering lowest common ethical denominators—
those values or norms that can, at some level of understanding, be affirmed by all. The
problem with such “thin” values, of course, is that they have very little traction when
it comes to critically revising or reshaping real-world practices. They sound good, but
do little good. The Buddhist emphasis on building diversity as a key value calls
attention to the necessary precursor work to be done if a global ethic is to have sufficient
traction to make possible a real paradigm shift from competition and cooperation to
robust coordination.
6 DIVERSITY AS COMMONS: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
BEYOND COMPETITION AND COOPERATION
1 Hedley Bull. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Columbia
University Press, New York: 1977.
2 Realism survives most evidently in the underpinnings of market liberalism, where a





rationality of market operations: images of fighting “tooth and claw” for scarce
resources have given way to a vision of the positively summed effects of individual
choices made in the pursuit of self-interest.
3 So compelling has the evidence become that the space of international relations has
shifted from favoring independence to favoring interdependence, that even such
staunchly solipsistic actors as Libya have recently pressed forward in dialogues
intended to restore authentic participation in the international community. Declining
such participation on moral grounds so narrow that they afford reliable purchase only
for solitary actors amounts to a commitment that blocks the circulation of resources
and energies (again, economic, social, cultural, and spiritual) without which societies
are incapable of flourishing. Taken to an extreme, such commitments so profoundly
deplete the internal resources of a society that it ceases being to fully care for and
reproduce itself, much less compete effectively with others.
4 See, for example: Robert Keohane. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the
World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ: 1984; or
Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in
Transition, Little and Brown, Boston: 1977.
5 See, for example, Mervyn Frost. “A Turn Not Taken: Ethics in IR at the Millennium,”
The Review of International Studies, 24(5), 119–132, December 1998.
6 Christopher Lasch. The True and Only Heaven: Progress and its Critics, W.W. Norton,
New York: 1991, p. 170.
7 For more on downward causation, see P.B. Andersen et al. (eds) Downward Causation:
Minds, Bodies, and Matter, Aarhus University Press, Ärhus: 2000.
8 James March and Johan Olsen. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis
of Politics, Free Press, New York: 1989, p. 168.
9 The notion of competency traps will factor substantially into our discussion of education
in Chapter 8.
10 March and Olson, Rediscovering Institutions.
11 On the notion of a “logic of appropriateness,” readers may wish to consult March and
Olsen, 1989; Boekle, H., Rittberger, V., and Wagner, W.. “Norms and Foreign Policy:
Constructivist Foreign Policy,” Center for International Relations/Peace and Conflict
Studies, University of Tubingen, 1999 at http://www/uni-tuebingen.de/uni/spi/taps/
tap34a.htm; or Martha Finnemore. National Interests in International Society, Cornell
University Press, Ithaca: 1996.
12 James Carse. Finite and Infinite Games, The Free Press, New York: 1986.
13 Ibid., p. 29.
14 Ibid.
15 For a discussion of the distinction between the social and the societal, see Peter
D. Hershock. Liberating Intimacy: Enlightenment and Social Virtuosity in Chan
Buddhism, State University of New York Press, Albany, NY: 1996, especially p. 58ff.
16 Carse, Finite and Infinite Games, p. 31.
17 The interested reader is directed to my paper, “Renegade Emotion: Buddhist Precedents
for Returning Rationality to the Heart,” Philosophy East and West, 53(2), Spring 2003.
A concise definition of emotion and its relation to reason appears on pp. 354ff.
18 It should perhaps be noted that this way of seeing emotions in resolutely relational
terms makes it impossible to pin untoward courses of events on the emotional imma-
turity of specific individuals involved—for example, the president of a country willing to
use pre-emptive military strikes against a problematic state to turn it decisively toward
“democratic freedoms.” Given the interdependence of all things, there is no avoiding
the admission that in all cases, responsibility is always shared. Additionally, the
emotional immaturity playing out in international relations, for example, does not
allow drawing any conclusions about the emotional immaturity of specific individuals,
even if they are centrally involved. After all, enlightening beings—bodhisattvas—must
continuously appear in situations of conflict and emotional malaise in order to
contribute to the resolution of suffering for all sentient beings.
19 The temporal qualification here has everything to do with the ongoing “colonization
of consciousness” and what it means for our individual and collective capacities for
negotiating shared meaning.
20 John Rawls. A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 1971.
21 The later Rawls, too, seems sensitive to the liabilities of universalizing the meaning of,
for example, justice, and has critically revised his own thinking to make greater room
for value pluralism. See his Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Belnap Press,
Cambridge: 2001.
22 The strategy of retreat should not be confused with isolationism which continues to
replicate the pattern of values–intentions–actions associated with a bias toward sover-
eign security and continued commitment to the metaphysics of existence. Retreating in
the sense discussed here marks a “turning point” process—a process undertaken in the
interest of a paradigmatic shift of situational direction and relational quality. Similarly,
refusals to participate in global movements to secure public good—for example, the
US refusal to sign and honor the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions—are
exercises of power rather than redirections of effort toward strength training. In such
cases, freedoms of choice continue to trump relating freely.
23 I have considered role of technology in shaping the way society changes, with special
reference to social activism in Peter D. Hershock, “Changing the Way Society Changes:
Transposing Social Activism into a Dramatic Key,” Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 4(3),
July 1999.
7 FROM VULNERABILITY TO VIRTUOSITY: RESPONDING 
TO THE REALITIES OF GLOBAL TERRORISM
1 This overall structure of this chapter and some parts of its content are derived from my
paper, “From Vulnerability to Virtuosity: Buddhist Reflections on Responding to
Terrorism and Tragedy,” published online by the Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Vol. 10, 2003.
2 The explicit aim of the massive and pre-emptive American strike against Iraq was to
“shock and awe” the Iraqi government and people, with the hope (apparently futile)
that this would cause them to summarily capitulate to regime change in keeping with
American aims and interests. The suggestion that this strike was an act of international
terror—not war—would seem to lent considerable credence by the Bush administra-
tion’s own characterization of the action.
3 This process can be observed in infants left alone by their parents in a room full
of strangers. As soon as parental absence is noted, infants will often stop exploring
and playing. If their cries for parental return and attention go unanswered, many
infants become frantic with the sense of abandonment, lapsing into inconsolable sobbing.
Should a nearby adult attempt to assuage the pain of separation, he or she is often rejected
or tolerated with the pained indifference that comes when one thing—and one thing
only—will make a difference: the restoration of parental attention. The infant’s normally
open consciousness has collapsed into a desolate singularity of lost presence.
4 A simple example of this cycle is the transition that takes place in newcomers to a
physically endangering sport like surfing. Initial excitement in small wave conditions
gives way to quite real fear as one ventures into larger surf, which gives way yet again to
a sense of confident pleasure as the needed perceptual and athletic skills to surf big waves
develop. Similar dynamics play out in more purely cognitive or emotional settings as
well. The common thread is that fear signals a breakdown of relational possibilities that
are truly responsive and a transition to reactive presence—the classic physical alterna-





5 Aung San Suu Kyi. Freedom from Fear: and other writings, edited by Michael Aris,
New York: Penguin, 1991.
6 It is important to see the relational difference between shock and the strategy of retreat
discussed in Chapter 6. Retreat is a withdrawal for the purpose of consciously culti-
vating relational resources, building the attentive virtuosity and dramatic insight
needed to freely engage in the resolution of all trouble and suffering, however they
might arise. Shock is withdrawal for the purpose of conserving individual integrity—
most fundamentally that of the body, but also the self. Shock may have the beneficial
result of allowing already developed relational capacities to be restored and safe-
guarded—at least as long as the person in shock is suitably cared for by others. But
shock itself includes no commitment to building relational virtuosity as such.
7 This is true regardless of the amount of power—political, economic, or military—that
we bring to the task of shrinking, rather than relinquishing, our horizons of relevance,
responsibility and readiness. It is quite literally, a shrinking of who we are, both in the
more typical terms of what we can claim as “our own,” and in the Buddhist sense of
what we mean for others.
8 While eating a fast-food burger will, for example, put an end to the minor suffering of
hunger pains, the situation looks rather different from the perspective of the cow
slaughtered to make the beef patty or of the subsistence farmers in Central America
whose lands have been converted to cattle grazing to meet the needs of the global econ-
omy. Trouble/suffering or its absence, the first noble truth insists we admit, is relative
to situational position.
9 See, for example, Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamaka-karika 24.14.
10 See, for example, Dïgha Nikaya 16.2.5.
11 See, for example, Sutta Nipata IV.8, IV.11, and IV.13.
12 Dhammapada 201.
13 Majjhima Nikaya 139.6ff.
14 Sutta Nipata, IV.11.7.
15 See, for example, Majjihma Nikaya 7 and 40.
16 See: Les Roberts, Riyadahl Afta, Richard Garfield, Jamal Khurdhari and Gilbert
M. Burnham, “Mortality before and after the invasion of Iraq: cluster sample survey,”
originally published in the Lancet online, October 29, 2004 and available at:
http://www.zmag.org/lancet.pdf
8 EDUCATING FOR VIRTUOSITY
1 Especially at the tertiary (college and university) level, there is a striking uniformity in
the content that is delivered, with virtually identical ranges of subjects taught worldwide.
Math, science, and engineering courses are, in particular, taught in almost identical
fashions globally. For reasons related to knowledge generation and circulation in research
and business, there is a growing emphasis on English as a language of instruction—
again, especially in math, science, and engineering. Just as importantly in terms of
establishing conditions that support or resist educational change, there is also remarkable
global uniformity in how schools are institutionally structured.
2 These two functions of education are embedded in the traditional instruction of
Buddhist monks and nuns—the conservative function most evident in the study of
sutta (doctrinal texts) and vinaya (narrative presentations of communal behavioral
norms); the creative function most evident in sustained bhavana (or personal training,
especially meditative).
3 It is perhaps useful to stress that there are many complicated systems or situations that
are not complex. A complicated system resists predictive analysis because of the sheer
number of variables that would need to be taken into account. In principle, however,
given time and sufficient resources, a merely complicated system’s behavior could be
accurately anticipated—at least within reasonable statistical parameters. By contrast,
complex systems are liable to exhibiting behavior that is in principle impossible to
anticipate.
4 Indeed, it is part of the complexity of contemporary patterns of change that our efforts
at anticipating the direction of change are increasingly factored into the dynamics of
situational transformation. For example, predictions of stock market behavior factor
into—and thus alter—the processes driving the behavior of the market. Stated over
simply, perhaps, we can no longer expect to happen anything that we have expected
happening.
5 Empirical evidence for the crisis in American education is widespread. But a particularly
pointed look at the performance shortfall of American students with respect to
twenty-first century workplace skills (especially mathematics) can be found in the
Organization of Economic Development (OECD) report on Programme for International
Student Assessment (PISA) at: http://www.pisa.oecd.org/document/55/0,2340,
en_32252351_32236173_33917303_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed 12/12/04). The report
documents that United States students now perform below average compared to students
from the forty countries studied, ranking number 26 of the 30 OECD countries
involved in the study.
6 Teachings aimed at disclosing the pervasive role of karma in shaping our individual
and collective experience have been among the most difficult to understand of the core
teachings informing and supporting Buddhist practice. Part of their difficulty can be
traced to the fact that the interdependence of all things and the operation of karma are
not at all apparent at typical intensities and scales of awareness or attention. Like the
curvature of space-time and the particle-wave ambiguity of light that are entailed by
relativistic physics, the irreducibility of interdependence and the experiential ramifi-
cations of values and intentions become evident only with a certain amount of training
and through skillfully practiced techniques. Hence, the crucial roles of mindfulness
and insight meditation for those intent on liberation in a Buddhist sense.
7 Reported in the New York Times, 12/8/04, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/
2004/12/08/international/08hunger.html
8 More precisely, predicaments are not open to solution, except at the cost of silencing
one or another of the diverse stakeholders in the situation—that is, through precluding
the possibility of dissent with respect to meaning. This is by no means uncommon.
Unilateralism is, in spite of the evidence of global interdependence, at least still alive
if not entirely well. But silencing opposition, in the larger scheme of things is to limit
situational resources. It is, in Buddhist terms, to deny the emptiness of the situation or
its capacity for supporting infinitely complex, mutual contributions to shared meaning.
Unilateralism is, then, a strategy for solving problems that will be liable to severe
ironic consequences.
9 The combined use of dramatic and moral here is intended to highlight a pattern of
mutual reinforcement between meaning making and socio-cultural identity. Morality
arises in the context of sustained community, most traditionally in the context of a
given cultural, ethnic, or religious community. While the morality of a given situation
or action can be debated within a given community, it is profoundly difficult to hold
moral debate across cultural or communal boundaries. By alluding to both dramatic
and moral homogeneity, I am invoking a consonance between individual meaning-
making patterns of conduct that are consciously elected and patterns of evaluating
conduct that are largely inherited. It is such a consonance that establishes a community’s
shared karma.
10 It bears remarking, here, that the currently prevailing model for global development is





example, Chapter 3). Ironically, it is the close linkage between education and development
(noted, for example, by Amartya Sen) that drives education inexorably toward crisis.
In a sense, the particular orientation of the postmodern model of development
commands—for its own success— “counterculturally” or contrarily oriented forms of
education.
11 It is worth noting that this constellation of conditions can also be correlated with the
conditions that launched the American economy in the position of world leader in the
second half of the twentieth century. That is, the conditions that thrust America onto
the center of the global stage will also, unless a decisive change of direction occurs in
the quite near future, be at the root of its humbling exit to the chorus of former global
leaders on—let us say—stage right.
12 As will become evident, the kind of instruction undertaken in civics courses—the
traditional locus for formally mediated instruction in shared norms and values—is not
an adequate substitute for institutionally secured educational space for cultivating wis-
dom. On the contrary, and at its worst, it tends to be a forum for moral indoctrination.
13 It has been said, by Ivan Illich, that there is no such thing as a universal conception of
peace except in the utterly emaciated, negative form of a simple lack of conflict. Once
peace is qualified, it is in highly particular and context-dependent ways. Similarly, wis-
dom is not a universal characteristic, identically expressed by all who attain some
measure of it. Rather, wisdom is all about qualitative differences in appreciative and
contributory acts making appropriate difference in specific contexts. The loss of
cultural traditions and ways of life marks a loss of resources for achieving wisdom.
14 Here it should be stressed that this shift was both simple outcome and opportunity—
neither good nor bad in and of itself. The demise of strong differences in how daily
needs are met led also to the decreasing role of ethnic ghettos in structuring city life,
to more open policies regarding property ownership, school attendance and so on—a
shift very much in keeping with a stress on greater equality with respect to freedoms-
of-choice. Yet, at the same time, a certain sense of belonging is lost along with the tran-
sition from distinctive neighborhoods to highly rationalized suburbs. There is nothing
simple about this transition. The point here is to keep in mind the degree to which
values are relational phenomena and have traction proportional to the range and depth
of relationships in which they are actively embodied.
15 It should be added that knowledge generation and transmission are also ill-affected by
the segregation of knowledge and wisdom, though in a less debilitating fashion in the
short and medium term. All good teachers know that giving knowledge to students who
are not passionate about learning can quickly become an exercise akin to pushing a
string. As the metaphor suggests, knowledge is not most effectively given, but elicited.
In the absence of a desire to learn—a passion for widening our horizons of relevance,
responsibility, and readiness—knowledge is stripped of intimate connections with vir-
tuosity. Knowing comes to be good in the narrow sense of being “good enough,” but
not an ultimate or virtuosic good (kusala) in the Buddhist sense.
16 Islamic critiques of the contemporary West and globalization have much to do with
these effects. Islamic traditions embody a strong commitment to expressing a single set
of values from the domain of the spiritual to that of economic activity—from the
mosque to the marketplace. The compartmentalizing of values/practices—a moral
division of the public sphere—is not easily accepted and almost impossible to fully
endorse in this context. The tensions resulting from the modernization (and post-
modernization) of Islamic communities and countries is perhaps strongest in the
Middle East rather than in Asia, but is quite real in all cases.
17 Excessive media consumption is in this way morally compromising—not because of
the media’s explicit contents (though that, too, can be a factor), but because the space
of mass media consumption is not both interactive and consequentially rich.
18 The contrasting and often competing needs for change and continuity in any community
or society bring into focus the particular boundary conditions involved in expressing
therein the meaning of interdependence and its qualitative enhancement. In particularly
heterogeneous societies, and in any intercultural or international community, such
boundaries inevitably come into conflicting patterns of overlap. Often this becomes an
occasion for promoting the value of tolerance—a capacity for allowing differences to
obtain, uncontested. Such apparent conflicts, however, are also opportunities for trans-
gressing the identity-conserving logic of tolerance by concretely realizing that differ-
ences open up concrete possibilities for mutual contribution. It is only in this way that
the overall diversity of our shared situation can be increased—meaning, finally, an
increase of the overall resources for dramatic improvisation or meaningful predicament
resolution. The conservation of “differences that make a difference” is thus centrally
important to directly and creatively appreciating and contributing to one another’s
welfare.
19 It should perhaps be noted that there is a voluminous body of literature (the abhidharma
and associated commentaries) in which there is much discussion of the stages of train-
ing toward becoming an arhant (realized being) or bodhisattva. But these stages are, I
would argue, are not understood as necessary competencies involved in the attainment
or expression of full Buddhist realization, but rather as common benchmarks of devel-
opment. The distinction has to do with the difference between capacities for respond-
ing to anticipated exigencies and typical landmarks of movement in the direction of
nirvana or relational virtuosity. In Chinese Buddhism, for instance, such stages are
critically abandoned to forestall any self-conserving tendencies to place full realization
at the kind of distance that might be infinitely divisible and hence preclusive of being
fully traversed.
20 The distinction is perhaps clearer in the analogous relationship between excellence and
excelling. It may be that few of us will ever be able to claim achieved excellence. But
all of us—regardless of the conditions under which we labor and the resources given
to us by birth and circumstance—can excel in what we do. That is, we can “raise up”
what we are doing to new levels. Excellence, too, is not an ontologically distinct state
of affairs. It is a direction in which movement can be slow or rapid, but one that is
always open.
21 This is not, of course, to deny that in any given training regimen, one will need to learn
particular techniques, vocabularies, and rituals. These, however, are prerequisites for
full and effective training, not results thereof—useful means for sustained training, but
not its ultimate meaning.
22 It should be noted that in the sense that I am using the word virtuosity, it entails move-
ment in the direction of heightened virtue. But this need not mean the inculcation of
specific, traditional virtues like loyalty, patience, kindness, and honesty. Such virtues,
while very widely accepted, are nevertheless still subject to great historical and cultural
variation in the degree to which they are considered centrally important and the man-
ner in which they are socially and culturally constructed. Instead, taking interdepend-
ence as basic, virtue arises and is built through offering or contributing what is needed
in any given situation to dissolve the conditions and causes of trouble and suffering,
and to compassionately direct the situation as a whole toward dramatically liberating
intimacy. Virtue is, in this sense, a capacity for and expression of creativity—in
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